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Through an examination of the elections of the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies and 
the elections to the Russian Federal Assembly and their deputy compositions, this 
dissertation argues that the elections held in the former Soviet Union and the 
contemporary Russian Federation from 1989-1993 have demonstrated elements of 
continuity, contradiction and departure compared to those elections held before Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s tenure as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU). There has been a continunity of a central, powerful institution interfering and ;f
designing the electoral system and largley influencing, encouraging and restricting their 
outcomes. This continuity can be interpreted as a contradiction between the regime’s 
intention to implement democratic changes and its reform efforts. Notwithstanding these 
factors, with each successive election there have been numerous innovations, greater 
scope for candidate competition and subsequently public choice, improved possibilities for 
civic involvement in all stages of the election campaigns and the opportunity for civil 
society to become actively involved in political affairs. Therefore, this accumulation of 
these electoral reform measures has resulted in significant departures from the previous 
electoral system that existed in the USSR from 1937-late 1980s. These developments 
have changed the Soviet electoral system from a series of plebiscites in which there was 
no choice among candidates to elections in which citizens were offered a choice among i
candidates to, ultimately, multiparty elections.
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The elections held in the former Soviet Union and the contemporary Russian Federation
from 1989-1993 have demonstrated elements of continuity, contradiction and departure
compared to those elections held before Mikhail Gorbachev’s tenure as General Secretary
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). There has been a continunity of a
central, powerful institution interfering and designing the electoral system and
influencing, encouraging and restricting their outcomes. This continuity can be
interpreted as a contradiction between the regime’s intention to implement democratic
changes and its reform efforts. Notwithstanding these factors, with each successive
election there have been numerous innovations, greater scope for candidate competition
and subsequently public choice, improved possibilities for civic involvement in all stages
of the election campaigns and the opportunity for civil society to become actively
involved in political affairs. Therefore, this accumulation of these electoral reform
measures has resulted in significant departures from the previous electoral system that
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existed in the USSR from 193'Mate 1980s. These developments have changed the Soviet 
electoral system from a series of plebiscites in which there was no choice among 
candidates to elections in which citizens were offered a choice among candidates to, 
ultimately, multiparty elections.
Electoral developments in the former Soviet Union and the Russian Federation 
during this transitional period have been dependent upon the nature of the dominant 
institutions of power, historical factors and the emergence of the former USSR’s and 
Russia’s civil societies. As Troy McGrath argues
Russia’s emerging electoral and party systems have been conditioned by the 
processes of power and authority legitimation that shaped the lives of the 
contemporary elite. In constructing a new (presumably) democratic order, 
Russian politicians are drawing upon the only relevant experiences they 
have: the rules, norms and organisational [sic] structures of the obsolete 
Leninist ancien regime. Thus, Russia’s construction crew is composed of 
workers whose productivity is hampered by behavioural patterns resulting 
from the disincentives and bureaucratic restrictions of command economies. 
Leninist systems are the womb from which post-communist democracies 
must emerge, and consequently it is essential to consider their legacy.^
The ‘strong hand’ in pre-Revolutionary Russian politics, Soviet politics and contemporary 
Russia is indeed a very prominent feature of Russian political culture. Throughout its 
existence, Russia has been ruled by tsars, the CPSU and a very powerful President. To 
rank them equally is entirely unfair. There are significant differences between 
absolutism, CPSU rule and the Yeltsin administration. Pre-revolutionary Russian rulers 
did not have to confront collective leaderships like^om m unist leaders had to confront in 
the post-Stalin era. Indeed, Stephen White has argued that, ‘[a] charasteristic of the 
Muscovite state was the absence of political institutions in any a  constraining the 
exercise of monarchical p o w e r . I m p e r i a l  Russian political culture also contained 
elements of personalised attachment to political authority, a general lack of autonomous 
sub-group activity, a non-independent judiciary, absence of liberal distinction between 
actions and beliefs.^ Yeltsin, although the most powerful constitutional figure in 
contemporary Russian politics, in theory, does not reign unchecked and is subject to
popular election. The experiences of tsarism undoubtedly influenced how the Bolsheviks 
reacted to popular discontent. This heritage was taken further by Lenin’s successors up 
to the Gorbachev era. Indeed, as Troy McGrath argues^ the Soviet heritage influenced 
Russia’s transition by setting patterns for how the respective sets of governors ruled and 
set examples for how the population perceives what it should expect of government.
Therefore, the present study may be viewed as a fusion of institutionalist approaches 
to political science, political culture interpretations'^, and the literature that has emerged 
on democratic transitions^ and civil society.^ Nevertheless, the present author does not 
wish to engage in a re-interpretation of any one or combination of these types of 
literatures. He shall, however, set this dissertation within the parameters of these 
political science methodologies and use them to help interpret the topic under scrutiny.
Institutions have played important roles in the political cultures of Imperial Russia, 
the USSR and the contemporary Russian Federation. From the reign of Peter the Great, 
throughout the Bolshevik Revolution, Stalin’s industrialisation and collectivisation 
programmes, Nikita Khrushchev’s ‘Thaw’, limited economic reforms under Leonid 
Brezhnev and more recently, liberalising efforts under Gorbachev and moves towards 
democratic consolidation under President Boris Yeltsin, major efforts at moving Russian 
and Soviet society forward have come ‘from above’. However, this is not to suggest that 
elements ‘from below’ like the civil society that emerged from the late 1980s have not 
played pivital roles in transforming Soviet and Russian society and politics. That anti- 
CPSU candidates won seats in the elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies 
in 1989 and in republican legislatures in 1990 and Boris Yeltsin was elected Russian
President in 1991 can be partially explained by the high rate of civic involvement in the 
campaigns. However, it can also be argued that the development, emergence and 
effectiveness of civil society in gaining any toeholds in Soviet and Russian political life 
was, to an extent, directly dependent on the central institution and its political goals.
This dissertation focuses in detail on aspects of the continuity, contradiction and
departure in the USSR’s first largely competitive national elections to the USSR
Congress of People’s Deputies held in March 1989, and the Russian Federation’s first set
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of multiparty style elections ^ December 1993 elections to the Russian Federal 
Assembly. As this dissertation will demonstrate, in both cases, there was one dominant 
institution which designed the electoral guidelines and introduced the electoral 
innovations. Moreover, this institution set the parameters for competition the electoral
A.
legislation and, at points, interfered in the electoral proceedings. That anti-dominant 
institution forces may have scored limited victories cannot be denied. Certainly these 
instances stand as tributes to the dedication of supporters of independent candidates, 
political organisations and individual politicians themselves. However, they may also be 
understood from the standpoint of an institutionalist perspective. In many cases, 
supporters of anti-CPSU and anti-establishment figures and anti-Yeltsin and government 
blocs cast their ballots as protest votes against those dominant institutions. Therefore, 
there is a tendency in Russian political culture that citizens are more likely to vote against 
certain individuals or institutions, as opposed to casting ballots in favour o f a. candidate or 
political organisation for positive reasons.
For the purposes of this study, institutions are considered important components in
‘transition’ literature for two major reasons. First, institutions are important in initiating
transitions. Second, the choice of institutional design presidential systems or
parliamentary systems " influences the degrees of success that a transitional polityA
can have in consensus building on important issues and the accompanying levels of 
executive-legislative tensions the polity will encounter. Samuel Huntington argues that
-  (A
the USSR’s transition fell a category which he labels as a transformation process
of political reforms which is initiated by the ruling elite or leading institution.'^ From 
At?
1917 1991 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the USSR’s leading institution.A
The CPSU dominated the USSR, its monopoly status as the country’s leading political 
organisation was codified in Article 6 of the USSR Constitution from 1977^1990,® It 
exercised this latter function by controlling and censoring the media and educational 
curricula, sanctioning social organisations, forming and directing party groups in work 
places, the military, state and educational institutions, supervising the economy, 
restricting employment and education opportunities, controlling political appointments to 
key bureaucratic, state and party posts or the nomenklatura system, and managing, 
overseeing and controlling the electoral process and selecting and approving candidates. 
The CPSU determined the major direction of the country’s internal and external 
development.^ Therefore, any impetus for official political change had to meet with 
party authorisation and was party-initiated. Moreover, it was the Party which set the 
parameters within which any changes would occur. That the electoral system functioned 
non-competitively until the late 1980s is directly related to the CPSU’s desires; that 
changes were implemented can also be attributed to the Party’s will.
Under Gorbachev’s stewardship the Party went through a series of reform initiatives 
in which the leadership attempted to renew its relationship with society, and released 
information to the population in greater capacities than it had at any other time in its 
history. Moreover, the Party also spearheaded the overall perestroika reform 
p r o g r a m m e . T h a t  any progress could have been made in the démocratisation process, 
glasnost' or economic reforms without Party involvement is undeniable. Nevertheless, 
the refoims had very strict parameters. Neil Robinson argues that ‘between 1985 and 
1991 Gorbachev only tried to stop the CPSU from acting in ways that he perceived to be 
unconducive to the expansion of the party’s political leadership of society. He therefore 
only tried to curb the power of the party in a narrow s e n s e . R o b i n s o n  convincingly 
elaborates that while political reform and constitutional changes were taking place under 
thq CPSU’s guidance, there were actually no constitutional amendments that pertained to 
the Party’s activities and performance.^^ To an extent, it was still above the law.
By 1990, however, the CPSU appears to have hit a crisis point. Political 
liberalisation had encouraged Soviet citizens to form and join autonomous political 
organisations and other socio-political clubs and parties. The revelations from the policy 
of glasnost* revealed the crimes of the Stalin era on repressions, crimes against humanity 
and the process of the Baltic republics’ incorporation into the USSR as well as how 
poorly the economy was performing. The CPSU which had previously legitimised its 
right to rule on strong economic performance and its successes during World War II had 
lost its credibility in the eyes of the population. The Party which since 1921 had not 
allowed fractions within itself was confronted by huge splits. The Baltic Republics 
divided themselves into ‘native’ parties which were organised around the principles of
greater republican sovereignty within the union or full independence and ‘Moscow- 
oriented’ parties largely of ethnic Russians living in these areas who preferred
that the republic remain integral parts of the USSR. In addition, the Party had to 
confront a number of ‘platforms’ within its ranks that had emerged around the time of 
the XXVIII Party Congress in 1990. As a result of these factors, Party membership 
began to decline in 1990. Therefore, when Article 6 was amended to allow other 
political and social organisations to participate actively in the USSR’s political process, 
there were numerous outlets for politically-conscious and active individuals, many of 
whom had been Party members
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Therefore, in this sense, the development of the USSR’s civil society had further 
links with the USSR’s dominant institution. As this institution collapsed, civil society 
was able to benefit from its crisis. Many political organisations that developed during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s were formed after former communists set off to establish their 
own political parties. Victor Nee has offered some useful suggestions of how elites 
shifted during this time. Nee argues perceptibly that the communist parties in the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe were not monolithic. Rather, party 
membership was of three distinct groups: ‘dogmatic’ adherents, ‘waverers’
and ‘opportunists’. The ‘dogmatics’ joined the parties to their conviction and belief 
in Marxist-Leninist principles. ‘Opportunists’ became members because the party itself 
was the best means for career advancement; their attachment to party ideology was not a 
primary concern. Subsequently, they ‘jumped ship’ when the ruling parties sanctionedalWwts-Vw-e
parties or other opportunities to advance their social positions and accumulate 
wealth became available. The most important group, according to Nee were the
waverers. They demonstrated political pragmatism and sided with the group they felt was 
most likely to end up victorious. They took a variety of routes in their post­
communist careers: some moved into business; others into politics. '^* Those who opted 
for the latter took two major routes. Some entered into the ‘democratic camp’. Indeed, 
individuals such as Nikolai Travkin, a former CPSU member who founded the first anti- 
CPSU party^the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR)^ in 1990^ is a good example of one of 
these politicians. Nevertheless, Travkin’s party also had an extremely ironic principle for 
a ‘democratic party’. DPR employed democratic centralism, long a CPSU mainstay, as a 
means to ensure party discipline. David Dyker argues that others adopted either 
hardcore or moderate^nationalist inclinations.^^ The fact that the dogmatic remainedA A
also suggests a partial explanation why the ‘post-communist’ communist parties have 
actually remained such powerful political organisations in the transition period and have 
won elections or play diminant roles throughout the former Eastern bloc. Indeed the 
institutionalist interpretation successfully illustrates this point. Party members firmly 
believed in their cause. They had a strong core of supporters. Moreover, they had the 
organisational framework in place and experience from their time in the CPSU and other 
former Central and East European ruling Marxist parties.
The choice of institutional configuration that Russia employed in the early 1990s has 
also contributed to the conduct of Russia’s elections. From 1990- the RSFSR’s 
supreme legislative organ was the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies and its 
permanently functioning legislature was the RSFSR Supreme Soviet which was selected 
from among deputies in the former. Although a legislature was in existence during this 
period, it would be incorrect to suggest that the RSFSR was a parliamentary republic.
The CPSU still maintained a hold over political power in spite of whatever difficulties it 
faced at that time. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of the deputies were CPSU 
members and were bound by democratic centralism to toe the Party’s line. In 1991 
Russian voters approved the introduction of a directly-elected presidency through their 
participation in a referendum. Elections were held for the position in June 1991 and 
Boris Yeltsin, the charismatic chair of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet^ won in a landslide 
victory in a field of six competitors.
This situation produced mixed results. On the one hand, Russia was governed by 
popularly-elected legislative and executive branches. However, as Alfred Stepan and 
Cindy Skach argue^ presidential systems present difficulties for the consolidation of 
democratic norms in transitional polities: too much power tends to be concentrated in the 
hands of one individual, the president often loses the desire to build consensus on issues 
and the chief executive tends to by-pass the legislature and rule by decree in the name of 
the people. As it will be discussed in Chapter 5, parliamentary systems provide greater 
means for different views within society to air their grievances and contribute to the 
governmental process and build structures for accommodation of interests.
Problems between the two institutions began seriously in the wake of the August 1991 
coup attempt and in particular after the introduction of rapid-pace economic reform in 
January 1991. As Stephen White argues, Yeltsin emerged the victor after the coup and 
was awarded extraordinary powers in November 1991. He used this influence to initiate 
the radical economic reform under acting Prime Minsiter Yegor Gaidar. The Russian 
Parliament initially supported Yeltsin as a symbol or Russian sovereignty and a defender
10
of the Constitution. However, they turned against him as a result of his greater moves 
towards consolidating personal power and his use of this power for the economic 
transformation.^^ In fact, Judith S. Kullberg argues that the contentious issue of the 
pace of economic reform contributed towards ‘moderate democrats’, both inside and 
outside the Parliament, moving into the ranks of the oppos i t ion.Subsequent ly ,  the 
Congress voted out Gaidar as acting Prime Minister in December 1992, replacing him 
with Viktor Chernomyrdin, the former USSR Minister for the Soviet gas industry, and 
former chair of the Russian state company Gazprom and later it stripped Yeltsin of his 
extraordinary powers at the VIII Congress of People’s Deputies in March 1993.^^
On the other hand, the Parliament, headed by its speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov (and 
supported by Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi)^ favoured a political system in which 
there was a more clearly-defined balance of power between the executive and legislative 
branches. In addition, the Parliament, ( _ of many party apparatchiki, directors of
state-run enterprises (see the discussion in Chapter 5), favoured a more gradual approach 
to economic reform, with a much greater role for the state. Moreover, in Khasbulatov’s 
opinion, Russia’s legacy of rule by the tsars and Communist Party General Secretaries 
provided ample warning signs of the potential for personal dictatorship in the Russian 
transition and created a legitimate argument against concentrating political power in the 
hands of one individual.
In this situation, both institutions could claim legitimacy because both were popularly 
elected. However, this particular situation is an acute problem in presidential systems. 
Both branches can argue that they are acting on behalf of the population which elected
11
each of them. Both sides agreed to have the population decide the matter and break the 
institutional deadlock in a referendum in April 1993. Russian voters were asked four 
questions:
1. Do you have confidence in the President of the Russian Federation, 
Boris Yeltsin?
2. Do you approve of the socioeconomic policies carried out by the 
President of the Russian Federation and the government of the Russian 
Federation since 1992?
3. Do you consider it necessary to hold early elections to the presidency of 
the Russian Federation?
4. Do you condiser it necessary to hold early elections to the people’s 
deputies of the Russian Federation?^^
On the first two questions the motions would be passed if they were approved by a 
simple majority of the participants of the referendum (50 per cent turnout was required 
for the poll to be considered valid). The latter two items required the support of more 
than 50 per cent of the entire electorate to be enacted. The results indicated that the 
Russian population voted in favour of stability. Some 64.5 per cent of the electorate 
participated. Among them 58.7 per cent (37.3 per cent of the electorate) expressed 
confidence in Yeltsin and 53 per cent (34 per cent overall) approved of the reforms. 
Nearly 50 per cent of the participants expressed their desires for new presidential 
elections and 67.2 per cent desired that new parliamentai*y elections be conducted. 
However, in reality, this meant that respectively only 31.7 per cent and 43.1 per cent of 
the electorate favoured elections for new institutions. Therefore, in accordance with the 
rules of the referendum new elections did not take place.
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The two institutions : an uneasy relationship until 21 September 1993 when
Yeltsin dissolved the Parliament with decree No. 1400. Subsequently, the 
parliamentarians and other supporters barricaded themselves in the White House, the 
Russian Parliament building. Ultimately, however, their efforts were unsuccessful. The 
Army sided with Yeltsin and brutally suppressed the revolt. Simultaneously with the 
dissolving of Parliament, Yeltsin decreed that elections to a new bi-cameral Russian 
Parliament, the Federal Assembly and a plebiscite on a draft constitution be held on 12 
December 1993. The latter document would provide Yeltsin with the dominant position 
in the Russian political system. Moreover, the President’s allies supervised the conduct 
of the elections and the plebiscite. This campaign and its results are discussed in Chapter 
6 .
Michael Urban argues that elections under Gorbachev and Yeltsin can be considered i
‘democracy by design’. U n d e r  these circumstancs, the dominant institutions
established the ground work for the elections so that the outcomes would work to their
, benefit. Indeed, the present author generally agrees with this point of view.
Nevertheless, this point must be taken further. First, this factor should not be considered i
very surprising. If politics is defined not as ‘who governs’, but ‘who gets what, when, 1
how’^ '^  then a situation in which politicians create rules which will benefit them (or their
supporters) is perfectly understandable. It can be argued that both Gorbachev and Yeltsin
were merely engaging in politics. Second, transition literature helps us understand why, , , a . j
if the ‘construction c r e w s w e r e  trying to establish political orders in which their 
0 ^  Au êL s. W u
would be dominant , they did not react entirely negatively and shut down the
institutions when the elections did not turn out as they had originally envisaged. It will
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be recalled that in pre-revolutionary Russia the tsar shut down assemblies when their 
compositions were considered ‘too r a d i c a l . M o r e o v e r ,  J. Arch Getty has
demonstrated that one of the reasons that the first elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet 
were not conducted on a multi-candidate basis electoral law did not expressly prohibit 
competition the Party discovered in advance of the poll that it would beA.
defeated in many areas of the c o u n t r y . T h e r e f o r e ,  it can be argued that  ^ despite
interfering in the design of the system, a fact which can be considered as a continuity in
Russian and Soviet electoral practices, allowing the results to stand was, indeec^ a 
significant departure. Leading transitoligists Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter 
and Laurence Whitehead argue transitions are great periods of uncertainty: leaders and 
their populations certainly know the form of mle away from which they are moving; their 
destination is a great unknown. Moreover, there are three other factors that have to be 
taken into consideration in an analysis of transition politics: first, transitional societies 
have the consolidation of political democracy as a desirable goal; second, there are bound 
to be numerous surprises and difficult dilemmas that will occur during the process;
finally, ‘normal societies’ methodologies, i.e., those that rely on relatively stable
economic, social, cultural and partisan categories for identifying those who defend the 
status quo and those who are pushing for changes, are relatively difficult to translate into 
adequate frameworks for analysing transitional p o l i t i e s . T h e s e  factors are indeed 
applicable in the Soviet and Russian transitions.
John Gooding has argued that Gorbachev was ‘the leader and the product of a party 
whose power has for the past 70 years rested on an effective denial of democracy’ and
(X.
that his tactics for a massive overhaul of the economic and political structures
14
contrast to ^ Imperial Russian and earlier Soviet r e fo rm er s .S t ep he n  White also 
notes that even after Gorbachev had become President of the USSR and was allocated 
more powers than any tsar or ‘greater than even Stalin had commanded’ he ‘voluntarily 
surrendered the extra-ordinary powers of the General Secretary of the CPSU, powers 
which at the time were greater than those of any other world leader.’^ ® Moreover, 
White queries whether or not Gorbachev would have done this if he were seeking 
unlimited personal a u t h o r i t y . M o r e o v e r ,  even though the initial reforms may have 
been targetted as popular checks against the bureaucracy and there were some limits on 
debates, legislation was introduced which enhanced some personal and civic freedoms and 
human rights they may not have been implemented fully into practice.
Therefore, Gorbachev and the leadership team had some commitments to democratic 
norms.
Yeltsin suspended the activities of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR 
after its alleged involvement in the coup attempt in August 1991. However, he allowed 
new communist political organisations, some claiming to be the natural successors to the 
legacies of CPSU and Communist Party of the RSFSR, or the rightful heirs to their 
property and their f inances .Never theless ,  communist supporters challenged this ruling 
and claimed that in accordance with the USSR Law on Public Associations registered
political parties could be disbanded^by a court of law. This issue was brought 
before the Russian Constitutional Court. The verdict was in favour of the pro­
communist forces. Subsequently, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation
r-e,
in February 1993. Yeltsin did not attempt to have the court’s decision 
overturned nor did he attempt to ban the Party’s reformation. There is ample evidence to
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Other aspects of Russian political culture help explain electoral reform and their
Elections to local Soviets should be conducted in such a way that there are 
several candidates for each post.
CP50It is necessary to ban elections and allow the , to rule the country
(without elections) (disagree)
Political parties other than the Communist party should be legalised [sic].
i
support the fact that while Yeltsin and Gorbachev may have been, at best, reluctant Idemocrats, they did demonstrate among their beliefs that results of elections are indeed
core elements of democracy to which they needed to adhere. I
1implications during the Soviet period and more recently, in contemporary Russia, and Ihelp create an appreciation for how civil society began to play an increasingly important
■to I
role in transitional politics from 1985 the present. There is ample evidence to suggest ^ Ithat during the pre-reform era, Soviet citizens could have been said to have held elections 
with contempt. However, several arguments exist that demonstrate that in the late- Soviet
period there was support for democratic values and institutions, albeit at a somewhat
, »IKlower scale than established democracies. For instance, James L. Gibson, Raymond M.A
Duch and Kent L. Tedin argued that in European Russia and Moscow oblast' in 
particular, citizens expressed support for political tolerance (lowest level), personal 
liberty, rights, dissent, independent media and competitive e lec t ions . Indeed ,  in regard 
to elections, Kent L. Tedin found quite a high degree of support in the European part of 
the Soviet Union for a number of questions:
Those supporting competitive elections are doing harm to the country. |;
(disagree)
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Competition between the Communist party and other parties will improve 
the way authorities work in the Soviet union.
A one-party system in the USSR promotes the development of democracy, 
(disagree)^'*
It is also quite notable to point out that Gibson, Duch and Tedin also included a very
important factor in supporting democratic changes, wealth, in explaining turns in voter
support. They also address the fact that support for law and order is a key component in
Russian political culture; however, they stress that ‘[pjerhaps the key cultural enemy of
democracy in the Soviet Union is the desire for order. Since liberty inevitably poses a
- \~ o
potential for disorder, opposition démocratisation [sic] is thought to be concentrated 
among order-loving Soviets^
While Russian and Soviet history has been characterised by an overabundance of 
authority in the hands of a tsar or the party, they have not heen able to rule without 
means of legitimacy. Indeed, Nicolai Petro has suggested that Russians may be attracted 
to a stong, stable government, but they also support ‘good g o v e r n m e n t w h i c h  protects 
its citizens and provides the basic necessities of life. Indeed, the state provided for its 
subjects. Stephen White has argued that communist countries implemented social 
contracts with their populations. The state provided the basic necessities of life in 
exchange for monopoly of political power. When economic problems emerged and the 
social contract showed signs of weakening, the regimes introduced various reform to 
‘renegotiate’ the contract and implement various forms of safety valves that they could 
use to defiise the social tensions of economic decline and reinvigorate their legitimacy
17
with the m a s s e s . H o w e v e r ,  these ultimately failed to lack of resolve and various 
forms of interference.^®
Recent events demonstrate that those who have lost the most have clearly 
departed the most from supporting democratic forces. There is a significantly widening 
gap in wealth between the highest and lowest earning groups of the population. The 
Russian State Statistics Committee has reported that Russians with the highest incomes 
earned more than the lowest stratum of the population in at a rate of 11:1 in 1993 and 
this compares to a more equitable distribution of 4.5:1 in 1990.^^
Gibson, Duch and Tedin’s hypothesis that in the late-Soviet period ‘those who have 
the most from the quo are least likely to want to change it, is well- 
grounded. The working classes, pensioners, agricultural workers and collective farm 
directors and state enterprise workers and some directors have been the most resistant to 
change and the most likely to support opposition f o r c e s . A l t h o u g h  Gibson, Duch and 
Tedin limit the validity of their observations from their empirical work in Moscow 
oblast’, their extrapolations certainly held true for the region. Vladimir Zhirinovskii 
actually won his single-mandate seat in the Shelkovo district of Moscow oblast’. This is 
rather significant given the fact that the party won only 5 of the 66 seats it contested. 
What is significant here is that the electorate does not appear to have a negative view of 
these institutions of democracy. There has been, as Gibson, Duch and Tedin predicted a 
marked decline in their popular support since the economy ‘went haywire’. In addition, 
this factor has radically reduced Yeltsin’s popular appeal since January 1992.'^^
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The electorate increasingly associates these negative developments with the democrats. 
Therefore, in certain cases they have appeared to be consistent in their pattern of anti­
system voting throughout the different sets of elections.
Another factor which greatly affected how Soviet political culture developed and 
ultimately stimulated its civil society was the improvement in the country’s level of 
education. Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. has pointed to the work of Gibson and Duch and 
their views on the importance of education in the promotion of democratic values in 
Russian society. Gibson and Duch note that ‘individuals with higher education are more 
likely to be exposed to and socialized into accepting officially sanctioned norms 
promoting democratic values’; ‘education may inherently instill or reinforce liberal values 
such as equality, tolerance, and respect for individual liberties’ and ‘education 
contributes to support for democatic norms, regardless of formal system norms.
Indeed from the Khrushchev period onwards Soviet society’s overall level of 
education increased. Consequently, citizens began to demand more from their politicians 
but were unable to articulate their concerns ;. Nevertheless, some key reformers
diverge on their opinions^hy comprehensive reform was not initiated under Khrushchev. 
For instance, Fedor Burlatskii argues that , ‘neither the party nor society was ready for 
major r e f o r m s . H o w e v e r ,  Aleksandr Yakovlev states that
[m]y personal point of view is that objectively Soviet society was ready for 
fundamental changes in 1956 and this was reflected in certain reforms 
begun then. But I don’t think the leadership was ready. It remained stuck
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in the past, [Under Gorbachev] the situation [was] different: the
leadership [was] ready for these changes/^
Frustrated, they retreated inwardly and held discussions within the confines of families 
and close circles of friends. Indeed, Vladimir Shlapentokh demonstrates that the civil 
society of the 1980s had its roots in the politics of stagnation during the period of 
s t a g n a t i o n . A t  the political extreme, dissidents emerged actively circulating documents 
against the regime. However, there were veiy few of these individuals and the 
communication between them was not signicantly strong. Moreover, the regime 
constantly harassed them. Therefore, their impact within the USSR was limited. Their 
moral weight outside the Soviet Union’s borders was, however, significant.'*®
The Gorbachev leadership sought to capitalise on the human potential in Soviet 
society in economic and political reforms and win the support of technicians and 
specialists. Therefore, the regime encouraged freer exchanges within the party and 
popular press and within scholarly publications. In addition, the Party also encouraged 
the formation of discussion clubs and other civic organisations. Eventually, movements 
in support of perestroika also emerged throughout the USSR. However, as the political 
liberalisation increased and the revelations from the media discussed earlier became 
public, these organisations expanded the scope of their activities and their political 
demands became greater. Thus, by the late 1980s,^ movements in support of perestroika 
had taken on more radical agendas. For instance in the Baltics they demanded greater 
levels of sovereignty. As it will be demonstrated throughout this dissertation, these 
agents of civil society helped candidates sympathetic to their causes win office in elections
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held during 1989-1990. These factors contributed to the amendment of Article 6 of the 
USSR’s Constitution which allowed alternative political organisations like parties to 
participate actively in Soviet political life. Therefore, during the late 1980s and early 
1990s the civil societies of Russia and the former Soviet Union had become politicised. 
Although these organisations and parties were not as well-organised as they are other 
industrialised democracies they still played rather important political roles in creating 
social space between the regime and the individual and, in a small way, developing links 
between political and civil society. Nevertheless, it needs to be understood that these 
organisations also took stances of anti-politics. Thus, they were united against the CPSU. 
However, there was little to unite them once the common enemy was defeated. Russia’s 
nascent parties inherited this legacy as the transition began.
Therefore, the combination of political culture, institutions and civil society to 
explain why there have been elements of continuity, contradiction and departure in 
elections in the former USSR and contemporary Russian Federation between 1989 1993. 
A dominant institution has designed the election legislation and often interfered in the 
electoral proceedings. Opposition candidates and political organisations representing 
emergent civil society have, in varying capacities, played an oppositional role in these 
elections and provided voters with the opportunity to cast their votes against these 
institutions factor which appears to be manifested in the population’s political values.
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Situating this Dissertation within the Context of Existing Studies on Soviet and 
Russian Electoral Reform
As Jeffrey Hahn correctly stated, ‘[g]iven the general lack of importance that most 
Western observers ascribe to Soviet elections, the volume of specialist literature on the 
topic is r e m a r k a b l e . I n  addition, Timothy Colton referred to Soviet electoral studies 
as a ‘budding subfield’ in his well-received article on the 1990 elections in Moscow.^* 
There exists a wide variety of English language publications focusing on elections in the 
former Soviet Union under pre-reform conditions. Moreover, the literature on electoral 
reform under Gorbachev has blossomed and it has continued to increase in its volume and 
scope since 1989. That this could have occurred without the Gorbachev reforms is 
unthinkable: Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost’ greatly increased the scope of topics
discussed in Soviet popular and scholarly publications; political reforms under 
demokratizatsiya meant that more political space was open for contestation, civil rights 
and freedoms were either expanded or, as discussed in this dissertation, finally realised. 
The fusion of these two factors means that the elections occupied a more prominent role 
within the Soviet political system. Media coverage of events was much more in-depth 
and included (albeit with some significant limitations) a much greater discussion of 
campaign topics. Therefore, from 1989 onwards the range of issues available for analysis 
increased exponentially.
Existing English language literature on pre-reform Soviet elections focused on a 
reasonably diverse range of subjects and its content and interpretations appear to be linked 
to the developments in the post-Stalin political atmosphere. For instance, in the 1960s
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and 1970s, English language writings on the Soviet electoral system largely linked to 
developments in Western, and in particular, American social science. During this time, 
this body of scholarship was confronted with how to re-conceptualise the Soviet system in 
the wake of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation efforts. Hence, the popular totalitarian model 
was considered to be largely inapplicable for post-Stalin conditions. Therefore, the range 
of topics that were becoming very popular in Western political science discourse began to 
be applied to Soviet conditions and those of the communist hloc. Western commentators 
began to conceptualise the USSR and other communist countries using terms such as 
‘pluralist’ ‘corporatist’,^ ® and discussed major topics like ‘interest groups’,^ '* 
Political behaviour also . significantly in Western social science literature. Thus,
topics at that time focused on political participation and emphasised citizens’ voting 
patterns in election campaigns as they were manifested in electoral avoidance
However, it should also be noted that Western writings on the former USSR were 
not only conditioned by the state of Western political science. Several scholars have 
noted they were also inextricably linked to the quality of sources available to scholars 
when they conducted their research in the USSR and those items on hand outside the 
USSR.^^ Central party and state newspapers were readily available outside the USSR. 
Moreover, the of both the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet
were, for the most part, readily attainable. These publications contained election results, 
but because of the lack of competition inherent in Soviet elections of the period there was 
often very little material valuable to extract from these documents and periodicals. 
However, it should be noted that they offered very little for electoral observers to try to 
base substantive analyses of Soviet elections. In general, reports from the Central
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Electoral Commission contained turnout figures, the numbers of votes that the electorate 
cast in favour of the candidates and statistical data on the demographic breakdown of the 
deputies. Statistical handbooks were also published which illuminated the public to 
virtually the same information as those published in the heralds and central press.
Deputies’ biographical information was published widely in the central, regional 
and local press and^ from 1958 onwards, the USSR Supreme Soviet’s deputies’ 
biographies were published in bound volumes, Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR. 
These may not have been the most informative (or exciting) of sources^ however, they 
were useful because they contained summaries of the individual deputies’ work and 
political careers. Roger A. Clarke and Ronald J. Hill produced seminal articles based on 
information contained in the Deputaty and these papers revealed the pecking order in 
Soviet politics with particular reference to deputy selection and re-election. For instance, 
Clarke argued that while the USSR incorporated more women, young people and 
recipients of secondary education in their legislatures than did Western countries, it was 
obvious that not all of these deputies were important. Particular deputies had more 
influence than others and the party selected them for different reasons. Hill identified 
that the real deputy heirarchy could be reflected in who was re-elected to successive terms 
in the USSR Supreme Soviet. Hill acknowledged the fact that deputies reflected the 
diversity inherent in Soviet society. However, there were some who were more 
important than others and those considered most important by the regime were more 
likely than others to be incorporated in successive Supreme Soviet convocations.^^
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This dissertation follows in the traditions of the existing literature in Russian and 
Soviet electoral studies and attempts to ‘fill in gaps’ where they exist in present English 
language studies. For instance, the present author includes three in-depth analyses of 
deputy compositions resulting from the 1989 and 1993 elections. These studies contain 
information from the author’s personal databases which were compiled from a range of 
official Soviet and Russian publications and specialist English language biographical 
sources.
Chapter 3 discusses the continuity and change between the deputies elected in 1989
with those of their predecessors. However, it addresses, in particular, the radical change
that resulted in deputy re-election between the ‘old-style’ elections and the USSR’s first
limited choice elections. Whereas in the past there were particular individuals who were
guaranteed places in successive legislatures when the Party virtually designated who
would be awarded deputy mandates, the 1989 elections showed that, by and large^ this
pattern was shattered. In addition, the present author demonstrates that the findings that
Hill presented between the Seventh Eighth Convocations of the USSR Supreme SovietA
(1966-1970) were in many cases identical to his own results for turnover between the
Tenth i^leventh Convocations of the USSR Supreme Soviet (1979-1984), This discussion A
is, at present, the only other work to address the issue of re-election in Soviet national 
legislatures since Hill produced his groundbreaking article. Mary Buckley, however 
addressed re-election in an article on the 1985 Azerbaidzhan Supreme Soviet.^®
Chapter 4 analyses the composition of women in the USSR Congress of People’s 
Deputies by comparing them to those elected to the Eleventh Convocation of the USSR
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Supreme Soviet. Soviet statistics demonstrated that during the pre-reform era between 
one quarter to one third of the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies were women. However, 
they were overwhemingly drawn from those ranks which the Party considered least 
important and; therefore, their parliamentary roles were largely ceremonial. Women 
deputies tended to be overwhelmingly non-party members or members of the Komsomol 
(Communist Youth League), they were more likely to have attained secondary levels of 
education and were primarily manual industrial or agricultural workers. Moreover, the 
present author considers how important the regime considered them in the pre-reform 
political system by scrutinising their contributions to the sessions of the Eleventh 
Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The information contained in this chapter 
demonstrates that electoral reform measures could have been considered a double-edged 
sword for women. On the one hand, the number (and percentage) of women elected to 
the parliament decreased radically. However, the women elected, while more likely to 
possess the aforementioned traits than their male counterparts in the Congress, were 
generally better qualified than those who were elected earlier. Moreover, they 
participated much more frequently in the sessions of the First Congress of People's 
Deputies (May-June 1989) than they had during the Eleventh Convocation of the USSR 
Supreme Soviet. Therefore, the elections contributed to aspects of continuity, 
contradiction and departure from previous electoral practices. This chapter is drawn 
primarily from the author’s article ‘Women and the 1989 Elections to the USSR Congress 
of People’s Deputies’, Coexistence, Vol. 28, No. 1 (March 1994), which is, at present^ 
the only existing in-depth analysis of women in the Congress.
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The composition of the Russian Federal Assembly is addressed in Chapter 7. The 
present author demonstrates that Russia’s first multiparty-style election produced a 
parliament which, in many ways, was radically different from its Soviet predecessors. 
Virtually all the State Duma deputies and Federation Council Senators were recipients of 
higher education. There were greater numbers of white-collar professionals than had 
been elected in the past. However, there were also elements of continuity. For instance, 
in Soviet elections there were very high numbers of professional politicians who were 
linked either to the Party or state apparatus who became deputies. In the 1993 elections, 
the majority of deputies were also professional politicians. However, they had a wider 
range of ‘masters’: the presidential administration, subject and local administrations and 
political parties. Therefore, it is possible to argue that in many cases the voters were 
represented by deputies whose allegiances were to individuals and institutions other than 
to their constituents and electoral association supporters. the Soviet period they
were, by and large, bound by democratic centralism to uphold the Party line. Duma 
deputies held their loyalties to those who put them in their positions it the President or 
the political party. In addition, this chapter also contains an application of the findings of 
Akos Rona-Tas on the 1990 Hungarian elections to the Federal Assembly elections. The 
present author’s data suggests that^ like the Hungarian party list deputies, Russian list 
deputies were more likely to come from ‘parking orbits’ which gave them access to 
power during the communist p e r i o d . I n  constituencies, deputies were more 
to have been employed in professions conducive to contact with the citizemy or, were 
politicials who were involved in local and subject levels of government and 
administration. Therefore, it could be argued that they were more readily available to 
citizens than list deputies, who tended to be largely Moscow-based and involved at
27
the national levels of politics. This chapter also uncovers a particularly ironic situation. 
Despite the fact that this was the first election in which political parties played a 
significant role and the fact that half of the deputies to lower house were elected through 
party lists, a significant proportion of these representatives were not members of any 
political parties or electoral organisations.
The author states at the outset of the study that the statistical level of analysis 
employed in this dissertation is largely restricted to frequency distributions. There are 
numerous reasons (which are detailed more elaborately in Chapters 3 and 4) why he 
adopted this means of analysis. Documents (i.e., pre-election platforms), information on 
all candidates who competed in the elections, their policy platforms and the 
socioeconomic profiles of their constituencies, as well as other data to engage in multi­
variate analysis on issues like why certain deputies were re-elected and others were not 
(to name but one example) were unavailable to the author, even during his period of field 
research in Moscow. Therefore, it was not possible to compile comprehensive material 
on all candidates and this hampered the possibility to conduct multi-variate analysis that 
could establish statistically valid relationships on election and re-election. Moreover, 
'«t the chapters described above are not in any way concerned with voter preferences or 
voter behaviour which would require more detailed statistical analysis. This dissertation’s 
primary objective is to demonstrate the levels of continuity, contradiction and departure in 
the elections and these chapters help to illustrate these issues by providing concrete 
examples of the parliamentarians who emerged after different sets of electoral reforms.
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Western accounts of pre-reform Soviet elections and campaigns during the 
Gorbachev period include macro-level and regional analytical accounts of the campaigns, 
their major occurrences and the results and their places in within the context of the 
Gorbachev reform programme. The present study follows in this tradition. Indeed, 
theses case studies allow the present author to identify where the major changes and 
consistencies of electioneering have occurred. Moreover, the examples raised in these 
studies provide evidence from which it is possible to observe the degrees of continuity, 
contradiction and departure undering differing electoral conditions. Chapter 2 outlines 
the major campaign to the Congress of People’s Deputies, detailing the elements of 
continuity, contradiction and departure from previous Soviet elections. In particular, this 
chapter addresses innovations like candidates’ programmes and the importance of the 
media in the election campaign and provides the most comprehensive discussions of these 
topics currently available in English.®* This chapter is derived primarily from material 
which appeared in his article ‘Reforming the Electoral Sytstem: 1989 Elections to the
USSR Congress of People’s Deputies’, The Journal o f Communist Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 
(March 1991) and ‘Refoiming the Electoral System’ in Peter Lentini (ed.), Elections and 
Political Order in Russia: The Implications o f the 1993 Elections to the Russian Federal 
Assembly (Budapest, London and New York, 1995).
Chapter 6 is a case study of the 1993 Russian Federal Assembly election campaign. 
The present author , the methods of campaigning that the different electoral
associations and candidates employed during the electoral struggle. In addition, he 
incorporates examples of television advertisements from various electoral associations and 
candidates and his personal observations from the campaign in Moscow. This chapter,
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has been derived from his ‘Elections and Political Order in Russia: the 1993 Elections to 
the Russian State Duma’, the Journal o f Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 
10, No. 2 (June 1994) and his chapter ‘Overview of the Campaign’ in Elections and 
Political Order in Russia. The former piece formed the core components of his 
contribution to a co-authored piece with Troy McGrath, ‘The Rise of the Liberal 
Democratic Party and the 1993 Elections’, The Harriman Institute Forum, Vol. 7, No. 6 
(February 1994).
Although the very important elections to the republican Supreme Soviets, RSFSR 
Congress of People’s Deputies and the Russian presidential elections are addressed in 
Chapter 5, they are not given chapter-length dissucssions. There are significant reasons 
for this . First, there are a number of studies which consider these elections that 
' 0 The present author acknowledges the significance that
these legislative elections had in Soviet politics: they increased civic participation in the 
campaigns, (indirectly) contributed to the USSR’s collapse, and (in the case of the 
RSFSR) when fused with the presidential elections, they established the institutional 
framework for the post-Soviet transition. However, in the cases of parliamentary 
elections, and, in particular, those to the RSFSR Congress, they were (with the exception 
of Georgia) all examples of limited-choice elections like the elections to the USSR 
Congress of People’s Deputies. The present author considered it more useful to include 
full case studies of the first largely competitive multi-candidate Soviet national 
parliamentary elections and Russia’s first post-Soviet multiparty style elections to its 
legislature. Therefore, his study is predominantly concerned with the ‘firsts’ in Soviet 
and Russian history. Moreover, a case study of the presidential elections, while a
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hallmark in Russia’s history, would have been methodologically cumbersome. Such an 
analysis would have had to draw comparisons between elections of two separate 
institutions and would have not been a consistent analysis.
Studies of the Soviet electoral system have also included reviews of Soviet 
scholarship and debates amongst scholars and political practitioners on how they would
reform the electoral system. For instance, Ronald J. Hill the most significant
on Soviet debates over electoral reform during the late 1960s-early 1 9 8 0 s . I n  
addition, during the Gorbachev period, Stephen White produced a very comprehensive 
look at Soviet writings on the subject up to the Nineteenth Parth Conference in June-July 
1988.'*® In his co-authored volume with Darrell Slider and Graeme Gill, Stephen White 
notes some ‘unresolved issues’ in Soviet electoral developments after the 1989 and 1990 
republican elections.®* There was also a major Soviet review of reform writings 
produced during the Gorbachev era and up to 1989.^^ The present author acknowledges 
the hnportance of these writings on the development of the Soviet and Russian electoral 
processes. However, he does not seek to ‘reinvent the wheel’ and omits discussions of 
electoral reform in the pre-reform period and early Gorbachev period hy concentrating 
primarily on those articles produced in the wake of the USSR Congress elections. In 
particular, he summarises the major isses which were debated after 1990 that addressed 
the role of political parties and the difficulties they presented in the more competitive 
atmosphere, the importance of political consultants and political marketing. Parts of this 
chapter were published previously in his ‘Reforming the Electoral System’ in Elections 
and Political Order in Russia.
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f“0This dissertation begins with an overview of Soviet electoral practices from the Stalin ^
Chernenko periods. It compares elections under single-party rule to those conducted
under democratic regimes. In addition, the information presented here illuminates how
these elections deviated from the established practices of free elections. The information
presented here is largely derived from previously-existing English language sources on
Soviet elections and there is probably little new information that the observer of
Soviet elections will find in this chapter. Given this author’s inclusion of Jeffrey Hahn’s
views of pre-reform writings this is indeed ironic. Nevertheless, its inclusion is
absolutely essential in establishing a foundation from which it will be possible to compare
the degree of continuity, contradiction and departure that occurred in Soviet and Russian 
■fo
elections from 1989 1993 to those conducted in the pre-reform era.
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For anyone brought up in the Western political tradition, the obvious question is, why even bother with elections in 
the USSR?
- Darrell P. Hammer
...applying the term election to this procedure does semantic violence to the word as defined in the Western 
democratic lexicon.
- Frederick C. Baghoom
After Brezhnev’s death the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union met to choose his 
successor. Following his unanimous election as General Secretary, Yurii Andropov, former chief of the secret police, 
announced: ‘Very well comrades, now that you have voted you may lower your arms and come away from the wall’.
- Soviet humour
Introduction
This chapter has several distinct purposes. First, I establish the major provisions of the 
Soviet electoral system from the Stalin^hernenko periods (1937-1984). The presentation 
will determine that the elections held during this period are best described as ‘elections by 
acclamation’ because they did not provide the electorate with any choices among candidates 
or policies and they served primarily as mobilisational exercises that demonstrated support 
for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its policies. Nevertheless, Soviet elections 
performed several specific functions for the regime and these are analysed below. In 
addition, this chapter discusses what, if any, democratic features were present in Soviet 
elections during this period and the amount of choice available to the electorate. From this 
information it will be possible to establish a baseline from which to determine the extent of 
continuity, contradiction and departure from pre-reform Soviet elections to those conducted 
under Gorbachev and Yeltsin from 1989 1993.K
Free vs Acclamatory Elections
Historically, elections to representative bodies throughout the territory of Russia and the
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former Soviet Union have yielded relatively impotent assemblies, largely subordinate to and
obscured by the tsar and, until more recently, the CPSU. As Stephen White suggests,
‘elections have not traditionally been an important form of linkage between regime and public
in the USSR, or indeed its tsarist predecessor'/ Elections, have, however, played some
role in the country's history over the century. However, rather than serving as
mechanisims through which citizens could change their rulers, as potential means for
influencing policy-making and redirecting government priorities name but a few of their 
— SoviT-eir ^
theoretical functions ‘ . elections had other objectives.
A
Elections in which two or more political parties compete for seats in a parliament or 
for a country's presidency or free elections generally regarded as centrepieces
A
of democratic political systems, satisfy some specific criteria and serve several distinct 
purposes. Martin Harrop and William L. Miller^ point to Robert A. Dahl’s criteria of 
comprehensive eligibility, equality of information, universal adult suffrage, equally-weighted 
votes, the installation of winners in their offices, and the fulfilment of campaign promises 
among the characteristics that ensure free elections in an ‘ideally perfect society’.^  The 
aforementioned team regard David Butler, Howard Penniman and Austin Ranney’s criteria 
of the ‘"democratic general election'" suffrage, regularly scheduled elections,
A
opportunities for significant groups to form parties and run candidates, contested seats, non- 
coercive policies or interference to voters and candidates, secret ballot, honest vote tabulation 
and the installation of the rightful winners the ‘concrete characteristics of elections we
A
consider free and competitive."^ Among the infrastructural requisites for free elections, they 
cite W. J. M. Mackenzie's formula of a free and independent judiciary to interpret electoral 
legislation, an honest non-partisan administration to conduct the elections, a well-developed
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system of political parties, organised enough to put forward their policies, traditions and 
candidates as alternatives from which voters may choose. Also included in this categorisation 
is an acceptance of the rules of the game in which the participants realise that if they are not 
followed ‘the game itself will disappear amid the wreckage of the whole system.’^
Elections serve particular functions for a polity. David Butler, for instance, suggests 
that because ‘fear of the next election is a constant in politics...elections offer the final 
sanction against governments.’^  Thus, elections serve as a popular check that the electorate 
holds over its leaders. He claims further that they can be regarded as ‘ideological 
consensuses of voters’ and ‘devices to choose viable governments and give them legitimacy’, 
but also warns that they can be ‘a mirror of what the electorate felt on one particular polling 
day.’^  Mackenzie sees elections as creating popular consent and participation in public 
affairs despite governmental complexities and providing mechanisms for the direct orderly 
successions of governments and peaceful transfers of authority.^ Anthony King argues ‘they 
frequently settle major constitutional issues; they influence, even determine the structure of 
party systems; they can force changes of government; their results have a far greater impact 
on the content of public policy than is often supposed.’^  Ideally, elections serve as a link 
between the governors and governed, in which an underlying compact is implied: fulfilment 
of the electorate’s wishes helps increase a party’s or politician’s continuance in office; failure 
to do so decreases these prospects.
While elections are core components of democratic political systems, not all countries 
including elections as parts of their institutional frameworks are democratic. Butler, 
Penniman and Ranney claim that in categorising countries from non-democratic to democratic
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it is true that states that do not hold elections would be included at the non-democratic end 
of the scale; however,
one notch nearer the democratic end of the scale come the...nations in which 
elections are regularly held but only one candidate is allowed for office and 
these candidates are all chosen by the nation’s sole or ‘hegemonic’ political 
party.
As demonstrated in this dissertation’s Preface, ulthnate political power was held by the 
USSR’s leading and guiding force, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
This chapter will demonstrate that Soviet elections suffered from several serious 
deficiencies which fell far short of the aforementioned criteria for free and fair elections. 
For instance, although no law expressly prohibited .. . more than one candidate . 
for each seat, it was the invariable practice from 1937 late 1980s that the number of 
candidates was equal to the number of seats is ‘ [njotwithstanding Stalin’s observation,
A
in an interview with an American journalist that he expected a "very lively electoral 
s t r u g g l e " i n  the elections to the First Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet and that 
Stalin and the party appeared to make considerable efforts to prepare for these elections on 
a multi-candidate b a s i s . A l l  contestants to these and subsequent elections were
i \ d V "
meticulously chosen by the party to satisfy specific demographic criteria because they
A
possessed exceptional political skills. Few deputies had real decision-making powers, and 
only an elite corps were re-elected. This is despite the fact that at local level, for instance, 
well over two million deputies were elected to any convocation of the soviets. True power
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and influence were held by high ranking party officials who were frequently re-elected. 
Soviet representative institutions existed to ‘rubber stamp’ previously made CPSU decisions 
and give them an air of popular legitimacy. Although provisions existed in which Soviet 
voters could be linked to their deputies and have some input over their own lives through 
their elected representatives, such as voters’ mandates which bound deputies to fulfil voters 
demands, elections were not true means of selecting a government.*^
Serious students of Soviet politics were brazenly critical of the USSR’s elections 
because of the Party’s control over their procedures and the absence of competition in them. 
Barghoom’s aforementioned scathing assertion reinforces this fact.*'* According to the 
criteria, Soviet elections were never free or democratic. From the period
A.
1937-1987 voting in the USSR followed the pattern that Mackenzie labelled 
‘elections by acclamation’; these were not elections per se, but an ‘electoral pathology’. 
According to Mackenzie, in acclamatory elections:
No one believes in the secrecy of the ballot, the fate of known opponents of
the regime is terrible, the whole population is mustered to the poll, and its
- i - f
votes can be depended upon is probably unnecessary to fake the count,
A
though this is of course within the power of the totalitarian regime. The 
result is that an election ceases to be a public act of choice and becomes a 
public act of acclamation. Zealous servants of the regime push voting 
statistics to unheard of levels per cent of the votes in favour of theA
government; such figures condemn themselves in the sight of anyone who 
knows anything about electoral administration. There remains something
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which is called an election, and which possesses the trappings of an election, 
such as electoral cards, polling booths and voting papers: but which belongs 
in substance to the category not of elections, but of public demonstrations such 
as May Day processions and Nuremberg rallies. To quote (at secondhand) 
from an East German official: "The actual voting is of no importance. It has
been done.
Therefore, Harrop and Miller correctly ascertain that ‘[ejlections are about freedom and 
choice; [but] they are also about control and constraint.’*® Indeed control and constraint 
were central elements of the pre-revoultionary and Soviet political systems in general and this 
included their manners of conducting elections in particular. Moreover, as later chapters 
illuminate, these conditions were evident even under the Gorbachev regime and, to an extent, 
under Yeltsin.
Pre-Reform Soviet Electoral Procedures 1
The Significance o f Pre-Reform Soviet Elections
At a superficial level pre-reform elections in the Soviet Union contained elements of the 
franchise systems of the countries labelled liberal democracies. Soviet citizens elected their ÏÏrepresentatives to both national and local level legislatures. The individuals elected to 
represent the interests of their electorate in the organs of state power, the soviets (or 
councils), were people’s deputies. Voting was a constitutional right.*^ All citizens of the
■ilUSSR who had attained the age of 18 years with the exception of those deemed legally
; j |
'l|I
, incarcerated or institutionalised possessed the right to elect people’s deputies
(active electoral right). Citizens of the USSR who were 18 years or older could be elected
to local soviets (ranging from village to oblast’ levels) and those who were 21 or older could
be elected to republican level soviets and the USSR Supreme Soviet (passive electoral right).
t o
Elections were governed by law. From 1978 1988 elections were carried out in accordance 
with the 1978 Law on Elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet}^ Soviet elections occurred 
frequently. Elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet (since 1974) and republican supreme 
soviets were held every 5 years. Citizens voted for their representatives to village, 
settlement, city borough, city district, autonomous okrug, oblast’ and krai soviets once every 
two and a half years.
In addition to their formal similarities to elections in the liberal democratic world, 
pre-reform Soviet elections were exercises in mass citizen participation. The Soviet Union 
possessed a rather large electorate. For instance in elections conducted to local elections in 
June 1987 there were 184,425,691 eligible voters in the USSR.*^ Such a sizable electorate, 
alone^is not worthy of study. For instance in the non-communist world, there are immense 
numbers of voters in both India and the United States. What was indeed signficant, was that 
during the entire Soviet period, official statistics recorded that practically the entire adult 
population of the USSR participated in the elections in some capacity.
First, Soviet official documents recorded that nearly the entire eligible electorate voted 
in these elections. Voter turnout at the March 1984 elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet 
was the highest in the country’s history. Official figures claim that 99.99 per cent of the 
elegible electorate voted. These data indicated that in the entire republic of Turkmenistan
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only a single voter out of 1,531,613 eligible electors failed to cast a ballot on election day/** 
High voter turnouts were also recorded at local elections. Soviet voters, for instance, 
registered a 99.98 per cent turnout at the elections to local councils in February 1985.^* 
At the June 1987 elections to local soviets voter turnout declined slightly at 99.37
As
per cent.^^
An army of agitators worked in agitkollektivy (agitation collectives) to ensure that 
these voters appeared at the polling stations. These institutions existed in local enterprises, 
schools and other educational facilities and coordinated propaganda related to the elections. 
Approximately 6 to 8 per cent of the adult population served as agitators; all canvassers were 
responsible for registering 10 to 15 voters; and 5 canvassers were held accountable to a 
s u p e r v i s o r . T h e o d o r e  Friedgut has noted that in the 1975 local elections the 
overwhelming majority of canvassers, 95 per cent, were members of the CPSU. '^*
Millions of individuals worked in electoral commissions. These commissions, 
composed primarily of members of work collectives, servicemen and members of social 
organisations, were responsible for the preparatory work involved with the elections. These 
election commissions drew up the lists of voters. They would determine the colours of the 
ballot papers; in addition, election commissions translated the election documents into the 
proper languages of the locale. these commissions registered candidates for deputy.
A
Election commissions were formed in all major territorial divisions of the USSR. Their 
compositions varied from very large to rather small. For instance, a 29 member Central 
Election Commission (Tsentrizbirkom) which consisted of a chairperson, a deputy 
chairperson, a secretary and 26 members, coordinated the elections to the USSR Supreme
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Soviet at a national level. Other, lower-level commissions had as few as three members. 
Electoral commissions were also formed in railway stations, ships, Soviet institutions abroad 
and medical institutions. Data from recent local elections indicate that a large number of 
activists contributed to their organisational work. For instance, in 1985, 8,683,421 citizens 
participated in the work of 52,041 electoral commissions and in 1987 there were 8,530,017 
who performed similar activities in 52,567 commissions.^®
Citizens also participated in the elections as candidates and as people’s deputies. 
However, due to the fact that there was no competition among candidates and certain 
pecularities in the voting procudures which are undertaken in more detail in other
sections of this chapter a candidate was nominted to be a deputy, he or she was 
virtually guaranteed to win the seat. In accordance with Lenin’s principles and those of the 
Paris Commune, the system of soviets was intended to function as ‘schools of government’. 
Ordinary citizens, after performing their work activities^were eligible to perform unpaid work 
in politics. This served to educate ordinary citizens in the fundamental procedures of 
government. In addition, the Soviet implementation of this system was intended to serve 
as a . . to the creation of a caste of professional politicians.^® However, this
dissertation includes evidence that this intention was not fulfilled. In addition, there were 
higher rates of deputy turnover than in Western countries where incumbents are very likely 
to be re-elected. Deputy re-election is analysed in much greater detail in Chapter 3.
In addition to serving as a means of popular participation, Soviet elections served as 
a means of legitimising the Soviet political system. Since early in its rule, the CPSU sought 
to constmct a representative system that was nominally elected by the people. Electoral
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procedures, from announcing the elections, printing voters’ lists, discussing and endorsing 
candidates and the holding of elections themselves were interpreted by the CPSU as 
demonstrating popular support for the regime. Yet, Soviet voters did not have the 
opportunity to select from among alternative candidates and programmes. The key issue in 
the pre-reform Soviet election was voter turnout. Simply showing up at the polling station 
was, in effect, a vote in favour of the Soviet system and the CPSU.^^ As discussed above, 
voter turnout frequently exceeded 99 per cent. Additionally, the percentage of votes cast in 
favour of the candidates often closely resembled the voter turnout figure. However, these 
indicators do not accurately reflect near universal acceptance of the electoral system. As 
stated earlier, public opinion polls revealed a high level of popular resentment towards the 
electoral process. Their criticism came from several key sources. The 99 per cent turnout 
figure, in the first place, was not a true representation of the electorate’s preferences or the 
actual voting. Agitators harassed the electorate into showing up to the polls. The regime 
provided certificates to vote elsewhere to voters who expected to be away from their 
constituencies on election day. These documents removed applicants from the electoral rolls. 
Therefore, they were no longer obliged to vote. Hence, this mechanism reduced the actual 
size of the electorate. In addition, the regime generated social pressure to discourage secret 
voting and casting votes against Party-approved candidates.^®
Soviet elections integrated men and women from diverse social, ethnic, professional 
and national backgrounds into the state system as deputies. The CPSU and state 
functionaries could use this means of incorporation to legitimise further Soviet rule and 
strengthen its argument that the USSR was a state of all the people. For instance, Soviet 
voters elected representatives of 57 nationalities to the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR
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Supreme Soviet of the Tenth Convocation (1979-1984). Forty™ one nations were 
represented by deputies in the Soviet of the Union at the same time.®** The Eleventh 
Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet was of members of 63 nationalities.®*
There were higher percentages of women elected to Soviet state organs than there were in 
Western countries, with the exception of Scandanivia where they usually constitute nearly one 
third of the deputies. Since the late 1960s, women accounted for between 25 per cent and 
one third of deputies elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Women also constituted about 
half the deputies elected to local soviets. Women’s representation is discussed in 
significantly greater detail in Chapter 4.
do wa ('OS i s
Based on these , the Soviet authorities could have argued that the system
i\
of soviets and the means of electing deputies to them successfully integrated the diverse 
peoples of the USSR into the country’s political process. However, Soviet citizens did not 
have even the initial input in selecting deputies. Further discussion the nominationA*
procedure for this time period is contained elsewhere in this chapter. Party and state officials 
searched desparately for candidates who possessed specific qualifications. Leading figures 
from political, academic and cultural fields were selected to be people’s deputies. In 
addition, workers and collective farmers with excellent labour records ‘competed’ for deputy 
mandates. In reality, local nominating bodies had specific quotas to fill for candidate 
selection. For instance, Stephen White has mentioned the account of a local party official 
who reported his election quota to the newspaper Izvestiya. He stated that 4.6 per cent of 
the deputies in his area were to be enterprise directors, 1.1 per cent were to be employed in 
culture and the arts, 0.8 per cent were to be party officials, 45.9 per cent were to be elected
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for the first time and so on. White also reveals another instance in which a well-known 
prostitute was nominated for deputy because she was the only person in the region who met 
specific demographic criteria , single with two children, aged between 35 and 40, and 
a factory worker.®^
Deputy ships were also rewards for service to the state. Nominations were distributed 
to outstanding labourers and award winners. In the 1984 election to the USSR Supreme 
Soviet, the party nominated (and Soviet voters endorsed with their ballots) 39 Heroes of the 
Soviet Union and 253 Heroes of Socialist Labour. In addition, 1,202 deputies (80.1 per 
cent) were awarded orders and medals of different types; there were 76 recipients of the 
Lenin Prize and 159 holders of State Orders of the USSR among the 1984 deputy corpus.®® 
Over 21 per cent of the deputies elected to local office in 1985 possessed awards, orders or 
medals®'* and approximately 16 per cent of their counterparts elected in 1987 did also.®®
Furthermore, the posts of deputies, at the local and national levels, were largely 
ceremonial. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. Therefore, Soviet elections 
did not produce legislative organs which were staffed by the most qualified individuals. 
Indeed, one of the primary objectives of Gorbachev’s reform programme was to restructure 
the system of soviets to produce legislatures that functioned effectively enough to handle the 
complex issues confronting the USSR during its efforts to restructure. Electoral reform was 
considered a significant step towards achieving this goal and disentrenching conservative 
opponents of perestroika and, therefore, incorporated popular checks against them.
As stated earlier, Soviet elections were also exercises in mass mobilisation and the
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major emphasis of the electoral process was getting the voters to the polls. In addition to
attaining high levels of voter attendance, the officials also mobilised the electorate into
participating in pre-election meetings. These gatherings were intended to involve as many
voters as possible and were conducted on a mass scale, frequently at lunch time in major
factories and places of work. They served several key functions. First, the meetings served
to legitimise the nomination process. Party representatives presented candidates for deputy
to their potential constituents at these mass meetings. The candidates discussed their personal
qualities and their achievements. In addition, in theory, the participants were intended to
have discussions on the candidates’ potential to be a representative. Following a discussion
of the candidates, the participants at the nomination meeting would vote on whether they
wanted him or her to represent them. Those candidates who received more than 50 per cent
of the collective’s votes would have their names placed on the ballot paper. The Party used
these meetings to legitimise i .. actions L they ‘involved’ the mass of workers in
Î U s
them. Therefore, the Party could claim that version of democracy was more 
‘democratic’ than bourgeois democracy because it involved the electors directly in the 
nomination process. In addition, the voting procedure (which at this point it should be noted 
voting was conducted in an open manner) legitimised the Party by claiming that the voters 
approved the party’s decisions for the people’s representatives.
Once candidates were nominated they once again met with their potential in
most Soviet instances it is appropriate to say eventual . At this stage of the
A
election process, voters presented the candidates with nakazy izbiratelei (voters’ mandates). 
These mandates contained a list of concerns that the voters found of real significance to their 
locale. Deputies who did not carry out their mandates could, in theory, be recalled by their
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constituents. In reality, however, deputies were recalled by the mass organisations which 
nominated them which, at the last set of elections in 1984 would have included the CPSU, 
trade union organisations, Komsomol, meetings of work collectives and servicemen. The 
significance of mandates is discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this chapter.
Elections also served as a means of political socialisation. First, the Party generally 
nominated individuals who embodied the qualities they hoped would permeate Soviet society. 
Therefore, these people included Party officials, figures who worked in areas of culture and 
exemplary workers and collective farmers. The Soviet press contained biographical 
information on these candidates. In addition to relaying these qualities to the electorate, the 
Soviet authorities released bulletins in the press that emphasized the importance of the 
elections. Voting was described as a grazhdanskii dolg (civic duty). The party also included 
educational materials at agitpunkty (agitation points) which were established to inform voters 
on recent Party directives and the individuals involved in the local elections. People 
participated in the pre-election process in several capacities. Canvassers visited the homes 
of the electorate and discussed issues that voters considered important. Also (in theory) ^  
citizens learned about administration principles when they served as people’s deputies in the 
soviets and on their standing commissions which were concerned with particular issues such 
as construction, education, environmental protection, to name but a few. In addition, the 
nearly 30 million activists who participated in the elections as canvassers on election 
commissions and in other capacities gained experience in different aspects of Soviet 
politics.®®
Soviet elections also served as a major means of communication between the
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‘governed’ and their ‘governors’. During the election campaign the press contained 
information about plan fulfillment and the Party’s future policies. In addition, the regime 
was able to receive valuable information from voters on housing and other matters during the 
election campaign. Victor Zaslavsky and Robert Brym have noted that while the campaigns 
were being conducted, the Party could use these events for control purposes over the 
population. For instance, canvassers had to visit the dwellings of the people on their lists. 
In the event that the canvassers discovered that people were living in areas without permits 
they would report this information to the police and eventually assist in the eviction 
process.®^
Nevertheless, ^ regime did not use the infoimation garnered through the campaign 
solely for coercive purposes. Often, canvassers would receive negative feedback from the 
electorate. Soviet voters could, for instance, use the opportunity of meeting with canvassers 
to pass on their grievances of living condiditons to the local Party and state bodies in the 
hope that they would help solve them. Agitators were obliged to register every voter on their 
lists. If the agitator did not intend to present the voters’ positions to the local authorities, 
the voters could threaten not to vote. In addition, voters could make suggestions for further 
policy initiatives on the ballot papers. After the elections were conducted the local electoral 
commissions noted all comments that were written on the voting slips. These proposals were 
discussed at the sessions of the newly elected soviets. Finally, when the electorate rejected 
candidates (which occurred generally in rare instances), they sent the regime a message that 
the party’s particular choice for popular representative was not compatible for the needs of 
the particular locality.
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Therefore, in response to Hammer’s comment^there were several major reasons why
Soviet pre-reform elections were significant. First, voting was a constitutional right.
Second, the Soviet Union conducted elections c .. Third, the Soviet electoral
s\
system served as a means of mass citizen participation. Practically the entire adult 
population took part in the elections in some way. Fourth, the electoral system served as a 
means to legitimise the Soviet system. Citizens were nominally able to choose their 
representatives in the state system. High rates of voter turnout were interpreted as signs of 
popular support for the system. Fifth, the elections were a means of incorporating the 
diverse socially-differentiated strata of Soviet society in the state system. This further 
reinforced the legitimating principles of the electoral process. Sixth, the elections were 
exercises in mass mobilisation. Seventh, the electoral process was a means of political 
socialisation and political education. Finally, Soviet elections were a means of 
communication between the regime and its subjects.
It is significant to note, however, that in the majority of instances the pre-reform 
Soviet elections served the interests of the Party and state more than the individual voter. 
However, the elections did not serve the regime alone. There were several key components 
in the electoral sytstem that could be considered theoretically ‘democratic’ and provided the 
electorate with elements of influence and choice.
Conformity with Democratic Principles and Voter Choice
Pre-reform Soviet elections conformed superficially with some of the criteria of democratic 
elections. It will be recalled that there were few segments of the population who were
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disenfranchised. In addtion Article 3 of the 1978 Election Law stated that all voters were 
to participate in the elections on an equal footing. Each voter had one vote. Men, women 
and servicemen participated in the elections with equal rights. Moreover, it was codified that 
candidates who recieved more than 50 per cent of the votes of electors who cast their ballots 
were declared winners. However, it should be noted that in order for elections to be 
declared valid more than 50 per cent of the eligible electorate had to have been registered 
as having voted.
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that elections under the Soviet regime did not 
always carry these equalities. For instance in the immediate post-revolutionary period, some 
members of the ancien regime were disenfranchised. For instance, in the Constitution 
(Fundamental Law) of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic adopted 1918 persons 
employing hired labour for profit, living on unearned income, such as interest on capital, 
revenue from enterprises, income from property, etc., private traders and commercial 
middle-men, monks and clergymen of all religious denominations, employees and agents 
of the foimer police, special gendarme corps and secret service, members of the former 
ruling dynasty of Russia, persons declared, under established procedure, insane or mentally 
deficient, and also persons under guardianship, persons convicted of mercenary or infamous 
crimes and sentenced to a term set by law or by the judgment of a court were all deprived 
of the right to vote.®® Termed ‘elections under civil war conditions’ because of its 
antagonism towards various sections of the population, this pattern of election was also 
adopted by the ‘people’s democracies’ after the communists came to power in the post-war 
period.®^ In addition, violations of the one person-one vote principle frequently occurred 
in the Soviet Union. For example, two soldiers went out and got drunk the night before the
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1954 election and they later froze to death in a . However, votes were cast on their
behalf so that a 100 per cent turnout could be recorded. An autopsy was prepared to show 
that they could have died after having voted.'*** Dr Boris Fedorov, former Russian 
Federation Minister of Finance and leader of the democratic-patriotic Forward Russia! Party^ 
told the present author the following anecdote:
On election day my father would call together those of us eligible to vote. He 
would ask which one of us would like to go to the district polling station.
The one who volunteered would take the family’s passports and present them 
to the workers at the polling station. He or she would receive the ballot 
papers for the entire family and vote. This relieved the burden from the rest 
of the family of having to go out and vote.'**
Soviet electoral legislation also stated that the candidate who received more than 50 per cent 
of the votes would be declared a people’s deputy. To the best of my knowledge there has 
not been an account of a candidate who received more than 50 per cent of the vote who was 
not declared a people’s deputy. This would have been absurd. The individuals would never 
have been included on the ballot paper if the Party had not approved them in the first place. 
Moreover, as is discussed below in more detail, it was virtually impossible for Soviet voters 
 ^ to put forward alternative candidates or include write-in candidates on the ballot papers. 
However, there have been instances in which falsifications of voting results have been 
recorded. The former dissident, Leonid Plyushch, for instance, crossed out the candidate’s 
name on one occasion and wrote Molotov on the ballot paper. He later found out that the 
candidate against whom he had voted had been elected unanimously.'*^ Stephen White has
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noted that during the first USSR Supreme Soviet elections in 1937, Stalin recorded votes for 
his candidacy in excess of 100 per cent. It was explained later that voters in adjoining 
districts had insisted on casting their votes in the Moscow constituency where he stood as a 
candidate.'*®
It will also be recalled that Butler, Penniman and Ranney further establish other 
preconditions for classifying democratic elections. Under these criteria it is possible to 
observe a general deviation from the established norms. The first criterion, that all adults 
have the right to vote has been discussed above in significant detail. Second, the ' that
 ^ A
states that elections occur within the prescribed time limits seems to be applicable to pre­
reform Soviet elections. The only exception was the extra-long interval between the First 
Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet elected in 1937 and the second elected in 1946. 
However, the combat conducted on Soviet soil was the cause of the election schedule’s 
interruption. Thereafter, however, it will be recalled that voting for local, republican and 
national legislatures took place on a regular basis.
There was superficial conformity with . the third criterion that all seats in the 
legislature were subject to election. However, in contrast to Butler ' ' , they ^A.
were not contested at all until 1987 in a local election. Even then, candidate choice was 
limited to about 1 per cent of the districts and only about 4-5 per cent of the deputies were 
elected in this manner. Soviet electoral provisions mandated that 50 per cent of the 
electorate had to approve the candidate for deputy in order for the representative to be 
elected. This feature established at least some form of popular consensus on the candidate. 




no choices among candidates. Nevertheless, Soviet ballot papers contained the instructions 
that voters were to strike out the name of the candidate against whom they wished to vote.
Thus, notionally, candidates still had to pass through at least some type of hurdle before 
they assumed their positions in the representative body. Restrictions on citizens’ fuller use 
of the possibility to reject deputies is discussed in greater detail elsewhere in the chapter.
These procedures, therefore, reduced voting to what could be considered a symbolic act. It 
should also be noted that no candidate was ever defeated in an election to the USSR Supreme 
Soviet. Moreover, Stephen White has indicated that the one candidate one seat principle was, I;
not even achieved at the last pre-reform election to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1984. Ito the death of one of the candidates shortly before the poll, 1,499 candidates stood for 1,500 iseats.'*'* However, candidate defeats did occur in elections to the lower level soviets, but 
they were the exception rather than the rule.'*®
Pre-reform Soviet elections fell far short of Butler, Penniman and Ramiey’s fourth
criterion that no substantial group should be denied the opportunity of forming a party and
putting forward a candidate. Under the pre-reform electoral legislation there were selected
organisations that possessed the right to nominate candidates for people’s deputy. These
organisations included the CPSU, the Komsomol, Trade Unions, cooperative and other social
organisations, meetings of servicemen in military units. Article 38 of the 1978
A
Law stated that the persons at nomination meetings had the right to participate in discussions Ion the candidates, to support the candidates or submit proposals challenging them. However, 
nowhere in the Law was it stated that candidates could be nominated directly by individuals ;Clr
or other groups not included in the above mentioned list.
c\
The campaign o f , Medvedev , foimer dissident historian, USSR People’s Deputy 
q ia V ^ \ 4-0
from 1989 1991, former CPSU Central Cormnittee member from 1990 1991 and co-chairman
^  — 'ho ^
of tlie Socialist Workers’ Party from 1991 to the present'*® compete in the 1979 electionsA
as an independent candidate to the USSR Supreme Soviet illustrates the difficulties that 
independent groups not sanctioned by the CPSU had when they nominated contestants who 
were not previously approved by the party. In January 1979, the Free Interprofessional 
Workers’ Union (SMOT) created a small organisation ‘Election 79’, and decided to offer two 
candidates, among them Roi Medvedev, to stand for election to the Soviet of Nationalities 
from the Sverdlovsk Electoral District of Moscow in the 4 March 1979 elections. After 
Medvedev agreed to accept its nomination, ‘Election 79’ prepared the necessary documents 
to be registered as a social organisation. A contingent from the group presented their 
nomination to the Sverdlovsk electoral commission. ‘Election 79’ was first turned down in 
its registration bid because it was not considered a legal organisation. However, following 
substantial legal research it was evident that under a 1931 statute ‘Election 79’ was indeed 
legal. The executive committee of the Sverdlovsk district soviet, upon receipt of the
i
necessary documents, tried to dissuade ‘Election 79’ from . . intentions to run alternative
A
candidates and to disband the group. However, ‘Election 79’ continued its lobbying. 
Grudgingly, the Sverdlovsk district executive committee accepted the papers. ‘Election 79’ 
simultaneously wrote a complaint to the Central Election Commission on the nomination
iDhind ranees that the Svedlovsk district soviet presented to them. However, as these 
proceedings were conducted the deadline for candidate registration passed and ‘Election 79’ 
was unable to field a candidate in the elections. In the end, only one candidate, ballerina V. 
I. Bessmertnova, was registered on the ballot paper.'*^ It should come as no surprise that 
she won the seat.'*®
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There was also at least nominal conformity in the pre-refonn Soviet electoral practices
with Butler, Penniman and Ranney’s fifth criterion that election legislation must be
reasonably fair: neither law, nor violence, nor intimidation should bar candidates from
presenting their views nor voters from discussing them. Soviet electoral law specified that
voters had the right to exercise their ballots secretly. All citizens, not declared legally
iUa'V
insane, had the right to vote. Also, the Election Law stated it was prohibited for officials 
to restrict any citizen from exercising his or her right to vote in secret. However, there were 
instances of non-compliance with these provisions. First, for the reasons described below, 
the regime hardly ever upheld the individual’s right to vote secretly. However, there is, to 
the knowledge of this author, no recorded instance of violence against or intimidation 
employed against dissident voters. However, Rasma Karklins has suggested that there may 
have been unofficial violence which may have been used in situations when people voted 
against the official candidates.'*® Further, Soviet voters could express their views on 
candidates in limited maimers. The Soviet electoral law allowed citizens to agitate fo r  
candidates. However, nowhere in the Law was it stated that participants in pre-election 
meetings or voters could agitate against candidates. Therefore, during the pre-election stages 
it was difficult for voters to discuss candidates freely and constructively.
One of the most deficient aspects of the pre-reform Soviet electoral system was the 
method of voting. The election law stated that voters had the right to cast their ballots 
secretly. Voting booths were provided in polling stations for voters to exercise this right. 
The election Law stated that votes were cast for the candidate whose name was on the ballot 
paper. Since there was invariably only one name on the ballot paper, voters, after being 
recorded as participating in the voting, would collect their ballot papers and drop them,
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unmarked, into the ballot boxes. This process has been labelled ‘inertia voting’ by Ronald 
J. Hill.®** The voting procedure, therefore, took place more openly than secretly. 
Moreover, the location of the voting booths did not promote free exercise of the right of 
choice. Ballot boxes were located in plain view of every voter and election workers who 
were present at the polls. However, voting booths or rooms for secret ballot, were located 
away from the ballot box. Voters who intended to vote against the candidate on the paper, 
scrutinize the document, or even exercise their legal right to vote secreAy, had to make 
detours to the booths or rooms in plain view of their peers. This action was considered to 
be a manifestation of a voter’s intentions, and gave away his or her choice.®* V. Timofeev, 
a veteran of war and labour expressed exactly this point in an article published in Izvestiya.
You get your ballot is looking at you. You pull a pencil out of your
pocket can guess your intentions. Young pioneers or poll attendants
are standing by the polling booth. If you go into the booth it’s clear that you 
voted against the candidate. Those who don’t want to vote against go stratight 
to the ballot box. It’s the same at plant or trade union elections and party 
election conferences. You can’t even go off into a corner by yourself before 
a curious eye is peering over your shoulder.®®
It should also be noted that voters elected their deputies by leaving the name of the candidate 
for whom they wished to vote on the ballot paper. All those against whom the voter wished 
to cast a ballot had to have their names crossed out. Frequently, electoral commission 
members would not supply the voting booths with pencils or pens to perform these tasks.®®
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There were other attributes of pre-reform Soviet elections that violated democratic 
principles. Vote counting fell short of Butler, Penniman and Ranney’s preconditions. There 
were many accounts, for instance, of actual falsifications of voting results. The examples 
presented above of the soldiers voting and Stalin’s vote in 1937 exceeding 100 per cent are 
good illustrations of this point. Often, however, agitators voted for people on the list of 
electors. For instance, a Soviet scientist^visiting Glasgow in 1989, told the present author 
of such examples. Once, during the 1985 local elections he received a knock on the door 
of his flat at 8 pm. He opened his door and recognised his friend, a canvasser. The agitator 
asked him if he was going to vote. He reminded the scientist that it was getting late and 
informed him that everyone else on his list had cast their ballots, stressing that he was tired 
and wanted to go home to be with his family. He had been at the polling station since 6 am 
and was physically and mentally exhausted. The scientist said he had no intention of voting. 
After hearing this statement, the agitator became concerned, then flew into a tirade and 
reiterated how imporatant it was for everyone on his list to show up at the polling station and 
vote. The scientist held his ground and refused to vote, stating he believed that it would be 
a meaningless exercise. In a final act of desperation, the canvasser asked the scientist if he 
would allow him to cast his ballot for him. On this point the scientist agreed. The canvasser 
later told the scientist that he returned to the polling station, marked off the scientist’s name 
and put his ballot paper in the box on his behalf. This action completed, the canvasser could 
report that all his voters participated in the voting.®'*
On the seventh criterion, the pre-reform electoral system had some success. Butler
lifrb
/  % as a component of a democratic electoral system, that those elected should be installed 
in office and remain in office until their terms expire or a new election period is held.
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Earlier it was established that voters gave mandates to their deputies. These mandates 
reflected the interests of the voters. The electorate presented the issues that they wanted 
implemented in their constituencies. Deputies were obliged to fulfill these mandates to the 
best of their abilities and were legally bound to do so. Mandates served several key 
functions. Soviet legal specialists Georgii V. Barabashev, Konstantin F. Sheremet and 
Nikolai G. Starovoitov suggested that these mandates performed three primary roles. First, 
they were a fonn of expression of the will and interests of the population and included the 
direct participation of the citizen in the direction of the affairs of state and society and the 
development of socialist self-government. Second, they J  i the ties between 
deputies and their constituents. Third, mandates served as an information device for the 
expression of public opinion which facilitated more effective activities in all state 
organisations.®® Moreover, they also indicated that the institution of the voters’ mandates 
did not exist in the bourgeois countries. Although they did not state it specifically, 
Barabashev, Sheremet and Starovoitov implied that elected officials in the bourgeois countries 
represent special interests in their institutions. They mention, however, that bourgeois 
legislators function on an anti-democratic basis by not implementing voters’ mandates. They 
suggest that voters’ mandates would make them representatives of all the people. However, 
because of their links with special interests, legislators in capitalist countries needed to 
remain independent of their electors.®®
Evidence suggests that deputies did indeed fulfill their mandates. The convocation of 
local soviets elected in June 1982 was presented with 748,396 mandates. In the period 
between 1982 and 1984 deputies had implemented 692,939 (92.6 per cent) Within this time 
period over 90 per cent of all of the mandates had been carried out in the RSFSR, Ukraine,
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Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Moldavia and Kirgizia/® It must be clearly stated that 
this is indeed significant evidence which indicates the significance of the bonds between the 
elected deputies and their electorate. However, there is one major drawback which prevents 
this author from claiming that the deputies, by fulfilling their mandates^were working very 
thoroughly to serve their voters’ interests. Thomas F. Remington has noted that *[o]ften such 
commitments had already been included as part of the local plan before being adopted 
formally as a deputy’s mandate’.®® Nevertheless, he still stresses that ‘the process of 
proposing nakazy and pressing them upon deputies gave voters some opportunity to lobby for 
their particular needs.’®®
Deputies who did not fulfill their mandates were subjected to recall and the 1977 
USSR Constition included provisions for removing representatives from office who did not 
achieve their contracts with the voters. Article 107 required that deputies had to report their 
work to electors and to the bodies that nominated them. The same article further stated that 
deputies who did not justify the trust of the electors would be recalled at any time by the 
decision of a majority of the electors. In theory, the regime used this mechanism to ensure 
that deputies were responsive to the will of the constituents whom they represented. 
Deputies had to act as instructed delegates while serving their terms of office.®**
There were no specific reasons for deputy removal. However, Article 6 of the Law
on the Status o f Deputies declared that deputies who did not justify the voters’ confidence or
who acted in manners unworthy of their high calling have been recalled. Actions which
A
constituted failing to justify voters’ confidence included not meeting regularly with 
constituents, not holding office hours in which individual citizens could bring points to the
63
deputies’ attention and not implementing or working on voters’ mandates. Deputies who 
acted in manners which were considered unworthy of their positions included those who were 
often drunk, behaved amorally, were publically abusive or exhibited poor labour discipline. 
S. M. Popova indicated that deputy recall was more frequent in the second type of 
offenses.
The deputy recall process was initiated by the collectives or organisations that 
nominated the deputy. The deputy was made aware of the meeting. Deputies who were 
considered for recall had the opportunity to present their cases before the collective or 
organisation. After this procedure had begun, the local soviet established a date for a 
referendum on deputy recall. Deputies were recalled if more than 50 per cent of the 
electorate cast their votes against them.
Recall was not implemented very frequently. Of the more that 2,000,000 deputies 
who were elected to the local soviets at each convocation, no more than slightly over 500 
were recalled in each term between 1970 and 1984.^^ Reasons for this exist in the fact that 
recall is a lengthy process. Deputies, conversely, served relatively short terms of two and 
a half years. It is probable that delays in the recall process were dragged into the next round 
of elections and the discredited representative was not selected for the next convocation of 
the soviets. Thus, the recall procedures were often avoided. In addition there were instances 
when recall was abused. Jeffrey Hahn notes that recall could have been used as a tool for 
furthering Stalin’s policies during the collectivisation period. During the first half of 1931 
over 23,000 deputies were recalled from village soviets and 1,000 were recalled from urban 
areas.
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Ronald Hill notes that there were a number of potentially (emphasis added) 
democratic principles in the nomination process. These included electors being involved in 
virtually every step of the candidate nomination process. However, it should be emphasised 
that this occurred after the Party had made its selections. Again, I would like to reiterate 
that I feel that there was democratic potential in the nomination procedures and mass 
meetings. However, it should be underlined that it is more appropriate to claim that these 
events were more akin to a rubber stamping of the Party’s choices rather than serious 
challenges to its priorities. Hill also argues that citizen participation in electoral 
commissions’ selections and in their compositions and discussions on candidates were other 
forms of somewhat democratic features of pre-reform Soviet elections.^ I share H ill’s 
assertion that civic-minded individuals could push their influence during these stages. 
However, the evidence cited above clearly establishes that it was difficult for citizens to make 
a significant impact in the overall electoral process.
Above it has been argued that voters in the USSR did not have the choice of selecting 
between competing candidates, parties or platforms that are taken for granted as key 
components andjpossibly, defining characteristics of liberal democratic polities and electoral 
systems. The pre-reform electoral system left voters with two choices: to vote or not to 
vote. As stated earlier, the overwhelming majority of Soviet adults cast their ballots. 
However, some stayed away from the polls and in isolated occasions, voters cast their ballots 
against the officially-approved candidates. In a limited number of cases, some of these 
candidates were defeated-but only at local levels. Voter abstention and dissident voting inA
the pre-reform period have been seriously-debated issues. However, all major writers on 
Soviet ‘dissident voting’-electoral avoidance and voting against candidates-appear to agreeA t\
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that the expression of loyalty to the Soviet system, manifested in (a) voting in the elections 
and (b) casting ballots in favour of the Party-approved candidate \ , key feature of theA
pre-reform Soviet electoral system. Therefore, these issues need not be addressed here. 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned evidence suggests that the electorate was largely unable to 
vote freely.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that elections in the pre-reform period although not providing 
choices for candidate among voters or competing parties were indeed significant. These were 
exercises in mass mobilisation for the Party and served various functions such as legitimating 
the system, incorporating the diverse elements of Soviet society in the elected organs by 
means of quota systems and communicating issues between the regime and the electorate. 
Most of all, the elections served as the main means of political participation for the adult 
population.
Soviet elections contained some (abstract) democratic features, but they did not 
necessarily live up to their potential. The pre-reform electoral system incorporated such 
features that Robert Dahl suggested that could be used as determinants for a democratic 
electoral system such as universal suffrage and the installation of winners in their seats. 
However, candidate nominations were limited. There could be no choice among competing 
parties or platforms. Voting against candidates was severely discouraged. Nevertheless, 
there were some (arguably) democratic features, such as the institution of voters’ mandates 
which bound the deputies to satisfy their constituents’ demands. However, these items were
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already factored into the five-year plans. Although there were no choices on the ballot 
papers for candidates of parties, voters could choose, albeit under extreme social pressure, 
whether or not they wished to vote and whether or not they wanted to vote for the Party- 
approved candidate. Therefore, elections under these conditions were clearly what 
Mackenzie has termed ‘acclamatory elections’ which were elections in name only. The next 
chapter focuses on the first largely competitive election conducted in the USSR in 1989 and 
demonstrates the elements of continuity, contradiction and departure exhibited between pre- 
refoim Soviet elections and those conducted under Gorbachev.
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Chapter 2. The 1989 Elections to the USSR 
Congress of People’s Deputies
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Mi;; On 26 March 1989, elections were held for the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. For 
■ the first time at a national election, in the great majority of cases, Soviet voters had the 
% opportunity to select their deputies from more than one candidate. This chapter chronicles 
the preparations, campaign and results of those elections. It addresses the following 
questions: What changes were introduced into the Soviet electoral practices for this election? 
What did this particular election have in common with previous USSR national or local level 
/  • elections and what differences were there? What types of deputies were elected? Finally,
: what were the implications for the politcal system in general? Throughout the text case
f ; evidence from Leningrad is cited. Leningrad was chosen for several key reasons: abundant
V: -,material on the elections was carried in the local press during the campaign; Leningrad is one 
of the major cities in the USSR, and its politics were important and representative of large 
Russian cities; moreover, Leningrad was the site of the heaviest defeats suffered by a local 
leadership throughout the USSR.
In addition, this chapter outlines the major features of the Soviet electoral system positing 
that throughout its existence, the USSR-even under the Gorbachev leadership-never held
A A
‘free’ or ‘fair’ elections in the conventionally understood sense. Despite increases in 
: V. opportunities for Soviet voters to select from among more than one candidate, usually with 
" different platforms, the Soviet electoral reform measures implemented under Gorbachev and 
scrutinised below are considered as examples of liberalisation, according to Elemer Hankiss’s 
. definition. This process includes ‘only half-hearted and incomplete reforms, alternating them 
with anti-reform measures’, owing largely to a ‘duality of goals’ on the part of the regime. 
Liberalisation is the ‘opposite of démocratisation’: the latter is the creation of an
institutional system based on real power, that guarantees rights stipulated in the constitution
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of a community.’ Liberalisation, on the other hand, works without rights...[and] make[s]
V;, people feel free...without giving them rights. Hankiss argues liberalisation is a form of
‘r paternalism. Liberalising rulers are likened to ‘enlightened despots’: they desire to be
y‘V . loved;’ however, they do not want the population to become too pushy. Liberalisers strive 
for their citizens to obey them tlirough love rather than coercion.^ Under Gorbachev,
reform measures opened a wider sphere of participation and new roles for citizens.
However, they were intended to be means of strengthening socialist society. The CPSU was 
to remain the country’s leading force. Electoral changes were implemented largely to 
. disentrench opponents of reform measures, while retaining a CPSU monopoly in the political 
sphere.^ Rights that were implemented under the changes were not new; rather they were 
re-interpreted or, more precisely, finally allowed to be fulfilled.
The evidence presented in this chapter will show that there were elements of continuity, 
* ■ contradiction and departure from the Soviet Union’s previous electoral practices. The former 
* is supported by the fact that the CPSU held a dominant position throughout the campaign. 
No other official or informal political organisation could openly compete for seats in the 
I Congress. Other means in which the Party attempted to limit the scope of competition 
' ; included the manner in which the aspirants in districts had to be approved at mass nomination 
. meetings in order for them make it onto the ballot paper. As it will be discussed in later 
chapters, the Party was able to pack the meetings with . supporters. In addition, aspects
of the Constitutional amendments and electoral reform such as the introduction of (largely)
on.-contested social (or public) organisation seats and a lack of uniform competition in the 
districts ftirther-reinforced aspects or liberalisation rather than démocratisation. Therefore, 
these factors are reminiscent of earlier electoral practices. Criticisms of the 1989 elections
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are analysed in greater depth in Chapter 5.
These policies, therefore, equated to a form of contradiction between the democratising
rhetoric of the regime and actual practice. Such slogans as ‘making the worker the master
of his/her own destiny’ and ‘all power to the soviets’ did not necessarily come to fruition as
T F
Î, , a result of the electoral reform measures. needs to be underlined that the
V ; ;
Party never intended to lose its leading position.
■■ ■ •
Despite these numerous shortcomings, the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of 
.. . People’s Deputies constituted a significant departure from earlier Soviet electoral norms.
. : Therefore, the election, to a large degree, served as an impetus towards a more open society
vv-\
more generally and a streamlined political^nd parliament in particular. These elections, as
it will be argued in the present and subsequent chapters, produced a new parliament which
*• hblped generate significant political changes throughout the USSR. The Congress and •A- •
‘. Supreme Soviet, although dominated by conservative deputies^ produced several significant 
*■' legislative acts, including the monumental adoption of the amendment to Article 6 of the
V - ' USSR Constitution which granted the CPSU a de facto  political monopoly. Moreover, the 
r.. elections to the Congress produced Soviet history’s first oppositions the Interregional
Deputies’ Group which '  ^ ' Boris Yeltsin, future St Petersburg Mayoi: Anatolii 
Sobchak and (until his death in December 1989) Academician Andrei Sakharov.
. Nevertheless, its ranks were small and shrank considerably from, for instance^ 273 deputies 
(if its supporters were included the figure was about 450), the First Congress in May-June 
> 1989 to about 159 by the Second in December 1989.'* Soviet voters also got their ‘deputies 
who were capable of running the country during perestroika’’, parliamentarians were more
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1 . likely than before to be from the professions. However, it should not come as a surprise that 
" ; the majority of deputies elected were CPSU members; in fact their share increased when 
■ compared to the last USSR Supreme Soviet election in 1984. The composition of the USSR 
• Congress of People’s deputies is discussed in much greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4. It 
: should also be noted that these elections constituted a turning^oint in Soviet politics, serving 
. as a stimulus for greater political participation in union republic elections held in 1990, 
increased political participation, including grass-roots involvement, and the development of
isignificant distinctions between All-Union and republican legislation. In addtion, the 1989
_  -hAeiv”
elections-despite numerous shortcomings-made competitive elections key features of late- 
Soviet and early post-Soviet political practices. Therefore, these principles started to become 
embedded in the collective political psyche of the Soviet people . Thus, the elections helped 
V to contribute new components to the political culture that had been evolving during the post- 
• Stalin years.
Electoral Reform Under Gorbachev
Several factors prompted Gorbachev to initiate electoral reform measures to change the 
Soviet electoral from an ‘acclamatory’ system to a ‘limited-choice’ variant like those that 
' existed in Eastern Europe^^ none, however, were intended to weaken the party’s control over 
society or reduce its hegemony in the political system. First, Gorbachev’s reform 
programme was centred initially around economic reform. Political reforms followed as 
«7 ‘ mechanisms to achieve the former. The electoral changes could be interpreted as measures 
to remove conservative members of the bureaucracy from positions of power. This, in turn 
would open space for (theoretically) reformist politicians to implement further changes and
" to mobilise the ‘human factor’ against his potential opponents in this manner.





( assist in achieving the General Secretary’s goals. Indeed, there was very high rate of 
.. personnel and elite turnover after Gorbachev attained the General Secretaryship.® Second, 
and closely related to the first, Gorbachev sought to bring forth a new corps of deputies who ipossessed the technical competence to serve as effective legislators. Consequently, they
would participate actively in sessions of the soviets and initiate measures necessary for I
societal reconstruction. Third, Gorbachev sought to renew the Party’s relations with society.
The CPSU, he claimed, had to prove that it was worthy to lead society. Therefore, Party 
secretaries would no longer be guaranteed seats in corresponding level soviets. They would 
have to compete against other candidates and prove their mettle. Should the official fail to 
win a seat in the legislature his or her position within the CPSU would then come into 
question. In this sense, it is evident that Gorbachev sought to introduce some forms of 
popular checks over the Party. Nevertheless, it is indeed plausible that Gorbachev intended
I
i’tIndeed electability was an important component of Gorbachev’s overall reform
trade union and Komsomol organisations.^ More significantly, places within the CPSU
■- were to be determined by competitive, direct, secret voting. The centrepiece of the economic 
reform programme, the 1987 Law on State Enterprise included provisions for workers to
elect their managers. Gorbachev himself noted that ‘...a  work collective must have the right 
to elect its own managers....Elections of economic managers are direct democracy in 
action. It was hoped that this mechanism would give workers more of a say in their own 
, affairs and rhake them feel more like the ‘masters of their own destiny’. Despite the 




‘ positions, the reforms ultimately failed. Nomenklatura officials interfered in the
electoral proceedings of these organisations or elections were not conducted at all. Stephen 
White notes that elections in the Party did not come to full fruition because of a lack of 
implementation at higher levels.
Over 1,000 local party secretaries had been chosen on a competitive 
’■ basis... [by 1989]. This, however, was only 8.6% of the total, at higher levels
the proportions were even less impressive^nly seven provincial secretaries,
■ for example, had been elected on a comptetitive basis, which [was] just 1%
of the total.^
. In addition, it was the intention that delegates to the XIX All-Union Party Conference be 
universally elected by secret ballot. Nevertheless, local interference thwarted these 
innovations from being realised to their full potential.*^
More significantly, however, the Party’s leading organs and key officials were elected 
in a competitive format at the XXVIII Congress in 1990. For instance it has been noted 
that party organisations discussed the candidacies of nearly 80,000 aspirants, but elected only 
4,683 delegates to the Congress.** Although Mikhail Gorbachev was re-elected as Party 
' General Secretary at the Congress, his bid did not go unopposed.
. Six candidates were proposed during the session, but finally only Teimuraz
Avelyani, a district party functionary from the city of Kiselevsk 
(Kemerevo oblast’ [sic]) remained. He had no chance, of course, to beat
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Gorbachev, who received 3,411 votes of the 4,257 votes cast: Avelyani's 
share was only 501 votes. The result means, however, that about one quarter 
of the delegates did not vote for Gorbachev, a surprisingly high figure.*^
Local officials influenced the proceedings of management elections and workers often 
; voted for candidates who were ‘easy going’ and proposed lower production targets and higher 
*' prices for their goods. Former Politiburo member Yegor Ligachev noted other drawbacks 
from management elections.
How much damage was caused by the pseudo-democratic principle of electing 
economic leaders? Not a single country in the world elects managers; they
# are appointed. But here too, we found ourselves ahead of the whole planet, 
demonstrating the immaturity of our democracy. Many excellent managers 
were removed from their posts.*'*
‘ Because of their ineffectiveness, management elections were withdrawn from a later variant
• of the Law.*^
Elections in these organisations and among economic managers reflect this chapter’s 
theme of liberalisation. These examples demonstrate that legislation was produced which 
contained an extension of rights. However, these rights were not allowed to be implemented 
' in practice. The CPSU, by either interfering in the elections themselves or failing to
• implement them, obstructed ûirther political changes.
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'• Gorbachev also introduced an ‘experimental’ election to local councils in June 1987 in 
which 1 per cent of the USSR’s constituencies were condensed to create multi-member 
. districts. Voters could select from among a number of candidates. The one receiving the 
greatest share of votes exceeding 50 per cent of those cast by the praticipating electorate was 
declared the winner. Candidates who received over 50 per cent became reserve deputies who 
would ‘fill in’ when the actual deputy was absent from the soviet. Overall only some 5 per 
, ' cent of deputies were elected in this manner. However, there were some instances in which 
; leading officials either did not obtain the confidence of more than half of the participating 
. ' electorate or, were reduced to the status of reserve deputies.*®
In 1988, the USSR Supreme Soviet released for public discussion drafts of constitutional 
amendments which revamped the state structure*^ and a new electoral law.*^ These 
. . documents were adopted at the Twelfth Extraordinary Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet
* in December 1988.*^ The revisions to the state institutions included the creation of a new 
supreme legislative organ, a USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. This comprised 2,250 
deputies: 750 deputies elected from 3 electoral divisions. First, 750 deputies would be 
elected from territorial districts, based notionally on population. Second, 750 deputies would 
be elected from national-territorial districts^stablished on a set basis according to the type 
of territorial administrative unit. For instance, there were 32 deputies allocated to each 
republic, 11 to each autonomous republic, five to each autonomous oblast’ and one to each
, autonomous district. The remaining 750 deputies were representatives of all-union social 
organisations such as the CPSU, trade unions, creative unions and other similar
* V organisations. Seat allocation was determined by the Electoral Law.^ ** Table 2.1 contains
. this information. In the constituencies registered voters elected their deputies directly,
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*;.• whereas only delegates to the social organisations’ all-union gatherings-conferences, 
congresses and plenums-could elect the representatives from that electoral division.A,
Table 2.1 Social Organisation Seat Allocation in the 1989 Elections to the 










Kolkhozes and Associatios of the
Union of Kolkhozes
Union of Consumers’ Societies
Fishing Kolkliozes
Associations of Scientific Workers
Including:
Academy of Sciences +  20 Scientific 
Societies & 8 Associations 
VASKhNIL
Academy of Medical Sciences +  40 
Medical Associations 
Academy of Pedagogical Sciences + 
Association of Pedagog. Researchers 
USSR Academy of Artists 
Union of Scientific & Engineering 
Societies of tlie USSR 





Source: Adapted from Izvestiya, 28 December
Seats Social Organisation 
100 Creative Unions (continued)
Union of Journalists 
Union of Composers 
Union of Writers 
Union of Theatrical Wokers 
Union of Artists 




Red Cross & Red Crescent 
Znanie 
Rodina
Soviet Fund Peace + 8 Committees 
for die Advancement of Peace, Solid­
arity and International Cooperation 
Associations forCooperation of the UN 
in the USSR 
Soviet Fund for Culture 
V.I. Lenin Soviet Children’s Fund 
Soviet Fund for Charity and Health 
USSR Social Sporting Associations 
All-Union Society for the Struggle 
for Sobriety
All-Union Society of Booklovers 
All-Union Society of Friends of the 
Cinema
All-Union Musical Society 

































Congress deputies would elect from among their members 542 deputies to serve in the 
USSR Supreme Soviet which would function as the Soviet Union’s permanently functioning 
legislative organ (deputies were to serve on a rotating basis)-a change which in effect 
marginalised the electorate. With deputies electing the permanently functioning 
legislative body, it can be argued that Soviet voters, in reality, only chose an electoral
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college. Moreover, because it was assumed that deputies would be predominantly CPSU 
members, electing the Supreme Soviet would be yet another means by which the Party could|;'v'. implement a liberalising tactic of increasing electoral choice, but reducing its significance.
The social organisation’s provision, which is criticied in greater detail in Chapter 5, can 
< certainly be considered an example of liberalisation. The addition of the social organisation 
’ ‘ seats was another potential control mechanism that party officials used to maintain dominance
. in the legislature. First, it was thought that the overwhelming majority of social organisation»' •• ■
deputies would be CPSU members. By dint of adherence to principles of democratic 
centralism, they would be forced to promote the Party line in any vote. Second, not all 
, Soviet citizens had the opportunity to stand for these seats-only members of those 
organisations could put forth candidacies. Third, not every elector could cast a ballot for 
these deputies, only the delegates to the all-union gatherings. Hence, these seats and the 
procedures for their election violated of the principle of one-person-one-vote.
‘ The draft Electoral Law suggested that ‘as a rule’ there were to be more candidates than 
seats (Article 9). This however, did not make it into the final version, which mandated that 
there may be ‘any number of candidates’. While the overwhelming majority of seats were 
’. contested, it is apparent that competition was not universal. For instance, during the first 
. round of elections (11 March-26 March 1989), there were 2,895 candidates registered in the
, 2'. 1,500 constituencies which included 1,449 in territorial districts and 1,446 in national-
'  ■ ■ y
territorial districts. However, this included 384 districts in which a single candidate
. s t o o d . F o l l o w i n g  the series of run-off and repeat elections held in April-May the
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aggregate number of candidates who made it to the final ballot paper was elevated to 
5,074/^ Nevertheless, 399 deputies were selected in the old manner of one candidate per 
seat/^ Within the social organisations there were initially 880 candidates who contested for 
seats^ ** and after repeat and run-off elections there were 912 who participated in the 
c a m p a i g n . T h e r e  however, significant variations in the levels of competitiveness 
within the social organisations. For instance, there were 100 candidates for the 100 seats the 
CPSU . allocated; but not all of them, including Gorbachev (12 votes against) received 
unanimous approval.^® The Council of Collective Farms approved 58 candidates for its 
58 seats in an open vote in a half hour^^ whereas the Writers Union had to whittle down 
its final list of 12 candidates from a field of 92 contestants.^®
The Elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies
The constitutional amendments and new electoral law focused on changes in the USSR’s state
structure and the means of electing these bodies. The first major constitutional change
affected the highest organs of state power. According to Article 108 of the constitutional
amendments, the highest organ of power in the USSR became the USSR Congress of
People’s Deputies, superseding the USSR Supreme Soviet. Under the new legislation, the
Congress of People’s Deputies was allocated powers previously held by the USSR Supreme
Soviet. The Congress had the authority to adopt the USSR Constitution and introduce
amendments to it, determine state boundaries, and define the domestic and foreign policies
wof the USSR. It was also assigned new powers. The Congress was empoered to elect theA>
Committee for Constitutional Review, a body intended to function similarly to a judicial body
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*• • by reviewing the constitutionality of legislation, and so forth. As already noted the Congress
also elected the USSR Supreme Soviet, which was intended to be formed on the basis of
• rotating membership.
There were, in fact, significant differences between the Congress of People’s Deputies 
and the pre-reform and reformed USSR Supreme Soviet. The Congress of People’s 
. Deputies was one-third larger than the ‘old style’ Supreme Soviet. The last convocation of 
,. the Supreme Soviet, elected in 1984, comprised 1,500 deputies. The Congress also elected 
. * the USSR Supreme Soviet’s principal officers by means of secret ballot. According to 
Article 111 of the Constitution, the USSR Supreme Soviet was the ‘permanent, active,
' V legislative, regulatory and control organ of state power in the USSR’. The main difference 
between the ‘old’ and ’new’ Supreme Soviets was their respective times in session. 
•Previously, the Supreme Soviet met infrequently; under the 1988 legislation the USSR 
*•. Supreme Soviet had to^as a rule’ from six to eight months a year.
The new electoral law introduced elements of voter choice for deputies, extended 
. participation on both quantitative and qualitative levels and provided for a greater flow of 
iiiformation between the governors and the governed. As stated earlier, pre-reform Soviet 
elections did not present voters with a choice of candidate for their representatives, although
possible in theory. One candidate stood for each available seat. In fact, there was sit was ^
XV
not even this degree of choice at the previous national elections in 1984. rPollowing the death
V.. ^
of one of the candidates shortly before the poll, 1,499 candidates competed for 1,500 deputy 
pos i t i ons . However ,  as it will be recalled^candidate choice was more the norm than the 
' exception in these elections. In this respect, the reform stood as a liberalisation. For the
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first time Soviet citizens were (in most instances) finally allowed to vote for a plurality of 
candidates. This was despite the fact that no previously existing law had expressly stated that 
only a single candidate could stand per seat.
Article 9 of the 1988 electoral law determined the rights of candidate nomination, 
- , whereby individuals who received the votes of more than a half of the assemblies of meetings 
' with 500 or more voters were registered as candidates for people’s deputies. Under the new 
... law, the CPSU, the Komsomol, etc. retained their traditional rights of nomination, 
jjowever, Article 9 extended the right to nominate candidates to meetings of local inhabitants 
in their places of residence. Moreover, nominations were allowed to come from the floor 
at the electoral meetings. In early January, for example, a nomination meeting was held at
the Ruch’i sovkhoz (state farm) in Leningrad province. The majority of the meeting’s
■■
w; V participants voted to put forward Ol’ga Ivanova Chedleeva, a sovkhoz brigadier, member of
ii. • the Vsevolozhinskii gorkom (city party committee) and Leningrad obkom (provincial party 
7 committee). Members of the collective made respectful and complimentary remarks about 
; her. Thus, an electric welder, B. Pavlova, said: T know Chedleeva from her social 
activities. She is a good organizer. ’ A cattle farmer, D. Andronov, asserted ‘Chedleeva is 
an efficient, principled, just brigadier. She is a fair person. ’ However, from the seats,»
. mechanic Andrei Grachev queried why another candidate had not been proposed. He 
favoured an aspirant who did not belong to the party or trade union committees. In addition 
to Chedleeva, Grachev nominated vegetable-growing brigadier Marina Vladimirovna 
Izmerova. The collective accepted her candidacy. The participants voted on the two 
candidates and Chedleeva won the nomination to proceed to the next round of elections.^® 
Although the independently nominated contestant did not receive the meeting’s endorsement,
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the nomination from the floor is still significant because it indicated that Soviet voters could 
 ^ at least propose candidates of their own choosing in addition to those selected by the trade 
* union, party or Komsomol organs and mass meetings. However, relatively few of those 
/ nominated in this way reached ballot paper.
Under the new law, the election campaign was extended from two months to four months 
in order to maximize voter turnout and increase voter awareness of issues and candidates. 
Soviet elections took place in several stages, the first of which is the armouncement of the 
elections. During the first period, the organisational preparations for the elections occurred. 
The elections were set for Sunday, 26 March 1989,^* and in accordance with the new 
V electoral law, a Central Electoral Commission (Tsentrizbirkom) was formed to oversee the 
. - proceedings of the elections on 1 December 1988. The commission was elected for a five- 
year term, and its main tasks include approving electoral commissions (izbirkomy) at lower 
' levels, registering candidates, distributng state funds for conducting the elections, producing 
and designing the ballot papers and other relevant documents in the appropriate languages 
and ensuring that elections were held under the guidelines established by the electoral law.
; Under the new elctoral law the commissions’ composition was increased from 29 members 
, (which included a chairperson and a deptuy, a secretary and 26 conunission members) to 35 
individuals. The new guidelines designated a chairperson and two deputies, a secretary and 
. 31 commission members. The social, personal and occupational backgrounds of its members 
*- supposedly reflect the diversity of the Soviet Union and it included full-time CPSU Central
U ' Committee functionaries, manual labourers, a cosmonaut, workers in health and education, 
; military officials, members of the creative intelligentsia and artists; one notable commission 




Electoral commissions guided the elections at all levels. For the Congress of People’s 
Deputies, electoral commissions were formed in early December for the territorial, national- 
territoriaP^ and social organisations. These bodies were responsible for registering 
candidates and setting up nomination meetings for work collectives, places of residence and 
military units and within the specific social and public organizations, and their activities were 
reported quite frequently in local and central newspapers. Electoral commissions informed 
the electorate of how the elections were proceeding and announced that they were available 
. to electors, candidates, and campaign staffs for inquiries. For example, Leningrad voters 
frequently saw notices in their local newspapers on the work of their electoral commissions. 
Reports from the Leningrad city electoral commissions informed the public of the 
i commissions’ addresses, telephone numbers and hours of work: they functioned daily from 
7 pm to 10pm except Saturdays and Sundays.^'* In this first phase of the electoral campaign, 
the electoral commissions were concerned with procedural tasks: the elections of their 
* internal staffs, setting up district and precinct meetings and preparing for the coming electoral 
. campaign.
The second stage of the elections began on 26 December 1989, when the nomination of 
. candidates started. As in the past, candidates had to be nominated by mass meetings of work 
collectives, and the social organizations. Participants at these meetings discussed the 
, qualities of the candidates, with particular attention focusing on the candidates’work records, 
involvement in social activities and their relationships to the party. From late December to 





It has been suggested that the distribution of power at the top of the Soviet political 
system could be identified through the nomination process the more nominations a 
member or candidate member of the Politburo received, the more apparent his or her power 
• position. Certainly, press reports of nominations frequently noted that the workshops of a 
^ particular factory proposed General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
Chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev,
•. as candidate for People’s Deputy. His nominations were often followed by the nominations 
of Politburo member and Chairman of the USSR Council of Minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov, and 
Politburo member Vadim Medvedev. The nominations of Gorbachev, the most prominent%
Politburo leaders, and the first secrectaries of the republican communist parties were 
followed by nominations of manual labourers.
Candidates were approved by mass meetings. In order for a candidate to be nominated, 
he or she was required to receive the approval of at least half of the participants at quorate 
meetings. This requirement, in fact, was not always met. At a nomination meeting in the 
Krasnosel’skii district of Leningrad neither of the two candidates nominated (hospital chief 
doctor, V.A. Morozov, or department chief LN. Men’shugin) polled the number of votes 
necessary to win the nomination.^®
•7 - Criticism of the mass meetings is discussed in
Chapter 5.
In addition to more input at the nomination stage and the chance to elect deputies from
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more than one candidate, other steps were taken to make the electoral system more 
' responsive to electors’ needs and help the citizens Team democracy’. For instance, in 
Leningrad, special consultative groups were established which assisted individuals concerned 
with the elections and the Leningrad Party Higher School set up meetings for candidates for 
people’s deputies, their campaign staffs, agitators and members of electoral commissions. 
The primary focus of these meetings was on organising the preparations for the elections and 
.. ensuring adherence to the laws on elections. Individuals involved with the elections were 
able to consult legal specialists, psychologists, economists and social science teachers in 
order to prepare themselves better for the approaching elections. Sessions began on 5 
January, and discussions were held twice weekly: on Thursday evenings from 6 pm to 8 pm 
and on Saturdays, from 10am to 1 pm. Professor V.D. Sorokin, who chaired the advisory 
group, stated that in its first two days of operation, 20 people sought advice. The advisers 
coached the electoral campaigners on what to include in their programmes, which bodies 
• should organise local nomination meetings, the legality of donations from enterprises to their 
favourite candidates and the rights of the media at nomination meetings. Sorokin stated that 
raising these questions showed that there was a lack of familiarity with the electoral law, and 
the professor placed part of the blame for the electorate’s poor knowledge of the law on the 
mass media. For example, initially, television was deficient in its presentation of nomination 
meetings, and segments of nomination meetings were often televised without informative 
commentaries on the proceedings.^^
V
;• The third stage of the elections began on 25 January. At this stage, candidates from 
work collectives and mass meetings met with their potential constituents to decide who would 
compete on 26 March for election as a People’s Deputy. Winners in this round of the
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meetings were registered by the electoral commissions, and following their registration, the 
candidates’ names appeared on the final ballot paper. These meetings took place for the 
territorial and national-territorial districts and for the positions in the social organisations. 
During this stage of the campaign, grass-roots involvement began to develop. Voters in 
Zhitomir district of the Ukraine, for instance, mobilised in support of their preferred 
candidate, journalist Alla Yaroshinskaya. Although nominated by seven collectives, she was 
not officially recognised until action was taken on her behalf by the electorate. There was 
a widespread belief that her articles, critical of the local party apparatus, were obstacles that 
blocked her nomination. On several occasions the local party officials tried to tamper with 
the memberships at the meetings: eventually, though, Yaroshinskaya did get on the ballot 
paper and she won in her district.^®
Citizen participation greatly increased during the 1989 election campaign. According to 
the Election Law (Article 46) candidates were allowed to have up to 10 doverennye litsa- 
campaign staff or advisers who were able to coordinate activities on their behalf. These 
activists were empowered to write pieces for them in the p r e s s , s pe a k  in their absence at 
meetings with voters and perform organisational activités. This was another movement 
away from the Soviet electoral practices in which all the candidates-previously approved by 
the CPSU-were supported by Party and Komsomol activists who conducted the pre-election 
agitation. However, this does not mean that the CPSU failed to provide support for its own 
candidates. Indeed, examples of candidates’ pre-election platforms indicate that certain 
people linked with the CPSU had access to computers and laser printers and the result was 
that their handouts and flyers were much more professional in appearance than the same 
affiliated citizens were able to produce. In addition, the doverennye litsa of candidates to the
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Congress gained essential campaign and political experience and established contacts which 
certainly has not impeded their own political careers. For instance, Lev Ponomarev, a future 
RSFSR People’s Deputy, activist in the ‘Democratic Russia’ Movement and candidate to the 
Russian State Duma from Moscow, was involved in the 1989 election campaign as a 
doverennoe litso supporting Andreii Sakharov.
Electors’ clubs in support of candidates (and in some cases against candidates) 
wer^other organisations that emerged during the campaign. In Leningrad, for instance, during 
the elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, voters banded together to oppose 
the candidacies of the CPSU local lijS^archy forming the electors’ club Vybory-89 (Elections 
’89), largely coordinated by the initiative group ‘For a Popular Front’. The group itself 
leafletted the city’s residents, promoting ‘democratic’ candidates and urging electors to vote 
against candidates running for the Congress such as Candidate Member to the Politburo and 
First Secretary of the Leningrad obkom Yurii Solov’ev, and first deputy chairman of the 
ispolkom of the Leningrad city soviet and the Chairman of the City Planning Commission, 
Aleksei Bol’shakov, both of whom ran unopposed. In fact, Vybory-89's slogan was ‘One 
candidate-strike him out!’.^ ^^ Vybory-89 disseminated on^document which attacked 
Bol’shakov personally, claiming he was unfit to be a people’s deputy. If he was 
simultaneously a people’s deputy and retained his office in the city soviet there would be too 
much potential for conflicts of i n t e r e s t . B y  contrast, this voters’ group successfully 
supported the candidacy of young maritime engineer, Yurii Boldyrev, against Gerasimov. 
Moreover, the club successfully pursuaded Leningrad voters to reject both Solov’ev and 
Bol’shakov as a People’s D e p u t i e s . Vybory-89 and ‘For a Popular Front’ coordinated 
the Founding Congress of the Leningrad Popular Front in June 1989. The latter organisation
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went on to help initiate Democratic-Elections 90 which successfully endorsed 25 democratic - 
minded candidates out of the city’s 33 (75.8 per cent) deputies to the Russian Congress of 
People’s Deputies and 240 of the 380 representatives in the Leningrad city Soviet (63.1 per 
cent).'*'^
In addition, it should be noted that the campaign presented the possibility for a number 
of the informal groups and National Fronts that emerged during the late 1980s'^  ^ to 
participate in the election campaign. Nevertheless, it must be reiterated that these 
organisations were not able to field their own candidates in districts, nor were they allocated 
any seats among the social organisations. This is further evidence that suggests that the 
electoral reform measures were examples of liberalisation rather than démocratisation. 
Despite the limitations that these groups faced, the Estonian National Front, Latvian National 
Front and Sajudis and the other political organisations were able to support candidates 
who shared their positions and help them win positions in the new Soviet parliament and 
gain essential experience which helped them in the subsequent elections to local sof viets and 
the republican supreme soviets held in late 1989 and 1990.
A. Luk’yanchikov who headed the Department of Work of the jjv ie ts  for the Moscow 
City soviet’s executive committee noted that in Moscow during the elections
nearly 100 different independent formations participated. Frequently, their 
members were associated by an interest towards national, political, social and 
ecological problems. Gradually, the Moscow Popular Front, the Ecological 
Association ‘Bitsa’, the Memorial Society and the ‘Brateevo’ Committee of
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Social Self-Government became the most influential/^
However, it should be noted that Lu’yanchikov was very critical of the activities of these 
informais during the campaign. He alleged that
[v]arious representatives of the informais exploited the difficulties in the 
capital, shielding themselves with the slogans of démocratisation, broadly 
using the atmosphere of openness to oppose the work of electoral 
commissions, the executive and management organs.'’^
The 1989 campaign brought the election to the voters’ living-rooms via television. 
Citizens’ electoral awareness and participation in activities concerned the leadership, and
»
attendance at local pre-election meetings tended to decline. In anticipation of this, and in 
order to keep the voters aware of the contest and candidates, the electoral law contained 
provisions to allow the mass media free access to any election-oriented event, ranging from 
election meetings to the counting of votes.
Election-related topics appeared on the nightly national news programme, Vremya, and 
regularly scheduled shows, such as the Friday evening news and current events digest, 
Vzglyad (View), throughout the entire campaign. In addition, special programmes were 
presented that focused exclusively on elections. Central Television broadcast Navstrechu 
vyboram (Towards the Elections) on Monday and Wednesday evenings, a series of ten-minute 
programmes that focused on the problems and special occurrences of the electoral campaign. 
On 10 March, for example, one of the programmes looked at the Ivanovskii territorial district
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in the RSFSR and discussed the low levels of interest in the current campaign. The presenter 
interviewed one of the members of the district electoral commission who indicated that even 
at such a late stage in the electoral struggle, only two people had visited the pre-election 
information centre. Constituents were questioned regarding whom they would select as their 
deputy. The overwhelming reply was that the voters did not know. One respondent replied 
that she did not know any of the candidates’ names. Interviews with the residents either 
confirmed the voters’ low level of interest, or indicated their wish to protect their right to 
select their deputies secretly.
Programmes focusing on individual candidates were also broadcast. On Tuesday and 
Thursday afternoons and early evenings Central Television ran a series entitled Vlast' 
Sovetam (Power to the Soviets). These 30-minute broadcasts, which centred on candidates 
from the social organisations, presented voters with information on the registered candidates, 
such as their occupations, their platforms and certain aspects of their personal lives. Thus, 
on Tuesday, 14 February, at 7 pm (Moscow time), Central Television focused on a candidate 
from the Komsomol, Aleksandra Zemskova, a senior investigator of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs for the executive committee of the Moscow district soviet in Kaluga. The broadcast 
began with a fellow officer speaking of the qualities that personify a competent deputy; 
efficiency, professionalism and a dedication to work. After ten minutes, the candidate 
appeared and was shown making an arrest, counseling a youth, and meeting with veterans 
of the Afghan war (the broadcast coincided with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from 
Afghanistan): she was also shown with her husband. The broadcast resembled Western 
election programmes in the sense that it revealed the ‘human’ face of the candidate, not just 
her political attributes. It also appeared to present qualities the party and state found
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desirable in a deputy: an interest in law and order, concern for Soviet youth, respect for 
Soviet herosim and the family/^
Television proved to be a strong communications medium during the election campaign. 
The Centre for Political Research of the USSR Academy’s Centre for the Study of Public 
Opinion of the Institute of Sociology conducted a pre-election poll of citizens’ attitudes 
towards the forthcoming exercise of the franchise during the nomination stages of the election 
campaign. The section of the survey that dealt with the electorate’s informational sources 
found that 70.1 per cent of the voters received information on the elections from television, 
54.3 per cent from local press reports and 53.4 from the central p r e s s . A  poll of 320 
Muscovites conducted by Gosteleradio (the State Committee for Television and Radio) at the 
end of April 1989 revealed that 70 per cent of the respondents received information on the 
elections from the local television broadcast, Dobryi vecher, Moskva (Good Evening, 
Moscow), 55 per cent from central television broadcasts, 40 per cent from central radio and 
press reports, and 37 per cent from Moscow n e w s p a p e r s . I n  addition, the results of this
poll indicated that the regime’s concern for low attendance at pre-election meetings was
4-0
justified. The survey revealed that in comparison the public’s wide-spread consumption
o ^of election-related informatin from the mass media, only 22 per cent of the electorateK
received information on the electoral campaign through pre-election meetings, and through 
friends and acquaintances.^^ This information suggests that television was the primary 
medium of information for the Soviet voters during the election campaign. However, the 
same Gosteleradio poll reported that although television was frequently watched during the 
campaign, only 17 per cent of the respondents were completely satisfied with the level of 
openness that had been shown in coverage of the subject; 62 per cent felt, however, that it
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was at least partially fulfilled/^
Probably the most significant innovation in the 1989 election campaign was the 
requirement that candidates present to the electorate programmes of their intended activities. 
The addition of such programmes allowed voters to select their deputies (t" ) on the
basis of concrete issues rather than their social characteristics or work achievements. 
Therefore, deputies were required to respond to matters of local and national concern and 
defend them in the Congress. Programmes were publicised on television, in the press and 
on leaflets. Voters in Leningrad’s Vasileostrovskii Territorial District No.47, for instance, 
found the following stances of candidate Vladimir Gennad’evich Rachin from a pre-election 
leaflet:
—the transfer of all power to the soviets;
—the stabilisation of state retail prices for the next five years;
—khozraschet and lease-holding, the development of the co-operative 
movement and the construction of joint stock-holding societies;
—the transfer of ownership of the means of production to work collectives; 
—a new form of socialism, with the person as the focal point;
—the revival of Leningrad as a prominent scientific, historical and cultural 
centre;
—full (unreserved) implementation of the programme ‘Leningrad. Housing- 
2000’ ;
—a healthy improvement to the ecological situation and the organisation of 
research on the whole ecosystem: Ladoga, Neva, the Gulf of Finland and the 
surrounding areas;
-c lean  air and the development of an active ecological programme;
—the revision of a technical project on the protective constructions defending 
Leningrad from flooding, the acceleration and cleaning of buildings, the 
purification of drainage and the utilisation of waste products;
- th e  holding of a referendum for Leningraders on the construction of a 
tourist, cultural, entertainment and fitness centre;
—the guarantee that the elderly get what they deserve in their old age;
—the guarantee of social security for various categories of servicemen;
—an annual adjustment of pensions and stipends in accordance with price 
changes;
—the expansion of maternity privileges and the education of children up to
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three years of age;
- a  better future for each Soviet person/'^
A special edition of Leningradskii MetrostroiteV contained the programmes of the thiee 
aspirants for election in Leningrad’s Smol’nii territorial electoral district No. 58: the 
mathematician Ludvig Dmitrievich Fadeev; a doctor of philosophical sciences Nikolai 
Nikolaevich Skatov; and the writer and chief editor of the journal Neva, CPSU member Boris 
Nikolaevich Nikol’skii, who had served as a deputy in the Leningrad city soviet for three 
terms. Fadeev proposed ten major areas of concern which included the organisation of 
science and the utilisation of its achievements; the continuation of educational reform; 
economic conditions such as the redistribution of the state budget and the curtailment of the 
deficit; ecological matters; problems of youth education; the démocratisation of government; 
the construction of a rule of law state; social equality; foreign affairs such as improved 
relations with the USA and Western Europe and a concentration on the conditions of
developing states in decisions global ecological, health and cultural conditions; theA
furthering of international contacts; and the problems of Leningrad-the conservation of 
historical areas, control of air and water quality, and the making of Leningrad into a cultural 
and spiritual centre of the coun t ry . Cand i da t e  Skatov’s programme was concerned with 
ecological, economic, social and moral i s s u e s . N i k o l ’skii supported the ideas of 
perestroika and the proclamations of the party, the deepening and devloping of the process 
of démocratisation and glasnosf on the basis of a legal state, radical economic reform, 
opposition to an all-powerful bureaucracy, the revival of Leningrad and the defence of the 
principles of internationalisni.^’
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their fellow workers, and their abilities to apply the experience they gained working in the 
soviets and at high levels of political office as their reasons for standing. However, the first
as a deputy in the highest organ of state power. 61
5' '„'s‘The daily newspaper, Leningradskaya pravda, in a regular column, Anketa kandidata
,„„i
(Candidate’s Questionnaire), published a series of informative bulletins on the candidates,
their platforms and what they intended to do if they were elected. The candidates responded i
,1
to three questions: Why did you decide to become a candidate for people’s deputy? What 
are the main provisions of your programme and have you made any changes to them during
7
the course of the campaign? And what will you discuss at the Congress of People’s 
Deputies?^® Candidates tended to have a broad range of reasons for standing. For instance, 
the first deputy chairman of the Leningrad city soviet executive committee, Aleskei 
Bol’shakov, declared that he intended to stand ‘to move perestroika forward’, to make use 
of his work experience from the executive committee and to make the soviets the real system
: t |
of government, rather than the minis t r ies .Steelworker  Sergei Ivanov stated that he had 
worked for years with the people from the collective that nominated him and that he had 
,, earned his collègues’ trust. Most candidates included in these surveys mentioned the trust
i
i:
secretary of the Leningrad city party committee, Anatolii Gerasimov, noted as one of his Jireasons the fact that his election to the Congress of People’s Deputies would be his first time
As regards the contents of their election platforms, most of the Leningrad candidates , 
included commitments that related to the work situation (increasing wages and vacation Iperiods), social conditions (education, housing, rights of pensioners, young people and JIworking women), anti-inflation measures, the development of the legal state, cultural policies 
and individual rights. Several candidates surveyed indicated that they had made changes to I97
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their programmes following on the electorate’s suggestions. For instance, future St 
Petersburg Mayor Anatolii Sobchak, then employed as a professor of Law, pointed out that 
voters suggested he make changes in ‘important social and regional questions’, such as 
housing. He introduced into his platform such additions as the construction of new housing 
units, the development of a housing fund, more developments for young people and the 
creation of renter co-operatives.^^ Similarly, candidate Vladimir Rachin, mentioned above, 
stated that his concerns for the status of servicemen were the result of his dealings with the
i’ electorate.'’^  The items that most concerned voters in Leningrad found similar attention in 
 ^ Moscow. A survey of 2,879 Muscovites indicated that 40.8 per cent of the respondents 
considered that solving the housing question was the most important issue their future 
deputies needed to resolve; 38.7 per cent said environmental protection, and 27.9 per cent 
the establishment of the legal state.^
Finally, candidates were asked to present information on the topics they would discuss 
at the Congress of People’s Deputies if they were elected. Milling machine operator 
Valentin Kashin intended to discuss the adoption of a law on laws, the transfer of all power 
; ' to the soviets, a referendum on important state problems, methods of combating the deficit, 
and the status of deputies.*’^  Candidates were primarily concerned with the adoption of new 
legislation on the press, a new criminal code, and laws on powers of local government and 
référendums on youth. Other topics included the manner of electing the Supreme Soviet and 
its chief officers. Seven candidates intended to discuss legislative reforms, five the electoral 
process, five the devolution of local power, three the effectiveness of the Supreme Soviet, 
two increased freedom of access to information, two the Law on State Enterprise, two the 
transfer of power to the soviets at all levels, two curbing the deficit, two improving the
*  ■
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Despite the fact that candidates were obliged to present election platforms, they could not
'
guarantee their implementation. In addition, there were instances in which candidates
proposed platforms with virtually unattainable promises. For example, one contender 
promised to secure a completely clean environment at enterprises in the constituency within 
three years, while another undertook to increase procurements of imported goods pending 
the appearance of Soviet goods of the same q u a l i t y . I n  addition, servicemq^n T.T. 
Vatanskii, nominated in Akhtubinskii territorial district No. 124, based his programme on 
the immediate reduction of the size of the armed forces, a large increase in collective 
farmers’ pensions and the closure of all enterprises in Astrkhan oblast* that produced a 
detrimental effect on the environment.^^ Electors, on the whole, viewed these platforms 
with scepticism, despite the appealing proposals the programmes contained. Among 4,000 
voters surveyed in mid-April 1989, 60 per cent felt that candidates’ election platforms 
contained demagogic statements and unattainable promises.
In addition to voters selecting deputies on the basis of their platforms, they also chose 
their representative for certain personal qualities. The Institute of State and Law and the
■Institute of Sociology poll asked voters their preferences in respect of candidates’ qualities
,
(N ” 2,800), Respondents listed qualities that fell into five categories: quality and character
of knowledge; moral and ethical qualities; qualities necessary for the adoption and realisation 
of decisions; properties necessary for a leader and informal qualities.
For the first, voters thought most important a knowledge of the electorate’s needs (67.8
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per cent), broad education (40.9 per cent), a knowledge of the law (32.6 per cent), a 
knowledge of the workings of state organs (16.7 per cent). In terms of moral and ethical 
qualities, voters looked for integrity and incorruptibility (56.4 per cent), fairness (46.7 per 
cent), sensitivity and responsiveness (36 per cent), and honesty (30.7 per cent).
Voters rated their preferences in the following order of the qualities they deemed most 
necessary for the adoption and realisation of decisions: principles (45 per cent), firmness of 
purpose and persistence (44.6 per cent), boldness and decisiveness (39.8 per cent) and 
flexibility and diplomacy (16.8 per cent). Respondents viewed accountability (45.7 per cent), 
the ability to join and lead the people (43 per cent), devotion to perestroika (32.3 per cent) 
and civic activity (22.3 per cent) as qualities necessary for a leader. Finally, for informal 
qualities the ability to speak in front of people (48.4 per cent) the capacity to establish 
personal relations for the fulfilment of duties (42.2 per cent), personal charm and 
attractiveness (18.1 per cent) and reliability and presence (8 per cent) were the preferences 
of those questioned. Voters ranked moral and ethical qualities (43 per cent), necessary 
capacities and character of knowledge (40 per cent), qualities necessary for the adoption and
realisation of decisions (37 per cent), leadership qualities (36 per cent) and informal qualities
r-
(29 per cent) as the traits that were most important for a deputy to possess.
Poll participants were also asked which types of people they most preferred to be 
people’s deputies. Respondents listed men (40.6 per cent), people elected for the first time 
(37.2 per cent), middle-aged people (37.1 per cent), workers (35.9 per cent), teachers, 
doctors, engineers and other representatives of the intelligentsia (34.8 per cent), ordinary 
workers (34 per cent), people in the same occupation as the respondent (33.2 per cent), and
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CPSU members (32.3 per cent) as the types of candidates they preferred most of all. 
Included in the category of the candidates who were ‘those preferred’ by the voters were 
collective farmers (32 per cent), young people (31.8 per cent), figures from science and 
culture (30.5 per cent), people with low incomes (29.7 per cent), people with middle-level 
incomes (29 per cent), Komsomol members (27 per cent), people who do not belong to the 
party (25.8 per cent), servicemen (23.9 per cent), and popular front representatives (23.4 per 
cent). Those questioned stated that candidates whom they ‘least desired’ were leading 
workers (22.3 per cent), workers in communication (20.4 per cent), representatives of grass­
roots movements and organisations (19.2 per cent), people who were elected deputies before 
(18.9 per cent), women (18.6 per cent), workers in the admininstrative apparatus (16.7 per 
cent), co-operative workers (13.2 per cent), the elderly (12.2 per cent), and people with high 
incomes (11.2 per cent).'^'’
Campaign techniques also changed from previous elections. Prior to the 26 March 
election a corps of agitators literally knocked on doors to get voters to the polling stations. 
There were also significant ceremony involved with the ushering in of e l e c t i o n s . A s  was 
consistent with the liberalisation of the electoral process in other socialist states, the emphasis 
on agitation decreased in the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. 
In an interview with the author, the chairman of a ward electoral commission from the 
Sevastopol’ Territorial District of Moscow revealed that fewer agitators were working in this 
campaign than in the past. During previous elections, the canvassers were out in full force 
and nearly dragged the voters to the polling stations. Now they had some new roles. They 
still registered voters and discussed relevant issues with the electorate, but, on election day, 
the agitators primarily brought the ballot boxes to i n v a l i d s . T o  keep awareness of the
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elections high, election commissions sent reminders to voters, and these memorandums 
appeared in nevyspapers/'^ Electors in Leningrad’s Polytekhnik Territorial District No. 50, 
for instance, received the following document through the post:
The people deserve these deputies whom they elect. The right of the mandate 
of the people will be fought for by three candidates in the Polytekhnik 
electoral district.
Appeal of the district commission of the Polytekhnik Territorial Electoral 
District No. 50
Comrades!
You will decide the fate of the country and the fate of perestroika. First you 
will choose not just the best person, but a people’s deputy! He must inform 
the Congress of People’s Deputies of your problems and questions. You have 
the power to choose the most worthy and the strongest. The district meeting 
presented three of the candidates nominated by work collectives. They are:
Denisov, Anatolii Aleskeevich, born in 1934, member of the CPSU, doctor of 
teclinical sciences, professor at Leningrad’s M L Kalinin Polytechnic Institute.
Ivanenko, Tat’yana Nikolaevna, born 1952, non-party citizen, teacher in 
school No. 63 in the Kalinin district of Leningrad.
Churkov, Leonid Aleksandrovich, born 1955, member of the CPSU, director 
of the poly technical department of territorial medical association No. 12 of the 
Kalinin district.
In National Territorial District No. 19
Bol’shakov, Aleksei Alekseevich, born in 1939, deputy chairman of the 
executive committee of the Leningrad city soviet of people’s deputies, 
chairman of the planning committee of the I^ningrad city soviet.
The crucial stage of the electoral campaign, the pre-election agitation, is 
ensuing. By casting your ballot you will become more closely acquainted with 
the candidates and get to know them. The high requirements and principle of 
your evaluation of the candidates and, most of all, the elections are moving 
ahead. You will become the creators of the history of our country, not only 
in words, but in deeds.
Unfortunately, at this difficult moment which is determining the fate of the 
country, demagogues are appearing publishing lists with appeals to min the
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elections. To whom is this beneficial? To you?!-hardly. These pseudo­
democrats are forcing their own views of democracy and openness 
proclaiming ‘better chaos’ tlirough the standard of democracy and are 
prejudiced by crushing the laws on elections.
We appeal to you, the heirs of the glory of Petersburg workers, intelligentsia 
and students, to participate actively in the meetings of candidates for deputy. 
By our words and deeds an investment in the revolutionary transformation of 
our society will be brought in.
Everyone to the elections! You give Power to the people! On 26 March you 
will decide the fate of the county. Your vote will decide this.
District electoral commission of the Polytekhnik Territorial electoral district 
No. 50.
Addresses of electors’ clubs:
School No. 199, Timurov Street, house No. 8/2 
School No. 71, Vavilov Street, house No. 5 
School No. 93, 31/5 Grazhdandskii Promenade 
Dormitory, Kultury, Promenade house No. 31.^^
The arrangements at the polling stations were also altered. Voting booths were now
So
located en route to the ballot boxes, even in single-candidate constituencies, the electors had 
to enter the voting booth before dropping their ballots in the ballot box. Presentation at the 
polling stations was also changed. The former merely ceremonial activity of voting was 
amended. There were no more flowers around the ballot boxes. The Young Pioneers,
’ ‘guarding’ the ballot boxes, disappeared from some of the polling places. The chairman of
the ward commission identified above informed the author that some individuals, particularly 
older citizens, were somewhat disappointed at the absence of ceremony at the stations. 
However, there were still some old tricks used to lure voters to the polls: for instance, in a 
students’ residence in Moscow, a supply of Coca-Cola, a sporadically available item in the 
f  city, was located on the same floor as the voting area on election day.^^
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A letter sent to the weekly magazine Ogonek (Small Fire)- but never published in that 
periodical-in June 1989 recounts that elsewhere Soviet officials used similar tactics to lure 
voters to the polls during the elections.
On 21 May 1989, the second round of elections for the Congress of People’s 
Deputies of the USSR took place in our town of Vershino-Darasunskii, in 
Chita oblast*.
The high point of the campaign to ‘get out the vote’ was as follows: 
An announcement was made that anyone who came in to vote would be given 
ration coupons for alcoholic products. And that’s exactly what happened. 
The procedure was simple: You’d come up to the electoral commission’s 
table, say your name and address and they’d give you a ballot with the names 
of the candidates for deputy and a coupon allowing the purchase of one bottle 
of vodka. And, so that there would be no confusion with the monthly coupons 
(original emphasis), the ‘election’ coupons were printed on coloured paper 
[Note: The ration coupon for April is on white paper with number 4 on it, 
and the ‘election’ coupon is on coloured paper with no month indicated.]
Only the ‘election’ coupons were being honoured. In the town of Svetlii, they
made it even easier for someone showing up at the town soviet to vote: they 
gave out election ballots and you could buy vodka and zakuski right there at 
the snack stand.
The reactions of the town’s residents varied:
1. Some said: ‘I ’m not going to vote. They want to buy me with a bottle 
of vodka?!’
2. Some came in, took a coupon and a ballot, and without crossing out a 
single name (there were two ballots for a single deputy seat), dropped the 
ballot in the ballot box.
3. Some voted and used the coupon as intended.
4. Some voted, but did not take the coupon.
5. Some voted, took the coupon, b u f did not use it as intended (or just 
destroyed it).
6. Some voters wrote on the ballot: ‘I ’m voting for the bottle.’
In conclusion, I would like to ask a question: Can you imagine a 
better way to discredit the elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies?
Residents of the town:
L. M. Kartuzova
and dozens of other
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signatures
P .S. All of the above signed work for the Darasunskii Geology Research 
Expedition/^
Some mention must be made of citizens’ attitudes towards the elections. A poll of 1,200 
Muscovite workers aged 18-30 was conducted by the Sociological Services of the weekly 
newspaper Mcskovksie novosti (Moscow News) three weeks before the election. Forty per 
cent of those surveyed approved of the new electoral system, a figure that included 35 per 
cent of blue-collar workers interviewed, 43 per cent of engineers and technicians, 53 per cent 
of workers from the creative fields, 55 per cent of executives and 36 per cent of workers in 
the service sector. Three per cent of the respondents disapproved of the new electoral 
system, which included two per cent of blue-collar workers, four per cent of engineers and 
technicians, two per cent of workers from creative fields and 18 per cent of executives.
 ^ However, evidence suggests that those surveyed did not feel the new electoral law was much 
of an improvement on its predecessor. Thirty-one per cent of the target group could not see 
any difference between the old system and the new system of voting. Also, 16 per cent did 
not care about the elections and ten per cent were undecided. When asked if they intended 
to participate in the elections, 62 per cent of the respondents indicated that they planned to 
vote, while 15 per cent predicted they would not.^®
, Voting for the Congress of People’s Deputies began in the social (or public)
organisations’ conferences on 11 March. The first deputies were elected from the All-Union 
Society of Inventors and Rationalisers, when five deputies, all males, were elected to 
represent this association in the Congress. Over the next few days elections proceeded in 
other organizations. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union held its elections on 15
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March at an enlarged Central Committee plenum. As stated earlier, of particular interest was 
the fact that for the 100 seats granted to it under the electoral law, the CPSU proposed 
precisely 100 candidates. In a speech made on 15 March, CPSU electoral commission 
chairman, V.A. Kopyturg, argued that despite the equal number of candidates to seats there 
was competition and debate involved in the CPSU’s candidate selection. He indicated that 
members in over 105,00 party organizations participated in candidacy discussions, 31,500 
nominees were proposed, and the Central Committee received 12,000 telegrams, letters and 
extracts from resolutions adopted at party meetings. Furthermore, he stated that when the 
Central Committee selected its final 100 candidates, it did so from a list of 312 potential 
a s p i r a n t s . A l l  candidates, not surprisingly, were elected. However, there was far from 
unanimous approval. Among Politburo members, Ryzhkov received the least number of 
votes cast against-10; Gorbachev received 12 votes against, and Yegor Ligachev received the 
most votes against, 78; among the 52 candidates who were elected unanimously, 12 were 
manual labourers.
The elections in the social organisations, although contested, can be said to have been 
geared to ensure possibly greater representation for certain groups that might not have fared 
as well if nominated in the constituencies. In the districts and social organisations, voters 
elected 334 women to the Congress of People’s Deputies by 26 March and by May 352 were 
elected. However, 75 seats were more or less automatically guaranteed to women by the 
election law as members of women’s councils and members of the Association of Soviet 
Women (although candidates did not necessarily have to be women); moreover women held 
ten of the CPSU’s seats. Although, after the first round, women increased their 
representation in the Congress from 16.6 per cent of candidates to 18.6 per cent of deputies,
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this number is much smaller than the 492 (32.8 per cent) that served in the Supreme Soviet 
during 1984-89. Women’s representation in the Congress is discussed in much greater detail 
in Chapter 4.
Voting in the > took place from 8 am to 10 pm on Sunday, 26 March: this
was two hours less than in the previous elections. However, Soviet interview sources 
indicated to the author that in some constituencies, voters began showing up at the polling 
station by 6 am, as in the past. As to the casting of the vote, rather than placing an 
unmarked ballot paper into the ballot box, in open view of all present at the station, voters 
now had to proceed through a voting booth, draw a curtain and make their choices in secret 
before dropping their votey into the box.
There were a number of changes in the results from the previous elections. First, as 
expected with less pressure in agitation, voter turnout declined. Although turnout was 
significantly higher than is customary in most of the West-Australia with compulsory voting 
a notable exception-the 1989 results showed a serious decline from the 1984 turnout for the 
Supreme Soviet elections. Of the 192,575,165 registered eligible voters, 172,840,130 or 89.8 
per cent took part in the e lec tions.T ab le  2.2 provides the results of voter turnout for the 
1984 and 1989 elections by republic. Overall, voter turnout decreased by nearly 10.2 per cent 
and the mean total of all republics was approximately a nine per cent decrease. There is, 
moreover, an apparent trend. In republics in which there were nationalist sentiments raised 
during the previous year, the decrease in voter turnout was above the mean. Armenia’s 
decline was three standard deviations above the republican a v e r ag e .L i th u a n ia ’s turnout 
was within two standard deviations above the mean. Latvia, the RSFSR, Estonia and
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Moldavia all had turnout declines one standard deviation above the republican average. 
However, it is also important that those areas which, until the late 1980s, traditionally 
exhibited the most support for the Soviet state tend to have a decline in voter turnout below 
the republican mean: Belorussia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia, Georgia 
and Kirgizia all showed voter turnout declines one standard deviation below the mean. 
Azerbaidzhan had the lowest drop in voter turnout of the country, two standard deviations 
below the mean.
Table 2.2 Voter Turnout: 1984 and 1989 (%)
Union Republic 1984 1989 Decline*
RSFSR 99.98 87 12.98
Ukraine 99.99 93.4 6.59
Belorussia 99.99 94.2 5.79
Uzbekistan 99.99 95.8 4.19
Kazakhstan 99.99 93.7 6.29
Georgia 99.99 97 2.99
Azerbaidzhan 99.99 98.5 1.49
Lithuania 99.99 82.5 17.49
Moldavia 99.99 90.5 9.49
Latvia 99.99 86.9 13.09
Kirgizia 99.99 97 2.99
Tadzhikistan 99.99 93.9 6.09
Armenia 99.99 71.9 28.09
Turkmenia 99.99 96.1 3.89
Estonia 99.99 87.1 12.89
Total 99.99 89.80 10.19
Mean* 99.99 91.03 8.96
Max* 99.99 98.5 28.09
Min* 99.98 71.9 1.49
Std* 0 6.8 6.8
* Author’s computations; Sources: ‘Soobshchenie Tsentral’noi izsbiratel’noi kommissii ob itogakh vyborov v
Verkliovnyi Sovet SSSR sostoyavshiklisya 4 marta 1984 goda’, Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1984, No. 11, 
pp. 199-203, p. 199; ‘Soobshchenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii ob itogakh vyborov narodnykh deputatov 
SSSR v 1989 godu’, Izvestiya, 5 April 1989.
Soviet citizens elected 1,225 or approximately 81.6 per cent of the 1,500 people’s 
deputies from territorial and national-territorial electoral districts on 26 March. Run-off 
elections were conducted at a later date in one territorial district owing to the death of the
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deputy. Electors in two national-territorial districts had to go to the polls again because in 
neither did 50 per cent of the voters turn up at the po l l s .N a t iona l ly ,  repeat and run-off 
elections had to be held in 274 electoral districts. Included in this group were 76 districts 
that originally ran more than two candidates and 195 districts with one or two candidates.
Several key defeats occurred during the contest of 26 March 1989. Most notable was the 
defeat of the several prominent members of the Leningrad city Party committee. Aleksei 
Alekseevich Bol’shakov was defeated, having received only 49 per cent of the vote in 
Leningrad city national-territorial district No. 19. Also defeated in the elections on this day 
were the city party committee first secretary, Anatolii Nikolaevich Gerasimov, and (as it will 
be recalled) the first secretary of the oblast* party committee (and Politburo candidate 
member), Yuri Fillipovich Solov’ev.*  ^There were also major defeats of party leaders in the 
Ukraine: Kiev city committee first secretary, Konstantin Masik, and Valentin Zgurskii, 
chairman of the Kiev city soviet executive committee, failed to win seats.
The defeated functionaries aired their thoughts about what happened. Solov’ev, in an 
interview with Leningradskaya pravda, noted that individuals in party and state positions had 
to face the voters’ three bones of contention. These included the problems of the past and 
future and the inability to make wild promises: ‘possessing complete information about the 
situation in the country and in the region about existing resources and possibilities, and being 
realist[s] [they] could not, as some candidates allowed themselves to do, promise the voters 
a land flowing with milk and h o n e y . T h e  Khabarovsk Territorial Party Committee first 
secretary, V.S. Pasternak, indicated that many party officials were not accustomed to the 
practice of having to win the trust of the people.
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Repeat and run-off elections took place between 9 April and 21 May. The first round 
of mn-off elections was conducted in districts where there were more than three candidates 
but none received more that 50 per cent of the vote. Voter turnout decreased further during 
this second round of the voting. On 14 May more elections were held in districts in which 
there was no winner. During this part of the campaign the number of candidates per seat 
greatly increased. In Kishinev, the Moldavian capital, 25 aspirants competed for the 
mandate; 33 candidates stood in Kiev. However, the record for candidates was in Leningrad 
city national-territorial district No. 19, where 34 candidates ran for a single seat. A total of 
1,216 candidates stood for election in 198 districts, a mean of 6.2 candidates per seat. 
Included in these districts were 127 that had four or more candidates. Voters could choose 
between two candidates in 13 districts. However, there were 15 districts where candidates 
ran u n o p p o sed .D e p u t ie s  were elected in just 72 districts after this round of the elections; 
after this part of the campaign, two candidates stood in 125 districts.^
Repeat elections were also conducted in the social organisations between April and May. 
Candidates competed for the right to represent the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR 
Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, the USSR Union of Artists, the Soviet Fund for Peace, 
and the USSR Society of Friends of the Cinema. However, the choice among candidates was 
much smaller in the social organisations during the subsequent rounds than in the districts: 
32 candidates competed for 18 vacant seats, 1.8 candidates per seat.^^ All remaining social 
organisation deputies were elected before the Congress of People’s Deputies met on 25 May.
The elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies also focused on the campaign 
activities and election of several notable figures in Soviet society. The contest which
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received the most attention in the West (and also in the Soviet Union) was that between 
Chairman of Gosstroi (State Committee for Construction), Boris Yeltsin, and the chairman 
of the ZiL automobile factory, Yevgenii Brakov, in which Yel’tsin won a landslide victoiy, 
with nearly 90 per cent of the v o t e s M o r e o v e r ,  also winners, albeit in run-off elections, 
were former dissidents Roy Medvedev, in the Lenin district of Moscow, and Academician 
Andrei Sakharov, in the USSR Academy of Sciences.
Conclusion
The elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies expanded the opportunities for choice and 
political participation on different levels compared with previous elections. First, voters 
were able to choose their representatives, in most instances from among more than one 
candidate. Second, the electorate could make its choices of candidate on the basis of 
concrete stances, the election platforms. Nomination rights were also expanded from mass 
meetings of social organisations and military units to meetings of local inhabitants in places
(Aof resi idence. Also, voters could put forward their candidates from the floor during 
nomination meetings, and the number of candidates discussed rose dramatically. Other 
outlets for political participation increased over previous elections: most notably, with the 
creation of the social organisation seats there were now places for 750 more deputies in the 
supreme representative body. In addition, citizens had more opportunities to participate in 
organisational work as the size of electoral commissions was also increased.
Although sometimes considered defective by the electorate, the flow of information on 
candidates and the elections increased in the course of the camapaign, which ran twice as
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long as in the past. Also media coverage of the elections, particularly on television, brought 
more information to the voters. Reports covered nomination meetings, profiles of candidates 
and preparations for the elections. Most important, candidates had to present their potential 
constituents with programmes of their choices with a greater degree of information about 
their priorities and public issues than ever before.
As a result of these and other changes in the Soviet electoral system, the composition of 
the Congress of People’s Deputies altered somewhat from its predecessor, the
Supreme Soviet. First, the opening up of the nomination system and the introduction of 
competing candidates ushered in more professionals and middle-level managers than in 
the past. Furthermore, the 1988 electoral law introduced an element of separation of powers 
into the election system by prohibiting People’s Deputies of the USSR from being 
. simultaneously ministers of the USSR. There was also, however, a decline in the election 
of representatives of certain social groups as a result of the new electoral system: women, 
manual labourers, collective farmers and young people have seen their numbers decline in 
■ the highest levels of state power, whereas men and communist party members increased their 
numbers. This result is not surprising. Communist party membership had long been a de 
facto  key to social mobility, which would include educational opportunities. Thus, the 
majority of managers, academicians and other high-ranking officials probably owed their 
status, at least partially, to their party cards, as well as to their own achievements and 
capabilities. And, as was reflected in the opinion polls, preferred candidates included those 
who were educated and party members. This seems to represent at least a partial explanation 
for such an increase in CPSU members in the Congress. Equally, there were elements of 
manipulation, slander and even some illegality in some instances throughout the campaign.
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Thus, the greater number of professionals in its composition indicated that the Congress of
In theory, the elections introduced greater levels of accountability of the party to the 
people. This was the first step towards elections in which there were guaranteed seats for
will illustrate in greater depth to what extent the elections to the USSR Congress of People’s 
Deputies exhibited continuity, contradiction and departure from earlier procedures.
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People’s Deputies appeared to be more qualified to face challenges and function as a working
parliament, rather than a rubber-stamp institution as was its predecessor, the old-style 
Supreme Soviet.
the first secretaries or other members of the party committees. As was exhibited by the Ielections to the Congress, party leaders who did not take public demands into consideration
or seem to be alienated from citizens in their territorial divisions could be voted out of the "i
state organs. Thus, a further check was introduced into the political arena.
Nevertheless, the elections were far from free and fair. First, not all deputies were 
elected by the electorate. Special seats were set aside for public organisations in which only |J
special individual^could cast their ballots. Second, not every seat was contested. Third,
^lîalternative political parties could not compete for seats. The CPSU maintained a monopoly Iof power throughout the campaign. Therefore, the elections, while departing from earlier 
Soviet practices^ contained some ‘holdovers’ from the past. The following three chapters
discuss, in detail the deputy turnover during the 1989 elections, women and the 1989 a
:elections and criticisms of the 1989 elections and post-election developments. These chapters
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Chapter 3. Continuity, Contradiction and Departure in 
Soviet Deputy Re-election, 1984-1989
119
::-î
The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether the electoral reform measures 
implemented by Gorbachev in 1989 had an effect on creating a new corps of national-level
,:2
deputies by focusing on the social composition of the parliamentarians elected to the USSR 
Congress of People’s Deputies and comparing these features to those of their counterparts 
elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet. One of the key topics that I wish to address is
120
determining if there were any differences between those deputies who were elected under 
semi-competitive conditions and representatives who were selected to the USSR Supreme 
Soviet by some form of centrally-determined quota system. This type of analysis will help 




«iMy main thesis in this chapter is that electoral reform measures altered radically the t
Ioccupation and demographic composition of the country’s highest legislative organ, ;||
Moreover, the deputies who staffed the Congress had a definite impact on the further
development of the political system. Therefore, the electoral reform measures implemented 
in March 1989 influenced political participation in the creation of a new parliamentary elite.
'IThe characteristics of this new parliamentary corpus can be described as follows: the new Ideputies were overwhelmingly male;% was even more highly represented by CPSU membersV'Iaa. : I
deputies-albeit, the corpus witnessed a reduction in leading officials previous years.
A greater number of lower and middle echelon party officials gained advancement into the
Congress than they had in the pre-reform USSR Supreme Soviet. The deputies were better 
educated than their predecessors. This is reflected in the higher proportion of managers and 
representatives of what could arguably termed as intelligentsia. The deputies were also 
extremely diverse in their outloooks. Other authors have noted that this was reflected in the
Î
ft;
way in which the deputies cast their ballots in roll-call votes and had them recorded and 
IÛpublic lly disseminated!^ therefore, this information need not be addressed in this study. 
It should be noted that this data’s publication also indicated that the leadership must have had 
some serious desires for the electorate to take an interest in their representatives 
performance. Conversely, the reformers also intended for the deputies to take their 
constituents’ demands very seriously. This action constituted a significant departure from 
previous electoral and governing practices. In addition, and this could perhaps be considered 
most crucial, is that the vast majority of the deputies were new. As it will be demonstrated 
below, there was a consistent corps of deputies who were constantly in the country’s 
legislature during the Brezhnev-Chernenko periods. The elections to the Congress radically 
altered this facet of Soviet politics. Therefore, in terms of opening up the political arena 
to a new corps of deputies, electoral reform greatly enhanced political participation. Other 
social groups, often well-represented in the Supreme Soviet under less competitive 
conditions, had fewer parlimentarians elected after electoral reform measures were 
implemented. In particular this can be observed among women, the elderly, deputies under 
30 years of age and deputies who did not belong to the CPSU. The following chapter 
considers women’s representation in the new parliament.
The present chapter is divided into several sections. In the first section I analyze the
composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet from the late 1950s until the early 1980s. Here
I rely extensively on the work of Roger A. Clarke and Anatolii Shaikevich. In the second
t o
section of the chapter I analyze patterns of deputy re-election from 1966 1984. Here I 
compare results that were published by Ronald Hill and those which I have derived from my 
own databases on the 1979 and 1984 compositions of the USSR Supreme Soviet.^ Section
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The Composition of the Supreme Soviet From Khrushchev to Brezhnev
The composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet of any convocation would be
list of deputies; some numerical indicators... [that were] irrefutable information 
of the democracy of the soviet system.
three compares the deputies re-elected in 1989 to those who were previously in the Supreme ISoviet.^ Finally, this chapter discusses the presence of re-elected deputies who were elected 8:
to key state positions by the Congress, their representation in the USSR Supreme Soviet and
the extent to which they were elected to the revamped Soviet parliament’s committees and
,1commissions.




The earliest study on the composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet was conducted by Roger 
A. Clarke and published in 1967. His investigation had two primary objectives. First, he 
sought to identify which deputies elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet in the convocations 
between 1958-1966 were most prominent and what relationship these deputies had to their 
overall occupation structure. This study attempted to uncover whether or not there were any 
occuaptional categories in the population which were over-represented or under-represented 
based on the figures presented in the 1959 Census. His second objective was closely related
'ftto his first. By analyzing the occupational composition of the Supreme Soviets in the years 
concerned, he hoped to draw some conclusions on the nature of deputy selection.^
Clarke’s research brought forth significant findings. First, he noted that there were certainly 
particular groups which had advantages being selected to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Clarke
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the lack of consistency that was available in the patterns of, for instance, the state structures
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determined that ‘ [t]he group with consistently the highest representation is government, party,
■IKomsomol and trade union who together compromise around 35 per cent of all deputies !<:'I
[but], over 80 times their weight in the occupied population’.^  In addition, other groups
such as writers were over-represented, while the ITR (engineering and teclinical workers) :were most under-represented. The ‘under-representation’ of two very large employment
agroups-agricultural and non-agricultural workers, allowed for this situation to occur.'' Clarke
'■idetermined that because of the high proportion of state and party officials that occupied 
positions in the Supreme Soviet, nearly one third could be considered ex officio members of 
the institution.^
Clarke also focused his study upon women and identified that the proportion of 
women worker-deputies was very large and that the proportion of women employed as 
agricultural workers was nearly equal to its share in the population. Moreover, he mentioned 
that ‘women actually form[ed] a greater proportion of the worker-deputies than they [did] of 
all workers in the occupied population.’^  As the present author argues below, the tendency §
■ f tr :
of women to be over-represented among worker deputies was also present among the 1979 
and 1984 convocations of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
.i.i
Clarke also discussed different patterns of deputy selection. His main assumptions 
were that either local party committees could have set representation norms or they were
'Idetermined centrally. Based on the stability that the Supreme Soviet demonstrated in the 
period that he studies, he determined that the levels of consistency in the occupation levels 
suggested that these deputies were generally centrally determined. Nevertheless, regarding
%
and ministries, he conceded there must have been some degree of local input. Therefore, 
he suggested that
[p]erhaps the process of choice of deputies is analogous to the working out of 
enterprise economic plans. An initial central directive would indicate the 
number of deputies to come from each oblast’ and republic and any general 
changes of policy on the composition of the new Supreme Soviet. Local 
committees would then produce a draft list of deputies which would be based 
on the previous but incorporate any suggested modifiactions, and this would 
be finally revised centrally.'®
Shaikevich, focusing on deputies who served from 1966 until the 1980s^has also noted 
that certain groups had higher representation in the USSR Supreme Soviet than others. 
While acknowledging that the share of women and workers grew slowly grown from 2 to 33 
per cent and 3 to 35 pdr cent respectively and that the percentage of collective farmers 
declined from 19 to 16 per cent, he pointed out to the relative consistency of other groups. 
For instance, he pointed to the consistent levels of representation of non-party citizens (about 
28 per cent), the intelligentsia (9-10 per cent), party workers (16-17 per cent), workers in 
the soviets (13-15 per cent), Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labour (15- 
18 per cent). Moreover, there appeared to be relatively similar levels among the different 
nations represented in the Supreme Soviet."
Nevertheless, he claimed that the USSR’s state configuration of the USSR helped 
ensure the membership stability of the Supreme Soviet. Moreover, it was clear that some
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nations benefited from this situation. For instance, he noted that there were ‘fewer Latvians 
than Chuvash in the USSR, and fewer Chuvash than Germans.’ However, there were 
inevitably more Latvians than Chuvash and more Chuvash than Germans elected to the 
Supreme Soviet during these time periods (he fails, however, to produce statistics for this 
comparison). According to Shaikevich, ‘The reason is clear: Latvia [was] a union republic, 
Chuvashiya [was] an ASSR and the Germans had no autonomous state.’ It is also important 
to note that in deputy selections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, smaller nations, would often 
be over-represented among parliamentarians in comparison to their population per one million 
individuals. Based on figures Shaikevich computed from the 1970 USSR Population Census, 
the Dolgany, for instance, had what equated to 203 deputies per one million head of 
population. However, larger nationalities like Russians had 5.4 deputies per million people 
and Ukrainians had 4.2 deputies per one million head of population.'^
Shaikevich’s findings of the occupation structures of USSR Supreme Soviet deputies 
very much reiterates those top-heavy features of the selection to the legislature that Clarke 
stressed. For instance he notes that officials of 'oblast’ staffs (and higher) had 80 tunes more 
chances of finding themselves in the USSR Supreme Soviet than raion staffs.’ However, he 
also notes that this latter group was ‘200 times’ more likely to be elected to the Supreme 
Soviet than for example, ‘cooks, who, in agreement with Lenin, would, under communism, 
learn to manage the state’. Again using the per million head of population figure to illustrate 
the extensiveness of preferences for certain groups in the USSR Supreme Soviet, Shaikevich 
notes that there were 5,130 per million officials who occupied positions in oblast’ levels or 
higher, 67 persons per million in raion positions while only 7 per million workers (the group 
he used included locomotive , miners, textile workers and drivers) were elected
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to the USSR Supreme Soviet during the period of zastoi. Another important finding to which 
Shaikevich pointed was that at the same time there were certain ‘mass socio-professional’ 
groups such as cleaners (2.5 million), nurses (1.3 million), hospital orderlies (1.6 million), 
janitors and and watchmen (1.6 million) who were never represented in the legislature at this 
time.





existed at this time (the 1974 UK Parliament, 1987 Italian Parliament and 1983 US
ICongress), Shaikevich noted several important distinctions between the different national 
legislatures. For instance, he noted a signficant difference in the proportion of women in 
each parliament. Whereas in the 1966-1984 period women comprised an average of 31 per
X?"cent of all Supreme Soviet deputies, they comprised only 11 per cent of Italian deputies and 
senators and 6 per cent of American representatives and senators.''' Unfortunately,
Shaikevich did not take this point of reference further, and, in particular, he did not analyze 
the position of women in politically powerful positions at that time, discussing their 
n^gmbership in parliamentary or Congressional Committees-to name but a few instances- 
which would have brought out more information on where women fell comparatively in the ft#
ft?:political systems,'^ indicating that the quantity of women that the Soviet system purported 
to integrate into its politics was not a substitute for the qualitative participation that women 
parliamentarians achieved in their respective legislatures. To bridge the gap in this literature, 
the present author compares women deputies’ participation in the pre-reform USSR Supreme 
Soviet to their efforts in the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies in the following chapter. ft|
I"
Age structure was another factor which Shaikevich analyzed in comparative
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perspective. His conclusions were that the USSR Supreme Soviet was on average a 
somewhat younger legislature than its foreign counterparts. For instance, in 1966 the typical 
deputy age was 44.9 years old. Subsequently, deputies’ mean ages were 45.4 and 48.3 in 
1974 and 1984 respectively. However, the average age of the UK 1974 Parliament was 
48.8, the 1983 Congress was 50.4 (including 49.4 in the House of Representatives and 54.8 
in the Senate) and 51.9 in Italy (49.7 in the Chamber of Deputies and 56.4 in the Senate) for 
the period of study.
Table 3.1 Basic Professional Groups in Parliaments (%)
Source: Anatolii Shaikevich, 'Portret v manere Rubensa: Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR epokliizastoya’, Obshchestvennye 
nauki i sovremmenost’, 1991, No. 4, pp. 105-118, Table 1, at p. 106.
Shaikevich also noted different occupational structures among, in particular, the USSR 
Supreme Soviet, and the Italian and British Parliaments (he made no mention of the US
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USSR Italy UK :Occupation 1966 - 84 1987 1974 :X;Party Workers 16 6 1.4
State Officials 19 6 -
Generals
Officials of Economic
4 - - ft:
1Organizations
Heads of Scientific Research 
Institutes and Institutions of
8 9 24
1
Higher Education 1.6 - -
Scientific Associates 
Lecturers in Institutions of
4.5 ft's;
ftHigher Education - 8.4 - ft;'
Teachers - 10.6 10 ft:
Doctors 1.1 6 1.6
Economists, Businessmen 0.4 4 7.6 ft:*
Journalists, Publicists 0.3 11 10.8
Lawyers 0.1 24 18.4
Engineers 0.6 3 3.5
Workers 24 2 6.2 ftl




its significant composition of teachers, academics and doctors and the ‘economic character’ 
of the British Parliament due to the domination of representatives from ‘opposing labour and 
capital’.'^
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Congress) which are contained in Table 3.1. Among the Soviet deputies there were higher 
numbers of party and state functionaries, generals, workers and peasants than in the British 
or Italian parliaments. Data on their respective memberships in the Supreme Soviet, with 
the exception of generals-who constituted 4 per cent of the deputy corpus at this time-is imentioned earlier in the chapter. The Italian and British Parliaments (listed respectively), 
in contrast, were staffed by more teachers (10.6 and 10 per cent) and engineers (3 and 3.5 
per cent). Moreover, they also contained a higher portion of economists, journalists and 
lawyers. In comparison, the Soviet representatives from these professions were virtually
ftinsignificant during the Brezhnev-Chernenko periods. Therefore, while Shaikevich does not 
label it as such, the USSR Supreme Soviet can be characterized as either (or perhaps both) 
a ‘partyist’ or ‘statist’ institution based on its professional composition. He does, however.
draw his readers’ attention to the ‘humanitarian character’ of the Italian Parliament due to
I
What is significant is that Shaikevich took his study further than an analysis of 
biographical characteristics and determined that there was a positive correlation between the 
factors of age (in particular those deputies older than 40 years of age), male sex, higher 
education and membership in the nomeklatum^^ in deputy selection to the USSR Supreme
:
Soviet during the 1966-1984 period. (I should state here that based on the criteria that
%
Shaikevich lists for inclusion in the nomenklatura, the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress 
of People’s Deputies could be considered to have broken this trend. This is indeed a #
,
significant factor in establishing a departure from previous electoral trends.) However, he 
noted that there were conflicting results regarding youth, female sex, non-party affiliation,
which was usually connected with ‘the toilers’ and those who were not officials such as 
peasants, workers, teachers and doctors. Therefore, he established shkaly vlasti (scales of •Ipower) to reflect the ‘vertical structure of the Supreme Soviet’ which reflected a person’s 
likelihood of entering into the legislature. Those who fell under the first set of correlations 
were more likely to have a much higher scale of power than the latter.'^ Thus, the USSR
y
Supreme Soviet during the zastoi period was fonned by pre-established selection patterns and 
positions were set aside for particular ‘job slots’ much like the elite members and certain 
workers who held positions in the CPSU Central Committee.^®
:t
Therefore, these studies of the USSR Supreme Soviet can provide the present analysis 
with several conclusions. First, the CPSU and Soviet state officials tried to create a national- 
level legislature which was more akin to a microcosm of society^what is conventionally 
acknowledged as a working parliament. Therefore, this particular institution contained
certain population groups which were not as highly represented in parliamentary structures 
in other countries. The deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet were predominantly male, like Iparliamentarians in other countries^ howeven there was a higher proportion of women among 
their ranks. Soviet deputies tended to be, on average, younger than their foreign 
counterparts. However, it should be noted that there was a very high number of deputies 
who were frequently re-elected. Therefore, the median age of the deputies increased after IIeach convocation. There were more party and state officials among the deputies than
'"'ft':legislators in other countries. Significantly higher numbers of workers and peasants were 
found in the USSR Supreme Soviet than the European bodies Shaikevich studied.
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Conversely, those professions which were in the greatest abundance in the Italian Parliament 
and the British House of Commons-lawyers, doctors, teachers, engineers and economists-for 
instance, were significantly under-represented in the supreme organ of state power in the 
USSR. A second point to recount was that those individuals falling under the category of 
state and party officials had better chances of being USSR Supreme Soviet deputies and,
Deputy Re-election, 1966-1984
according to Shaikevich, having higher ‘scales of power’ ratings. The next section of this
chapter focuses on another indicator of power and continuity in the Soviet political system, 
deputy re-election to the USSR Supreme Soviet.
Ronald J. Hill established that re-election to the USSR Supreme Soviet revealed some type 
of pecking order in the Soviet political heirarchy. Of the 1,517 deputies who were elected 
in 1970, 623 (41.1 per cent) had been members of the 1966 Supreme Soviet and 894 I(58.9 per cent) dropped out. Using information drawn from biographical sources. Hill
compared the re-elected deputies based on several personal criteria: gender, party Ïmembership status, education, age, nationality and occupation.^'
5
x:Hill determined patterns of ‘bias’ based on the criteria. First, men had greater 
chances to be re-elected than women. There were 1,092 men (71.98 per cent) and 425 
women (28.02 per cent) elected in 1970. Among the deputies who remained from the 
1966 Supreme Soviet there were 557 men (51 per cent) and 66 women (15.3 per cent).
Second, CPSU members had greater chances of being re-elected than did their
non-party counterparts. The total of full CPSU members and candidates for CPSU
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membership elected was 1,151 in 1966 and from this group 569 (49.4 per cent) were re­
elected. This compares to only 54 of the 362 (14.9 per cent) non-party citizens and 
Komsomol members in the same category. Third, Hill indicated that there was a close 
relationship between party affiliation, sex and re-election and that among the 980 male 
party members 531 (54.2 per cent) were re-elected. Fourth, deputies with higher 
education were more likely to be re-elected than lesser educated representatives. Of 
831 deputies with either complete or incomplete higher education elected in 1966, 481 
(57.9 per cent) were re-elected in 1970; whereas, 12 of 82 deputies with primary education 
(14.6 per cent) and 130 of 600 who achieved either secondary or incomplete 
secondary education (21.7 per cent) found themselves in the USSR Supreme Soviet 
for the following convocation. Fifth, certain age groups had advantages over others in 
being re-elected. For instance, deputies between the ages of 50-69 were re-elected in 
the highest percentages. Among the 523 who were elected in 1966, 329 (62.9 per cent) 
were deputies in 1970. Also with strong representation was the over 70 group; 11 of 24 
deputies (45.8 per cent) were re-elected in 1970. Most disadvantaged, however, were the 
deputies under 30 years of age. Only 13 of 123 (10.6 per cent) found themselves 
members of the subsequent convocation.
The other major areas that Hill analyzed were re-election according to nationality and 
occupational status. Clearly the nationality most favœed in 1970 were the Ukrainians asA
64 per cent of these deputies were returned. Other nationalities re-elected with 
more than 50 per cent of their deputies were Tadzhiks and Kirgiz (60 and 52.2 per 
cent respectively). Conversley, Estonians (31 per cent), Kazakhs (19.4 per cent), 
Lithuanians (25 per cent), Moldavians (18.2 per cent) and non-titular nationalities (24.1 per
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the point that Shaikevich raised pertaining to guaranteed election of people in varying 
positions. When party or state officials who were simultaneously USSR Supreme Soviet 
deputies either changed or lost their positions, they would vacate their seats and their 
successors would occupy these places after winning in ‘new elections’.
On 4 March 1979 Soviet voters elected 1,500 deputies to the Tenth Convocation of
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cent) were showi\ bias against them. Deputies who had certain occupations were more Ilikely to be re-elected than other workers. Re-election patterns of deputies which amounted 
between one half to three quarters of particular occupation groups included members of the
■I
artistic community (72.2 per cent), state officials (70.7 per cent), military officers (67.3 per Icent). Communist Party officials (65.6 per cent-however, the group most frequently I.
re-elected, higher party officials-individuals who held the posts of obkom chairman and
■ftabove-returned 155 of 206 deputies or 75.2 per cent) and trade union officials (61.7 per
■ft
cent). Among all variables, occupation, according to Hill^was the most decisive in
'
ensuring re-election. îi
The present author’s research, conducted on deputies re-elected from the tenth 
convocation of the Supreme Soviet (1979-1984) to the eleventh convocation 
(1984-1989), supports Hill’s findings and illustrates a very high level of consistency within 
re-election patterns. Of the 1,500 deputies who were elected to the Supreme Soviet on 4 
March 1984, a strikingly similar 41.2 per cent (618) had served as deputies in the tenth Iconvocation. However, it should also be noted that 570 (38 per cent) of the deputies elected 
on 4 March 1979 served complete terms. The remaining deputies were elected in a series 
of elections held in different consitutencies. The results of these elections reinforce further
:.f t
ft
Table 3.2 Deputy Turnover, 1979-1984 According to Sex
Elected Elected Re - elected Re - elected
Sex 1979 (N) 1979 {%) 1984 (N) 1984 (%)
Men 1,013 67.5 540 53.3
Women 487 32.5 78 16.0
Total 1,500 100 618 41.2
1
the USSR Supreme Soviet. As stated earlier, in this chapter’s epigram, the election results
I
reflected the diversity in Soviet society. However, certain social groups fared much better 'I
than others in their chances for re-election or more correctly, perhaps, ‘re-selection’. Table 
3.2 contains information on deputy re-election according to sex. As the table indicates,
:4ftnearly two thirds of the deputies elected in 1979 were men and about one third were women.
However, when the figures for re-election are taken into account, once again, the pattern that 
Hill established was very much still valid. Again, over half the men elected in 1979 were 
re-elected to the eleventh convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This compares to 16 
per cent of the women. Therefore, these data indicate that men were still preferred to be re­
elected to this particular convocation of the Supreme Soviet. They had a more than 50-50 
chance of becoming deputies to consecutive sessions.
Data on re-election according to party status are contained in Table 3.3. As stated s
earlier, CPSU members had greater chances to be re-elected than their non-party counterparts I
'in 1970. This pattern was repeated in the other election currently under scrutiny. Soviet 'Ivoters elected 1,098 communists and candidates for membership to the USSR Supreme Soviet 
(73.2 per cent) in 1979. Of deputies, those 561 were re-elected in 1984; this constitutes a
turnover rate of 51.1 per cent. Non-party candidates rates of turnover also remained
■ft-somewhat low. In 1984, about 14 per cent of the Komsomol and non-affiliated citizens were
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re-elected from the Tenth Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Thus, the patterns of 
re-election and party status again indicate that CPSU deputies had about an even chance of 
being re-elected to the Supreme Soviet.
Table 3.3 Deputy Turnover, 1979-1984 According to Party Status
Elected Elected Re - elected Re - elected
1979 (N) 1979 (%) 1984 (N) 1984 (%)
CPSU & Cand -
idates 1,098 73.2 561 51.1
Non - Party 402 26.8 57 14.2
Including:
Komsomol mem -
bers 185 12.3 24 13.0
Total 1,500 100 618 41.2
Table 3,4 Deputy Turnover, 1979 - 1984 According to Sex and Party Status
Re - Elected Re - Elected
Elected 1979 (N) 1984 (N) 1984 (%)
Political Affiliation Men Women Men Women Men Women
CPSU & Candidate 911 187 523 37 57.4 19.8
Non - Party 102 300 17 41 16.7 13.7
Including:
Komsomol members 27 158 2 22 7.4 13.9
Total 1,013 487 540 78 53.3 16.0
It is also worthy to note that there appears to be strong correspondence between gender 
and re-election in the sets of re-elected deputies. Among the deputies re-elected from 1979- 
1984, 523 CPSU members were men (84.6 per cent) and 40 of the non-party deputies were 
women (70.1 per cent). In this category the condition a deputy belonging to the party 
appears to assist his or her chances of being re-elected. Over 57 per cent of male CPSU 
members were re-elected. Indeed, it should also be mentioned that women members had 









Table 3.5 Deputy Turnover, 1979-1984 According to Education
Education Elected Elected Re - elected Re - elected
Level 1979 (N) 1979 (%) 1984 (N) 1984 (%)
Primary 4 0.3 1 25.0
Secondary 693 46.2 123 17.7
Higher 613 40.9 353 57.6
Postgraduate 190 12.7 141 74.2
Total 1500 100 618 41.2
Table 3.5 contains data on deputy election according to education level. As the 
information indicates, Supreme Soviet compositions contained a substantially high number 
of representatives with primary or secondary education, equating to 46.5 per cent of all 
deputies elected in 1979. Nevertheless, deputies with these educational qualifications were 
less likely to be re-elected subsequently to the Supreme Soviet than their more highly 
educated counterparts, constituting 17.7 per cent of re-elected deputies in 1984. By contrast 
the data indicate that deputies with post-secondary education were most numerous in the 
cases of both the overall deputy compositions and re-elected corpuses. Deputies with higher 
education comprised 53.5 per cent of the USSR Supreme Soviet’s representatives in 1979. 
However, these deputies made up 79.9 per cent of deputies re-elected in 1984. Therefore, 
more highly educated deputies again found that they had extremely high chances of being re­
elected.
The age distribution for deputies re-elected from 1979-1984 are contained in Table 3.6. 
The data show that there are certain patterns which remain similar for the data sets compiled 






younger deputies (30 and under), although given representation in the Supreme Soviet, were 
seriously disadvantaged when party officials considered individuals to be re-elected. Of the 
305 elected in 1979, 35 (11.5 per cent were re-elected in 1984. Second, middle aged 
deputies were elected in the greatest abundance among the entire deputy corpus-696 (46 per 
cent). Their turnover rate was 55.7 per cent overall. Among deputies who were older than 
retirement age, their overall representation in the Supreme Soviet was less than one-fifth; 
however, well over half of them were re-elected. Moreover, it should be noted that nearly 
61 per cent of deputies older than 50 were re-elected. This included nearly two-thirds of 
those deputies aged between 51-60 and over 55 per cent of those older than retirement age. 
These figures are indeed significant. The turnover rates exceed these groups’ shares of the 
1979 deputy corpus respectively by 22.7 per cent and 18.9 per cent. Therefore, the data 
compiled by the present author reaffirm patterns in Soviet deputy selection that Hill 
indicated over twenty years ago.
Table 3.6 Deputy Turnover, 1979 - 1984 According to Age Group
Elected Elected Re - elected Re - elected
Age Group 1979 (N) 1979 (%) 1984 (N) 1984 (%)
30 & Under 305 20.3 35 11.5
31 -4 0 216 14.4 39 18.1
41 -5 0 355 23.7 164 46.2
51 - 60 341 22.7 224 65.7
61 & Older 283 18.9 156 55.1
Total 1500 100 618 41.2
Data on re-election according to occupation is contained in Table 3.7. As stated earlier, 
Hill concluded that occupation was the key to re-election and, party and state officials were
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the deputies most likely to be re-elected; workers and collective farmers were least likely to 
continue their representative duties. These patterns were similar in the 1979-1984 re-elected 
deputies. Party officials were re-elected in the greatest number 182 (72.5 per cent). 
Workers and collective farmers were least likely to have been returned (114 or 16.5 per 
cent). It is significant to note that the share of re-elected agricultural and industrial workers 
is actually somewhat lower than their overall representation in the 1979 Supreme Soviet. 
Indeed, it should be stressed that these are the only groups to which this circumstance 
applies. Agricultural workers comprised nearly 1 in 5 of all deputies in the Tenth 
Convocation;* however, slightly fewer than 17 per cent of them were re-elected. Industrial 
workers constituted nearly one quarter of all deputies in the same period. However, only 
slightly more than 16 per cent of them were re-elected.
Table 3.7 Deputy Turnover, 1979-1984 According to Occupation Group
Elected Elected Re-elected Re-elected
Occupation 1979 (N) 1979 (%) 1984 (N) 1984 (%)
Agricultural Management 85 5.7 20 23.5
Agricultural Workers 308 20.5 52 16.9
Industrial Management 48 3.2 27 56.3
Industrial Workers 381 25.4 62 16.3
Party Officials 251 16.7 182 72.5
Including:
Politburo/Secretariat 24 1.6 17 70.8
High Ranking 212 14.1 156 73.6
Lower Officials 15 1.0 9 60.0
State Officials (all) 231 15.4 166 71.9
White Collar (all) 141 9.4 73 51.8
Military 55 3.7 36 65.5
Total 1500 100 618 41.2
Representatives of every other significant occupation group had far better chances of 
being re-elected. Agricultural managers comprised only 5.7 per cent of the 1979 Supreme 




industrial workers were a mere 3.2 per cent of the deputies, however more than 56 per cent ft
ftof them became deputies to the subsequent convocation of the Supreme Soviet. White collar 
workers of all levels constituted little more than 9 per cent of the deputies in 1979, but nearly 
52 per cent of them were re-elected.
The turnover rate for the party and state officials reaffirms Hill’s findings. These
Aindividuals had the best chances to be re-elected. Politburo and Secretariat members
'
comprised less than 2 per cent of the Tenth Convocation, yet more than 71 per cent of them 
were returned. While lower ' ; officials made up 1 per cent of the deputy corpus, 60
per cent were re-elected. High ranking party officials were re-elected in the greatest 
proportion: a few less than three-quarters of their number remained in the national
legislature for a successive convocation. Nearly 72 per cent of state officials and just under f
two-thirds of the military deputies were re-elected.
:
qTable 3.8 contains data on deputy re-election according to nationality. As Hill’s study Iindicated Ukrainians were the nationality most favoured for re-election to the Supreme 
Soviet. In 1984 the Ukrainians also held this status. However, it is worth that their
representation among re-elected deputies decreased from 64 per cent in 1970 to nearly 56 per
cent 14 years later. In addition, it should also be noted that the representation for Tadzhiks
declined nearly by half. In fact, with the exception of the Turkmenians, compared to 1970,
the Central Asian nationalities seem to have suffered drastic decreases in the number of their
o f
deputies who were re-elected in 1984. It is also worthy note that the representation of
Moldavian deputies nearly doubled during the period. In addition, the Russians also 
increased their representation. Among the nationalities suffering the greatest declines were
the Uzbeks and Latvians who saw their representatives decline by nearly half.
Table 3.8 Deputy Turnover, 1979-1984 According to Nationality
Elected Elected Re-elected Re-elected
Nationality 1979 (N) 1979 (%) 1984 (N) 1984 (%)
Russian 654 43.6 312 47.7
Ukrainian 188 12.5 105 55.9
Belorussian 56 3.7 14 25.0
Uzbek 53 3.5 12 22.6
Kazakli 38 2.5 15 39.5
Georgian 47 3.1 18 38.3
Azeri 49 3.3 18 36.7
Lithuanian 31 2.1 9 29.0
Moldavian 26 1.7 10 38.5
Latvian 32 2.1 7 21.9
Kirgiz 28 1.9 9 32.1
Tadzhik 29 1.9 11 37.9
Armenian 42 2.8 13 31.0
Turkmenian 28 1.9 13 46.4
Estonian 28 1.9 9 32.1
Other 171 11.4 43 25.1
Total 1,500 100 618 41.2
In conclusion, patterns of deputy re-election for the 1966-1970 Supreme Soviets and the 
1979-1984 Supreme Soviets reflected strong continuities. Men were more likely than women 
to be re-elected. CPSU members had better chances than non-party members to be re­
elected. Deputies who completed higher education were extremely likely to find themselves 
in the next convocation of the legislature. While younger deputies had relatively high 
patterns of representation and, in the Soviet parliament^were more prominent than in Western 
legislative assemblies, they were not very likely to be selected to serve consecutive terms. 
However, deputies who had reached middle age or were of retirement age had better chances 
to serve more than one term. Deputies who occupied positions in the state and party 
l^^archy had a nearly 75 per cent chance that they would be re-elected. However, less
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ôhthan one in 5 workers and collective farmers could count serving consecutive terms in theA
legislature. In addition, Ukrainians maintained their priviliged position as the nationality 
most likely to have deputies re-selected. Nevertheless, several nations-particularly those in 
Central Asia had their numbers decline drastically. Russian representation increased duringA
this time period. Therefore, based on the relative stability that the Supreme Soviet held 
during its years of existence during the zastoi period, this author is certainly inclined to 
believe that there were definite patterns established for deputy selection. Indeed, the fact that 
in 1966 41 per cent of the deputy corpus and in 1984, 41.2 per cent of the deputies were re­
elected seems to indicate a rather fixed membership formula. The next section of this 
chapter focuses on the corps of re-elected deputies who occupied positions in the USSR 
Congress of People’s Deputies and analyses the similarities and differences that occurred in 
the parliament’s composition after the first competitive elections held in Soviet history.
Deputy Turnover from the Zastoi to the Perestroika Periods
The 1989 Elections to the USSR Congress o f People’s Deputies and Methodo logical 
Problems Electoral Reform Brought to Soviet Studies
The constitutional and electoral changes a ^ ^ e d  by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 1 
December 1988 eventually led to a major landmark in the USSR’s political life. The 
constitutional amendments changed the supreme organ of state administration from the 1,500 
member bi-cameral USSR Supreme Soviet to the 2,250 member USSR Congress of People’s 
Deputies, elected from territorial, national-territorial and public organization seats. As stated 
earlier, for the first time at a national election, and for that matter, any Soviet election, the
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overwhelming majority of seats were contested. In addition, Soviet voters were able to base 
their choices of candidates on some types of concrete proposals: the election law mandated 
that all candidates had to put forward some type of programme of their intended activities.
Nevertheless, these reforms present some obstacles in conducting a consistent, scientific 
study on the aforementioned social groups and their chances for re-election during the zastoi 
and perestroika periods. First, the introduction of candidate choice, alongside the 
introduction of the largely uncontested social organization seats, created a paradoxical 
situation: competition and lack of competition. Following all rounds of the elections, 399 
deputies won seats after uncontested cam paigns,m oreover, there was only an average of
1.2 candidates per seat for the social organization seats. At this stage in Soviet electoral 
development, the system changed from an ‘acclamatory’ type to a ‘limited choice’ variant. 
Therefore, the electoral system could have been considered ne ryba, ne myaso (literally, 
neither fish nor meat-or in this case it was neither entirely competitive nor completely non­
competitive). These factors seriously impede constructing a consistent application of the 
factors discussed above in the present comparison.
Second, candidate choice may have affected some previous deputies’ chances for 
election. The question ‘Did the inclusion of more candidates than seats hold significance 
in affecting their chances to be re-elected?’ must be asked in this repsect. Unfortunately, this 
is difficult to determine. One of the methodological problems associated with the analysis 
of the 1989 Elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies derives from the fact that 
not all candidates had their biographical information printed in the central and republican 
press. Thus, the present study cannot determine whether or not voters favoured candidates
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These instances would have been reminiscent of the ‘old style’ electoral practices
who served in the 11th Convocation of the Supreme Soviet or those who had not. However, I
it will be recalled from the previous chapter that Levanskii, Obolonskii and Tokarovskii
noted that Soviet voters viewed former Supreme Soviet deputies rather unfavourably. Other
questions that cannot be addressed in this study are whether candidates who served in the
11th Convocation fared better in single candidate, two candidate or three or more #
candidate constituencies. Related to the latter question is that initially, there may have
existed some seats or candidacies designated solely for deputies who had served previously.
Another problem of the electoral reform process that affects this study involves the
0introduction of pre-election platforms of the candidates’ future activies. Under the law, 
all candidates had to present some type of indication of the principles they stood for and 
sought to further at the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. These programmes were 
infrequently published in the Central and Republican press. Therefore, in this study it is 
impossible to determine accurately either the existence or level of programmatic differences 
between candidates who had served in the previous convocation of the Supreme Soviet and 
the ‘newcomers’ to Soviet politics. When combined with the factor of candidate choice, ■j-%the potential for analyzing the electorate’s preferences based on issue-oriented voting Iis further diminished. These programmes were very difficult to obtain if an analyst was not 
present in the USSR during the time of the elections. Although the USSR’s Central 
Electoral Commission retained copies of the programmes of all the candidates who I
Stood for election, it was impossible for outsiders to review their contents. Even Soviet
;scholars had difficulties trying to gain access to the Commission’s information. For 





obtain information from the Tsentrizbirkom and were refused access to relevant materials 
Moreover, when the present author was in Moscow to conduct his field work he was notified 
by his contact there, a specialist who^^orked in the Soviet archive system for over twenty 
years, that the materials for the elections to the Congress, including programmes, were being 
transferred from the White House to the State Archives of the Russian Federation and would 
be unavailable for examination during his period of stay.^^ However, some pre-election 
programmes that the candidates presented to their intended constituents are a v a i la b le . I n  
addition, a major study of the elections in Moscow includes analyses of the platform content 
of winners and losers.^® It should also be noted tliat several Soviet newspapers carried 
detailed excerpts or the complete texts of candidates’ programmes during the campaign. 
These included Bakinskii rabochiÇ Kazakhstanskaya pravda^^ Pravda Ukrainyp 
Sovetskaya Belorussia^ Turkmenskaya iskra^^ Zarya vostoka^^, Kommunist 
(Yerevanÿ^ Sovetskaya Estoniyay Sovetskaya Latviya^^ Sovetskaya Litva^^ Sovetskaya
M oldaviyaf and Vechernyaya M oskvaf As stated in the previous chapter, Leningrad
Ÿ 7newspapers also carried the entire texts or excerts of candidates p rogram m es.T herefo re ,t\
it is possible to present some of their contents and illustrate the primary positions of some 
of the candidates who were deputies of the Eleventh Convocation of the Supreme Soviet and 
competing for the Congress.
For instance, Apas Dzhumagulov, born in 1934, a holder of the degree of candidate of 
economic sciences, a CPSU member, and the Chairman of the Kirgiz Council of Ministers^ 
a candidate in the Slyutnitskii national-territorial district No. 322 of Kirgizia for the 1989 
elections, had been previously elected a USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy of the Soviet of Union 
from territorial district no. 715 in Kirgizia in a pre-term election in 1986.^ ^^  He stated he
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would accelerate scientific and technical progress, guarantee the development of the 
republic’s national economy, improve the administrative and economic mechanisms working 
in the republic, introduce I^zra sch e t and self-financing in Kirgiz labour collectives, 
concentrate on the further development of cooperatives and lease-holding farms and improve 
the republic’s social conditions/®
Another example can be found in the information that the chairman of the Estonian 
Academy of Sciences, Karl Rebane^included in his manifesto. Rebane, elected to the Soviet 
of Nationalities from Tallinn-Lenin electoral district. No. 449 in 1984,' '^  ^ Tartu-Ropkas 
electoral district, No. 477 in 1979^ ^^  and Taitu-Tyakhtveresk electoral district. No. 476 in 
1 9 7 4  46 Estonia, stood as one of 23 candidates for 20 seats allotted to the USSR 
Academy of Sciences in March 1989. It should be noted, however, that the election 
platforms of candidates from the social organisations are probably not entirely representative 
of Soviet programmatic content. Indeed, it has been noted that in the great majority of cases, 
candidates who competed for these seats in the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies often 
failed to draft their own platforms; rather, they embraced the programme presented by their 
own a s s o c i a t i o n . T h e r e  were, however, some notable exceptions. For instance, 
candidates from the USSR Academy of Sciences presented their own programmes'^® as did 
some contestants for seats from the CPSU,'^^ the Committee for Soviet W o m e n , t h e  
Union of Cinematographers^^ and the all-Union Council of Veterans of War and Labour.®^ 
Finally, it has been noted that the candidates’ programmes were often very similar, and 
reduçed to ‘slogans’ in the press and the absence of inter-party competition greatly impeded 
distinctions between candidates’ political positions.®®
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Candidates from these organisations not only were parliamentarians, however* they were 
representatives from specific social institutions. Therefore, these candidates included policies 
that would be most relevant to that social institution in their platforms. Rebane’s platform 
was chosen, therefore, for several reasons. First, it was one of the few instances in which 
the author was able to find some information on the pre-election stances of a deputy who had 
served in the 1984 Supreme Soviet. Second, it is the only complete text of the original 
document that I was able to find of a deputy re-elected from 1984-1989 (barring, of course, 
Yeltsin’s). Third, although Rebane’s platform contains the concerns of science and the 
development and functioning of the Academies of Science, it also contains his stances on 
more general political, environmental and social issues. Therefore, it should serve as an 
illustration-albeit an imperfect one-of an election programme from a deputy who served in 
the 1984 Supreme Soviet.
Academic REBANE Karl Karlovich
Rebane Karl Karlovich-born 1926; Estonian; CPSU member; academic; 
President of the Academy of Sciences of the Estonian Soviet Socialist 
Republic; head of Tartu State University’s faculty of laser optics; Hero of 
Socialist Labour; participant in the Fatherland War, was wounded at the front; 
has military decorations.
K. K. Rebane is the author of several books, the author or co-author of nearly 
200 articles and five author’s testimonies {avtorskikh svideVstv). The works 
are connected with laser optics and the spectroscopy of molecules, crystals and 
glasses, luminescence, heat luminesence, difused light activated by admixtures 
of hard bodies, and optical information- (More than 1100 in the Science 
Citation Index) . ..
Academic K. K. Rebane is in charge of great scientific-organisational work 
in the republic and also in the USSR Academy of Sciences. He is the 
chairman of the scientific council of the USSR, ‘Spectroscopy of Atoms and 
Molecules’, a member of the editorial boards of several journals including the
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international Optics Communication, and chairman of the Soviet side of the 
permanent organisational committee for the series of USSR-USA seminars 
‘Problems of Laser Optics of Condensed Matter’. In the course of five years 
he was a member of the Executive Committee and is now a member of the 
commission ‘Physics and Society’ of the European Physics Society.
K. K. Rebane is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of Estonia, a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, was a delegate to four 
CPSU Congresses; a member of the Constitutional Commission of the 
Suprme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, a member of the 
‘Committee of Soviet Scholars in^he  Defence of Peace and against the 
Horrors of Nuclear W ar’, a Laureat^of the State Prize of the Estonian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, and was awarded the P. N. Lebedev Gold Medal. He was 
awarded two Orders of Lenin, the order Labour of the Red Banner, the order 
of the Fatherland War (first class) , the medal ‘For Valour’ and other medals.
PROGRAMME of candidate for USSR People’s Deputy from the USSR 
Academy of Sciences Academic Rebane, Karl Karlovich
1. SCIENCE
1.1 In the analysis and decision of problems having essential significance for 
the country, republic and region, the USSR Academy of Sciences and the 
Academies of Sciences of the Union Republics must raise the role of science. 
[The Congress of People’s Deputies must] adopt a law on scientific expertise. 
The financing of fundamental research should come from the state budget to 
raise firmly the competence of the administration of science.
1.2 To raise the effectiveness of international scientific ties. To broaden the 
preparation of students and probationary young scholars, engineers and 
specialists significantly by sending them abroad. The selection of candidates 
shall be open, based on competition. To create an amendment to the state 
budget system of hard currency self-financing of scientific work abroad. To 
develop scientific work with foreign laboratories on a contractual basis.
1.3 To impress upon people working in science to establish and raise the 
prestige of work in the scientific sphere. To place attention to the conditions 
of work and everyday life, scientific growth, raising justice in the nomination 
of young and other perspective scholars...working in serious science.
1.4 To strengthening the material-techincal guarantees of science, to raise the 
instrument making and scientific instrument making in the country. I consider 
the main reason that many potentially strong laboratories in the Academy of 
Sciences and institutions of higher education’s work is insufficient is that they 
lack contemporary tools and materials. To raise the level of students’ 
preparations, and in particular by a path of a broad formation of the bases in 
the faculties in the academies and other institutions.
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1.5 To develop cooperation between the Academy of Sciences of the Estonian 
Soviet Socialist Republic and the USSR Academy of Sciences and wise 
coordination of the work of all the academies in the country.
2. ECOLOGY
2.1 To assist in the working out of a contemporary ecological policy, 
combining a thoughtful development of agricultural and industrial 
manufacturing with active measures to protect the environment. To place 
serious attention to the ecological spheres closest to the person-the conditions 
in the flat, in the work place, on transport (sanitary conditions,verification on 
toxic chemicals^poisons and materials).
2.2 The development of scientific research and the organization of monitoring 
the environment, guaranteeing the publicity of results. To create active 
systems of forces for the quick reaction to ecological accidents, which 
includes drawing attention to the local population (the education and retraining 
of the analagous civil defen#^ units concerned with the existing system of 
military preparation), the transfer of forces and means from defenCci to 
ecological activities.
2.3 To achieve levels of medical and sanitary services necessary for a 
struggle with the coming of AIDS in the shortest possible time.
3. POLITICS, THE SOCIAL SPHERE
3.1 To stand solidly for the establishment and development of a rule of law 
state in our country, for the broadening of human rights and their guarantees 
as law by the judicial system, and for the morale of society, that people are 
informed of them.
3.2 To regulate the agreed work of the scholar.^ in the composition
of the Congress of P e ^ l^ ^  Deputies and Supreme Soviet of the USSR. To 
tie the scholar \o the scientific community. It is necessary that
juridical and technical services guarantee this work.
3.3 Among the social tasks, the care of invalids and pensioners is extremely 
important to me. It is necessary to develop the means of technical assistance; 
to study the demands of invalids with regards to the construction of buildings 
and streets, and in the organisation of transport. To introduce a system of 
compensation to in ^ id s  and pensioners in accordance with the growth of the 
cost of living.®'^
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Deputies Re-elected from 1984-1989
in the USSR Supreme Soviet previously, there is adequate biographical information 
available for them. Reports of the Central Electoral Commission produced after the 
elections also provide us with data as to the constituency the deputy represents, his or her 
party affiliation (which may have changed since the 1984 election, e.g ., a member of 
the Komsomol or a candidate for CPSU membership may have been admitted to CPSU 
member status), occupation or post at time of election, and place of work. In this study,
Table 3.9 contains data on the new deputy composition elected in 1989. Among the
convocation were also elected to the Congress of People’s Deputies; therefore, 244 deputies
S
I
What is included in this section of the study is an analysis of the biographical 
characteristics of the re-elected deputies. Because all deputies in this group served
■I
I '
several characteristics are analysed: gender, party affiliation, re-election by gender
and party affiliation, education, age, nationality, occupation and electoral division.
I
The re-elected deputies are compared among themselves and^the remaining deputies 
elected to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies in all the aforementioned categories.
:
consequences of electoral reform and the 1989 elections was that the rate of deputy 
re-election was altered radically. At the surface, it is apparent that the reforms put in 
place under Gorbachev brought in an overwhelmingly new corps of deputies. Of the f
1,500 deputies elected in March 1984, only 161 (10.7 per cent) were elected to the USSR 
Congress of People’s Deputies. However, in a series of repeat elections which were iconducted betweep 1984 and 1988 an additional 83 deputies who served in the eleventh
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from the last convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet were re-elected/® 
Table 3.9. New Deputies in the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, 1989
All Re-elect­ New
Elected ed from Deputies
Category 1989 1984 SS (%)
Gender
Including:
Men 1897 227 88.0
Women 352 17 95.2
Party Status
Including:
CPSU members & candidates 1957 238 87.8
Non - Party and Komsomol 292 6 97.9
Education
Including:
Secondary 547 25 95.4
Higher 1702 219 87.1
Age
Including:
30 and under 187 2 98.9
3 1 -4 0 454 14 96.9
41 -5 0 661 52 92.1
51 -6 0 691 140 79.7
61 and older 256 36 85.9
Occupation
Including:
Agr, & Ind. Management 344 13 96.2
Agr. & Ind. Workers 638 22 96.6
Party Officials 237 106 55.3
State, TU & KSM Officials 245 50 79.6
Healtli, Culture, Media,
Science & Education 618 35 94.3
Military 80 18 77.5
Others 87 0 100.0
Electoral Division
Including:
Territorial 749 99 86.8
National - Territorial 750 60 92.0
Social Organizations 750 85 88.7
Moreover, the Congress of People’s was a body that was one third larger, with 2,250 
deputies. However, it should be noted that 2,249 deputies were elected.®® When this 
expansion is taken into account, only 10.8 per cent of the deputies elected had previous 
experience in national state administration from the Congress’^  immediate
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predecessor. An additional 23 dœnties had served in the Supreme Soviet at some other 
point, bringing the total^deputies who served previously to 267.®  ^ Therefore, 89.2 per cent 
of thp deputies were entirely new to the supreme state organ. However, it would be 
incorrect to say that these deputies lacked experience in the USSR’s representative 
institutions. According to official Soviet statistics, about half of the deputies had served as 
deputies at some level.®®
A s M
Table 3.10 contains data on deputy turnover rates 1984-1989 according to sex. 
earlier Soviet elections, men were more likely to be re-elected than women in 1989. 
However, their rates of re-election were greatly diminished. Under pre-reform conditions, 
men stood about an even chance of being re-elected. However, under the more competitive 
conditions, about 22.5 per cent served in consecutive legislatures. Therefore, electoral 
reform measures and increased competition significantly reduced their re-election potentials. 
Overall, women’s representation declined from 1984-1989; 352 women were elected to the 
Congress (15.3 per cent of all deputies). Potential reasons why women’s representation 
declined are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. However, it is significant 
to note that whereas women had about a 15-16 per cent chance to be re-elected under the old- 
style election system, only 3.5 per cent of the women elected in 1984 survived as deputies 
in the Congress. Therefore, the 1989 elections, while altering significantly the sex 
composition of the Soviet parliament created opportunities for bringing new people into the 
legislature.
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Elected 1984 1,008 67,2 492 32.8
Elected 1984
Non- Non-
CPSU (N) CPSU (%) Party (N) Party (%)
1072 71.5 428 28.5
238 22.2 6 1.4
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Table 3.10 Deputy Re-election According To Sex
"iMen (N) Men (%) Women (N) Women (%)
j',..
Of whom those
Re - Elected 1989 227 22.5 17 3.5
ÎI
Like non-competitive predecessors, the elections to the USSR Congress of
People’s Deputies showed that Communists were more likely to be elected and re-elected.
When in 1984 some 71 per cent of the deputies were CPSU members^ and nearly 88 per A ^
cent were elected in 1989f^ Therefore, it should Once again come as not too big a
,’d;
surprise that the vast majority of re-elected deputies were CPSU members. Among the 
244, 238 or 97.5 per cent were CPSU members. Included among the deputies who I
were not party members there were 4 who belonged to the CPSU nor the Komsomol HA ;and 2 Komsomol members (see Table 3.11). The new electoral conditions, in general, 3 l
greatly diminished the chances of a CPSU member’s potential re-election. W herea^under 
the old system, a member would have had about an even chance to serve consequcutively,
%their ranks were cut down to about 22 per cent. Non-party members were significantly
biased against in their chances for re-election. However, in 1989, their numbers among the 
new deputy corpus were virtually non-exis#it; only 1.4 per cent of them were re-elected.
'■i;STable 3.11 Deputy Re-election According To Political Status
s
Ï
SOf whom those 
Re - Elected 1989
Given that in both of the previous categories the data . revealed that the re-elected 
deputies were overwhelmingly male and Communist Party members, it is natural that men 
were most abundant among re-elected communists. Among the 238 communist party 
deputies, 225 were : (94.5 per cent) and 13 were . (5.5
per cent). Among the non-party deputies (six people), women outnumbered men 2U. It is 
important to note that in following the patterns of re-election analysed earlier in this chapter,
men once again were more likely to have a higher percentage of party members and
frowomen a higher^ortion of the non-party citizens.
Table 3.12 Deputy Turnqver According To Sex and Party Affliation, 1984-1989
Re- Re-
Elected Elected Elected
1984 1989 (N) 1989 (%)
Men 1008 227 22.5
Including:
CPSU Members &
Candidates 898 225 25.1
Non-Party 110 2 1.8
Women 492 17 3.5
Including:
CPSU Members &
Candidates , 174 13 7.5
Non-Party 318 4 1.3
There are other significant factors which should be noted. As in Hill’s study, party 
membership appears to have assisted former candidates in their re-election bids. There were 
drastic declines in the rates of re-election for party members of both sexes when compared 
with both the present author’s and Hill’s data sets. Male communist party members stood 
a 54 per cent chance of re-election and the present author noted that 57.4 per cent were re­
elected from 1979-1984. In 1989 only about one quarter of male CPSU members who had 
been deputies of the Eleventh Convocation were re-elected. Nevertheless, this feature is 
s o m ^ y ^  stronger to the candidate than just being a man. Similarly, while only 3.5 per cent
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of women were re-elected, their rates of representation were more than double among party 
members.
Table 3,13 contains information on deputy re-election according to education. The
overwhelming majority of all deputies elected in 1989 had completed or attended institutions
of higher education and this factor constituted a very serious departure from previous
electoral practices. Of the 2,249 deputies elected by May 1989^
. 1,702 (75.6 per cent) post-secondary education. Similarly, re-elected deputies
were overwhelmingly rec ipients of higher education-219 (89.8 per cent). Conversely, there
were 25 (10.2 per cent) who had attained secondary level education.A
Table 3.13 Turnover According to Education
1989
1984 SS Re - elected
Education Level (N) (N) (%)
Primary 0 0 0
Secondary 685 25 3.6
Higher 813 219 26.9
Unidentified 2 0 0
Total 1,500 244 16.3
Like the other categories considered thus far, the turnover according^was reduced
significantly at all levels. In no circumstances was a deputy with primary education who was
elected in 1984 and who had served a full term re-elected in 1989. In addition, there was 
ia signifcant decrease in the percentage of deputies with secondary education qualifications 
who were re-elected to consecutive terms. In 1984, 17.7 per cent of the deputies with these 
atrtributes were re-elected. However, in 1989 only 3.6 of them were returned. About 53.5
153
I 1
per cent of deputies with higher education were re-elected from 1979-1984. However, this 
figure declined by nearly 50 per cent in 1989: 26.9 per cent of deputies with higher Ïeducation were re-elected.
the entire Congress there were 947 deputies who had attained 51 or more years (42.1 per
1989
1984 SS Re - elected
Age Group (N) (N) (%)
Under 30 331 3 0.9
3 1 -4 0 186 14 7.5
41 -5 0 334 92 27.5
51 -6 0 414 106 25.6
61 and older 235 29 12.3
Total 1,500 244 16.3
s
•a
The Congress of People’s Deputies elected in March-May 1989 had a very middle - aged
:ïà.character: its average age was 47.8 y e a r s . D e p u t i e s  who served in the eleventh
■I;convocation were somewhat older; the average deputy was 48.3 years old. However, the 
re-elected deputies and the composition of the Congress, when taken as a whole^do share 
some common characteristics. First, the largest share of deputies in both instances were 51 
and older. Among re-elected deputies there were 175 (71.7 per cent) in this age group. In
:# I
cent). Second, deputies 30 and under are the least represented age group among both the
re-elected corpus and the aggregate Congress. In the former, 3 (1.2 per cent) had been
:representatives of the eleventh convocation and among the latter there were 187 (8.3 per
cent). In all age groups, the deputy corpus in the entire Congress was predominantly new.
There were 185 new deputies aged 30 and under (98.9 per cent); 440 aged 31 -4 0  (96.9 per
''.Icent); 609 aged 41-50 (92.1 per cent); 552 aged 51 - 60 (79.9 per cent) and 220 (85.9 per 
cent) aged 61 and older.
Table 3.14 Deputy Turnover, 1984-1989 According to Age Group
Ï
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Table 3.14 contains the rates of turnover between the Supreme Soviet and the Congress
of People’s Deputies. As the data show, deputies who were elected when they were 30 or
fetoevT
younger in 1989 were few and far between in 1989. ■ " than 1 per cent entered the USSR
Congress of People’s Deputies. In addition, it should be noted that compared to their older 
counterparts, deputies aged 31-40 witnessed the least significant"decrease in their share of 
re-elected deputies. In 1984, 18.1 per cent of the deputies^in this age group. However, in 
1989 their representation stood at 7.5 per cent.
The three age groups with the highest rates of turnover from 1979-1984 were also 
subjected to sharp decreases in 1989. However, it is significant to note that the re-election 
patterns altered radically in 1989. At the last convocation of the Supreme Soviet, deputies 
aged 51-60 were tlie ones most frequently re-elected (65.7 per cent) and they wer^ollowed 
respectively by deputies aged 61 and older (55.1 per cent) and those aged 41-50 (46.2 per 
cent). In stark contrast to the aforementioned pattern, the group with the third largest 
percentage of re-elected deputies in 1984 emerged as the age cohort whi^h had the greatest 
share in 1989 (27.6 per cent). Re-elected deputies aged 51-60 dropped from their number 
one ranking to second place in 1989 losing 40 per cent (25.6 per cent). The most significant 
decline, however, occurred among the deputies older than retirement age. In 1984, 55.1 per 
cent of the deputies in this age cohort were re-elected. However, in 1989 their ranks were 
radically reduced down to 12.3 per cent to the third largest share of re-elected deputies. 
Without comprehensive data on contestants and their programmes it is impossible to draw 
substantive conclusions on how the 1989 elections affected patterns of age and re-election. 




There were representatives of 65 nationalities elected to the USSR Congress of People’s 
Deputies in 1989.®  ^ Among the re-elected deputies, there were representatives of 27 
nationalities. Therefore, 41.5 per cent of the nationalities which had deputies in the 
Congress were represented by individuals who had served in the eleventh convocation of the /
USSR Supreme Soviet.
Slavs were the most numerous among re-elected deputies. ' 150
re-elected deputies (61.5 per cent). Included in the entire Congress there were 1,378 Slavs 
(61.3 per cent). However, in comparison with their constitution of the Soviet population they 
were under-represented; Slavs were 69.8 per cent of the population. In the cases of both Ithe re-elected deputies and the entire Congress Russians were most abundant. Among all | |
deputies in the Congress, Russians constituted 1,026 of its representatives (41.9 per cent).
However, data from the re-elected deputies indicate that the Russians comprised a higher
■iproportion of this group-109 (44.7 per cent). Nevertheless, when compared to their share
of the population in the USSR’s All-Union Census in 1989, Russians were under-represented: 
at this time they were 50.8 per cent of the population.®® The 31 re-elected Ukrainians 
were the second largest national group in this category (12.7 per cent of re-elected deputies).
Like their Russian counterparts, the Ukrainian re-elected deputies constituted a higher share 
of the re-elected group than did Ukrainians in the Congress (11.5 per cent) and were under-
■irepresented in comparison with their national composition (15.5 per cent). Also included 
among the re-elected deputies were 10 Belorussians (4.1 per cent). This figure is somewhat 
close to their overall representation in the Congress-there were 94 Beloiussians elected (4.2 
per cent of the composition).
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There were 29 deputies of Central Asian origins (11.9 per cent) re-elected in 1989. 
Overall, there were 259 Central Asians (11.5 per cent) elected to the Congress. Their 
representation was only slightly lower in both categories (re-elected and elected overall) in 
comparison to their population statistics (12.1 per cent). Kazakhs were the largest group 
among Central Asian deputies. There were 10 re-elected Kazakhs (4.1 per cent of re-elected 
deputies) and 53 in the entire Congress (2.4 per cent). Therefore, Kazakhs exceed their 
proportion of the Soviet population (2.9 per cent) with their re-elected corpus, however, fell 
below the figure in the Congress as a whole. Also included in this national group were six 
re-elected Uzbeks (2.5 per cent). Soviet voters, however, elected 87 Uzbeks to the Congress 
(3.9 per cent). Uzbeks were under-represented in both categories in accordance with their 
population results (5.8 per cent). Five Kirgiz deputies were re-elected from the Eleventh 
Convocation (2 per cent) and 35 were elected to the Congress (1.6 per cent). In both 
instances, the Kirgiz exceeded their share of the population (0.9 per cent). There were also 
five re-elected Tadzhiks (2 per cent) and 44 in the over all Congress (approximately 2 per 
cent). Tadzhiks also exceeded their national proportion (1.5 per cent). Three Turkmenians 
were re-elected (1.2 per cent) and 40 elected to positions of USSR People’s Deputies (1.8 
per cent). These figures compared to a 1 per cent share of the population.
Soviet voters re-elected 27^ aucasians (11.1 per cent) and 192 overall (8.6 per cent) to 
the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989. Among both re-elected deputies and the 
deputy coipus as a whole, ^  aucasian representation exceeded their share of the Soviet 
population (5.4 per cent). Among the 60 Azeris elected to the Congress (2.7 per cent) there 
were 12 re-elected deputies (4.5 per cent of re-elected deputies). Their parliamentary 
represenation was slightly higher and composition of re-elected was nearly double their share
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of the Soviet population (2.4 per cent). Also among Congress were 71 Georgians (3.3 per 
cent) 8 re-elected deputies of that nationality (3.3 per cent of re-elected deputies). 
Their representation as both re-elected deputies and as a national group in the Congress
exceeded their population figures by more than two times (1.4 per cent). Finally from the
TnivM-Sc
aucasians there were 61 Armenians in the Congress (2.7 per cent) which included seven 
re-elected deputies (2.9 per cent of the re-elected corpus). In both categories the Armenians 
exceeded their national share of the Soviet population (1.6 per cent).
There were 180 deputies from Moldavian or Baltic origins elected to the Congress in 
1989 (8 per cent), of whom 12 were elected to the Eleventh Convocation (4.9 per cent of 
the re-elected corpus). The re-elected representatives of these nationalities included five 
Moldavians (2.1 per cent of the re-elected deputies), four Latvians (1.6 per cent), two 
Estonians (0.8 per cent) and a Lithuanian (0.4 per cent). The share of population of these 
four nationalities (as an aggregate group) was exceeded in both cases of re-elected deputies 
and the entire deputy corpus when compared to the national representation (3.2 per cent).
The 15 major nationalities comprised 2,009 of the entire deputy corpus elected in 1989 
(89.3 per cent) and 220 of the re-elected deputies (90.1 per cent). Twelve other nationalities 
(those without republican status in 1989) were represented by deputies who had served in the 
Eleventh Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Overall, there were 112 deputies from 
these nationalities elected to the Congress (approximately 5 per cent) which included 24 re­
elected deputies (9.9 per cent). Therefore, their representation among re-elected deputies 
was nearly twice their representation in the entire Congress.
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In all nationalities which had re-elected deputies, most of the deputies elected to the 
USSR Congress of People’s Deputies were new. This included 54 Armenians (88.5 per 
cent), 48 Azeris (80 per cent), 84 Belorussians (89.4 per cent), 39 Estonians (95.1 per cent), 
63 Georgians (88.7 per cent), 43 Kazakhs (81.1 per cent), 30 Kirgiz (85.7 per cent), 40 
Latvians (90.9 per cent), 51 Lithuanians (98.1 per cent), 38 Moldavians (88.4 per cent), 917 
Russians (89.4 per cent), 39 Tadzhiks (88.6 per cent), 37 Turkmenians (92.5 per cent), 227 
Ukraninians (88 per cent) and 82 Uzbeks (94.3 per cent) from the major nationalities. 
Among the nationalities without republics there were 5 new Abkhazians (62.5 per cent), 3 
Avars (60 per cent), 5 Checheni (71.4 per cent), 4 Karakalpak (80 per cent), 8 Mari (88.9 
per cent), 9 Mordovians (81.8 per cent), 16 Tatars (69.6 per cent), 4 Tuvin (66.7 per cent), 
10 Yakuts (90.9 per cent), 9 Germans (90 per cent), 10 Kabardins (90.9 per cent) and 5 
Kabardins (83.3 per cent). Table 3.15 contains data on deputy turnover according to 
nationality.
Table 3.15 Deputy Turnover According to Nationality
Elected Re-elected
Nationality 1984 SS 1989 (N) 1989 (%)
Russians 684 109 15.9
Ukrainians 172 31 18.0
Belorussians 53 10 18.9
Uzbeks 58 6 10.3
Kazakhs 37 10 27.0
Georgians 46 8 17.4
Azeris 49 12 24.5
Moldavians 31 5 16.1
Kirgiz 28 5 17.9
Tadzhiks 24 5 20.8
Armenians 24 7 29.2
Turkmenians 30 3 10.0
Lithuanians 39 1 2.6
Latvians 26 4 15.4
Estonians 25 2 8.0
Others 174 26 14.9
Total 1500 244 16.3
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Re-elected deputies of all nationalities declined significantly from 1984-1989. There 
were several notable reductions in the shares of re-elected deputies for particular 
nationalities. For instance, Ukrainians who were the most favoured in pre-reform elections 
witnessed the greatest share in their re-elected share (37.9 per cent) and Turkmenians 
suffered a reduction of 36.4 per cent. Both of these nations had decreases between 1 and 2 
standard deviations greater than the overall decrease in re-elected deputies. Russians and 
Lithuanians (respectively decreased by 31.8 per cent and 26.4 per cent) had their ranks 
reduced within the range of 1 standard deviation above the average decline. Estonians (-24.1 
per cent), Moldavians (-22.4 per cent), Georgians (-20.9 per cent) and Tadzhiks (-17.1 per 
cent) had re-elected corpus declines within 1 standard deviation of the mean. It is notable 
to indicate that three of the five Central Asian nationalities had their shares of re-elected 
deputies reduced to within two percentage points of each other. Kirgiz were reduced by 14.2 
per cent, Kazakhs by 12.5 per cent and Uzbeks by 12.3 per cent. Azeris representation 
amongs re-elected deputies was reduced by 12.2 per cent and the share of L a t\j^^  and 
Belorussian incumbents sank by 6.5 per cent and 6.1 per cent respectively. The Armenians’ 
drop in rate of re-elected deputies was the least significant. There were 1.8 per cent fewer 
re-elected Armenians in 1989 than in 1984. It should also be noted that the re-election rate 
amongst the non-titular nations declined by 10.5 per cent.
Perhaps one of the questions that most seriously linked with electoral reform is whether 
or not re-elected deputies, because they were affiliated with the ‘old system’^ were more 
abundant among social organisation deputies than those elected in other electoral divisions. 
There are several reasons for addressing this problem. First, despite the fact that there 
were more candidates than seats allocated for the social organisations, as it will be recalled,
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the least degree of ; occurred in this electoral division. Therefore, these seats
could have served as a place for getting individuals re-elected who _ not have stood a 
good chance in a more competitive district. Second, according to the Law on Elections, only 
a closed amount of people actually had the right to vote for people in the social organizations 
-delegates to congresses, plenums and conferences of their all-union bodies. Therefore, these 
seats could have been seen as places of prestige-the higher up one was in the political 
l]|0|jjfarchy of the USSR, the more chance the person had to be selected for a seat from one 
of the social organisations. Despite these arguments, deputies re-elected from the eleventh 
convocation to the Congress through the social organization seats were actually the least 
represented-60 of 244 deputies (24.6 per cent). There were 40 per cent more (84) re-elected 
deputies who entered the Congress through the territorial consitituencies-the most competitive 
of the electoral divisions. This^ however, does not mean that these deputies universally 
participated in very competitive campaigns. The relative lack of comprehensive lists of 
candidates for the constituencies inhibits the drawing of conclusive evidence on the degree 
of competition the candidates who served in the last USSR Supreme Soviet faced. The 
largest number of re-elected deputies entered the Congress after winning in the national- 
territorial districts. As noted earlier, there was a relatively large number of obkom first 
secretaries who ran in these constituencies (who were subsequently deputies in the last 
convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet) and many did so unopposed.
Of the 38 social organisations allocated seats through the Law on Elections, 14 were 
represented by deputies who had served in the last USSR Supreme Soviet session (36.8 per 
cent). This group included the USSR Academy of Sciences, Union of Consumers’ Societies, 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Voluntary Association for the Armed
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Forces (DOSAAF), Kolkhoz associations, Komsomol, Soviet Women’s Committee, Trade 
Unions, Rodina, Union of Artists, Union of Composers, Union of T he^J^al Workers, and 
the All-Union Organization for Veterans of War and Labour. Thus, those whose seats were 
filled by deputies who had not been in the last convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet
-flAjL V.jT. L e w im  ICrtA.
included the All-Union Society of Fishing Kolkhozes (2 deputies),^(VASKliNIL/(10), ^
Academy of Medical Sciences (10), Adademy of Pedagogical Sciences (10), Academy of
Artists (5), Union of Scientific and Engineering Societies (5), All-Union Society of Inventors
and Rationalisers (5), Union of Architects (10), Union of Journalists (10), Union of
Cinematographers (10), Red Cross and Red Crescent (10), Znanie (10), Soviet Fund for
Peace plus the 8 committees for the advancement of peace, solidarity and international
cooperation (7), Soviet Peace Committee plus the Associations for cooperation of the United
N^ijéns in the USSR (5), Soviet Fund for Culture (5), Soviet Fund for Charity and Health
(5), Social Sporting Associations of the USSR (3), Temperance Union, the Book Lovers’
Society, Society for Friends of the Cinema, the Musical Society and the Stamp collectors -
each with 1 deputy. It is significant to note that the CPSU held the largest numeric
representation of re-elected deputies to any organisation; Nearly one-
VV
third of the 100 seats allocated to was held by deputies who had been elected to the 
Eleventh Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Writers’ Union possessed the 
largest share of re-elected deputies. Table 3.16 contains data on re-elected deputies elected 
to social organisation seats.
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AN 30 4 13.3
Consumers’ Socs 40 2 5.0
CPSU too 33 33.0
DOSAAF 15 1 6.7
Kolkhozes 58 2 3.4
KSM 75 2 2.7
KSovZh 75 1 1.3
Writers’ Union 10 4 40.0
Artists’ Union 10 1 10.0
Union of Theatrical 
Workers 10 1 10.0
Rodina 5 1 20.0
VViT 75 4 5.3
Trade Unions 100 4 4.0
c M 'à  o ' \
OTable 3.17 contains data on re-election according to occupation group. In all occupatin 
groups the percentages of re-elected deputies declined significantly. For instance, the share 
of industrial and agricultural managers decreased by about half. In 1984 about 38 per cent 
had been re-elected whereas in 198^ they accounted for about 19 per cent. While 
agricultural and industrial workers had the least chances of re-election under the previous 
system, it appears that their fate turned for the worse in 1989^ slightly fewer than 3 per cent 
of the toilers who sat in the Eleventh Convocation were re-elected. White collar workers in 
health, culture, the media and science and the intellegentsia had their share of incumbents 
reduced by nearly 20 per cent after the elections to the Congress.
Earlier research has noted that party and state officials had the best chances to be re­
elected under the old system. Indeed, this appears to have remained consistent in 1989 but 
with significant alterations. Perhaps the most signficant overall decline can be found amongst 
the state/trade union/Komsomol officials. In 1984, nearly 72 per pent of these officials had
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served in the Tenth Convocation of the Supreme Soviet. However, in 1989, only a combined 
total of 22 per cent were incumbents. It is necessary to state that there may have been some
1989 1989
1984 SS Re - Elected Re - Elected
(N) (N) (%)
Occupation by Sector
Ind. & Agr. Management 68 13 19.1
Ind. & Agr. Workers 769 22 2.9
Party Officials 250 106 42.4
State Officials 198 43 21.7
TU/KSM Officials 19 7 36.8
Health, Culture, Media,
Science and Education 134 35 26.1
Military 55 18 32,7
Others 7 0 0.0
Total 1500 244 16.3
aspects of the electoral legislation which reduced the share of candidates who competed for 
the Congress from the state ranks. According to Article 11 of the 1988 Electoral Law USSR 
ministers were prohibited from holding their posts and seats in the Congress simultaneously.
' IThe military also had its share of re-elected deputies reduced from 65.5 per cent in 1984 to 
just under 33 per cent in 1989.
Table 3.17 Deputy Re-election According to Occupation I
1
:S
CPSU officials still had the largest single share of re-elected deputies in 1989.
Nevertheless it is significant to note that the share of CPSU officials who sat in continuous 
sessions of the legislature from 1984-1989 dropped markedly from previous years. In 1984,
mnearly three-fourths of all party officials who had served in the Tenth Convocation of the
USSR Supreme Soviet survived to the next parliamentary session. In contrast, in 1989 this 
share was reduced to about 42 per cent. Therefore, it is significant to note that while the 1share of re-elected deputies was reduced significantly amongst all occupation groups, CPSU
-rï.£officials still appear to have had the greatest potential chances for re-election.
164 S
■ ' R
Deputy Turnover and Key Appointments in the New State Configuration
"I,
As mentioned earlier, the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies was empowered by the
Constitution to elect and appoint specific individuals to positions of state power. Therefore, 
according to Article 108 (points 6-11), the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies would elect 
the USSR Supreme Soviet, its Chair and First Deputy Chairman, endorse the Chair of the 
USSR Council of Ministers, the Chair of the USSR People’s Control Commission, the Chair Iof the USSR Supreme Court and the Chief State Arbitrator of the USSR and elect the
Committee for Constitutional Supervision of the USSR. It should be noted, that the majority 
of these posts went to deputies who had been deputies of the Eleventh Convocation of the '
USSR Supreme Soviet. For instance, it is well-known that Gorbache\^ who had been a 
deputy in the final convocation of the Supreme Soviet had been elected by the Congress’5 
deputies as the new Supreme Soviet’s Chair-of the 2,221 deputies who participated in the
i
vote, 2,123 voted for him and 87 rejected his candidacy (95.6 per cent).^ In addition,
Anatolii, another deputy from the Eleventh Convocation, was elected the Congress’ First 
A
Deputy Chair (in an open vote) in which 179 deputies voted against him and 137
a b s t a i n e d . T w o  former USSR Supreme Soviet deputies of the Eleventh Convocation
'i.received the Congress^endorsements for leading posts. Nikolai Ryzhkov was endorsed as 
candidate for the Chair of the USSR Council of Ministers and Gennadii Kolbin was backed 
as the contestant for the Chair of the USSR People’s Control Commission.^^ However, it 
should be noted that ‘newcomers’ were elected to the other key posts. The Congress 
endorsed Yevgenii Smolentsev as Chair of the Supreme Court, Yurii Matveev as Chief State
Arbitrator and Aleksandr Sukharev as General Procurator.^’
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Soviet statistical sources have viitually ignored the composition of the First USSR
Congress of People’s Deputies’ Committees and Commissions. At present the demographic
breakdown of the Mandate Commission of the Congress is the only statistical information
which has been made public. Soviet sources indicate that among the 47 members of this
commission there were 6  deputies who worked in industry, construction, transportation and
communication, 8  agricultural workers, 8  party workers, a single deputy who worked in the
system of the soviets, 3 trade union and Komsomol workers, 3 workers in various level
educational establishments, 6  workers in health, 3 scientific workers, 5 from culture, arts and
press, 1 worker from consumers’ cooperatives, 2  servicemen, and a single pensioner.^®
Amongst these deputies there were 6  women, 42 CSPU members and 5 non-party citizens.
It should be noted that Soviet statisticians did not include any information on whether or not
the corpus of this commission was predominantly new or if there was a considerable
Co
of deputies from the Eleventh Convocation had its ranks. The present author’s
findings suggest that this particular commission was overwhelmingly new. Of the 47 
deputies, 45 had not been members of the last Supreme Soviet. Only Vladimir Ivashko, at 
the time the second secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine’s Central Committee^ 
and Ivan Polozkov, first secretary of the Krasnodar kraikom^^2ii as members of the Eleventh 
Convocation, the former serving as one of the commission’s two deputy chairs.’^
Table 3.18 contains information on re-elected deputies who staffed the Commissions and 
Committees of the Congress. There is evidence that indicates that the overwhelming majority
\
of the posts were held by deputies who had not sat previously in the Eleventh Convocation 
of the Supreme Soviet (81.6 per cent). Nevertheless, it is possible to suggest that there were 
larger numbers of deputies who had served under the previous regime in those bodies and
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commissions that seem to have had more influence on the direction of policy-making. For 
instance, the largest share of re-elected deputies sat in the presidium of the Congress, 8  of 
18. Chingiz Aitmatov, Viktor Ambartsumyan, Vitalii Vorotnikov, Mikhail Gorbachev, 
Anatolii Luk’yanov, Soniyabibi Mukhabatova, Rafik Nishanov and Boris Baton had all been 
members of the last Supreme Soviet.’  ^ In addition, 21 of 6 8  members of the Editorial 
Commission for the Preparation of the draft Resolution of the Congress for the Report ‘On 
the Basic Directions of the Domestic and Foreign Policies of the USSR’ served in the 
Eleventh Convocation of the Supreme Soviet.’  ^ Moreover, more than one in three deputies 
who sat on the Constitutional Commission had been a deputy in the Eleventh Convocation.’  ^
The exception was the Commission for the preparation for a draft law on constitutional 
supervision in which Grigorii Yeremei was its sole member.’'^  Conversely, there were 
fewer re-elected deputies among those commissions with reduced impact on policy-making 
or those which conducted inquiries. Among the 75 members of the Accounting Commission, 
only 4 members were re-elected deputies (Vladimir Anishchev, Georgii Arbatov, Genrikh 
Novozhilov and Grigorii Tkemeladze).’  ^ Similarly, only three re-elected deputies sat on 
the commission connected with the Tbilisi massacre (Vladimir Govorov, Nursultan 
Nazarbaev and Roald Sagdeev),’  ^Olzhas Suleimenov was the sole re-elected deputy on the 
Gdlyan commission”  and Aleksandr N. Yakovlev (commission chair), Chingiz Aitmatov 
and Georgii Arbatov served on the commission evaluating the Nazi-Soviet Pact.’®
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Table 3.18 Re-elected Deputies in Commissions of tlie USSR Congress of People’s Deputies
CPD All Re-elected Re-elected
Commissions Deputies Deps (N) Deps (%)
Including:
Mandate 47 2 4.3
Accounting 75 4 5.3
Editorial 68 21 30.9
Tbilisi Events 24 3 12.5
Gdlyan Commission 16 1 6.3
Soviet-German Pact 26 2 7.7
Constitutional
Commission 107 37 34.6
Constitutional Review
Draft Law Commiss­
ion 23 1 4.3
Total 386 71 18.4
Re-elected deputies in the Supreme Soviet, while in the minority of deputies, were 
slightly more abundant than in the Congress. For instance, of the 542 deputies, there were 
62 (11.4 per cent) who sat in the Eleventh Convocation.”  It should also be noted that an 
additional 4 deputies had served in other sessions of the Supreme Soviet.®® Therefore, 87.8 
per cent of the deputies had never served at the national level until 1989. Half, nevertheless ^  
had experience as deputies to the Supreme Soviets of union and autonomous republics and 
the local soviets of people’s deputies.®^
Although the permanently functioning part of the Soviet legislature was ■ an
overwhelmingly new corps of first-time national-level parliamentarians, their leading posts 
had a significantly high number of re-elected deputies among their ranks. The cases of 
Mikhail Gorbachev and Anatolii Luk’yanov have already been discussed. Flowever, it should 
also be noted that the chairs of both chambers, Yevgennii Primakov and Rafik Nishanov, 
respectively the chairs of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities^ had been 
deputies from the last Supreme Soviet.®’ In addition, half of the deputy chairs of the Soviet
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of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities were members of the Eleventh Convocation of 
the USSR Suprme Soviet. Deputy Chair of the Soviet of Union Aleksandr Mokanu and 
Deputy Chair of the Soviet of Nationalities Georgii Tarazevich sat in the Supreme Soviet 
during its last Convocation; their colleagues (respectively) Bayan Iskakov and Ilmar Bishar 
were new to the Supreme Soviet.®^
Specialised tasks and policy-making activities took place in various committees of the 
Supreme Soviet (which included among its ranks, in addition to the USSR Supreme Soviet 
deputies, USSR Congress Deputies who were not elected to the permamently-functioning 
branch of the legislature), and special commissions of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet 
of Nationalities. USSR Supreme Soviet Committees focused on International Affairs, 
Questions of Defence and State Security, Questions of Legislation, Legality and Law and 
Order, Questions of the Work of the Soviets of People’s Deputies, the Development of 
Goverment and Self-Government, Questions of Economic Reform, Agrarian Questions and 
Food, Questions of Construction and Architecture, Science, National Education and Culture, 
the People’s Health Protection, Women’s Affairs, the Protection of the Family, Maternity 
and Childhood, Veterans’ Affairs and Invalids, Youth Affairs, Questions of Ecology and the 
Rational Use of Natural Resources and Questions of Glasnost’, Ciyil Rights and Appeals.®'  ^
The Soviet of the Union’s Commissions included a Planning and Budget-Financial 
Commission, a Commission for the Questions of the Development of Industry, Energy, 
Machinery and Technology, Commission for Questions of Transport, Communications and 
Information and a Commission on Questions of Labour, Prices and Social Policy.®^ The 
Soviet of Nationalities’ Commissions focused on National Policy and International Relations, 
Questions of Social and Economic Development of the Union and Autonomous Republics,
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Self-Government 44 6 13.6
Questions of Economic Reform 43 2 4.7
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Autonomous oblastjf and Autonomous Districts, Questions of Consumer Goods, Trade, 
Communal and Other Services and a Commission on Questions of the Development of 
Culture, Language, National and International Traditions and the Protection of Historal
Legacies.®® Among these Committees and Commissions, the overwhelming majority of 
deputies who served on them had not been members of the previous convocation of the
' ISupreme Soviet. Indeed, 91.5 per cent of the deputies who staffed these committees and 
commissions fell under this category; 79 had served in the Eleventh Convocation; their 
share in other ad hoc commissions and committees formed in the Supreme Soviet and the
Soviet of Nationalities was not that significant.®’ Tables 3.17 and 3.18 contain data on re- if
' Ielected deputies and their presence in these committees and commissions. ; i
ÏTable 3.19 Re-elected Deputies in the Committees of the Supreme Soviet 
Committees of the Supreme All Re-Elected Re-Elected
Soviet Deputies Deps (N) Deps (%) 0
Including: 1 f
International Affairs 44 14 31.8
Questions of Defence and
State Security 43 11 25.6
Questions of Legislation, K
Legality and Law & Order 43 4 9.3
Questions of the Work of the ,
Soviets of People’s Deputies,
Development of Government & ^
Agrarian Questions and Food 43 3 7.0
Questions of Construction &
Architecture 46 2 4.3
Science, National Education &
Culture 50 2 4.0
Defence of People’s Health 40 2 5.0
Women’s Affairs, Defence of the
Family, Maternity & Childhood 39 1 2.6
Affairs of Veterans & Invalids 38 1 2.6
Youth Affairs 39 1 2.6
Questions of Ecology & Rational
Use of Natural Resources 50 3 6.0
Questions of Glasnost’, Civil 
Rights and Appeals 40 3 7.5
Total 602 55 9.1
Other Commission 
Deputy Commission for the
Review of privileges 28 5 17.9
Table 3.20 Re-Elected Deputies in the Permanent Commissions of 
The Chambers of the Supreme Soviet
Soviet of the Union 
Including;
Planning and Budget- 
Financial Commission 
Questions of the Development 
of Industry, Energy, Machinery 
& Technology 
Questions of Transport, 
Communication & Information 
Questions of Labour, Prices & 
Social Policy
Soviet of Nationalities 
Including;
National Policy & International 
Relations
Questions of the Social & Eco­
nomic Development of the 
Union & Autonomous Repub­
lics, Autonomous oblasts & 
disricts
Consumer Goods, Trade, 
Communal-Social & Other 
Services to the Population 
Questions of the Development 
of Culture, Language, National 
& International Traditions & the 
Defence of Historical Legacies 
Total
Other Commissions of the 
Soviet of Nationalities 
Commission on Nagorno- 
Karabakli Autonomous Oblast 
Problems of Soviet Germans 





































In addition, it should be noted that there were 6  re-elected amongst the committee and 
commission chairs. Therefore, nearly one^third of these bodies were staffed by deputies of 
the Eleventh Convocation. Nevertheless, it needs to be established that there were no re­
elected deputies who chaired any of the Soviet of the Union’s Permanent Commissions.®® 
However^ there were three each who headed the Supreme Soviet’s Committees (Vladimir 
Lapygin, Questions of Defence and State Security; Boris Yeltsin, Questions of Construction
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and Architecture and Kakimbek Salykov, Questions of Ecology and Rational Use of Natural 
Resources); and three who chaired permanent commissions in the Soviet of Nationalities 
(Georgii Tarazevich, National Policy and International Relations; Gennadii Kiselev,
Consumer Goods, Trade, Communal and Other Service^ and Chingiz Aitmatov, Questions 
of the Development of Culture, Language, National and International Traditions and the 
Defence of Historical Legacie^.®^
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated several important features of the compositions of pre-reform I
Soviet legislatures and the effects that electoral reform measures have had on them. First, |
there were specific quotas that party officials had to meet to fill deputy ships in the USSR 
Supreme Soviet. Although there were many more ‘popular representatives’ among these 
deputies in the USSR Supreme Soviet than would be found in other parliaments, their 
representation was not nearly as high as their overall share in the population. However, their j i
numbers were made up of white collar professionals. The i
greatest bias towards any particular social group was towards the nomenklatura whose share 
of the deputies was much larger than their representation in the overall population. Re- 
election was a popular indicator of power within the pre-reform Soviet political system.
Ronald J. Hill’s research found that men who belonged to the party-state heirarchy and were 
of Slavic origins had the greatest chances to be re-elected from 1966-1970. The present 
author has argued that the data presented above indicate that this pattern continued 
throughout the zastoi period by focusing on the 1979-1984 period.
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The elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies altered the composition of the 
Soviet legislature. First, there was a significant decline in the number of deputies who were 
re-elected from 1984-1989. Therefore, the number of people serving as national-level 
parliamentarians for the first time was very great indeed. Therefore, the elections brought 
forth a predominantly new corps of deputies. This has been observed in the re-elected 
deputies’ share amongst the entire Congress and their representation in the USSR Supreme 
Soviet. In this sense, the electoral reform measures helped bring about a departure from the 
earlier electoral and appointment practices. Second, the number and share of popular 
representatives declined significantly. Third, there was a significant increase amongst the 
number of more highly educated deputies and broadly defined white collar deputies.
Nevertheless, there are some results that appear to hold some facets of continuity from 
previous elections. Communists were still very prominent amongst the legislators. In fact, 
their representation increased. This is visible amongst the entire corps of deputies and the 
re-elected deputies. Although deputy re-election was reduced significantly, the old pattern 
remained in place: those who were re-elected were predominantly Slav men employed in the 
party-state apparatus. The following chapter examines how the electoral reform measures 
resulted in continuity, contradiction and departure from previous electoral practices by 
analysing the place of women in the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People’s 
Deputies.
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March 1989, p. 2) and Anatolii Gorbunov (25 March 1989, pp. 1 - 2).
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(2 March 1989, pp. 2 - 3), A. Vasilyauskas (4 March 1989, p. 2), Klemensas Sheputis (5 March 1989, p. 3), 
Valerii Shurupov (7 March 1989, p. 1), Irena Kachenskene (8 March 1989, p. 2), Kyastutis Ashmonas (10 
March 1989, pp. 1 & 3), K. Surblis (12 March 1989, p. 7), Antanas Zheitmanas (14 March 1989, pp. 2 - 3), 
R. Visokavichyus (15 March 1989, p. 1), Boleslav Rudis (17 March 1989, p. 3), Rimvidas Yasinavichyus (18 
March 1989, p. 2), Chelovas Yureshans (21 March 1989, p. 2), Bronislovas Zaikauskas (22 March 1989, pp. 
1 - 2 ) ,  Mikhail Kachanov (23 March 1989, p. 2), Vladislav Shved and Oktyabr’ Burdenko (24 March 1989, 
p. 2) and Antanas Burachas and Dommenikas Gumulyauskis (25 March 1989, p. 2).
39. Included in Sovetskaya Moldaviya's pages were the programme excerpts of Timofei Moshnyag (15 March 
1989, pp. 1 & 4), Valerii Kozliukhar (24 Mareh 1989, p. 2), V. K. Pshenichnikov (22 March 1989, p. 2), 
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p. 2), Vladislav Kutyrkin and A. P. Belyi (7 March 1989, p. 2), Aleksei Mares’ev (5 March 1989, p. 2), 
Mikhail Dumbravan (4 March 1989, p. 2) and A. A. Mokanu (3 March 1989, pp. 1 - 2 ,  esp. at p. 2).
177
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SSSR po voprosam stroitel’stva i arkhitektury’. No. 60-1 (10 June 1989), ibid., p. 72.; ‘Postanovlenie 
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samoupravleniya’. No. 57-1 (10 June 1989), ibid., p. 71; ‘Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii 
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1989), ibid. ; ‘Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta 
SSSR po agrarnym voprosam i prodovol’stviyu’. No. 59-1 (10 June 1989), ibid.; ‘Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo 
Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po nauke, narodnomu 
obrazovaniyu, kul’ture i vospitaniyu’, No. 61-1 (10 June 1989), ibid., p. 72; ‘Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo 
Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po okhrany zdorov’ya naroda’. 
No. 62-1 (10 June 1989), ibid.; ‘Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta 
Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po delam zhenshchin, okhrany sem’i, materninstva i detstva’. No. 63-1 (10 June
1989), ibid., p. 73; ‘Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo 
Soveta SSSR po delam veteranov i invalidov’. No. 64-1 (10 June 1989), ibid.; ‘Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo
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Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po delam molodezlii', No. 65-1 
(10 June 1989), ibid.; ‘Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komiteta 
Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR po voprosam glasnosti, prav i obrashchenü grazhdan’. No. 67-1 (1989), ibid., p. 
74 and ‘Postanovlenie Soveta Natsional’nostei Ob izbranii Predsedatelya Komissii Soveta Natsional’nostei po 
voprosam sotsial’nogo i ekonomicheskogo razvitiya soyuznykh i avtonomnykh respublik, avtonomnyklr oblastei 
i okrugov’. No. 53-1 (10 June 1989), ibid., p. 190.
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Chapter 4. Continuity, Contradiction and Departure in 
The Composition of Women Deputies, 1984-1989
184
My objectives in this chapter are to present biographical information on the 352 women 
elected to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies in March-May 1989/ to establish the 
differentiation between them and the men elected during the first largely competitive elections 
in Soviet history and to discuss the extent of change that electoral reform may have had on 
the composition of women deputies since the last election to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 
1984. I also examine the extent of women’s participation in the First USSR Congress of 
People’s Deputies held May-June 1989. My data indicate that the electoral reform measures |
inplemented in 1989 brought forth a corps of women deputies which had better political, j
educational and occupational credentials than its 1984 predecessor. Nevertheless, men were 
considerably more qualified and this can perhaps be considered at least a partial explanation ^  ^  :
their participation was higher during the First congress. Comparative criteria employed 
in this analysis include: party affiliation, education, nationality, occupation and the divisions 
from which the deputies were elected. It is necessary to state at the outset that this chapter 
is not concerned with the overall decline in women representatives in the former USSR
or the position of women in post-Soviet politics. Rather, my primary aim here is to ’fill in’ i
4-W l
some of the existing gaps^on women’s representation in the Congress. That there were 352 
women elected is quite well known. However, the present study provides the most detailed 
analysis of their biographical characteristics to date. Also, I hope, perhaps, to add some 
more information to the existing literature on the 1989 Elections to the USSR Congress of 
People’s Deputies and women’s participation in Soviet politics.
These data also show that the electoral reform measures that came to fruition in the 1989 
elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies eventuated in continuity, contridiction 
and departure from previous elections. Men were most abundant among all deputies.
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Women were more likely than their male counterparts to have been agricultural or manual 
workers. Men were much more likely than women to have been party and state officials and 
representatives of the white collar professions and intelligentsia. The reforms, nonetheless^ 
constituted a departure from previous electoral practices. While more women than men were 
represented among the workers, there were also more educated, more potentially forceful 
deputies elected among them. Electoral reform measures provided them with better 
opportunities to showcase their political talents and earn the electorate’s respect based on 
their merits. Nevertheless, it appears that the political reform measures in general, and 
electoral reform initiatives, in particular, worked more to the benefit of men than women.A
This could be considered to be a contridiction in the official démocratisation rhetoric. These 
implications are illustrated more clearly in the next section of this chapter. Indeed, it is 
therefore, well understood why the motto of the Nezavisimaya zhenskaya demokraticheskaya 
mfr.y/a/iV(3-Independent Women’s Democratic Initiative (its abbreviated form was Nezhdi 
which translates as Don’t Wait), the USSR’s first independent feminist organisation was 
‘Democracy without women is no democracy! ’
Women in Soviet Politics and Society
Among the goals of the first socialist state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was 
creating a society in which class equality would precipitate conditions for gender equality. 
During the seventyTour years of its existence, the Soviet state could boast of 
impressive numbers indicating women’s active participation in the USSR’s social life. In 
1989 approximately 68,000,000 women were employed and comprised over half the USSR’s 
labour fo rce / more than half a million directed enterprises, organisations and
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institutions, and nearly one million led smaller industrial subdivisions/ The largest share 
of women worked in health, education, physical culture and social security (23 per 
cent), trade, public catering, material technical supply, sales and procurements (13 per 
cen t)/ Women comprised over 61 per cent of all specialists with higher and secondary 
specialist education; nearly 60 per cent of all engineers, 45 per cent of agronomists, animal 
technicians and veterinary workers, ,8 7  per cent of economists and
accountants, more than 70 per cent of doctors and teachers and over 90 per cent of 
librarians and bibliographers/
Although these data reflect positive aspects of women’s employment, they do not 
indicate that in many respects there still existed a high degree of gender inequality in the 
work sphere. According to 1988 data, nearly 16 per cent of men and over 43 per cent of 
women received average monthly wages of up to 150 rubles; among those who received 
between 200 and 300 rubles they were, respectively, nearly 35 per cent and 14.5 per 
cent; and, among those who were paid over 300 rubles monthly, women were 11 per 
cent and 2 per cent.^ Information from family budgets for March 1989 indicates that 
women’s average wages were less than men’s at 170 rubles and 233 rubles respectively.* 
Despite their comparatively impressive representation in the national work force, women 
comprised only 5.6 per cent of enterprise and industrial organisation directors in 1991.^ 
Women were also heavily affected by job layoffs made during Gorbachev’s economic 
restructuring programme; according to sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya, women made up to 
70 per cent of restructuring redundanices,^^ or, two women lost their jobs for every man.^^ 
Moreover, women’s unemployment increased as market reforms began to take effect: among 
over 60,000 registered as unemployed in the Russian Federation on 1 January 1992, tw o’
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thirds were women/^
The USSR also included higher numbers of women in their political bodies than 
non-socialist countries. Women’s representation and participation in the Eleventh 
Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet is discussed in greater detail below. Women also 
comprised 36 per cent of the deputies elected to the supreme soviets of union republics, 
40 per cent elected to the supreme soviets of autonomous republics in 1985/^ and 49 per 
cent of the deputies elected to the local soviets in 1987 {krai, oblast\ district, city, 
settlement and village level soviets); Moreover, women occupied many leading 
positions in local state organs.''*
Despite strong representation in Soviet state organs, women, however, did not 
necessarily constitute major actors in the political arena. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, for instance, men were more likely to be ‘re-elected’ to the USSR Supreme 
Soviet than were women in the pre-reform era. Mary Buckley also found that among 
deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaidzhan in 1985, there were similar links 
between gender, occupation and re-election.'^
Women were also active in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. According 
to party statistics, on 1 January 1990, there were 5,813,610 women in the CPSU (30.2 per 
cent of the entire membership)'^ and by March 1991 they constituted 30.5 per cent of its 
members.'^ However, it is in the Communist Party that it was evident that Soviet politics 
was very much dominated by men. In 1989, there was only one woman, Rimadzhon 
Khudaibergenova, who was an obkom first secretary, and even as late as 1991 there were
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only 3.^* Similarly, women were infrequently represented in the Party’s leading organs. 
For instance, Yekaterina Furtseva became the woman elected as a full member to the CPSU’s 
main policy making body, the Politbur(^in June 1957, and was dropped from its composition 
in May 1960.^® It was not until September 1988, with the election of Aleksandra 
Biryukova^that another woman entered into the ranks of the Politburo, but only at the level 
of candidate (non-voting) s t a t u s . S h e  remained a candidate member until the XXVIII 
Congress in 1990, at which Galina Semenova was elected as a full member to the Politburo 
(at this stage, candidate membership was e l i m i n a t e d ) I n  other party capacities women 
comprised 13.3 per cent of the Central Control Commission and 18.4 per cent of full-time 
branch secretaries.^^ Only 4.3 per cent of the of the first secretaries of gorkomy and 
raikomy were women and there were no women among 125 union republican central
o.v\A
committees, republican^^ra/^om secretaries.^^
Women’s representation at the last all-union party Congress and the 1988 XIX Party 
Conference was lower than share of CPSU membership. Earlier, the proportion of 
women in the party and their representation at congresses had been similar. For instance, 
women comprised 26.5 per cent of members in 1981, '^  ^ and 26.5 per cent of the 
delegates to the XXVI C o n g r e s s . I n  1986 women constituted 28.8 per cent of party 
membersj^ however^ they were under-represented slightly at the XXVII Congress^ comprising 
27 per cent of the d e l e g a t e s . I n  1988 the disparity increased somewhat further: 29.6 
per cent of party members were women but 25 per cent^ ® of the delegates were 
women. In 1990, the gap was seriously widened. As stated above, women comprised 
30.2 per cent of party members at the beginning of 1990, but constituted only 7.3 per cent 
of the delegates to the XXVIII Congress, held in Jul^^^ ‘the lowest indicator in the post­
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war period. >31
Women in the 11th Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet (1984-1989)
It will be recalled that there were 492 women elected to the 11th Convocation of the USSR 
Supreme Soviet in March 1984. Therefore, nearly one third of the deputies were women. 
This figure constituted a much higher number of Soviet female parliamentarians than their 
American counterparts. The 1985 edition of the annual Soviet statistical publication on 
women indicated that the US Congress had among its ranks only 23 women or 4 per cent of 
its composition and, moreover^ there were only 2 in the Senate in 1984.^^ Nevertheless, 
there were substantial differences in the party statuses, age distributions, education levels and 
occupation backgrounds of the men and women elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1984 
which suggests that women’s positions in the Supreme Soviet were mainly ceremonial or 
‘token’. H o w e v e r ,  it should also be noted that there were also rather large numbers of 
men who also fell under this token category. Power was held by high-ranking communists 
who were a very small group indeed. Therefore, in a sense, sex may not have determined 
power within this body. '^^ Political affiliation was more important in determining power. 
Nevertheless, as the aforementioned statistics indicate and as the ensuing discussion will 
support, men were more likely than women not to have been among the tokens in the 
Supreme Soviet.
First, men were^much more likely to have been CPSU members than women were. 
Among the 1,072 CPSU members in the Supreme Soviet 898 or 83.8 per cent were men. 
What could be considered even more important is the fact that nearly nine^tenths of all men
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in the Supreme Soviet were CPSU members. Conversely, women were much more abundant 
among deputies who were not CPSU members: 318 of 428 (74.3 per cent). In this category 
women accounted for 156 of 223 deputies who were neither CPSU nor Komsomol members 
(nearly 70 per cent) and 162 of 225 Komsomol members (72 per cent). Second, women 
tended to be more frequently represented among the younger deputies than men were. 
Included among the 331 deputies aged 30 and younger, 245 were women (74 per cent). This 
figure accounted for nearly half of all women deputies. Third, more men received some type 
of higher education and more women achieved some type of secondary education. Of the 
813 deputies who undertook post-secondary education (including complete higher, incomplete 
higher and post-graduate) 730 were men (89.7 per cent) and there were 409 women (59.7 
per cent) included among the 685 deputies who attained some level of secondary education 
(complete, vocational and incomplete). Moreover, these data represent 72.4 per cent of all 
men and 83.1 per cent of all women. Fourth, men elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 
1984 were more highly represented among the ranks of industrial and agricultural managers, 
the scientific and creative intelligentsia, CPSU, state, military and public organisation 
officials (90.5 per cent of these occupations) and women were most highly represented 
among industrial workers and collective farmers (54.1 per cent of these workers).
The data presented above indicate that women parliamentarians in the Supreme Soviet 
were not entirely on an equal footing with the male deputies. However, there are other 
factors which clearly indicate that the role and status of women in the Supreme Soviet was 
indeed ceremonial and that Party officials included women in the composition of the 
parliament to create some type of ‘social picture’ of Soviet society, but they undoubtedly did 
not intend for them to play a major role in political participation or policy making. Three
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.factors can be used to support this . \.i.
corpus.
personnel were also. 37
First, power and status in the Soviet Union was held by CPSU membership. As 
indicated above, women were more abundant among individuals who were not party 
members. Moreover, women deputies constituted 16.2 per cent of the 1,072 members of the
■ISupreme Soviet, whereas, if we use party statistics compiled between the XXV and XXVII 
Congress, we find that in 1984, women comprised somewhere between 26.5 and 28.8 per 
cent of all Party m e m b e r s . T h e r e f o r e ,  women party members were greatly 
underrepresented in the Supreme Soviet compared to their share of Party members. Given 
the fact that the CPSU was the dominant nominating institution at this time, if the party was
serious about bringing the most politically experienced individuals into the Supreme Soviet,




Second, the occupational status of the women indicates that.again, officials were not f
■||
concerned with bringing the most experienced managerial and professional women into the
S;Supreme Soviet. Data from the 1979 All-Union Population Census indicates that there were
about 24.3 million women employed in occupations that would be considered predominantly
:
‘mental work’ and they comprised about 61 per cent of all workers in this category.
.Moreover, there were certain occupations in which women were employed which would have
J'f
been more suitable for parliamentarians than milkmaids and crane drivers. Forty-four per
cent of all directors of state management and their structural divisions were women; 24 per ;|




My above argument suggests that women were elected mainly as ‘tokens’, i.e ., elected 
more for their personal qualities than their professional or political abilities. However, it is 
also possible to argue that by including large numbers of women in their parliament, the 
CPSU, at least in theory^ provided a potential means for including women in the political 
process. I firmly believe that this incorporation did provide a theoretical outlet for 
participation. Contributions to the sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet are a means-albeit 
imperfect-to test this hypothesis. Using the proceedings of the Supreme Soviet to determine 
the level of political participation of deputies is flawed mainly due to the fact that although 
the institution existed since 1937, it was not until very late in the 1980s that it began to 
function as somewhat of a working legislative organ. Previously, it was considered a mbber 
stamp mechanism for legitimating CPSU decisions. This means that the CPSU controlled 
the agendas of these sessions, but it also means that it controlled the list of speakers in the 
Supreme Soviet. Therefore, my assumption is that if the CPSU desired to promote women’s 
participation in the sessions, there would have been a « high proportion of women
speakers, and 32.8 per cent, a figure equal to women’s share of the Supreme Soviet deputies, 
could serve as a good base figure for comparison.
\ oThis brings me up^my third point. Women’s contributions to the Supreme Soviet 
sessions were far too low to satisfy a claim that their being in the parliament increased their 
chances for political participation. Twelve sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet were 
convened between April 1984 and December 1988-including a twelfth extraordinary session 
convened in November-December 1988 which adopted amendments to the USSR Constitution 
and a new Electoral Law. In eleven of those sessions, there were 448 speeches delivered; 
however, women spoke only 60 times (13.4 per cent of speeches).
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I;Therefore, women constituted a '  "  high proportion of USSR Supreme Soviet
I.
Deputies. However, it was not the intention of the CPSU to have them play a significant
Irole in policy making. They lacked the proper political and professional backgrounds to be
I
considered the most active deputies in the parliament. Moreover, the party did not Iincorporate them in speaking roles in the sessions of the Supreme Soviet.
Some Methodological Hurdles
The previous chapter discussed methodological problems in analysing deputy compositions
-Ibetween the pre-reform era and the Gorbachev period; this section raises some similar points |
Iwith particular reference to women deputies. First, there may have existed some seats or ■Îcandidacies designated solely for women. Examples from Leningrad illustrate this point.
It will be recalled that when 01’ga Ivanovna Chedleeva, a sovkhoz brigadier and member of 
the Vsevelozhinskii gorkom and Leningrad obkom was initially nominated unopposed at a 
candidate discussion at the Ruch’i sovkhoz in Leningrad oblast' in January 1989, participants %
at the meeting put forward the candidacy of another woman for discussion, Marina
Vladimirovna Izmerova. Following a debate on their qualities and a vote, Chedleeva won
'I-the right to proceed to the next round of the nomination process. Chedleeva was registered
.11
as a candidate for Vyborg territorial district No. 61 in late F e b r u a r y , a n d  her opponent 
was another woman, Lyudmila Bystrova.'*^ Neither candidate received the required amount 
of votes necessary to be elected.'** Later, Chedleeva, one of 16 candidates (which included
three other women)'*^ in a repeat election held 19 May, ultimately finished in second place, cl
losing to the editor of the raion newspaper, Vyborgskii kommunist, V. I. Kotolev.'*^ Also,
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livestock sovkhoz chief, Galina Ivanovna Stoumova'*'* eventually stood unopposed in 
Leningrad’s Gatchinskii territorial district No. 62 and received 6 6  per cent of the vote.'*  ^
At one point during the campaign she confronted deputy chief engineer of the Leningrad 
atomic energy station, V. P. Moskovskii.'*^
The contest in Vyborg territorial district 61 and Chedleeva’s candidacy, in my opinion, 
raise serious doubts over the overall competitive nature of the elections to the USSR 
Congress of People’s Deputies. First, there has been a great deal of fuss made by students 
of Soviet and Russian politics and history over the patriarchal nature of the Russians. There 
is a brief discussion of this in relation to the elections later in this chapter. Therefore, with 
this in mind and other factors which are discussed later, without some type of ‘rigging’ or 
quota fixing, (if the Ruch’i sovkhoz nomination meeting is taken into consideration), it seems 
unlikely that the only opponent nominated against Chedleeva could have been a woman. 
Second, if the voters did not have this patrarchal strain in them, then how come neither of 
the women won on the first ballot? This, could be answered in a positive manner by the 
stating that both candidates were nearly equally as qualified. However, if this was the case, 
then it seems that Chedleeva would have won outright in the repeat election when her 
opponent was removed. This brings up a third, and extremely crucial point. According to 
Article 61 of the Law on Elections o f USSR People's Deputies, when neither of the 
candidates in a two candidate contest able to achieve 50 per cent of votes , then,
by law, new elections had to be held. Generally, it was the practice that when this situation 
occurred, neither of the original two candidates stood again. Chedleeva’s example is rare. 
On the one hand, maybe we should applaud her ambition to win her seat. On the other, 
given her pedigree, Chedleeva, was certainly an establishment figure; perhaps therefore, the
195
OLAA
continuance of her candidacy was^attempt by the Leningrad party apparatus to try to retain 
some seats. Or, perhaps the party apparatus wanted a seat for a woman.
Second, there is the problem of competition affecting women’s participation in the 
elections. Official data suggest the electoral changes worked more to the benefit of men 
than women. As stated earlier Soviet voters elected 492 women to the USSR Supreme Soviet 
in 1984. Because the Soviet electoral system at that time operated on the principle of one 
candidate per seat (although the election law did not prohibit more than this), there were 492 
women candidates for these seats, or women comprised 32.8 per cent of the candidates for 
the USSR Supreme Soviet. In 1989, women constituted only 16.6 per cent of the 2,895 
candidates in the districts for the first round of elections in 1989,'*  ^ or 48 Ij® and 
constituted 17.8 per cent of all candidates in the districts and public organizations'*^ or 
672^ ** altogether. According to these figures, we can determine that the electoral reforms 
implemented in 1989 afforded women with a greater chance for political participation as 
candidates than before. However, men certainly constituted the overwhelming majority 
in both the districts and social organizations. Although there was a larger number of women 
who stood for election in the districts than in the social organizations (481 vs. 191), the 
percentage of women as candidates for the electoral divisions was higher in the latter (21.7 
per cent vs. 17.8).
Table 4. U* gives some indications of the decrease in the number of women candidates 
during the two elections in several territories. According to the data, there were 182 
candidates to the USSR Supreme Soviet from Moscow and Leningrad constitutencies, 
Lithuania, Moldavia and Estonia in 198^ which included 60 women (33 per cent). During
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the next elections citizens certainly took advantage of the opportunities for political 
participation as candidates for people’s deputies; 469 were registered by the end of February 
1989 (this was an increase of nearly 158 per cent from 1984). However, the overall number 
of women decreased by more than half and constituted only 4.7 per cent of the candidates 
in these constituencies.
Table 4.1 Distribution of Women Candidates in Several Territories, 1984 & 1989
Territory All Candidates Women (N) Women(%)
1984 1989 1984 1989 1984 1989
Moscow 43 82 15 5 34.9 6.1
Leningrad 19 44 9 5 47.4 11.4
Lithuania 41 150 13 4 31.7 2.7
Moldavia 43 71 14 4 32.6 5.6
Estonia 36 122 9 4 25.0 3.3
Total 182 469 60 22 33.0 4.7
As stated earlier, election programmes were difficult to obtain and this fact constitutes 
an obstacle to comprehensive analysis on voter selection patterns and issue identification with 
candidates. Nevertheless, it is possible to provide some examples of women’s platforms for 
the purposes of the present chapter. For instance, excerpts from the election programme 
of Khurman Abbasova, a kolkhoz chairwoman from Agdamskii national-territorial district 
No. 202^ were published in the Azerbaidzhan republican newspaper, Bakinskii rabochiVs 
rubric, Znakomstvo s kandidatom. Abbasova, born in 1927, a CPSU member since 1954 and 
delegate to the XIX Party Congress in 1988, who had served two previous terms in the 
Azerbaidzhan Supreme Soviet, included such items on her political agenda as conducting an 
active struggle for improvements in inter-nationality relations, and implementing the rational 
use of land and strong environmental protection p o l i c i e s . H e r  candidacy was 
successful.
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The programme of Mariam Mushegovna Martirosyan, a weaver at a silk combine and
candidate in Yerevan-Shaumyanskii national-territorial district No. 391 of Armenia, is an
example of an unsuccessful woman’s platform. Martirosyan’s programme contained a
detailed plan for defending the rights of mothers. This included creating a kind of ’children’s
industry for nutrition’, improving industrial manufactured goods, medical services and
education, extending maternity leave for up to three years, raising the allowances for families
with many children and lowering the criterion for this category from families with five
children to those having at least three children. Martirosyan also focused on other issues
such as improving the ecological situation, public services, socio-cultural activities and
transport services and using energy more cost-effectively. She was also concerned with
several issues of concern to her fellow combine workers: improving their socio-cultural
activities and facilities, improving the housing situation for the workers and opening up
foodshops for them in the combine.^'* She was defeated by Elmir Tatulovich Arutyanyan,
a tool-makers’ brigadier from an industrial org^l^ation in Yerevan, born in 1938, a CPSU
member since 1966,^^ and a former deputy to the Armenian and USSR Supreme Soviets.^^
Arutyunyan had participated in all sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Nagorno-
Karabakh problems at that time and had twice met with Gorbachev on special commissions
pertaining to that matter. He was extremely concerned with questions related to the republics
and the centre and favoured a forceful centre and independent regions. He proposed that he
would fulfil his voters’ mandates as a primary task and that he would work to broaden the
sovereignty of republics and increase national self-determination, construct a rule of law state
in the USSR, improve the enviromnent and housing construction.^^A
Although these examples are not the only ones which were published in the republican
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press, and they may not be entirely accurate samples of the programmes presented by men 
and women, they are, however, representative of the way in which the Soviet media 
portrayed the differences between male and female candidates. First, the published platforms 
and excerpts are evidence that women’s programmes contained more instances of issues that 
pertained to women, families, work environments and problems specific to their localities 
than did men’s. Second, men’s platforms were more concerned with issues of the 
construction of the rule of law state, and contained more concrete proposals of political and 
economic reform. The extraction of programmatic information from the republican press 
poses another methodological problem on the validity of the issues. Analysts must ask the 
question of whether the issues presented in the excerpts of the platfoims were comprehensive. 
One of the consequences of this material is that it may have been subjected to manipulation 
and there could be the possibility that the press wanted to present women and men as being 
concerned with the types of issues noted above.
Biographical Information on Women Elected to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies
Sex and Party Affiliation
Like its non-competitive predecessors, the elections to the USSR Congress of People’s 
Deputies showed that Communists were more likely to be elected than their non-communist 
counterparts. It will be recalled that in 1984 some 71 per cent of the deputies were CPSU 
members, and nearly 8 8  per cent were elected in 1989. As table 2 indicates, the majority 
of both men and women were CPSU members. This is a radical change from 1984 in which 
most women were not members of the CPSU. However, again, the percentage of non­
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communist women was higher than non-communist men (despite the fact that there were 
more men in the non-party and Komsomol categories). Ninety-four women (26.7 per cent 
of women) either belonged to the Komsomol or were neither CPSU nor Komsomol members 
compared to 198 men (10.4 per cent).
Table 4.2 USSR People’s Deputies Elected According to Sex & Political Status
Political Status All All Women Women Men
Gender as % of 
Men Category
(N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%) Women Men
CPSU & candidates 1957 87.0 258 73.3 1699 89.6 13.2 86.8
Komsomol members 48 2.1 19 5.4 29 1.5 39.6 60.4
Non - party 244 10.8 75 21.3 169 8.9 30.7 69.3
Total 2249 100 352 100 1897 100 15.7 84.3
Sources: Author’s database and figures adapted from Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR..., p. 11.
Sex and Education
Table 4.3 contains information on the level of education and gender of deputies elected to
the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. Voters elected a deputy corpus in 1989 which was
more educated than its 1984 predecessor. Included in the last session of the USSR Supreme
Soviet were 789 deputies with completed higher education (52.6 per cent), 24 with
incomplete higher education (1.6 per cent); 644 with some type of completed secondary
education (43 per cent) and 41 with incomplete secondary education (2.7 per cent).^® As
the data above indicate , over three quarters of the deputies had pursued some type of post -A
secondary education. In addition, more than 1 of 5 had received some type of postgraduate 
training. Most women received some type of post-secondary education (195 or 55.4 per 
cent)-a dramatic change from the their share in the 1984 Supreme Soviet. However, the 
percentage of men who achieved the same levels was significantly higher. Nearly 8  of 10 
men were in this category (1,509 or 79.5 per cent). Therefore, although there were more
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(44.6 per cent vs. 20.4 per cent).
Table 4.3 USSR People’s Deputies According to Sex and Education







Gender as % 
Men of Category 
(%) Women Men
General Secondary 334 14.9 92 26.1 242 12.8 27.5 72.5
Secondary Specialist 194 8.6 53 15.1 141 7.4 27.3 72.7
Incomplete Second - 
or Unknown 19 0.8 12 3.4 7 0.4 63.2 36.8
Completed Higher 1,187 52.8 156 44.3 1,031 54.3 13.1 86.9
Incomplete Higher 33 1.5 4 1.1 29 1.5 12.1 87.9
Post - Graduate* 482 21.4 35 9.9 447 23.6 7.3 92.7
Total 2,249 100 352 100 1,897 100 15.7 84.3
^Derived from Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR... , p p . 17 & 21.
men than women who received some type of secondary education (388 vs. 157), the
-huaU’C a s  a .3
percentage of women with this qualification was more than among men
Gender and Nationality
Table 4.4 contains data on the gender and nationalities of the deputies elected in 1989.
..I
Soviet voters elected representatives of 65 nationalities to the Congress of People’s
■ÉD e p u t i e s . M e n  constituted the overwhelming majorities of all nationalities with titular I
republics. Slavs were the most numerous national group in the Congress ( ‘ or 61.3 per 
cent) and Russians were the nationality represented most frequently (1,026 or 45.6 per cent).
This trend was also apparent among both sexes; however, Russians constituted a greater
,:y
percentage among all elected male deputies (47.1 per cent) than among their female I“iï::;c:counterparts (37.5 per cent)-a point which was also reflected among the re-elected deputies.
It is worthy to note that among most nationalities, the percentages of both male and female
"Ideputies is remarkably close. For instance, among Ukrainians, men and women comprised 
11.5 and 11.4 per cent respectively of all their genders elected (who constituted 11.5 per cent
:of all deputies); Belorussians (4.2 per cent of all deputies), 4.2 and 4.3 per cent; and also Iamong Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Tadzhiks, Armenians, Lithuanians and Turkmenians. Women’s 




(nationalities without titular union republics).
Table 4.4 People’s Deputies Eiected According to Sex And Nationality
Gender as %
Women Women Men Men of Category
Nationally All (N) All (%) (N) (%) (N) (%) Women
Russians 1,026 45.6 132 37.5 894 47.1 12.9 87.1
Urkainians 258 11.5 40 11.4 218 11.5 15.5 84.5
Belorussians 94 4.2 15 4.3 79 4.2 16.0 84.0
Uzbeks 87 3.9 26 7.4 61 3.2 29.9 70.1
Kazakhs 53 2.4 12 3.4 41 2.2 22,6 77.4
Georgians 71 3.2 18 5.1 53 2.8 25.4 74.6
Azeris 60 2.7 23 6.5 37 2.0 38.3 61.7
Lithuanians 52 2.3 6 1.7 46 2.4 11.5 88.5
Moldavians 43 1.9 3 0.9 40 2.1 7.0 93.0
Latvians 44 2.0 3 0.9 41 2.2 6.8 93.2
Kirgiz 35 1.6 6 1.7 29 1.5 17.1 82.9
Tadzhiks 44 2.0 6 1.7 38 2.0 13.6 86.4
Armenians 61 2.7 9 2.6 52 2.7 14.8 85.2
Turkmenians 40 1.8 8 2.3 32 1.7 20.0 80.0
Estonians 41 1.8 3 0.9 38 2.0 7.3 92.7
Otliers 240 10.7 42 11.9 198 10.4 17.5 82.5
Total 2,249 100 352 100 1897 100 15.7 84.3
Men
Sources: Author’s database and adapted from figures in Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR..., pp. 13-16.
;;r;
Sex and Occupation
Data on women’s occupations are contained in Table 4.5. Perhaps one of the more important 
changes electoral reform had over Soviet representative institutions was transforming the 
USSR Supreme Soviet from a largely ceremonial political body reflecting the demographic 
features of Soviet society, to the Congress of People’s Deputies, as a more ‘working’ 
parliament, staffed with ‘a full fledged corps of deputies capable of running the country at 
the time of perestroika'. A. Nazimova and V. Sheinis published a very detailed breakdown 
of the occupational disparities between the two institutions 'mizvestiya in early May 1989.^ 
Their study points to a decrease in industrial and collective farm manual workers and an 
increase in industrial and collective farm managers and specialists.
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Table 4 .5  USSR People's Deputies Elected in 1989 According to Gender &  Occupation
All All Women Women
Occupation by Sector (N) (%) (N) (%)
Industrial Management 152 6.8 32 9.1
Industrial Workers 405 18.0 90 25.6
Agricultural Management 192 8.5 25 7.1
Agricultural Workers 233 10.4 45 12.8
Party Officials 
Including:
237 10.5 8 2.3
CPSU CC 23 1.0 0 0.0
Republican 1st Sees 35 1.6 0 0.0
Obkom/Kraikom 1 Secs 113 5.0 1 0.3
Local 1 Secs 43 1.9 1 0.3
Other Officials 23 1.0 6 1.7
State Officials 150 6.7 24 6.8
TU/KSM/Other Public Orgs. 95 4.2 21 6.0
Secondary/Primary Ed. 183 8.1 33 9.4
HealUt 98 4.4 28 8.0
Scientific Workers 133 5.9 19 5.4
Culture/Media 204 9.1 21 6.0
Military 80 3.6 0 0.0
Others 87 3.9 6 1.7
Total 2249 100 352 100
Sources: Author’s database and adapted from figures in Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR..., pp. 23-28. Note:
the category Other Industrial Workers’ includes some hard to define positions. This contributes to some 
descrepancies with official Soviet data and the study by Nazimova and Sheinis. Notwithstanding, the author’s data 
indicate a quantitative increase in the industrial and agricultural management over the 1984 figures Nazimova and 
Sheinis provided in their study.
4-Among the 2,249 deputies who were elected, men constitued the overwhelming majorityA
of deputies employed in all sectors. Nevertheless, there still existed some gender gaps 
among the deputies. For instance, industrial and agricultural workers constituted over 38 per 
cent of all women elected whereas they were more than one quarter of the men elected. 
Also, among party officials, there was a huge gap between men and womem229 and 8 
respectively. What is more striking is the difference in the positions held by these men and 
women: men held a virtual monopoly over the highest ranks of party leadership; women 
were more concentrated among the lower echelons of power. There was only one woman 
elected from among the party elite of obkom first secretary of above, Rimmadzhon 
Khudaibergenova, who, incidentally^ was the only woman occupying that post in the USSR 





ranks of kolkhoz/sovkhoz/projkom party organizations. Although industrial managers 
constituted a higher percentage among women than^men, women managers came more from 
light industry backgrounds whereas their male counterparts were more likely to have had 
heavy industry and engineering portfolios.
Sex and Electoral Division
Data on gender and the distribution of elected deputies according to electoral division are
contained in Tables 4.6-4.8 . As stated earlier, territorial districts were the most competitive
electoral divisions followed respectively by the national-terrirorial districts and public
organisations. When the distribution of elected women is analyzed, an inverse relationship
exists: where there was greater competition for seats fewer women were elected and, where
there was less competition for seats, a greater number of women were elected. Table 4.8
AvsWdr
contains comprehensive data on women elected to territorial d A  seats.
Table 4 .6  Distribution of Deputies Elected to Territorial Disticts According to Gender
Gender as
% of
All Women Women Men Men Category
Territory (N) (N) (%) (N) (%) Women Men
RSFSR 403 22 30.1 381 56.4 5.5 94.5
Ukraine 143 15 20.5 128 18.9 10.5 89.5
Belorussia 28 3 4.1 25 3.7 10.7 89.3
Uzbekistan 38 12 16.4 26 3.8 31.6 68.4
Kazakhstan * 40 5 6.8 35 5.2 12.5 87.5
Georgia 16 5 6.8 11 1.6 31.3 68.8
Azerbaidzlian 15 5 6.8 10 1.5 33.3 66.7
Lithuania 10 2 2.7 8 1.2 20.0 80.0
Moldavia 11 0 0.0 11 1.6 0.0 100
Latvia 8 0 0.0 8 1.2 0.0 100
Kirgizia 9 1 1.4 8 1.2 11.1 88.9
Tadzliikistan 9 0 0.0 9 1.3 0.0 100
Armenia 8 0 0.0 8 1.2 0.0 100
Turkmenia 7 2 2.7 5 0.7 28.6 71.4
Estonia 4 1 1.4 3 0.4 25.0 75.0
Total 749 73 100 676 100 9.7 90.3
* Note: Kazaklistan was allocated 41 deputies in territorial districts, howi
death of a deputy in one of the territorial districts. See ‘Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii’, p. 42. Sources: Author’s 
database and adapted from ‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii po vyboram narodnykh deputatov SSSR 
O territorial’nykh izbiratel’nykli okrugakli po vyboram narodnykh deputatov SSSR’ in Izvestiya, 7 December 1988, 
pp. 1-5.
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T able 4 .7  D istribution o f  Deputies Elected to N ational-Territorial D istricts A ccording to G ender
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% o f 
Category 
W omen
2 1.9 30 4.6 6.3 93.8
5 4 .9 27 4.2 15.6 84.4
6 5.8 26 4.0 18.8 81.3
3 2.9 29 4.5 9 .4 90.6
S 4.9 27 4.2 15.6 84.4
7 6.8 25 3.9 21.9 78.1
16 15.5 16 2.5 50.0 50.0
1 1.0 31 4.8 3.1 96.9
2 1.9 30 4 .6 6.3 93.8
2 1.9 30 4.6 6.3 93.8
2 1.9 30 4.6 6.3 93.8
1 1.0 31 4.8 3.1 96 .9
6 5.8 26 4 .0 18.8 81.3
4 3.9 28 4.3 12.5 87.5
1 1.0 31 4.8 3.1 96 .9
2 1.9 9 1.4 18.2 81.8
4 3.9 7 1.1 36.4 63.6
1 1.0 10 1.5 9.1 90.9
2 1.9 9 1.4 18.2 81.8
3 2 .9 8 1.2 27.3 72.7
3 2 .9 8 1.2 27.3 72.7
0 0 .0 11 1.7 0 .0 100
4 3.9 7 1.1 36.4 63.5
3 2 .9 8 1.2 27.3 72.7
1 1.0 10 1.5 9.1 90.9
0 0 .0 11 1.7 0 .0 100
2 1.9 9 1.4 18.2 81.8
2 1.9 9 1.4 18,2 81.8
2 1.9 9 1.4 18.2 81.8
3 2 .9 8 1.2 27.3 72.7
i 1.0 10 1.5 9.1 90.9
t 1.0 10 1.5 9.1 90.9
i 1.0 10 1.5 9.1 90.9
I 1.0 10 1.5 9.1 90.9
1 1.0 10 1.5 9.1 90.9
0 0 .0 5 0.8 0 .0 100
1 1,0 4 0.6 20.0 80.0
0 0 .0 5 0.8 0 .0 100
0 0 .0 5 0.8 0 .0 100
1 1.0 4 0.6 20.0 80.0
0 0 .0 5 0.8 0 .0 100
0 0 .0 5 0.8 0 .0 100
1 1.0 4 0 .6 20.0 80.0
0 0 .0 1 0.2 0 .0 100
0 0 .0 1 0,2 0 .0 100
0 0.0 1 0.2 0 .0 100
0 0 .0 1 0.2 0 .0 100
0 0 .0 1 0.2 0 .0 100
0 0 .0 1 0.2 0 .0 100
0 0 .0 1 0.2 0 .0 100.
0 0 .0 1 0.2 0 ,0 100
0 0 .0 1 0.2 0 .0 100
0 0 .0 1 0.2 0 .0 100
103 100 647 100 13.7 '  86.3
Sources: Autlior’s database and adapted from, ‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi kom issii po vyboram  narodnykli deputatov SSSR  
O national’no-territoriarnykli izbiratePnykli okrugakli po vyboram  narodnykh deputatov SSSR in Izvestiya, 7  D ecem ber 1988, pp. 5-8 .
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Table 4.8 Distribution of Women Elected According to Public Organizations
There are several reasons^* which I have found which may explain both the reasons for 
women candidates winning more seats in less competitive electoral divisions and their decline 
in comparison to the 11th convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. First, there is a 
strong possibility that a patriarchal attitude existed among Soviet voters. It will be recalled
■that in a pre-election public opinion poll conducted by the Centre for Political Research I;I
W om en W om en
Public Organization A ll (N) (%)
All Public Organizations 750 176 23 .5
Including:
CPSU 100 12 12
Trade U nions 100 23 23
Cooperative Organizations 100 27 27
K om som ol 75 11 14.7
W om en’s C ouncils 75 75 100
A ll - U nion Organizations o f
Veterans o f  War and Labour 75 6 8
A ssociations o f  Scientific
Workers 75 6 8
Creative U nions o f  tlie U SSR 75 5 6 .7
Other Social Organizations 75 11 14.7
Sources: Author’s database; and adapted from Sostav narodnykh deputatov SSSR..., p .  9.
to be reluctant to vote for woman candidates when obstructions to competition were removed.
good.®  ^ Second, the amount of free time that women had declined during the years
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of the Institute of State Law and the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion of the Institute 
of Sociology of the USSR Academy of Sciences (N =2,800) women were regarded among #the groups of people respondents least desired as their deputies.^ It is very possible
f
that in addition to this patriarhal attitude, the ‘token’ women (selected more for theirA , I;
personal characteristics rather than their leadership and political abilities) that Soviet party 
officials nominated to become deputies during previous elections may have caused voters
Leading feminist from the former USSR Anastasya Posadskaya has noted that the ‘obedient’ Iwomen who sat in bodies often did the cause of women in politics more harm than
. a
of perestroika^ and with an opening up of the electoral system, it is highly doubtful 
that they could have had the time necessary to undertake participation in competitive 
campaigns. This point may be especially valid given Soviet men’s lack of enthusiasm for 
participating in domestic duties.
A third factor was exposed by former First Deputy Chairwoman of the Soviet Women’s 
Committee (later elected to the CPSU Central Committee in July 1990)^^ Alevtina Fedulova 
in an interview published in Izvestiya. Fedulova mentioned that stereotypes certainly had 
some reason to play why women made such a poor showing at the polls. More importantly, 
in the opinion of the present author, is that she stated the Soviet Women’s Committee failed 
to provide adequate support for women candidates outside the seats allocated to the 
zhensovety. ‘As it turned out, even women’s councils were not prepared to work under the 
new conditions and failed to consider the changed political situation and the public mood.
I
As a result, they did not nominate a single woman for candidate for deputy in te r r i to r ia l^ ^  
national-territorial districts in a whole series of oblasts, krais or even republics.’^ ® Fedulova 
brought forth other reasons which contributed to women’s poor showing at the polls. ‘First, 
in terms of numbers, there were far fewer women among the candidates than men. Second, 
wherever a woman ran against a man, voters preferred a man (this shows how voters think 
in terms of stereotypes). Third, women, as a mle, were short of oratorical skill, confidence 
in their strength, and in conviction concerning the merits and advantages of their own 
programmes. Forgive me for saying so, but there were times when our candidates were not 
bold enough. One confirmation of this is the fact that not a single woman who thought she 
had unfairly lost an election appealed to the Central Election Commission for a recount’
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I feel these are strong reasons which certainly affected the reduction of women deputies 
in the highest organ of state power; however, I believe that her second point is probably a 
well-grounded, over-generalization, and, at least in the case of Lithuania, it is entirely 
incorrect. In only 1 of four instances did a man defeat a woman during the first round of 
elections: journalist Vitas Tomkus received 168,847 votes for and 46,335 votes against his 
candidacy whereas, secondary school director Irena-Dnena Kachinskene polled only 9,342 
votes for and 205,430 against during their competition for Panevezhskii territorial district 
No. 961. Tomkus also defeated Antanas Budvitas, director of the Lithuanian scientific 
research institute of agriculture.®^ The three victorious women included in the territorial 
districts, Zita Shlichite who defeated Bronislavas Sheshplaukis in Klaipeda territorial district 
690 and Kazimiera Prunskiene who defeated Sigitas Vilchauskas and Pranis Leonitas in 
Shyalyauskii territorial district 694.®  ^ In the national-territorial districts, Jurate 
Kupliauskiene polled the highest number of votes among her competitors in Vilnius- 
Dzerzhinskii district 226, Valerii Shurupov and Algimantis Matulyavichyus^during the first 
round of elections on 26 March^** and later won in a run-off election. It should be 
noted, however, that, at least in the cases of Prunskiene and Kupliauskiene, the candidates 
were members of SajudisJ^
A fourth factor, which I noticed is that there were few informational items on women 
candidates, particularly in the districts, in the Central and Republican press on 8 March 
1989, International Women’s Day. Izvestiya, for instance, failed to publish either 
information on women candidates in either the districts or public organisations or their pre - 
election programmes'^. There were some exceptions, with particular reference to 
candidates in the districts in some republican n e w s p a p e r s . T h i s  event would have been
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a good opportunity for the social organizations, the CPSU and the participants themselves, 
to promote women’s candidacies, as items in the press on that day naturally, were devoted 
partially to women.
There are other criteria which should also be considered in evaluating both women’s 
representation in the electoral divisions and the influence that this had on the deputy corpus. 
It has already been stated that women were most highly represented in social organisation 
seats. However, the composition of the social organisations suggests some discrepencies 
between the men and women in several categories. First, based on occupations it appears 
that the social organisations could have been used to boost the compositions of the certain 
professional and politically affiliated women. Of the 127 industrial managers who were 
elected to the Congress from the territorial and national-territorial districts, 116 (91.3 per 
cent) were men; whereas, of 25 elected to social organisation seats, 18 (72 per cent) were 
women. A similar trend is found among party and state officials. Men accounted for 206 
of 207 party officials elected from the districts (99.5 per cent) and women comprised 7 of 
30 from the social organizations (23.3 per cent). Among state officials, 115 of 122 elected 
from the districts were men (94.3 per cent); however, 16 of 28 state officials from the public 
organisations were women (57.1 per cent). Also, although agricultural workers were least 
represented among deputies in the social organisations, 21  of 28 from this electoral division 
were women (75 per cent). Table 4.10 contains data on women deputies’ occupations 
according to electoral division. Second, the largest share of women with higher education 
were elected to social organisation seats; 89 of 156 women who completed higher education 
(57.1 per cent) and 21 of 35 with post-graduate qualifications (60 per cent). Table 4.11 
contains data on women deputies’ educational attainments according to electoral division.
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Table 4.9 Distribution of Women Deputies Elected in Territorial Districts
Women as %




Moscow City 26 0 0.0
Moscow Oblast’ 19 1 5.3
Leningrad City 14 0 0.0
Leningrad Oblast’ 5 1 20.0
Altai Krai 8 0 0.0
Krasnodar Krai 14 1 7.1
Krasnoyarsk Krai 10 0 0.0
Primorsk Krai 6 0 0.0
Stavropol Krai 7 2 28.6
Khabarovosk Krai 5 1 20.0
Amur Krai 3 0 0.0
Arkliangel’sk Oblast’ 4 0 0.0
Astrakhan Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Belgorod Oblast’ 4 0 0.0
Bryansk Oblast’ 4 1 25.0
Vladimir Oblast’ 5 1 20.0
Volgograd Oblast’ 7 0 0.0
Vologda Oblast’ 4 0 0.0
Voronezh Oblast’ 7 1 14.3
Gorkii Oblast’ 10 1 10.0
Ivanov Oblast’ 4 0 0.0
Irkutsk Oblast’ 7 0 0.0
Kaliningrad Oblast’ 3 1 33.3
Kalinin Oblast’ 5 0 0.0
Kaluga Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Kamchatka Oblast’ 1 0 0.0
Kemerovo Oblast’ 8 0 0.0
Kirov Oblast’ 5 0 0.0
Kostroma Oblast’ 2 0 0.0
Kuibyshev Oblast’ 9 0 0.0
Kurgan Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Kursk Oblast’ 4 0 0.0
Lipetsk Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Magadan Oblast’ 1 0 0.0
Murmansk Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Novgorod Oblast’ 2 0 0.0
Novosibirsk Oblast’ 8 1 12.5
Omsk Oblast’ 6 1 16.7
Orenburg Oblast’ 6 0 0.0
OrkS # Oblast’ 3 1 33.3
Penza Oblast’ 4 0 0.0
Perm Oblast’ 8 0 0.0
Pskov Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Rostov Oblast’ 12 0 0.0
Ryazan Oblast’ 4 0 0.0
Saratov Oblast’ 7 2 28.6
Saklialin Oblast’ 2 0 0.0
Sverdlovsk Oblast’ 13 0 0.0
Smolensk Oblast’ 3 0 0.0




Tula Oblast’ 5 0 0.0
Tyumen Oblast’ 8 0 0.0
Ulyanovsk Oblast’ 4 0 0,0
Chelyabinsk Oblast’ 10 0 0.0
Chita Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Yaroslavl’ Oblast’ 4 0 0.0
Baslikir ASSR 10 0 0.0
Buryat ASSR 3 0 0.0
Dagestan ASSR 4 1 25.0
Kabardjne - Balkar ASSR 2 1 50.0
KalmyTk ASSR 1 0 0.0




Marii ASSR 2 0 0.0
Mordov^i^SR 3 2 66.7
N Osetir ASSR 2 0 0.0
Tatar A^SR 10 0 0.0
Tuvin ASSR 1 0 0.0
Udmurt ASSR 4 0 0.0
Chechen - Ingush ASSR 3 0 0.0
Chuvash ASSR 3 0 0.0
Yakut ASSR 2 0 0.0
Ukraine 143 15 10.5
Including:
Vinnitsa Oblast’ 6 2 33.3
Volynsk Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Voroshilovograd Oblast’ 8 0 0.0
Dnepropetrovsk Oblast’ 10 0 0.0
Dontesk Oblast’ 15 1 6.7
Zhitomir Oblast’ 5 1 20.0
Transcarpathian Qblast’ 9 2 22.2
Ivano - Franko Oblast’ 4 2 50.0
Kiev City ^ 6 0 0.0
Kiev Oblast’ 6 1 16.7
Kirovograd Oblast’ 4 0 0.0
Crimea Oblast’ 6 0 0.0
Lvov Oblast’ 7 1 14.3
Nikolaev Oblast’ 4 0 0.0
Odessa Oblast’ 7 1 14.3
Poltava Oblast’ 5 1 20.0
Roven Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Suma Oblast’ 4 1 25.0
Ternopol Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Khar’ko V Oblast’ 9 0 0.0





Chernigov Oblast’ 4 1 25.0
Chernov^^ Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Belorussia 28 3 10.7
Including:
Brest’ Oblast’ 4 0 0.0
Vitebsk Oblast’ 4 0 0.0
Gomel Oblast’ 5 0 0.0
Groden Oblast’ 3 1 33.3
Minsk Oblast’ 8 1 12.5




Andizhan Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Bukliara Oblast’ 2 1 50.0
Kashnadar’in Oblast’ 3 1 33.3
Namangan Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Samarkand Oblast’ 5 3 60.0
Surkhandar Oblast’ 2 1 50.0
Sydarin Oblast’ 3 2 66.7
Tashkent Oblast’ 9 1 11.1
Fergana Oblast’ 4 1 25.0
Kliorzem Oblast’ 2 2 100
Karakalpak ASSR 2 0 0.0
Kazakhstan 40 5 12.5
Including: 
Alma Ata City 3 0 0.0
Alma Ata Oblast’ 2 0 0.0
Aktyubin Oblast’ * 1 0 0.0
E Kazaklistan Oblast’ 3 1 33.3
Gunev Oblast’ 2 0 0.0
Dzhambul Oblast’ 2 2 100.0
Dzhezkazgan Oblast’ 1 0 0.0
Karaganda Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Kyzyl “ Ordin Oblast’ 1 0 0.0
Kokchetov Oblast’ 2 1 50.0
Kustanai Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Pavlodar Oblast’ 2 0 0.0
N Kazaklistan Oblast’ 2 0 0.0
Semipalattnsk Oblast’ 2 0 0.0
Taldy - Kurgan Oblast’ 2 0 0.0
Ural’sk Oblast’ 2 1 50.0
Tselinograd Oblast’ 3 0 0.0
Chimkent Oblast’ 4 0 0.0
Georgia 16 5 31.3
Azerbaidzhan 15 5 33.3
Lithuania 10 2 20.0
Moldavia 11 0 0.0
Latvia 8 0 0.0
Kirgizia 9 1 11.1
Tadzhikistan 9 0 0.0
Armenia 8 0 0.0
Turkmenia 7 2 28.6
Estonia 4 1 25.0
Total 749 73 9.7
* Note: Due to the death of a deputy in this oblast’, there was only 1 deputy in office when the first Congress met 
in May I9d>9.Sources: Autlior’s database and adapted from ‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii po 
vyboram narodnykh deputatov SSSR O territorial’nykh izbiratel’nykli okrugakh po vyboram narodnykh deputatov 
SSSR’ in Izvestiya, 1 December 1988, pp. 1-5.
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Table 4 .10  Women Deputies Elected According to Occupation & Electoral Division
Nat’l- Nat’l-
All All Terr. Terr. Terr. Terr. p. Orgs. p. Orgs.
Occupation by Sector (N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%)
Industrial Management 27 7.7 3 4.1 6 5.8 18 10.2
Industrial Workers 63 17.9 14 19.2 21 20.4 28 15.9
Agricultural Management 28 8.0 5 6.8 6 5.8 17 9.7
Agricultural Workers 77 21.9 27 37.0 29 28.2 21 11.9
Party Officials 8 2.3 0 0.0 1 1.0 7 4.0
State Officials 23 6.5 3 4.1 4 3.9 16 9.1
TU/KSM/Otlter Public Orgs. 18 5.1 0 0.0 2 1.9 16 9.1
Secondary/Primary Ed. 34 9.7 7 9.6 16 15.5 11 6.3
Health 30 8,5 12 16.4 10 9.7 8 4.5
Scientific Workers 21 6.0 1 1.4 6 5.8 14 8.0
Culture/Media 18 5.1 1 1.4 2 1.9 15 8.5
Others 5 1.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 2.8
Total 352 100 73 100 103 100 176 100
Sources: Autlior’s database; Sostav narodnykh deputatov.. . . ,  p p . 23-28.
Table 4.11 Women Deputies Elected According to Education and Electoral Division
Nat’l Nat’l p. Orgs p. Orgs
Terr (N) Terr (%) Terr (N) Terr (%) (N) (%)
Secondary* 43 58.9 50 48.5 64 36.4
Higher** 25 34.2 44 42.7 91 51.7
Post-Graduate 5 6.8 9 8.7 21 11.9
Total 73 100 103 100 176 100
* Includes women who achieved general secondary, specialist secondary and incomplete secondary education.
** Includes women who achieved incomplete and complete higher education.
Sources: Author’s database; Sostav narodnykh deputatov. p p . 17 and 21
Women in the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies
Women’s participation in the first USSR Congress of People’s Deputies in May-June 1989 
is a final factor to consider in the ways in which electoral reform measures affected the 
women deputies’ share of the Soviet parliament and political participation. As stated earlier, 
between the sessions of 1984-1988, women were infrequent contributors in the Supreme 
Soviet, and, because the agenda was more or less controlled, it can be safely assumed that 
the CPSU did not intend to promote their participation even as high as their representation 
in the legislature. Thus, the question now poses itself as to how women fared in a generally 
more open atmosphere. At present, the one major existing study concerning participation 
in the first USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, written by Italian journalist, Giulietto
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Chiesa^ suggests the women were infrequent contributors to the sessions^"  ^ and suggests that 
they belonged to what he considered a ‘marsh’ of deputies-‘those who either do not want or 
are unable to take sides.
There are three ways''^ which I concluded that are possible to analyse women’s 
participation in the Congress: as chairs of sittings; as makers of major speeches and those 
who contributed to discussions from the floor. During the 13 sittings (and one extraordinary 
session) held between 25 May and 9 June 1989, there were nearly 2,100 entries entered into 
the Congress^ stenographic report made by 413 USSR People’s D e p u t i e s . M e n  chaired 
every one of these sittings. However, in the Second Session held in December 1989 
Valentina Shevchenko chaired the 4th and 6 th s i t t i n g s . A m o n g  the 413 contributors 
overall, 32 were women (7.7 per cent of all contributors; 9.1 per cent of all elected 
w o m e n ) . W h i l e  this figure was lower than the total from the previous convocation of the 
Supreme Soviet, it was certainly a higher total of women speaking at any one sitting of held 
between 1984-1988.^^ Thus, we can consider that women’s participation in the legislature 
may have been enhanced somewhat by a reduction of CPSU control over the agenda. The 
deputies made 188 major speeches or reports; however, only 8  women contributed in this 
capacity (4.2 per cent). Therefore, the majority of women contributed ‘from the floor’. 
However, it should be pointed out that there existed extreme discrepencies between the 
percentage of women contributors and the amount of times they were entered into the 
stenographic report. It should not be suiprising that Mikhail Gorbachev had the greatest 
number of contributions recorded in the parliamentary proceedings (578). However, no 
woman’s name was entered more than four times in the record.
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What were the characteristics of these women? The majority of them belonged to the 
CPSU: 23 or 71.9 per cent. Also, most were recipients of higher education (27 or 84.4 per 
cent), and more 1 in 4 women deputies who had achieved a post-graduate degree 
contributed to the Congress. In addition, most of the women were from white collar 
backgrounds of some sort (26 or 81.2 per cent). Women from the social organisations 
contributed most to the Congress (14 or 43.8 per cent) and were followed respectively by 
those in the national-territorial districts (10; 31.3 per cent) and territorial districts (7; 21.9 
per cent). Table 4.12 contains data on women who spoke at the First USSR Congress of 
People’s Deputies (May-June 1989).
Table 4,12 Women Speakers at First USSR Congress of People’s Deputies 
Session Speakers Women %
1 7 1 14.3
2 44 8 18.2
3 40 4 10.0
4 45 7 15.6
5 50 5 10.0
6 59 9 15.3
7 30 4 13.3
8 34 4 11.8
9 62 8 12.9
11 40 5 12.5
12 37 5 13.5
448 60 13.4Total
Sources: Author’s database; Pervyi S"ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR 25 tnaya-9iyunya 1989 g.: Stenograficheskii 
otchet, (Moscow: Verkhovnyi Sovet/Izvestiya, 1989), 6 Vols, Vols 1-3.
Conclusion
Electoral reform measures had varying effects on the composition of women in the USSR 
Congress of People’s Deputies. As a result of the elections women’s representation 
decreased. However, the women were more likely to have been party members, white collar 
workers, and recipients of higher education than they were in 1984. Thus, on these levels,
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it seems that the women could have been in better positions to contribute to the sessions of I
the Congress than their predecessors in the last convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
However, the greatest share of women with these traits were elected to the social ?
organisation seats which were less competitive than the electoral districts. The social 
organisation seats, eliminated from the Law on Elections of USSR People’s Deputies after 
the Second Congress in December, certainly violated the principle of universal suffrage and 
one-person one vote. This point is among the topics discussed in the following chapter.
However, in the case of the First Congress, the largest share of women deputies who 
participated in the proceedings were elected from these seats. In one way it is not surprising. ISome of them were leading figures in science, the state and management and they would 
have had strong party ties. For instance two of the three women speakers (among eight 
overall) who made major speeches at the Congress and were elected to social organisation
seats included Zoya Pukhova, the chairwoman of the Soviet Women’s Committee, and Zeina
Beishekeeva, 2i(gosspetskhoz)^Qmox shepherd, and member of the CPSU Central Auditing A
Commission since 1986. Nevertheless, the social organisation seats provided at least in 
theory a mechanism for increased participation for women. The removal of these seats 
certainly affected women’s representation in subsequent elections at the republican and local 
levels, and for instance comprised about 5 per cent of the Russian Congress of People’s 
Depu t i e s , Howeve r ,  men’s political participation in Soviet politics increased in all areas: 
candidates, deputies and participants in the parliament. Nevertheless, as later chapters will 
argue, women’s representation increased in the 1993 elections to the Russian Federal 
Assembly.
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Chapter 5. Developments in Elections and Parties,
1989-1993
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The purpose of this chapter is to create a link between the USSR’s first multi-candidate 
national parliamentary election conducted in March 1989 and Russia’s first Post-Soviet 
‘multiparty’ election in December 1993. There are several particular points of reference 
upon which this chapter focuses. First, the present author outlines some of the major 
occurrences in the republican and local elections of 1989-1990 and discusses to what 
extent these demonstrated elements of continuity, contradiction and departure from earlier 
elections. The second part of this chapter discusses the elections to the RSFSR Congress 
of People’s Deputies and the Russian presidency. These elections set the stage for 
Russia’s post-communist transition by creating its two most important institutions. Third, 
the present author engages in a survey of Soviet writings on electoral reform between 
1989-1991 and demonstrates the deficiencies contained in the legislation throughout this 
period and the great variations between the republics governing the franchise. Moreover, 
these authors amply illustrate that the electoral process was rapidly moving towards 
conditions in which citizen groups, public organisations, like political parties and 
movements and other actors took increasingly more prominent roles. The final section of 
this chapter presents a brief exposition on the state of parties from 1990-1993 and 
therefore establishes the importance these organisations had and the numerous difficulties 
they had to overcome on the eve of Russia’s first Post-Soviet multiparty elections.
Elections to Local and Republican Soviets of People’s Deputies, 1989-1990
Elections to local soviets of people’s deputies and republican legislatures took place 
between 1989-1990. These elections were significant for several reasons. First, the 
contests and the new legislatures they produced were necessary steps towards the
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fulfilment of one of the points of Gorbachev’s overall reform program. In his bookA
Perestroika, Gorbachev advocated re-invogorating the soviets of all levels.^ In addition, -i,
the XIX Party Conference resolved that these newly elected bodies would have greater 
degrees of autonomy from the centre and from the CPSU.^ Second, the manner in 
which these elections were conducted reveal significant differences between (a) politics at
the all-union level and the republics and (b) among the 15 union republics and other 
administrative subdivisions. These developments are important because they constituted a 
radical departure from previous republican election legislation. In the pre-reform period, 
the electoral laws (and constitutions) of the union republics were, more or less, carbon 
copies of the all-union legislation. N. A. Mikhaleva and L. A. Morozova have suggested
'Ithat
There have been changes and amendments to the [USSR] Constitution on 
questions of the electoral system and all union and autonomous republics 
adopted new laws on elections and developed normative acts on the various 
levels of soviets. This is a serious step in the development of a sovereign 
nation-state of union republics and the elevation of the status of the 
autonomous formations.^
;
They also noted that following the Second USSR Congress of People’s Deputies held in 
December 1989 and the adoption of constitutional amendments pertaining to questions of 
the electoral system, ‘[rjepublics received the possibility to determine independently the 
forms of their highest bodies of state and local self-government. For instance, at the 
all-union level the state was governed by the President of the USSR, the USSR Congress
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of People’s Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet/ (However, it will be recalled that 
the USSR Presidency was approved at the Extraordinary Third Congress of People’s 
Deputies of the USSR, 12-15 March 1990/) Mikhaleva and Morozova specify that
[i]n the RSFSR [the corresponding state organs were the] Congress of 
People’s Deputies and Supreme Soviet and in the other republics and





autonomous republics, supreme soviets. In the Russian Federation the 
Supreme Soviet [ 1] of two equal chambers, a Soviet of the
I
Darrell Slider has noted the importance of these developments f |
Legislation on republic and local elections was passed not at the level of 
the central government, but by each republic’s government. Even the 
timing of the elections was left up to republic authorities; they extended
from January to late October [1990].®
■'I
I
It is also significant to point out, with the advantage of hindsight, that it is clear that 'Ï
the elections of the republican organs of legislative power were extremely important in 
late-Soviet politics and contributed greatly to the governing process in the immediate post- 
Soviet transition. These institutions were popularly-elected under their own, rather than 
centrally-directedj electoral legislation; therefore, they had (theoretically) some popular 
legitimacy. Therefore, the body of legal documents that they enacted during the late 
Soviet period and early Post-Soviet period held their status after the Union collapsed in
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1991. Moreover, the independence and sovereignty declarations that the legislatures 
passed in the names of their respective republics carried both legal and moral force. 
Thus, in a sense, these elections could be considered to have contributed indirectly to the 
USSR’s dissolution. However, it should also be noted that to an extent these legislatures 
were also able to keep total power vacuums from developing in the wake of the August 
1991 coup and its aftermath-despite the volatile political climates in that period.^
During these elections the opportunities for competition and political participation
Cincreased greatly compared to the eMions to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. 
Indeed, Soviet scholar V. A. Kryazhkov, writing in the legal journal Sovetskoe 
gosudarstvo i pravo in 1990^ went so far as to declare that ‘[a]t the present time the 
competition among candidates for deputy may be considered as a principle o f the Soviet 
electoral system (original e m p h a s i s ) . N o t  only did these elections bring forth an 
increase in the number of individual candidates “ who competed for seats in the new 
republican legislatures, but political organisations such as National Fronts and other 
informal movements increased the scope of their activities through their campaigning.^^ 
Despite these attributes it must be established that while the competition increased in these 
elections, the CPSU still maintained a dominant position on a union-wide level. 
Therefore, the rights that were extended in this series of elections reinforces the thesis 
that the reforms were part of a liberalisation, not a full démocratisation. Several 
examples highlight this proposition.
Delegates to the CPSU Central Committee’s February 1990 voted to suggest 
amending Article 6  of the USSR Constitution, which granted the Party its monopoly in
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the Soviet political system. This suggestion was approved by the Third USSR Congress 
of People’s Deputies and made into law in March 1990.^^ Therefore, this motion meant 
that the CPSU had, de jure, renounced its privileged position in Soviet society. In its 
previous incarnation, Article 6  declared:
The leading and guiding force of Soviet society, its political system, state 
and social organisations is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The 
CPSU exists for the people and serves the people.
Armed with Marxist-Leninist thought, the Communist Party determines 
the general perspective of society, the lines of the domestic and foreign 
policies of the USSR and leads the great constructive activity of the Soviet 
people and gives a planned, scientific fundamental character for its stmggle 
for the victory of communism.
In March 1990 this article was amended to read:
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, other political parties and also 
trade unions, youth and other social organisations and mass movements, 
through their representatives elected to the soviets of people’s deputies and 
in their other capacities shall participate in the making of the politics of the 
Soviet state and in the management of state and society.
Therefore, the legal groundwork for new. political and social forces to contend for power 
legally had been established. Although this was indeed a significant political 
development, the amendment came far too late for the political organisations which had 
been developing since the late 1980s to participate effectively against the CPSU. It 
should be noted that the Law on Public Associations which governed the registration, 
operations and norms of these new public organisations was ^ adopted until October 
1990.**^  Moreover, the law (the provisions of which will be discussed later) did not go 
into effect until 1 January 1991.^^ The timing of these measures reinforces the argument 
that the CPSU implemented liberalising tactics in its reforms.
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Slider argues that the conditions surrounding the elections could not have assisted any 
of the newly-formed political organisations with the possible exception of those in the 
Baltics where they were reasonably well-established/® In Lithuania, for instance, during 
the first round of elections (24 February 1990) 72 of the 90 seats that were filled were 
won by Sajudis-h2iQk&& candidates (the Lithuanian Movement in Support of Perestroika). 
This included 46 of 48 independents, 13 of 22 members of the Independent Lithuanian 
Communist Party and every deputy of the Social Democratic Party (9), Green Party and 
Christian Democratic Party (2 each). During the second round (10 March) 17 of 26 
elected deputies were supported by Sajudis}^ Rein Taagepera notes that although the 
Estonian Popular Front did not win an outright majority in the republic’s Supreme Soviet, 
its leader Edgar Savisaar was elected Prime Minister; whereas in Latvia, the Popular 
Front of Latvia won a clear majority of 131 of 201 seats during the first two rounds of 
the e l e c t i o n s . S l i d e r  argues that with the exception of these examples, the CPSU was 
the only political organisation that could have benefited from the early election dates. 
Indeed it was only in Georgia, where the authorities postponed elections until late 
autumn, that there were multiparty-type elections.
There are other points which reinforce CPSU dominance throughout the campaigns to 
the republican legislatures. Slider maintains that CPSU officials were afforded greater 
access to media than other candidates. In addition, the ballot papers did not identify the 
political affiliations of any of the candidates and this worked to the disadvantage of 
members of the newly-formed political organisations and social movements. (It will be 
demonstrated later in this dissertation that Yeltsin’s team utilised this same practice-a
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move which theoretically hindered those who were affiliated with political organisations 
other than Russia’s Choice.) Moreover, in all republics, the vast majority of candidates 
were nominated at work places through the ‘production principle’ as opposed to places of
residence. It was in the work places that the CPSU and its satellite organisations were
i
able to manipulate nomination meetings. Candidates who were members of the newly- I
Ô ' T  Iformed political organisations^ supported by them or those who stood on issues that :
deviated from the CPSU’s official line were nominated by ‘research institutes and i
progressive enterprises’. New political organisations, their supporters and their 
candidates were harassed in Turkmenia, Kirgizia and Belorussia. In fact the degree of 
official interference was so extreme in the latter case that the Belorussian National Front 
was forced to convene its founding Congress in L ithuan ia .Independence-m inded  i
political organisations and progressive forces were represented in instances in large 
Russian cities, Moldavia, Armenia and Ge o r g i a . Ho w e v e r ,  these forces can attribute 
their victories to dissatisfaction with the CPSU, the legitimacy of their candidates and the 
dedicated work of their supporters in the face of significant opposition.
Slider correctly identifies that Party-manipulation was a negative feature of the 
production principle method of election. However, there were many notable Soviet 
politicians, commentators and scholars who have praised the idea of founding electoral 
districts around enterprises as the best possible way of fusing the political and economic 
aspects of socialist democracy, claiming that Lenin preferred this method of election. For 
instance, the noted legal scholars and leading advocates of electoral reform Georgii f
Barabashev and Konstantin Sheremet have noted that this would contribute a significant 
move towards a ‘return to Lenin’; however they conceded that there would be drawbacks
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like large work collectives having advantages over smaller enterprises when nominating 
candidates/*^ Indeed, socialists with divergent views on politics such as former dissident 
historian Roy Medvedev^^ and Yegor Ligachev have considered this method among their 
preferred variants of electoral reforms/^
1Mikhaleva and Morozova note that in late 1989 the Leningrad United Workers Front
put forth a proposal to conduct elections to local soviets on the production principle and
this initiative began to gain support in a number of regions throughout Russia. Thus, the
RSFSR Supreme Soviet issued a resolution on 27 October 1989 in which it was stated
that experimental elections would be conducted on the production principle. Therefore,
electoral districts were established in two Moscow hamlets where there were large
enterprises, Perov and Tushina. Mikhaleva and Morozova argue that advocates of this
experiment hoped that voters’ alienation from the previous election to the USSR Congress
of People’s Deputies would be resolved, i.e., the deputy corpus would be more in
accordance with the area’s social structure and more working class representatives would
be elected than would be elected in territorial districts. In addition, they noted that the
experiment had other objectives. First, the drafters wanted to have the workers elect
those of their colleagues with whom they were most familiar. Second, it was hoped that
production principle elections would create conditions in which more workers could
participate in the nomination meetings. They pointed out the fact that no more than 5 per
cent of the toilers participated in nomination meetings in places of residence whereas 
\vunder the alternate system, this figure would be raised to closer to 100 per cent. Third, A
they stated that the increased possibilities for the candidates to come into contact with 
workers could result in more discussions on the aspirants’ stances and the creation of
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programmes that reflected more accurately the will of the workers. Finally, they noted 
that in the production principle districts there were alternative candidates, whereas in the 
territorial districts there were instances in which a single candidate stood for a given 
seat. 27
Despite the production principle’s theoretically positive attributes, Mikhaleva and 
Morozova pointed out some deficiencies in the experiment. First, they noted that the 
scope of the election was far too small and that deputies were not elected in this manner 
to either the Moscow City Soviet or the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies. Second, 
the enterprises’s work schedule made it difficult to hold elections at the same time and) 
therefore, the elections were held on two days. Third, the principle of one-person one- 
vote was often violated in these districts, Mikhaleva and Morozova note that only 30 per 
cent of the workers in those production principle districts resided there and cast their 
ballots solely in elections for those seats; the other 70 per cent of the workers had places 
of residence outside those areas and were on the electoral rolls of other districts as well. 
Therefore, these workers had extra votes. In addition, they pointed out that voter 
turnout did not reach the levels that had been hoped, some 85 per cent. For instance, in 
Tushina the figure stood at 76 per cent and in Perov it was 75 per cent. This compares 
to 60-70 per cent in the territorial districts that held elections during the same period. 
Mikhaleva and Morozova considered that weak administrative work and poorly defined 
legislation could be attributed to these elections not being as successful as their initiators 
would have hoped.
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Elections to the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies, March 1990 and RSFSR 
Presidency, June 1991
Elections to the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies were conducted on 4 March 
1990/^ Voters chose their deputies in 900 territorial districts established on a 
nominally equal share of population and 168 national-territorial districts in which the 
ethno-territorial administrative units were each allocated a specific number of deputies. It 
will be noted that the RSFSR’s election law did not grant any seats to social organisations 
in the new legislature.
Judith Devlin has argued that the Russian Congress ‘had been elected on a fully 
democratic basis’/® however, the present author will demonstrate that like the elections 
to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, the hustings for the RSFSR’s parliament 
were limited-choice elections. New political organisations campaigned actively in the 
contest. However, none were allowed formally to put their candidates forward. Despite 
the restrictions on candidates from alternative political organisations standing officially, 
there were two other significant political forces which competed in the elections in 
addition to the CPSU: National Patriots and Democrats. However, it will be noted that 
there were criticisms i by democratic supporters that the National Patriots and CPSU 
were working closely during the campaign. Overall, some 7,018 candidates, 84 per cent 
of them men, competed for mandates in the parliament. Although the Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe noted that there were more than 20 candidates in 
some districts, they reported that in 33 a solitary candidate stood unopposed.
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Despite the increase in candidate competition in comparison to pre-reform elections 
and the elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, there were numerous 
instances in which candidates opposed to the CPSU had their chances for competing on an 
equal footing with their opponents violated. In addition, there were several accounts in 
which the appamtchiki abused their positions of power and took advantage of their access 
to the media, computers and printing and photocopying equipment. Some significant 
examples include the fact that candidates who supported the Party line were granted space 
for their platfonns in the central press. In addition, they appeared ‘on television to 
discuss non-election related issues, but they would be identified as candidates for office, 
thus providing them with publicity and an oblique opportunity to c a m p a i g n . O v e r a l l ,  
voters felt that they knew little about the candidates. Often the electors stated that the 
first time that they found out any information on the aspirants was when they went to vote 
and read their pre-election materials at the polling places. Moreover, the Party was able 
to manipulate and direct the composition of the election commissions which supervised 
the conduct of the elections.
Irregularities and violations of the law occurred during the nomination stages, the 
campaign itself and during the counting of votes. For instance, the Memorial Society 
which advocated constructing a monument in remembrance of the victims of the Stalin 
period was denied the right to register as a public organisation for over a year. As a 
result the movement was not able to field c a n d i d a t e s . ( I t  should be noted that only 
work collectives, voters of electors in places of residence and previously approved public 
organisations possessed the right to nominate candidates to the Congress.) Campaign 
literature and posters were defaced. In addition, the Commission on Security and
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Cooperation in Europe noted that ‘two carloads of soldiers were apprehended two nights 
before the run-off elections (held 28 March 1990) pasting up leaflets containing 
slanderous attacks on [Army colonel Vitalii] Urzhatsev^, a key figure in the Shchit 
(Shield) military reform movement/^ On election day voters in one Moscow district 
complained that ‘a local election commission changed the location of the polling station 
without properly notifying voters’/*^  In Moscow, the election protocols were taken to 
the regional executive committee before they were submitted to the electoral commission. 
There were also reports of ballot box stuffing. The principle of one person-one vote was 
also violated when one family member cast votes for the entire family. In fact, in 
Krasnodar, a father who voted for his daughter claimed, ‘we’re all of the same opinion 
back at the house.
Voter turnout during these elections decreased even further than^the previous elections 
to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. It will be recalled that some 87 per cent of 
the voters in the RSFSR participated in the 1989 elections to the Soviet parliament. 
However, in 1990, this figure fell to 72 per cent.^^ Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
the decline in voter participation ” . have worked to the Party’s benefit. The 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe argues that ‘knowing the mood of the 
electorate, Party officials were more interested in keeping voter turnout low in areas 
where reform candidates stood a good chance of winning.
Voters elected key reformers such as Boris Yeltsin in Sverdlovsk National-Territorial 
District No. 74, Democratic Russia movement co-chairman Lev Ponomarev in 
Zamoskvoretskii National-Territorial District No. 2 in Moscow city, former political
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prisoner Father Gleb Yakunin in Shchelkovo National-Territorial District No. 11 in 
Moscow oblast’ and human rights activist Sergei Kovalev in Chertanovskii Territorial 
District No. 58 in Moscow city.^® Electors’ clubs were also important in the elections 
to the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies. Peter Duncan notes that the Inter- 
Regional Association of Voters, which was strongly oriented towards the Inter-Regional 
Deputies Group, played the major grass-roots role in establishing other voters’ blocs such 
as Elections-90 for the Moscow City Soviet (Mossovet) and Democratic Russia for the 
Russian Congress of People’s Deputies. Moreover, he states that the organisation was 
important in contributing to the creation of the Democratic Russia Movement. 
Accordingly, he notes the successes of the aforementioned voters’ organisations and other 
candidate support groups.
In Moscow Democratic Russia won fifty-seven of sixty-five seats in the 
Congress and 281 of the 463 (filled at the second round of voting) on 
Mossovet. In Sverdlovsk, Democratic Choice had endorsed seven of the 
nine successful Congress deputies, including Yeltsin, and eighty of the 194 
victorious candidates in the City Soviet. Members of democratic electoral 
blocs took control of city soviets in some major oblast’ centres, and 
became influential in a number of oblast’ soviets such as Sakhalin where 
the Democratic Movement for Perestroika in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk was still 
strong and had helped to initiate the Sakhalin Popular Front. Democratic 
Russia could claim the allegiance of 370 out of 1,061 deputies to the 
Russian Congress.*^®
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In addition, Alla Nazimova and Viktor Sheinis have indicated similar levels of support for 
Democratic Russia at the Congress during April-May 1990, claiming that its members or 
fellow travellers constituted between 30-35 per cent of the deputies/*
These successes for the democrats notwithstanding, the 1990 elections could be 
considered to have greatly benefited the nomenklatura. Overall, some 8 6  per cent of the 
deputies elected were CPSU members/^ However, Party unity at that time should not 
be overestimated. Ronald J. Hill has argued that by 1990 the CPSU began losing 
members, it had begun to divid^along ethnic lines in the Baltics and in the 1990 elections 
its members competed against each other for seats in the Congress; the Party failed to run 
a unified election campaign.'*^ However, Nazimova and Sheinis indicate that Russian
voters elected more deputies who were enterprise directors, state and Party officials in
/
1990 than they did in 1989 when they elected deputies in territorial districts and national- 
territorial districts to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. In 1989, 67 per cent of 
the 646 deputies allocated to the RSFSR fell under this category; the following year this 
figure increased to 78.6 per cent.'*'*
Several significant shifts in professional composition took place between 1989 and 
1990. It must be noted, however, that there was no change in the share of elected 
deputies who were from the ranks of the country’s highest political leadership (including 
Politburo and Secretariat); in 1989 and 1990 they constituted 0.3 per cent of each corpus. 
In addition, there was virtually no alteration in the proportion of officials employed in the 
lower echelons of party, state and economic management (secretaries of factory party 
committees, shop floor chiefs, low ranking military officers). In 1989 these deputies
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comprised 21.2 per cent of the RSFSR’s deputies in the USSR Congress of People’s 
Deputies and in 1990 they were 21.7 per cent of the RSFSR Congress deputies. The 
greatest growth amongst the differing groups occurred (respectively) within the ranks of 
deputies elected from the high echelons of power {obkom secretaries, leading figures in 
the corresponding level soviets of people’s deputies, ministers and leading workers in the 
state apparatus at all levels, high ranking military officials), the middle levels of 
management (secretaries of raikomy, gorkomy, officials from corresponding level soviets 
of people’s deputies, enterprise directors, agricultural managers, scientific research 
institute directors) and the highly qualified white-collar workers (engineers, technicians, 
teachers, physicians and the scientific and creative intelligentsia).'^^
The former group saw its share increase from 14.4 per cent in 1989 to 18.7 per cent 
the following year. While the share of obkom secretaries declined from 8 per cent to 6  
per cent, state representatives were elected in significantly higher proportions. For 
instance, workers in the ministries nearly doubled their presence in comparison to 1989, 
increasing their ranks from 2 per cent to 3.8 per cent. In addition, officials from oblast’ 
soviets jumped from 1.4 per cent of the corpus in 1989 to 4.9 per cent in 1990.'^^
Middle-level management had the highest increase. In 1989 this group comprised 
slightly more than 31 per cent of the deputies. However, in 1990, officials in these 
positions constituted just fewer than 39 per cent. Among these officials, secretaries of 
raikomy and gorkomy increased their representation from 1.9 per cent to 4.7 per cent. In 
addition, the proportion of officials from corresponding level soviets of people’s deputies 
grew from 0.9 per cent to 2 per cent. Enterprise directors and their chief specialists were
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also more abundant in 1990. Their share of the deputies was elevated from 9.1 per cent
',1
to 11.6 per cent. Amongst the white collar workers, scientific workers raised their 
representation by more than 50 per cent (3.9 per cent vs. 6  per cent). In addition the
I
share of journalists nearly doubled (1 .1  per cent vs. 2  per cent).**^
;
There were, however some significant declines in certain professional categories. For
■I
instance, the share of workers and collective farmers was reduced radically from 1989.
I
Some 21.1 per cent of the RSFSR’s deputies in the USSR Congress belonged to these
Igroups. However, they comprised a mere 5.9 per cent the following year. It should also
ibe noted that the combined share of sovkhoz and kolkhoz workers was less than 1 per cent 
in 1990.‘‘«
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The elections to the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies can be considered
significant in Russia’s political development for reasons other than those included at the 
beginning of this chapter. First, these elections expanded the candidate choice that was
I
first implemented in 1989 and this act alone signified that the citizens of the RSFSR 
(either as voters or^ candidates) considered competitive elections an essential part of the 
Russian political system. More importantly, despite their effforts to thwart alternative
candidates and forces. Party officials also worked in competitive conditions. Second, 
these elections provided a foium in which civil society could play a role-albeit very 
limited. Therefore, these elections . in some instances represented a further step in 
the development of electoral procedures throughout the territory of the USSR,
'■Third, following in the tradition of the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, like-
iminded deputies organised themselves in fractions. However, it should be noted that 
deputy participation was much higher in the RSFSR Congress than it had been in the t-
USSR Congress of People’s deputies. Fractions, according to Vladimir Novikov, Leader
834 deputies out of the 1,040 in the Russian Congress belonged to these fractions^^ (80.2 
per cent of deputies).
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I
of the Council of Deputies’ Fractions, were defined as^group[s] of people’s deputies of 
the Russian Federation professing united political views and the same organisational 
p r i n c i p l e s . T h e  Reglament (Standing Orders) of the Congress established that 
People’s Deputies ' associate in groups according to territorial or other principles. 
Those deputies who associated on territorial principles were able to group according to 
their republics, autonomous oblasti, autonomous districts, kray a, oblasti and the cities of 
Moscow and St Petersburg.^" Novikov stated that there were two further requirements 
to which deputies entering into fractions had to adhere. ‘A deputy [could] belong to only 
one association and ... there [could] not be less than 50 people per fraction’ In 
addition, deputy fractions were associated into blocs, which were required to contain at 
least three fractions. There were 14 major fractions in the former Russian Federation 
Congress of People’s Deputies and they organised into four b l o c s I n  late April 1993,
I
Several of these fractions and blocs had links with Russian political parties. For 
example, the deputy fraction ‘Communists of Russia’ included the members of the 
conservative Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Conversely, more liberal 
Communists rallied around Aleksandr Rutskoi and in the spring of 1991 banded together 
to form ‘Communists for Democracy’ to oppose ‘Communists of Russia’
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‘Communists for Democracy’, became the building bloc for the People’s Party of Free 
R u s s i a . L a t e r ,  the People’s Party of Free Russia’s parliamentary activities were f
■Scoordinated by the ‘Free Russia’ fraction. It should also be noted that many of the 
fractions formed the cores of the electoral associations that competed in the 1993 Ielections. For instance some ‘Agrarian Union’ deputies joined the ranks of the Agrarian 
Party of Russia. ‘Change-New Policy’ and ‘Free Russia’ were important in creating the
I‘Future of Russia-New Names’ electoral association. .Pi
.;ï
Référendums also contiibuted significantly to electoral development in 1990. In
accordance with the USSR Constitution’s (Article 5), the most important questions of 
state life shall be introduced for national discussion and also put to national référendums.
Despite this provision, no referendum was ever held in the USSR until 1991. Moreover, 
there was no legislation governing their procedures until the Gorbachev period. The 
USSR Congress of People’s Deputies adopted a Law on the Refendum in December 
1990^'’ which went into effect immediately.^^ The first referendum^ inspired by the 
secessionist tendencies demonstrated throughout the USSR^took place on 17 March 1991^ a v a i  
asked citizens about their attitudes towards the Soviet Union’s future configuration. The 
question asked voters ‘Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the 
rights and freedom of the individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?’. Voters t
■'Ihad to answer either yes or no and its outcome was binding if more than 50 per cent of
■Ï




Some 80 per cent of the electorate participated in the vote, among whom nearly tliree 
quarters supported the proposal. However, it should be noted that boycotts were 
conducted in the Baltic States, Georgia, Armenia and Moldavia.^® This particular 
referendum gave Gorbachev impetus to hasten the moves towards a renegotiation of the 
Union Treaty which established the USSR in 1922. However, the putchists who 
attempted to obtain power in August 1991 also used the results of this document to 
legitimise their actions. However, more in relation to the purposes of this chapter, 
supplementary questions were placed before citizens of the RSFSR. Throughout the 
republic, citizens were asked if they supported the establishment of a directly-elected 
presidency, which the overwhelming majority supported. In addition, residents of 
Moscow and Leningrad were asked if they supported the creation of the post of 
popularly-elected mayors (Leningraders were also polled as to whether or not they wished 
to change the name of their city back to St Petersburg; a proposal the electorate 
endorsed). In both cities, these motions were approved. These institutions constituted a 
significant achievement in Soviet local government. For the first time, the chief 
executives of a locality would be directly elected by the population. It also indicated a 
separation of powers between the local executive and legislature. Previously, deputies 
elected from among their ranks a chairman of the soviet’s executive committee as the 
chief officer of the state branch. In the first contests, Muscovites voted in economist 
Gavriil Popov and Leningraders elected Anatolii Sobchak as their mayors. Despite this 
innovation in the political system, there were numerous problems and conflicts that arose, 
for instance, between the mayor and the City Soviet in St Petersburg.
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I
The creation of the post of the President of the RSFSR was indeed a significant 
development.^ This position signified a further move towards the development of 
republican autonomy and a break away from the dominance of the centre in Soviet
'■'l
politics. Indeed this is reflected in the fact that some 70 per cent of the Russian
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population supported the creation of this position. It should also be noted that Russia’s 
political elites seem to have given the presidency some form of tacit approval. For t;-.■I.
instance, ‘the ‘Communists of Russia’ group-perhaps the most obdurate opponents of 
Yeltsin [sic] and his supporters in parliament-had even arrived at the Congress with a 
proposal among the amendments that they offered to the RSFSR Constitution.
Introducing election legislation for the presidency also reveals further elements of the
,
importance of institutions. First, Russia was not to be outdone by either the USSR or |
Georgia which each had presidents governing over their respective jurisdictions.
However^ it will be noted that although the constitutional amendments noted above called 
for the election of the President of the USSR in a popular vote, Gorbachev was elected 
only by a vote in the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. Also, two points could also
Î
be argued with relationship of the USSR’s central authorities and other subordinate 
administrative subdivisions. By allowing the results of the RSFSR’s referendum to stand,
%
and, moreover, permitting them to be enacted it can be deduced that the central leadership 
took on a belief in the validity of democratic principles and felt that the people’s choice 
reigned supreme. Therefore, there was an evident shift in the political culture of the 
population and the mling elite. In addition, it could also be argued that the central Iauthorities had lost the support of the republican elite that had propped them up during |
the post-Stalin years. Indeed the formation of the Communist Party of the RSFSR in June 
1990 is a concrete illustration of this point.
Another factor which needs to be considered in this regard is that Yeltsin was able to 
‘outflank’ his opponents by not treating the creation of the presidency like any other 
constitutional issue. That the constitution needed to be amended to introduce the 
presidency in undeniable. Moreover, according to the RSFSR’s constitution, the only 
legal manner in which it was possible to amend that document was if two-thirds of the 
RSFSR deputies approved them.
The campaign itself could be considered a form of departure from previous electoral 
practices. Indeed, Russia’s emergent civil society was able to play an even greater role 
than it had in the elections to the RSFSR Congress. As Michael Urban aptly illustrates. 
Democratic Russia conducted the lion’s share of Yeltsin’s campaign activities-even though 
it appears that the then RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman was rather dismissive of their 
actions. In addition, Yeltsin was able to exploit links with the growing labour and strike 
movement, supporting miners’ demands for the transference of Russia’s mines from all- 
union to Russian jurisdiction, and use this as a source of backing throughout the 
campaign. It will be recalled that strikes and independent labour initiatives and 
organisations, like trade unions^had been prohibited. There was a notable increase in the 
number of doverennye litsa, each candidate was able to field 100. Moreover, Yeltsin’s 
campaign was able to take advantage of the relaxation in international tensions and the 
increased contacts with the outside world-American political consultants offered advice to 
Democratic Russia activists coordinating Yeltsin’s presidential bid.
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Russia’s civil society and newly-foraied political parties, movements and other 
political organisations were provided with a theoretical means for increasing their 
participation in the election campaign. Electoral legislation allowed candidates from 
officially registered parties and other public organisations to compete for the presidency if 
they had the support of at least 20 per cent of the Congress. Vladimir Zhirinovskii the 
leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union (LDPSU) owed his place on 
the presidential ballot to this provision.
However, it may also be possible to question whether or not this particular provision 
could have been used as yet another filtering mechanism to prevent anti-establishment 
political organisations from putting their candidates on the ballot paper. The data 
presented above suggests that the RSFSR Congress could be considered a rather 
conservative collection of Party officials. Moreover, the reformist ranks within the 
parliament began to shrink during 1991. Therefore, the present author is doubtful 
whether candidates proposed by democratic-minded reformist public organisations and 
political parties and movements would have been able to pass through this gauntlet. 
Indeed, Zhirinovskii was considered useful to the regime in his capacity as a presidential 
candidate. Urban argues that the CPSU can be considered to have been behind his 
campaign as made ‘direct contributions in terms of personnel and materials to the 
Zhirinovskii [sic] campaign’, H e  argues further that ‘tactically’, the use of the term 
‘liberal democratic’ may have been used to draw non-communist and anti-communist 
support away from Yeltsin. Moreover, his rhetoric may have scored him points among 
the nationalist camp.^^ Indeed, Ronald J. Hill has suggested that the CPSU encouraged 
the creation of ‘friendly’ political parties which it could direct in case there was a
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These elections also demonstrated that the previously dominant institution, the CPSU, 
was extremely factionalised. The Party did not support a single candidate against Yeltsin. 
However, it is doubtful whether even with full Party support behind him, any other
those associated with the old order fielded a spate of candidates all of 
whom ran against Yeltsin [sic]....The whole point was to deprive Yeltsin of
best vote getter. 65
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multiparty system in the USSR and the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union was 
one of them. Stephen White’s evidence that by the time the USSR collapsed there were 
only two officially registered parties in the Soviet Union, the CPSU and the LDPSU 
reinforces this point.^
That the CPSU attempted to interfere in other ways to prevent Yeltsin from winning 
is undeniable. Urban presents evidence that the communists bombed Democratic Russia’s
Ï'
campaign headquarters. In the provinces, Yeltsin’s media campaign was severely ■î'î
impeded. Moreover, he cites evidence from key Democratic Russia activists Vladimir
Bokser and Mikhail Shneider that there was evidence of ballot fraud occurring on election ï
day and that in the provinces officials exploited Democratic Russia’s observers’
'-•'i
inexperience and did not allow them to exercise their rights fully.
contestant would have matched Yeltsin’s popular appeal. In fact it is doubtful to gauge
dYLpevdr'
what, Party-initiated central campaign coordination occurred.
Urban argues that
a first-round majority and thus force a run-off between him and the next
j:
Indeed, Yeltsin’s opponents (other than Zhirinovskii whose candidacy has been discussed 
previously) reflect the deep divisions that were present in the CPSU at that particular 
time. For instance, Urban argues that the former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov 
represented the conservative wing of the Party as personified by Yegor Ligachev and Ivan 
Polozkov. Moderate Vadim Bakatin was associated with the Gorbachev camp. Colonel- 
General A l’bert Makashov was considered essential in drawing the votes of the national- 
patriots among the population and Party. Chair of the Kemerovo oblsovet Aman-Gel’dy 
Tuleev, who advocated local autonomy, gradual economic reform and social protection^, 
was a candidate who hoped to draw support away from Yeltsin in the east and particularly 
from the miners.
That Yeltsin won a landslide victory^ garnering 57.3 per cent in the first round of the 
election^ is well k n o w n . I t  is also significant for several specific reasons. First, it 
officially raised Yeltsin’s profile in his relationship with Gorbachev. After this poll, 
Yeltsin could boast that he had won his position in a popular election-which was even 
impeded by the central authorities. Gorbachev could not claim to have ever won any post 
in a contested election. Thus, Yeltsin received a popular mandate from the Russian 
people and) legally, only they could remove it. Nevertheless, this did not prevent the 
putchists from attempting to snatch him during the August 1991 coup attempt. Second, 
this election contributed to the establishment of the presidency as a central component of 
Russia’s institutional framework. Moreover, the presidency was to have an extremely 
important role in post-Soviet R u s s i a . T h i r d ,  the elections were another step closer 
towards a multiparty contest. Political organisations like Democratic Russia played an 
active role in the campaign. In addition, Vladimir Zhirinovskii became the first non-
248
CPSU member to compete in a national election as a representative of a political party,
notwithstanding the fact that the party was at that veiy small and could have beenA
considered a CPSU/KGB front organisation. Fourth, this campaign hurled Zhirinovskii 
into the Russian political limelight and he was able to exploit his name recognition in the 
1993 elections to the Russian Federal Assembly. Therefore, a combination of Yeltsin’s 
personal appeal as a ‘democrat’, the personification of Russian sovereignty and an anti­
establishment figure, the active involvement of Russia’s civil society, popular 
disillusionment with the CPSU and its rule from the centre and a fractious CPSU all 
contributed to the final electoral result.
The present author acknowledges the difficulties that emerged between the President 
and the Russian Parliament during the aftermath of the August coup and September- 
October 1993 but must stress that an analysis of these complex issues is beyond the 
purposes and scope of his study. However, it must be stated that electoral reforms 
contributed indirectly to the difficult state of affairs in the transition. Alfred Stepan and 
Cindy Skach argue that presidential systems create shaky foundations for transitional 
societies because they foster competing legitimacies. This state of affairs can be applied 
to Russia in the 1991-1993 period. Under these conditions, both the chief executive and 
the legislature are popularly elected separately. Therefore, they can both claim to reflect 
the will of the people. Stepan and Skach refer to this condition as ‘mutual independence’.
i v \
However, parliamentary systems exist^situations of ‘mutual dependence’. The executive 
is derived from the ruling party or coalition in the legislature. Legislatures are dependent 
upon the executive in order to continue in session. In addition, the executive relies on the 
confidence of the legislature to keep governing.^^ As stated earlier, Yeltsin and the
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deputies in the Russian Congress (with the possible exception of the 33 deputies who ran 
unopposed) won their seats against competitors and could claim to be invoking the will of 
the people. Therefore, they could legitimately argue to support their efforts to obstmct 
the opposite camp.
Choice is Not Enough; Soviet Debates on Electoral Reform 1989-1991
The candidate competition first implemented on a broad-ranged scale during the 1989 
elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies was a marked improvement over the 
manner in which the Soviet Union previously conducted elections under leaderships from 
Stalin/,phernenko. An overwhelming majority of Soviet voters were presented with 
opportunities to select their representatives from among a plurality of contestants who 
competed against each other on the principles established in programmes. Nomination 
rights were increased as the CPSU and approved social organisations were joined by 
meetings of electors in their places of residence which could propose deputies. 
Individuals could also put themselves forward and have meetings approve or reject their 
candidacies. These measures were qualitative steps forward, advancing the administration 
and conduct of Soviet elections. However, in themselves, they did not, for instance, 
alleviate CPSU control over electoral procedures or maximise the democratic potential 
contained within the Electoral Law. Moreover, as political refoiins expanded during 
1989-1991, electoral legislation did not keep pace with other developments. This, in 
effect, further reinforces the argument that the electoral system was liberalised under 
Gorbachev, not entirely democratised.
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Electoral shortcomings were quickly identified by Soviet scholars and political 
practitioners. Indeed, these individuals were among the first to indicate that although 
bringing positive changes into Soviet politics, electoral reform measures needed further 
improvements to catch up with political realities. Moreover, the content of these 
criticisms reflects the political atmospheres during which they were written. For instance, 
writings appearing immediately after the 1989 elections to the Congress of People’s 
Deputies were system-specific: they focused exclusively on how Soviet legislators could 
introduce innovations to improve the conduct of elections and how to improve the 
electoral system in conditions of an ‘enlightened’ single-party rule. Following the 
introduction of new republican Constitutions and electoral laws in 1989-1990, Soviet 
writers concentrated on improving the mechanisms for conducting elections. However, 
they were also forced to take into consideration the new political forces which (following 
the adoption of the amendment to Article 6  of the USSR Constitution) had previously 
existed informally, but now had to right to become accepted, legal contestants for power 
in their own right. Subsequent debates emphasised tactics candidates and political 
organisations could use to win elections; systemic improvements were of secondary 
importance. By this time, the CPSU had lost its credibility as a ruling party and accepted 
that it would become one among several competing for power as potential parliamentary 
parties. Therefore, these contributions were part of the foundation upon which post- 
Soviet electoral administration was built.
Electoral geography and the principle of one-person-one vote were among the first 
of the shortcomings that Soviet scholars and politicians felt needed immediate
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improvements. deputy Viktor Alksnis, speaking at the First USSR Congress of
People’s Deputies in May 1989^ noted that in his republic there were grossly 
disproportionate numbers of voters in different districts.™ For instance, in one rural 
national-territorial district there were 28,000 voters, while in an urban constituency there 
were 137,000.^^ This posed a particularly acute problem in the republic. The rural 
voters’ ballots had greater weight than their urban counterparts. Although 71% of 
Latvia’s population was based in urban areas-and ethnic Russians living in the republic 
were more abundant there-the majority of rural dwellers were ethnic Latvians.™ 
According to legal specialist Suren Avak’yan this demographic imbalance reduced the 
chances of working class and Russian candidates being elected. Moreover, he recounts 
that 10 of 11 National Front of Latvia deputies won seats from these constituencies.^^ 
Political geographers A. V. Berezkin, V. A. Kolosov, M. E. Pavlovskaya, N. V. Petrov 
and L. V. Smiryagin indicate that if
electoral district boundaries were drawn based on the population count 
according to the 1979 census, then a transfer of 14 electoral districts from 
certain republics to others would be necessary, and, according to the 
preliminary results of the 1989 census, 28 of the 750 [territorial] districts 
would need to be changed.
Russian authorities did not alleviate the huge gaps of voters in constituencies and the 
problem of some voters’ ballots weighing more than others. Elsewhere in this volume, 
the present author indicates this problem also occurred during the 1993 elections to the 
Russian Federal Assembly.
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.both theoretically and practically, some [social organisation seat electors] 
may have had even more votes, so far as members of several leading 
organs (for example the CPSU Central Committee, the All-Union Central
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The principle of one-person-one vote was challenged by the introduction of social 
organisation seats. According to the Electoral Law, not all voters were allowed to elect 
these deputies-rather they were chosen by delegates to all-union congresses, conferences 
and plenums. Although not all voters could elect these deputies, they could participate in Icandidate discussions and nominations-proposals for candidacies were supposed to come 
from the lower levels and were approved at higher levels within the organisation.
IGorbachev sluugged off criticisms that a portion of the electorate would be effectively 
disenfranchised by the procedure for electing these deputies. Given the nature of the 
Soviet system, the majority of citizens belonged to trade unions and other social 
organisations of some type. Therefore, they possessed the right to discuss the candidates.
As a result, Gorbachev claimed that it was not important to discuss disenfranchisement; In 
reality, there were very few Soviet citizens who did not belong to any of these 
organisations.™ In any event, these 750 deputies were elected by only about 16,000 
people.™
Avak’yan, while accepting that members of the organisation possessed the right to 
discuss these candidates, nevertheless found further faults connected with the social 
organisation seats. First, voters in these congresses, conferences and plenary meetings I
possessed an extra vote other than what most of the electorate was granted: one for a
deputy in a territorial district and one for a national-territorial district. Second,
Council of Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the Komsomol, the 
governing board of a creative union, etc.) participated in the elections of a 
series of deputies.
Unlike candidates vyho stood in constituencies, social organisation seat contestants often 
did not have their own personal election programmes. Rather, they frequently adopted the 
manifesto of their social organisation.™ There were, however, as stated earlier, some 
notable exceptions.
The social organisation seats’ status was heavily debated by Soviet 
parliamentarians and^were removed from the USSR Constitution at the Second Congress 
in December 1989; republics possessed the right to retain them in elections to their own 
supreme legislatures.^^ Only Belorussia and Kazakhstan chose this option.*"
There were other criticisms of the electoral system that needed to be addressed 
further. Avak’yan viewed the structure and practices of the Congress of People’s 
Deputies itself as faulty. For instance, the Parliament was to meet infrequently (only 
twice per year), undertake the formation of the Supreme Soviet and adopt major laws at 
these sessions. He also claimed, based on their performances at the First Congress, that 
most deputies were not inclined to take so modest a role. In addition, he felt the 
Congress was too large and queried how the legislature could function effectively with 
more than 2 ,0 0 0  deputies.*^
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Nomination rights were also vague and introduced inconsistencies and inequalities. 
The Electoral Law mandated that candidates could be proposed by no less than 500 
workers at a meeting^but also, it was formally permissible for work collectives of 7-11 
(cooperatives, the court, the procuracy), 15-20 (editorial boards of periodicals, food 
shops, hairstylists), 30-40 (polyclinics and schools) to nominate candidates alongside 
factories, institutes and universities, where, for instance, the number of workers ranged 
from 15,000-50,000.*^ Another commentator noted that there were problems with work 
place nomination meetings-the work collective was also the easiest place for the apparatus 
to manipulate the candidate selection.*^
Nomination meetings and candidates’ meetings with the electorate received further 
criticism both in the USSR and abroad. Stephen White has argued that these served as 
filters through which candidates had to passf however, party officials ‘packed’ the 
meetings with their supporters to ensure that ‘their’ people would win nominations.*'^ 
Giulietto Chiesa considered them ‘one option among many for district leaders in 
protecting their position’ and they ‘became the apparat’s weapon of choice in eliminating 
radical candidates’.*^  Indeed, Boris Yeltsin noted that they were ‘carefully designed to 
sift out undesirable candidates’.*^  Aleksandr Ivanchenko, a current member of the 
Russian Federation’s Central Electoral Commission (appointed by the State Duma),*^ 
writing in 1990, argued that putting deputies forward through work collectives and 
meetings of electors would not be the ‘wave of the future’-given that new political forces 
had emerged. However, he defended them claiming that they would play a role in the 
‘making of a multiparty system’ by expanding paths for candidate nominations and 
stimulating assistance for candidates during the final stages of the electoral struggle.**
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Avak’yan saw other inequalities in the way pre-election meetings were conducted 
between candidates who stood in the constituencies and those from social organisations. 
Some of the former had to speak up to 30-40 times-including some who had up to 100 or 
more meetings-before different crowds in different auditoria. In contrast, candidates from 
the social organisations had, on average, 2-4 meetings per month and, moreover, these 
occurred in meetings with colleagues, in environments where they were well-known and 
among people with whom they were c l o s e , S u b s e q u e n t l y ,  district meetings were 
removed from the electoral laws of 11 republics-Turkmenia, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia and 
Kazakhstan the exceptions.™
Parties and other organisations were formally accepted as components of the 
Soviet political system. However, electoral legislation did not adequately address their 
status in the new conditions. For instance in a contribution to a round table on ‘Problems 
of the Development of Electoral Legislation’ sponsored by the parliamentary journal 
Narodnyi députât, director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Soviet State 
Construction and Legislation, V. Vasil’ev  ^ noted that the emergence of multiparty 
conditions created problems of equality in campaigning. Previously, the state provided 
the sole means of financial support and allocation of media time and space. In the new 
circumstances, this would not be acceptable: the state could not afford these policies.
Nevertheless, he contended, measures had to be implemented to ensure that parties, other 
social organisations and citizens would be able to undertake comprehensive support of 
candidates. At the same time, he argued, all should have equal rights to the feeding 
trough. Therefore, he proposed that the state should f ^ y  equally distribute finances to 
candidates and parties and place a cap on non-state donations to electoral contestants.^^
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In another round table forum,^Head of the USSR Academy of Science’s Institute of State 
and Law V. Smirnov noted the importance of regulating non-monetary sources of 
campaign support such as equipment, media, printing and specialist services.
Political parties and movements were not the only problematic issues challenging 
electoral legislation development. The situation in the USSR during 1990-1991 also 
reflected the increase in the significance of the shift in power relations from the centre to 
the republics. This was reflected in differing electoral codes the republics adopted.™ 
Some of which, like those enacted in the Baltic states, conflicted with the rights of Soviet 
citizens.™ There were also deficiencies in electoral legislation regarding deputy recall 
procedures, référendums, and a lack of systematised infonnation on electoral laws which 
needed to be rectified.™ Therefore, the electoral reform process, although providing for 
increased choice and participation, lacked many legal provisions which guaranteed what 
were outlined in the ‘Introduction’ as free and fair elections.
While accepting that the ground rules (electoral laws) regulating the hustings are 
important, Soviet writers also realised that the objective of any election campaign is to 
win seats. Therefore, writings from 1991 addressed campaign strategy, tactics and the 
role of ‘political marketing’. For instance, Narodnyi députât and the CPSU Central 
Committee’s Institute of Social Problems conducted a round table discussion between 
American and Soviet specialists concerned with the study of electoral campaigns. The 




Ralph Murphine, director of the Washington-based Institute for Practical Politics, 
for example, stressed how political consultants and pre-election research in a campaign 
benefited the contestants. He informed his Soviet colleagues that the political consultant 
is a specialist who assists candidates or parties by organising support among the 
electorate, develops an electoral strategy and works for its realisation. In addition, 
political consultants contribute to their clients’ success by providing answers to the 
important questions: Who is our candidate? What is his/her character? What are the 
candidate’s views, political positions, experience or other qualities which may influence 
the voter’s choice? Who is our opponent? What are his/her strong and weak points? 
What concerns our voters and what are their interests? How will the personality of the 
candidate, his/her slogans and arguments influence the electorate? Moreover, he 
emphasised how important it was to study surveys, demographic analyses and focus group 
interviews to help the candidate win office.™
Soviet commentators, however, tended to focus on how election-related research 
was useful to official bodies. For instance, A. Demidov of the USSR Academy of 
Science’s Institute of Sociology noted that these materials could benefit the soviets and 
electoral commissions. He added, however, that it could also be useful to political parties 
and groups and their candidates by providing recommendations about the qualities the 
electorate preferred in a candidate. District soviet chairwoman O. Bektabekova noted that 
election-related research was important because it notified authorities of electors’ 
orientations, what they knew about the elections, the candidates, whether they met with 
the candidates and whether they intended to vote.™ Notwithstanding their differences 
with their American colleagues, Soviet specialists recognised the changing nature of their
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political environment and deduced that the old ways of conducting elections were no 
longer appropriate.
The best example of new thinking in Soviet electoral strategies was produced by 
Moscow State University sociologists Tat’y ana Yurasova and 01’ga Selivanova and 
published in the Tallinn journal Politika (formerly the Communist Party of the Estonian 
Soviet Socialist Republic’s theoretical journal Kommunist Estonii). The authors viewed 
politics as a ‘market’: ‘[pjolitics is a social sphere where supply (the number of
candidates) increases and this will decrease demand (deputy mandates and various kinds 
of political vacancies)’.™ Moreover, they argue, politics can be seen as a market 
because its ‘commodities’ are the ‘possibilities of profits and privileges...connected with 
any political decision’. Power holders can be considered ‘salespersons’ and the voters are 
likened to ‘consumers’. In order for the former to present their product to their buyers, 
they must engage in ‘political marketing’ which encompasses
the careful and comprehensive study of the political market, the interests 
and expectations of various social groups and addresses the basic position 
of the candidate’s pre-election programme. On the other hand, it is the 
active influence over public opinion, on the formation of interests and 
political preferences.^^
To conduct this activity, it is necessary to construct some type of strategy. In drawing up 
the ‘marketing plan’, Yurasova and Selivanova argue, it is necessary to analyse the 
arrangement of forces in the local and central powers. Because of the activities of the
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CPSU and its dominance within the Soviet political system, it was necessary to determine 
whether or not the bodies would remain neutral during the campaign; and, if not, deduce 
whether they would show support for one candidate or assist the other. They also advised 
that it was necessary to study the economic situations in particular areas such as 
employment structures, unemployment and its sources, the average wage levels, the 
supplies in the region and prices. All these factors, they argue, should be included in the 
plan, because the candidate’s aim is to attract the consumer. Moreover, candidates must 
consider the parameters of the social groups they seek to influence, taking into account 
their income, age and professional structures, national features, traditions, etc. In this 
manner candidates should ‘model an image of the typical representative of the...group’ 
and build a campaign to influence that person’s vote.^™
Yurasova and Selivanova argue that there are several important factors to consider 
when campaigning. First, candidates must devise a strategy of how to attract more votes 
than their opponents. Second, they must determine causes of voter abstention and seek to 
remedy these symptoms. Third, candidates must remember that what they say is, to the 
electorate, felt to be more important than what they actually know. Therefore, 
contestants must make their statements tactfully. Fourth, they claim that if candidates 
want to be covered extensively, they have to ‘create a spectacle’. Finally, they 
recommend that competitors should not give their opponents any ideas which they could 
put to their own use.^"^
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The Development of Political Organisations and Political Parties, 1990-1993
Until 1990 the only political organisations legally operating in Russia were the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), its leading role codified in Article 6  of the 
USSR Constitution ^ and the Communist Party of the RSFSR (formed in June 1990). Only 
social organisations sanctioned by the CPSU were allowed to function including trade 
unions, the Communist Youth League (Komsomol), and, for instance^ women’s 
organisations. Despite this fact there were numerous political organisations which 
developed in the late 1980s and early 1990. It will be recalled that the CPSU’s political 
monopoly lasted de jure  until March 1990 when the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies 
amended Article 6 . Subsequently, the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies passed the 
USSR Law on Public Associations in October 1990 which went into effect on 1 January 
1991. On New Year’s Day 1991, some 700 public organisations, including political 
parties, trade unions and other formations had submitted their programmes and rules to 
the USSR Ministry of Justice for registration at the all-union level.
Political organisations in the RSFSR begah to form and develop during 1990- 
1991. According to a handbook on parties, associations, unions and political clubs 
published during this time period, there were 2 world organisations (the World Anti- 
Zionist and Anti-Masonic Front, Pamyat’ and Party of the World-which wished to 
associate Greater Russia, Greater Europe and America into a United Human State-a 
United World or the United States of the World); 85 all-union organisations; 47 
republican; 13 inter-regional; 45 regional and 265 local organisations.^™ Figures for 
registered and non-registered public associations were not determined. Moreover, it will
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be recalled that despite the high number of public organisations that registered in early 
1991, only 2 all-union political parties were officially registered with the USSR Ministry 
of Justice by August of the same year: the CPSU and Vladimir Zhirinovskii’s Liberal- 
Democratic Party of the Soviet Union.
The parties ranged from monarchists, socialists, Christian democrats and other 
political groupings with serious aspirations to compete for, and win, elected offices, to 
associations of citizens who viewed the political party with more light-hearted 
outlooks.^™ For instance, in October 1991 an organisational committee for the 
Duratskaya Partiya Rossii (Fools’ Party of Russia), chaired by the well-known political 
activist and poet Yurii Alekseev, convened in Tyumen’. According to Alekseev, ‘only in 
a land of fools could his party achieve success’ and the party’s slogan was ‘Give the 
people beer and sausage’.^ ™
During the months following the abortive putsch and the collapse of the USSR, 
political formations increased in the Russian Republic. In particular, between SeptemberI
and December 1991 several political organisations emerged after the CPSU’s and 
Communist Party of the RSFSR’s suspensions claiming either to be their successors, legal 
heirs to their property and funds, or communist or socialist organisations having nothing 
to do with the CPSU.^™ Moreover, in an informative item published in the political 
journal, Narodnyi députât, it was established that among the social organisations, there 
were 38 political organisations registered with the Russian Justice Ministry by 20 
February 1992 (one was the CPSU)^™; and in April of that year. State Adviser to the 
President on Political Questions, Sergei Stankevich, noted that there were 820 registered
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public organisations, including 25 political parties^in the Russian Federation. He also 
mentioned that there were many other political parties and that more than 300,000 people 
were involved in these formations.^"* It is indeed particularly significant that in
si:
November 1992 the Russian Constitutional Court overturned Yeltsin’s ban of the Russian 
Communist Party and in February the Party reformed as the Communist Party of the
A ii
i'iRussian Federation (KPRF) headed by Gennadii Zyuganov. The KPRF boasted some 
500,000-6000,000 members and became easily the largest party in Russia.
3Political parties in post-Soviet Russia face some problems. None of these parties f;
!
has the membership that the CPSU formerly had; some 9.6 per cent of the Soviet adult 
population were m e m b e r s . U n t i l  February 1993, the largest political parties f
operating in Russia were Nikolai Travkin’s Democratic Party of Russia with a 
membership of about 40,000-50,000; the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia with its self- 
proclaimed membership of between 80,000-100,000 members and Aleksandr Rutskoi’s 
People’s Party of Free Russia claiming about 120,000, but estimated to have 50,000- 
60,000 m e m b e r s . T h e  parties also lack the strength the foimer CPSU had in its 
representation in all territorial administrative divisions, social organisations, public
:institutions and work places, which impedes their potential for strength.
I
In addition these parties were viewed sceptically by the Russian population, A 
poll of 1,000 Muscovites conducted on 19 March 1992, asked the question, ‘with whom 
do you connect your hopes for leading Russia out of the economic crisis?’. Among these 
respondents only 4 per cent put their faith in the new political p a r t i e s . P r o f e s s o r  
Konstantin Kholodei of St Petersburg University has noted that at the end of 1^92 there
was extreme antipathy towards the political parties; some 85 per cent of the Russian 
population were ‘very sceptical of all of them'/^^ However, according to data collected 
in the ‘Political Parties in Russia’ survey of December 1992 the Russian populace had the 
highest positive attitude towards Nikolai Travkin’s Democratic Party of Russia-18 per 
cent. What is more important, however, is the fact that even as 1992 came to a close the 
majority of those surveyed was either uninformed about political parties and movements 
or still had not made up their minds about them. While only about one third of the 
respondents were unsure of their attitudes towards Nina Andreeva’s conservative All - 
Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), 80 per cent did not know about or form an opinion 
on the Russian All-People’s Union, led by Russian People’s Deputy Sergei Baburin. 
More recently, a poll conducted by the All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public 
Opinion (VTsIOM) in June-July 1993 indicated that over half the respondents had no 
support for Russian political parties.
Richard Sakwa has claimed that during the 1990-1993 period Russia had parties but 
no party system. He notes nine factors hampering the development of a stable party 
system in Russia. These include: an unstable ideological basis, reflected in indistinct 
programme differentials; a problematic relationship between leaders and parties resulting 
in krugovshchina-ihs, tendency for parties to fracture around their dominant personalities; 
a political and social atmosphere which was decidedly anti-party, preferring looser 
coalitions and political institutions to fill the space between the voters and government and 
lack of experience in opposition politics; the emergence of a presidential system, and 
moreover a president who has not allied himself with any political parties or movements, 
claiming to be above politics and the election of a non-party parliament in 1990; the
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Conclusion
Despite increasing the amount of choice available to voters in 1989, the electoral system 
had many significant deficiencies. Nevertheless, Soviet scholars and political 
practicioners attempted to debate these points and refine them. Elections to the
cooptation of the most able individuals into government rather than into political parties; 
small party memberships reflecting an anti-party stance among the Russian population; the
iîabsence of reliable social bases from which parties could draw support; the importance of Iregional politics hampered the effectiveness of a national base for party development.
■Finally, the breakup of the Soviet Union ‘weakened the coherence of the parties and 
challenged them to find a new synthesis of the national idea and democratic 
p r i n c i p l e s . T h e r e f o r e ,  his categorisation of Russia’s political configurations as not 
proto-party but pseudo-party has significant g r o u n d i n g . R u s s i a ’s political parties 
entered the 1993 elections to the Russian Federal Assembly with these obstacles in front 
of them.
republican Supreme Soviets, the RSFSR Supreme Soviets and the Russian presidency 
brought with them greater chances for candidate choice and civil society played an even
greater role in them than they had in 1989. In addition, these elections marked a turning 
point in which the republics’ stature within the union increased significantly. Indeed, the
election of these institutions greatly enhanced this facet of Soviet politics and conditioned
early post-Soviet politics. Nevertheless, the CPSU still tried to thwart alternative political 'Iforces. This factor stands despite the fact that the Party itself was facing many internal 
squabbles. Parties were given the official ‘go ahead’ to participate in political life.
265
However, their influence was limited significantly. Elections to the republican Supreme 
Soviets, although infused with the participation of alternative political movements and 
other civic organisations^ were not multiparty elections-rather they were limited choice 
elections. Presidential elections in Russia had a ‘multiparty flavour’. However, it was 
only in December 1993 that Russia had its first contest in which political organisations 
played a major role.
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Chapter 6. The 1993 Elections to the Russian
Federal Assembly
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Boris Yeltsin’s Presidential Decree No. 1400 of 21 September 1993 disbanding the Russian 
Parliament elected in 1990 and supplemental^ legislation creating the bi-cameral Russian 
Federal Assembly^ set the stage for Russia’s first multiparty-type elections since those to the 
short-lived Constituent Assembly in 1917.^ As discussed in earlier chapters, Russian and 
Soviet elections have not created institutions affecting major political changes: the elections 
themselves and the legislatures they produced were marginalised by the supremacy of tsar 
and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Criteria defining the major qualities 
and components of democratic elections indicate that Soviet elections possessed numerous 
deficiencies excluding them from this classification. Electoral reform measures implemented 
during the Gorbachev years increased the scope of citizen activity in elections, provided the 
electorate with choices among candidates for state offices who stood on specific programmes 
(although competing parties were not allowed), influenced the creation of more professionally 
qualified parliamentary elites, infused the USSR’s legislative organs with slightly higher 
degrees of autonomy from the CPSU and transformed them from their previous status of 
institutions whose purpose was to ‘rubber stamp’ decisions made earlier at party Central 
Committee plenums, to elected assemblies more akin (but not entirely similar) to, the 
‘working’ legislatures reflecting voters’ choices established in liberal democratic countries. 
Nevertheless, these modifications all occurred within the context of maintaining and 
improving the single-party system that had been in existence since Lenin’s time. 
Notwithstanding the election of a number of notable refoimers and anti-CPSU politicians to 
them, perestroika-QXdi institutions such as the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies and the 
RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies were dominated by CPSU members who were bound 
to pursue the party line. This in itself seriously limited the degree of political and economic 
changes that could be implemented within their respective territories.
274
Russia was presented with new political, social and economic challenges and 
possibilities to improve its nascent democratic order following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of Communist party rule. Ironically, after having jointly led and 
orchestrated the popular resistance that thwarted the attempted coup in August 1991, the 
Russian President and Parliament quickly fell out over numerous divisive issues, particularly 
the foimation of government, the pace of economic reform and, possibly most contentious, 
over which institution-legislative or executive-would occupy the primary role in the post- 
Soviet political arrangement.^ The crisis contained a series of flash points and reached 
its crest during the April 1993 referendum on the future of ecomonic reform, the presidency 
and the Russian parliament.'^ A majority of Russians indicated that they prefered that their 
leaders should remain in place and that reforms should continue,^ despite the harsh economic 
difficulties they confronted and the hostilities that the two branches of government 
demonstrated towards each other. Leading students of Russian politics generally agree that 
Yeltsin squandered an opportunity to usher in a reform-oriented legislature by not disbanding 
the RSFSR Congress in the wake of the post-coup victory. They believe that timing of 
elections is crucial to establishing a more stable democratic order and that Russia’s 
democratic forces could have ridden Yeltsin’s coat-tails in elections to a new legislature.^ 
Instead, the institution remained and president and parliament were locked into a conflict 
lasting well over a year and a half which climaxed in the bloody events of October 1993.
Russia’s inheritance of institutions created during the Soviet period (including its 
parliament, presidency and constitution) may have impeded the growth of its own post­
communist democratic institutions during 1991-1993. However, did Yeltsin’s dissolution of 
the parliament in the ‘name of democracy’, conducting new elections and a plebiscite for a
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new post-Soviet Constitution lay the foundations for a new, legitimate democratic order? 
More importantly, were Russians deprived yet again of a political order in which they could 
influence the state’s agenda thiough their elected representatives? If so, who ‘hijacked’ these 
possibilities for them: Yeltsin, old elites or the Russian people themselves? The purpose 
of the present chapter is to provide a general overview of the 1993 elections to the Russian 
Federal Assembly and the Constitutional plebiscite outlining their general provisions, 
protagonists, organisational structures and outcomes and placing this event within the context 
of the controversial debate^whether or not they contributed development of a ‘new’, 
‘democratic’ or ‘other’ type of political framework. Throughout this chapter it will be 
demonstrated that there were great instances of continuity, contradiction and departure 
exhibited in the campaign to the Federal Assembly
New Institutions and the Draft Constitution
The Provisions on Federal Organs o f Power in the Transitional Period created a restructured 
Russian legislature, the FederaVnoe Sobranie (Federal Assembly), a bi-cameral institution 
consisting of an upper house, the Federation Council and a lower house, the State Duma.'' 
The Federation Council was devised in a manner in which regional interests, growing in 
significance since the late 1980s, would be represented. Each of Russia’s 89 ‘subjects’ 
would be represented by two membersj one from the representative organs; the other from 
the executive bodies of authority. The chamber is empowered to implement border changes 
between subjects of the Federation and Presidential decrees on martial law and states of 
emergency, decide on the use of Russian armed forces outside the Russian Federation’s 
borders, set presidential elections, affirm federal judges and the Russian Procurator General
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and decide on the President’s removal from office (Article 8 ).
The Provisions mandated that legal voters-those who had achieved the age of 18 and 
were not declared insane by a court of law-would elect representatives to the 450 member 
State Duma (its deputies had to be at least 21 years of age).® The chamber would function 
on a ‘permanent basis’ (Article 6 ) and is empowered to approve the Chair the Government 
of the Russian Federation (Prime Minister), conduct votes of confidence in the Russian 
government and its members, appoint and release from office (with presidential approval) the 
Chair of the State Bank of the Russian Federation, and also the Human Rights 
Commissioner, and grant amnesties (Article 10). It should also be noted that although the 
Federation was ‘to be formed’, the first sitting was popularly elected.
In addition to a restructured parliament, Russian voters also participated in a 
controversial plebiscite on a draft Constitution for the Russian Federation. As Wyman, 
Miller, White and Heywood have indicated elsewhere, ‘Yeltsin’s decree described the vote 
as a "plebiscite" rather than a referendum, since the terms of the Russian Law on 
Référendums, promulgated in October 1990, required that constitutional changes gain the 
support of the majority all registered voters.’^  The draft of the Constitution was published 
in major papers and in booklet form for public scrutiny. Nevertheless, it appears that its 
dissemination and distribution schedule left little time for the electorate to become acquainted 
with the document and its provisions.^® Stephen White has argued that the document 
clearly bore Yeltsin’s vision for the future restructuring of a Russian political order in which 
the president would be the dominant actor.
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Despite its presidential favourings, the draft was a radical departure from earlier 
constitutions. The document’s provisions ensured it was not just a tool for another form of 
dicatatorship. Moreover, the draft reflected the leadership’s interest to fuse the move 
towards a market economy with some type of social saftey net creating at minimum a 
foundation for some type of social contract between the regime and the population. This 
theoretically established a means for further popular legitimation.
Whereas the last Soviet Constitution’s^  ^ Chapter VII listed the rights and duties of 
citizens which the regime could use for coercive purposes rather than human fulfilment, the 
Yeltsin draft contained a section on human and citizen’s rights and freedoms which had the 
person, not the state as its focal point. For instance, under the ‘Brezhnev Constitution’, 
work was a right, but also a duty. Individuals were not allowed to ‘live off the labour of 
others’; those who violated this principle were subject to prosecution under ‘parasite’ laws 
and deprived of their personal freedom. In conditions of ‘full-employment’ and complete 
party control it was feasible to maintain such a policy.
The Yeltsin draft also included particular duties which Russian citizens had to perform 
or to which they would be subjected. Among them are temporary suspensions of their rights 
and freedoms during states of emergency, payment of taxes and duties, maintenence of the 
environment and defence of the fatherland (including military service) (Articles 56-59). In 
certain circumstances Russian citizens committing serious crimes would be subjected to the 
death penalty (Article 20). However, the draft also took into account the changing political, 
economic and social conditions in Russia. With the emergence of a competitive labour 
market and a switch from a state-centralised to a market economy and the increase of
278
r»
unemployment, work is naturally no longer considered a duty; nevertheless 'A
. citizens are free to choose their preferred career paths (Article 37). Private 
property is protected by law and citizens and civic associations are allowed to hold private 
property in the form of land (Articles 35-36).
Draft provisions included elements of a social-safety net for Russian citizens. Article 
7, for instance, states that ‘The Russian Federation is a social state’. Moreover, the same 
article mandated
In the Russian Federation, labour and the people’s health shall be protected, 
a guaranteed minimum wage shall be established, state support of the family, 
maternity, fatherhood and childhood, invalids and elderly citizens shall be 
guaranteed, a system of social services shall be developed and state pensions, 
stipends and other guarantees of social defence shall be established.
Other social guarantees in the draft included the rights to choice of place of residence 
(Article 27), housing (Article 40) and education (Article 43).^^
The Contestants
Drafters of the Provisions on Elections o f State Duma Deputies selected an electoral 
formula which combined proportional and population-based representation for voters to 
choose their parliamentarians. In the former, political parties and other social organisations 
established on an all-Russia basis and whose rules were registered by the Russian Ministry
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of Justice were permitted to put forward lists of candidates for a federation-wide 
constituency. Those lists receiving more than 5 per cent of the votes would have their 
deputies represented in the Duma. Social organisations, parties and blocs had to collect at 
least 100,000 signatures with no more than 15 per cent from any of Russia’s regions and 
submit these documents to the Central Election Commission by midnight 6  November 1993 
to be included on the ballot paper. Therefore, the electoral associations had a very limited 
time period to organise their platforms, campaigns and coordinate electoral support bases. 
As Richard Sakwa has argued, this innovation should have favoured the (relatively) older and 
more established political organisations. The regulations, however, forced a number of 
organisations to band together as diffuse blocs. As a result, many smaller, comparatively 
marginal political organisations were able to compete at the federal l e ve l . T h e r e f o r e  the 
range of the participants in the Russian political spectrum was not reduced as efficiently as 
the drafters probably intended and lowered the potential for effective parties to participate 
in a parliament with strong coalition-building potential.
The Central Election Commission released a list of some 91 all-Russian political and 
social organisations possessing the right to nominate candidates for the Duma.^^ Initially, 
the Government attempted to prohibit three of them from participating in the elections and 
Russian political life because of their links with the opposition groups in October 1993: the 
Russian Communist Workers’ Party, the People’s Party of Free Russia and the Communist 
Party of the Russian Federation. Subsequently, however, the Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation was allowed to continue its activities by the Russian Ministry of 
Justice.^® In addition, members of the other banned parties contested in single seat 
constituencies or as members of other electoral associations.
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Twenty^one parties and blocs attempted to get on the ballot paper. However, the 
number of contenders was reduced to 13 after the document submission deadline. Although 
all 2 1  blocs and parties claimed to have obtained the required number of signatures, 8 were 
banned initially due to various administrative barriers. These included the Russian All- 
People’s Union, led by the former head of the Russian parliamentary fraction Russian Unity 
and staunch Yeltsin opponent, Sergei Baburin. According to Baburin, police raided the 
bloc’s offices and stole documents containing 20,000-22,000 s i g n a t u r e s . I n  addition, he 
claimed that his phone, and those of his colleagues, had been cut and that he could only meet 
with foreign journalists in his home after receiving official permission from the 
authorities.^® Nevertheless, Baburin contested the election, winning in Tsentral’nyi district 
No. 130, Omsk oblast’}^ Other blocs initially excluded from the poll included Nikolai 
Lysenko’s National Republican Party of Russia (although Lysenko contested and won a seat 
in Engel’skii district No. 158 in Saratov oblast'); Mikhail Astaf’ev’s Constitutional 
Democratic Party-People’s Freedom Party (however, one of its members, Anatolii Fedoseev 
won a seat in the Federation Council from the Komi-Permyak Autonomous District); the 
New Russia bloc, headed by Telman Gdlyan; and the Avgust (August) bloc.^^ One of the 
latter’s principal figures, Konstantin Borovoi, leader of the business-oriented Party of 
Economic Freedom^also competed as an individual c a n d i d a t e . H i s  Avgust bloc received
24only 62,000 signatures.
Thirteen electoral associations were included on the final ballot paper. These included 
what can be broadly categorised as four main camps: ‘democrats’, ‘interest groups’,
‘centrists’ and ‘opposition’. The following ranks the blocs on a pro-anti reform axis. The
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‘democrats’ included the most overtly pro-market and pro-Yeltisn coalition, Yegor Gaidar-led 
Russia’s Choice, Russian Democratic Reform Movement (RDDR) led by St Petersburg 
Mayor Anatolii Sobchak, the Yavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc (Yabloko) which was headed 
by reform economist Grigorii Yavlinskii, Yurii Boldyrev and former ambassador to the US 
Vladimir Lukin, and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) led by deputy chairman 
of the Russian Federation’s Council of Ministers, Sergei Shakhrai. ‘Interest Groups’ 
included Dignity and Charity (DIM) which advocated the rights of invalids, Chernobyl 
victims and those adversely affected by market reforms (led by Konstantin Frolov), the 
Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia (KEDR) led by the chairwoman of the 
‘Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia’ Movement, Lyubov’ Lymar’; and Women of Russia (ZhR) led 
by former deputy chairwoman of the Soviet Women’s Committee and CPSU Central 
Committee member Alevtina Fedulova. (Although this group seeks to advance a female- 
directed voice in the parliament, their voting record shows them to be very closely allied 
with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation). ‘Centrists’ were comprised of Future 
of Russia-New Names (which among its goals included promoting new, younger politicians 
into political life, led by Vyacheslav Lashchevskii, secretary of the Russian Union of Youth; 
Civic Union, which represented industrial interests, led by Arkadii Vol’skii, and Nikolai 
Travkin’s Democratic Party of Russia (DPR). ‘Opposition’ coalitions included Mikhail 
Lapshin’s Agrarian Party of Russia (APR), Gennadii Zyuganov’s Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation (KPRF) and Zladimir Zhirinovskii’s ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic 
Party of Russia (LDPR).^^
Voters elected the remaining 225 deputies in a first-past-the-post system from
282
candidates who stood in single seat constituencies which were notionally based on population: 
each district deputy would represent some 500,000 people.^® Candidates only needed to win 
the highest number of votes in the constituency to claim their seats; a contrast from Soviet 
practices in which they needed the support of 50 per cent of the eligible electorate in the 
district plus one vote. Contestants could stand independently (as the majority did), or 
representatives of electoral associations after collecting signatures of no less than 2 % of the 
voters in the district. The turnout figure was reduced to 25 per cent from its 50 per cent 
Soviet predecessor, largely in anticipation of greater political apathy and disaffection.
Overall some 3,797 people competed for seats in the Federal Assembly, including 494 
Federation Council candidates, 1,586 State Duma contestants in single seat constituencies 
and 1,717 on party lists. About 40 per cent of the Federation Council candidates were heads 
of the executive branch and 16 per cent were from representative organs. Among all 
candidates nearly a quarter were involved in economics and finance such as heads of large 
industrial enterprises, joint stock companies, funds, commercial banks, etc; nearly 8  per cent 
were employed in education at different levels, and only about 1-3 per cent were journalists, 
lawyers, workers in the agro-industrial complex^ health or had other special training.
Moreover, a little more than 13 per cent were formerly Russian People’s Deputies 27
In summary, the elections of December 1993 and the Constitutional plebiscite would 
set the groundwork for a potentially new, post-Soviet political order. That Yeltsin would 
have the dominant position in the new institutional arrangements is undebatable. 
Nevertheless, citizens would be able to select representatives to both houses of the Federal
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Assembly and establish links with these politicians who would have some degree of 
influence over certain areas of Russia’s policy formation. Moreover, the draft Constitution 
could be considered as a form of social contract between Yeltsin and the population in which 
the former would be granted a prominent role in the country’s politics and simultaneously, 
the population could be guaranteed of civic, human and social rights and freedoms.
Electoral Provisions
Electoral commissions coordinate the elections from the Federal level down to each 
individual precinct. A Central Electoral Commission (Tsentrizbirkom) oversees the electoral 
procedures tliroughout the country and is comprised of a chairman, appointed from among 
Russian Supreme Court judges by the President, and 20 other members. The chairman for 
the 1993 elections was Nikolai Ryabov. Half of the membership is drawn from legislators 
in the Russian Federation appointed by the President while he also selects the other ten from 
among the existing heads of administration. Therefore, the president had considerable 
influence over the Tsentrizbirkom's composition, akin to the CPSU’s powers of appointment 
of similar bodies during the Soviet period. In addition, all competing electoral organizations 
possess the right to appoint one of their members to the Central Electoral Commission; 
however^ they did not possess full voting rights in it. Election commissions at all levels 
ensure compliance with the electoral statute: that candidates and their campaign staffs
(doverennye litsa) are registered; lists of candidates and voters are available and distributed 
to the electorate and that ballots and finances are dispursed properly.
The elections were financed by several means. There is still some measure of state
284
support for the elections (previously the state provided the only source). By the beginning 
of December 1993, it was estimated that the government had expended about 252 billion 
roubles on the election campaign.^® In addition to state support, the European Union 
donated an additional 100,000 ECUs ($US 113,000) to the Tsentrizbirkom to purchase 
equipment such as copying and fax machines.
Tsentrizbirkom contributions went to the various electoral committees in order for 
them to conduct their duties. For instance, each Moscow polling station received close to
642.000 roubles to conduct the elections, and some ' ' have^receive an additional
300.000 roubles. Included among some of the expenditures of the more than 3,000 Moscow 
electoral precincts^® were about 30,000 roubles for preparing the stations for elections: 
assembling and dismantling equipment, 80,000 to print voters’ lists, 15,000 for the costs of 
paper goods, 50,000 for hooking up phones, and about 12,000 for s e c u r i t y . I n  addition, 
the Tsentrizbirkom distributed 50 million roubles to each electoral organisation to conduct 
its own campaign.
Both electoral associations and individual candidates have the right to create campaign 
accounts. These sources of support are derived from several means. First, candidates and 
blocs have the opportunity to include finances which were provided through the election 
commissions from the Russian State Budget. Second, they may comprise the 
candidates’ and the blocs’ own finances. Third, the associations nominating individual 
candidates in the districts may provide them with financial support. Fourth, election funds 
may include voluntary private donations of both individuals and other legal entities. 
Nevertheless, there are certain limitations on funding; campaigns must be financed solely
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by Russian sources.
The electoral associations clearly used a wide range of financial sources to pay for 
the 1993 contest. For instance, the KPRF paid for its campaign through membership dues 
and the 50 million roubles it received from the Tsentrizbirkom. Civic Union received 100 
million roubles from different sponsors and some from a bloc agitational concert held to 
attract younger voters. It used these funds to pay for publishing leaflets and signs bearing
bloc leader Arkadii Vol’skii’s portrait. The Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) produced
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3,000 leaflets, several tens of thousands of posters and 2 million calendars. The total for 
these items . 50 million roubles.
Before the elections, very few candidates or blocs publicised their financial 
information. For instance, in St Petersburg, of the 95 candidates competing in 9 electoral 
districts, only city council chainnan Aleksandr Belyaev published a declaration of his income 
from the beginning of the year.^® Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai publicized that 
he earned only 332,000 roubles per annum and at the end of October had only 14,000 in a 
savings bank. '^^ Yabloko was the only association which openly reported its financial 
information. According to its figures the bloc had 64,722,934 roubles in its account on 29 
November 1993. Among their contributors was the firm Mossibinterservis, donating
30,000,000 roubles. Yabloko's expenditures i^3-29 November included 1,305,402 
roubles for copying agitation materials; 2  million roubles for issuing and distributing special 
editions of newspapers and posters; 4.5 million roubles for issuing brochures of the pre­
election platform; 47,320 roubles for sending telegrams and 2.2 million roubles for 
publishing agitation m a t e r i a l s . O n  6  December 1993, the bloc had 222,573,967 roubles
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in its account and expended 87,317,967 of them on its campaign. The largest amount,
40,000,000, roubles went to the periodical, Zhurnalist (Journalist) for printing informational 
materials and publishing an interview which ran in 30 Russian regional newspapers. Among 
the contributors that week were the companies Viamond (30,000,000 roubles), the influential 
Gruppa Most (100,000,000 roubles), Optsion (10,000,000 roubles), Investionnaya kompaniya 
Most-Investment (100,000,000 roubles) and Torgovlya i Kredit (10,000,000 roubles).^®
In addition to providing for some type of equality for contestants regarding their 
financial support in the poll, the electoral statute contains provisions designed to ensure fair 
play in agitation. First, state institutions are forbidden from conducting any form of agitation 
(either for or against any candidate or electoral organisation). Rather, their function was to 
assist candidates and blocs find halls for meetings and like matters. Second, the statute 
expressly forbid any publication of election related survey results during the last ten days 
before the elections. According to Daphne Skillen this stipulation was a factor in the 
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia’s surprising performance.^^ Third, the state contributes 
towards the use of the media for the contestants. Each candidate had the right to present one 
speech on both state radio and television (the time allotment for the speeches was not 
specified in the statute). In St Petersburg, for instance, every candidate received 20 minutes 
of state-financed air time.^® Moreover, the St Petersburg channel programme, ‘Vybory: 
pryamoi efir’ (Elections: Direct Broadcast), kept a timer on the candidates. Additional 
television presenters and programme staffs monitored the time on other election broadcasts. 
However, it was difficult to maintain a strict control over time allotments. For instance, 
during one telecast, Russia’s Choice leader Yegor Gaidar ‘was occupied with his speech 
and...[the bloc] was on the air a minute and a half longer’ than they were s c h e d u l e d . T h e
287
Provisions also mandated that state television must allocate no less than one hour of air time 
per day to state financed political broadcasts between 7 and 9 am and 7 and 11 pm (takingA
into account regional differences) during the three weeks preceding the elections.
Electoral Shortcomings
The new electoral provisions had some potentially threatening features to the overall 
legitimacy of the deputies elected and equal weight among the electorate’s votes. As 
Richard Sakwa has noted the reduced turnout level and first-past-the- post system ‘would 
theoretically allow a candidate to win with only 6  per cent of the vote in a constituency 
where, for example^there were three candidates.’'^® In addition, the schema of each deputy 
representing about 500,000 people was not strictly adhered to and there were some seriously 
unequal distributions of voters amongst the 225 electoral districts^meaning that the votes of 
part of the electorate were worth more than those elsewhere tliroughout the country. For 
example, the Central Election Commission’s list of constituencies and number of voters in 
them published in Izvestiya on 13 and 14 October 1994 revealed that the deputy elected in 
Astrakhan district No. 62 represented some 737,800 electors'*  ^ while the deputy from 
Evenkii district No. 224 represented approximately 13,800 e l e c t o r s . T h e r e f o r e ,  as 
Wyman, Miller, White and Heywood correctly note, ‘[t]he voice of the Evenki in the State 
Duma would thus be 53 times louder than that of Astrakhan, leaving aside their two deputies 
to the upper h o u s e . I t  will be recalled that the unequal number of voters in districts has 
been a serious point of contention that Soviet and post-Soviet elites have not been able to 
solve effectively and can be traced back to the 1989 elections td the USSR Congress of 
People’s Deputies.
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The eligibility requirements for candidates included a major reversal of one aspect of 
Soviet electoral legislation. Under the 1988 Electoral Law, USSR ministers were not 
allowed simultaneously to hold their posts and he USSR People’s Deputies (Article 11).'^ '^  
This provision would theoretically reduce the possibilities of creating conflicts of interests 
for ministers who would be serving as elected representatives of the people, not just their 
ministries. Ministers would have to decide whether they wanted to serve the electorate or 
remain in their places. By forgoing a loss of status, most ministers chose to remain in their 
positions-the notable exception being Yeltsin who resigned as the chairman of the State 
Construction Committee to take his seat in the Congress. Thus, this move strenghtened 
Gorbachev’s position in the Parliament vis-a-vis the state apparatus.
The Provisions mandated that Duma deputies could not be members of the Federation 
Council, representative organs or organs of local self-government at the same time (Article 
3). However, as written in a concluding section of the draft Constitution, members of the 
Government of the Russian Federation could be simultaneously members of the Duma of the 
first convocation (Point 9). This is a factor which, theoretically, worked to the advantage 
of the ‘pro-reform’ forces. Moreover, this had the potential to strengthen further Yeltsin’s 
power base in the lower house. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin did not seek election 
to the parliament (although he is reputed to have supported Sergei Shakhrai’s Russian Party 
of Unity and Accord).'*^ Other members of government, however, actively sought seats in 
the Federal Assembly. Standing on the Russia’s Choice list were, for instance. First Deputy 
Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, Minister for Social Defence of the Population Ella Pamfilova, 
Deputy Prime Minister Anatolii Chubais, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Finance Minister 
Boris Fedorov, Environment Minister Viktor Danilov-Danil’yan, Deputy chair of the Council
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of Ministers Yurii Yarov, Deputy Finance Minister Aleksandr Pochinok, Science Minister 
Boris Saltykov and Culture Minister Yegvenii Sidorov. The Party of Russian Unity and 
Accord’s candidates included deputy chairs of the Russian Federation’s Council of Ministers 
Sergei Shakhrai and Aleksandr Shokhin, Justice Minister Yurii Kalmykov and Labour 
Minister Gennadii Melik’yan. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation’s Council of 
Ministers Aleksandr Zaveryukha stood as a candidate for the opposition Agrarian Party of 
Russia.'^®
The prominence of government officials among Russia’s Choice candidates and their 
activities in the campaign have led Michael Urban to suggest that the December elections 
demonstrated some continuity with late-Soviet electoral practices. He considers this 
‘"democracy by design", whereby those in control of the state machinery attempt to shape 
the institutions and procedures of a competitive election in ways that ensure an outcome 
favorable to the designers themselves. Russia’s Choice, considered by Urban to be a 
‘party of power’, had its candidates in key positions: Mikhail Poltoranin headed the Federal 
Information Centre and ‘others in the bloc holding the top posts in state broadcasting would 
have a free hand to shape the images and messages of the election transmitted to mass 
audiences via television and the r a d i o . U r b a n  also claims that Russia’s Choice had 
control over the ‘primary rules’-'the established offices for which parties and independent 
candidates compete’-and ‘secondary rules’-‘the procedures and regulations that govern this 
competition’-of the campaign.'*^ His evidence for the former includes examples such as the 
manner in which the constitution was drafted (by a ‘narrow political clique’ rather than a 
constitutional convention), ministers were able to be members of the Duma, prohibiting 
criticism on the draft constitution and the committee overseeing the conducting of the
290
plebiscite was headed by Russia’s Choice candidate Vladimir Shumeiko. Included among 
the second category are constituency gerrymandering from the former RSFSR Congress 
which represented 1,068 districts to the 225 district Duma and the resulting grossly unequal 
numbers of voters per constituency, the speed in which the campaign was conducted and the. 
manner and time frame in which electoral associations had to scramble for signatures^hurt 
blocs other than Russia’s Choice. Because Russia’s Choice had the largest number of 
candidates competing for seats, the Central Electoral Commission’s directive to keep the 
political affiliations of the candidates off the ballot paper worked more to Gaidar’s bloc’s 
benefit and disadvantaged others. Moreover, he claims that media coverage was biased 
heavily in favour of Russia’s C h o i c e . I n d e e d ,  as Daphne Skillen argues^ the fact that 
Russia’s Choice’s candidates included so many members of government and prominent 
personalities, further ensured that the high profile candidates would gain greater exposure for 
the coalition in the run up to 12 December.
Campaigning for the Federal Assembly
The media’s importance in shaping the former Soviet Union’s electoral politics is a recent 
development. It will be recalled that the first election-related television broadcasts, for 
instance, began during the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies. 
Programmes like VlasP sovetam (Power to the Soviets) and Navstrechu vyboram (Towards 
the Elections) informed the Soviet electorate of selected issues and candidates surrounding 
to the poll. Local programmes like Moscow’s Dobry vecher Moskva (Good Evening 
Moscow) presented debates between contestants for the sea t s .Subsequent ly ,  television 
took a more prominent role as the political system opened further. Television was the most
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widely used form of media agitation in the 1993 campaign/^ Nevertheless, it was an 
extremely expensive campaign medium. For instance, it was reported in Izvestiya that for 
one minute of air-time on Ostankino a party or bloc had to pay 707,000 roubles and it cost 
632,095 roubles for the same time allotment on the Rossiya channel.
Party political broadcasts began in late November providing voters with the 
programmatic specifics and personalities in the campaign^^ bringing the agitvecher^^ 
(agitational evening) into the Russian political lexicon. As Daphne Skillen notes these 
telecasts were relatively important in influencing v o t e r s . H o w e v e r ,  the entire viewing 
public did not watch them enthusiastically. For instance, many voters preferred to watch 
imported soap operas such as the Mexican ‘Prosto Mariya’ (Simply Maria) or the American 
favourite ‘Santa Barbara’^ ® while the party political broadcasts were shown. Former 
Constitutional Court Chairman Valerii Zor’kin noted the intrusiveness and abundance of 
political broadcasts when he claimed ‘I eat in the morning-they tell me to "Vote for Russia’s 
Choice". I eat in the evening and it is the same.’^ ^
On 30 November 1993 at 23.30 (Moscow time), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
presented a party political broadcast on the Rossiya channel devoted mainly to agricultural 
problems. Chairman Vladimir Zhifinovskii hragged about the specialists and academics he 
had on his team. He then ‘turned the show over’ to the candidates appearing with him- 
Aleksandr Kozyrev, Mikhail Lemeshev and Mikhail Sidorov. During the course of the 
broadcast Lemeshev spoke about the mistake of talking about social protection without taking 
into consideration the position of agrarian workers. He pointed out that other countries 
subsidised their agricultural sectors. Lemeshev also spoke of the need to invest more
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materials into Russia’s agricultural sector, noting that land is the country’s ‘greatest national 
heritage and salvation’. Lemeshev reminded his audience that the health of the population 
is related to food problems. When it was Zhirinovskii’s turn, he again spoke of the 
capacities of his party members and assured the Russian electorate that the only way to 
change the status of agriculture and develop the rural infrastructure was by voting for the 
Liberal Democratic Party. He emphasized that neither the Peasant Party (competing in the 
election as part of Russia’s Choice) nor the Agrarian Party could defend adequately the rights 
of the agricultural workforce; but that the Liberal Democratic Party would.^
Zhirinovskii’s television appearance is worth noting. The LDPR leader always looked 
in control of the situation. When cameras focused on Zhirinovskii during the speeches of 
his fellow party members, he looked very much involved in the speech despite the fact that 
he was not speaking. In addition, he knew how to perform vigorously and confidently before 
the cameras. Stylistically, he differed radically from Anatolii Yemets, the President of the 
group ‘Yemets’, a candidate from St Petersburg who nervously and apprehensively spoke of 
the need to raise the pensions of invalids and take into account women’s concerns^^ and 
(surprisingly), actress Natal’ya Gundareva, one of Women of Russia’s three leading 
candidates, who ‘obviously...read badly and kept her eyes on the paper the whole time’® 
during a spot on the second channel.
There were also incidents in which Zhirinovskii’s style either shocked viewers or 
attracted people’s attention. For instance he spoke for several minutes in Turkish during one 
election broadcast. In another, Zhirinovskii described Russia’s experiences under Communist 
rule using sexual analogies. The Bolshevik Revolution he equated with the rape of the
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country. The Stalin period, because men were killing other men and the population did not 
grow, was likened to homosexuality. Khi-ushchev’s period, because of its messing around 
with the system and not producing anything, was compared to masturbation. Zhirinovskii 
categorized the Brezhnev era as group sex and classified the Gorbachev and current periods 
as phases of impotence.® There may have been some agreement in some Russian people’s 
minds with his sexual analogies. Dr Dapline Skillen, coordinator of a Moscow hased project 
evaluating central and regional press items on the elections, mentioned to the author that 
there was very little reaction from the Russian people in the press following his sexual 
comparison statements.®
St Petersburg television’s ‘Vybory: pryamoi efir’ provided candidates competing in 
the city’s single seat districts with opportunities to speak about their programmes and their 
intentions. Candidates used different methods to convey their election messages. For 
instance, on one show broadcast on 1 December 1993 at 21.45 (Moscow time) Vitalii Kalinin 
a PRES candidate presented a speech to promote his platform. However, Russia’s Choice 
candidate, advocate Aleksei Aleksandrov, used a video to present his personal and 
programmatic information to the St Petersburg electorate.®
Some electoral associations produced their own television political advertisements. The 
Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia (KEDR) broadcast an information spot on 2 
December 1993 at 23.45 (Moscow time) on the Moscow Channel with a screen split into four 
small squares depicting environmental hazards, urging the electorate to vote for them in order 
to ensure their futures and those of their children. The Russian Democratic Reform 
Movement’s (RDDR) political advertisements depicted its symbol the astrological Taurus
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which then broke off into photos of the movement’s three leading candidates on the ballot 
paper, St Petersburg mayor Anatolii Sobchak, entrepreneur-physician Svyatoslav Fedorov and 
writer Oleg Basilashvili. A Civic Union commercial contained a large gathering of people 
depicting the diversity of the Russian population. Russia’s Choice ran several 
advertisements. One showed a small child very cozy in his home and resting his head on 
what was (presumably) a St Bernard uttering T’m too young to vote’. In addition the bloc 
also broadcast an advertisement in which an announcer stated ‘You can vote for this... ’ and 
then hands put forward several large cards depicting solid colours or spots. After two 
alternating successions of a solid card and a spotted card the announcer chimed in, ‘Your 
choice "Russia’s Choice"’.
The bloc-sponsored rock concert is a novel form of agitational-informational event 
used by electoral associations in the 1993 campaign specifically targetted to attract the 
support of young voters. Russia’s Choice, for instance, promoted a major rock concert at 
the Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 3-5 December. Their advertisement for this event 
used a ‘take off’ (or ‘rip off’) of the Pepsi Cola advertising slogan ‘novoye pokolenie 
vyhiraet’ ( ‘The choice of the new generation’). This event was televised on Ostankino at 3 
pm 5 December 1993. RDDR held a concert sponsored hy the Fund For Support of the 
Russian Democratic Reform Movement on 5 December 1993 in St Petersburg entitled ‘Stars 
of the Stage in Support of the RDDR’ televised on the St Petersburg station between 2-3 pm 
(Moscow time). The event was kicked off by the bloc’s leader in the elections, St Petersburg 
mayor Anatolii Sobchak, who informed spectators in the hall and in the viewing audience in 
their homes of the notable people on RDDR’s list of candidates and urged voters to make 
their choices for those individuals who ‘got their positions through their talents’. The
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performers included Mikhail Munnon, saxophinist Aleksandr Sirov (who, incidentally, 
performed a very impressive cover version of the Johnny Mathis classic, ‘Misty’^ Igor’ 
Nikolaev, Yurii Antonov (due to technical difficulties he was caught clearly lip-synching his 
selections) and the group ‘Lyuba’. The broadcast was interrupted by a hockey game between 
SKA St Petersburg and Dynamo Moscow. Nevertheless, RDDR was able to capitalise on 
this change in programming. Later, (for either personal or political motives) Sobchak and 
other members of the RDDR arrived at the game during the second period.
The cameras depicted them amid cheers of the crowd. Therefore, RDDR gained extra, 
unpaid publicity.
There was extensive coverage of the parties and hlocs and in some cases individual 
candidates in the central press. Izvestiya, for instancy regularly devoted page 4 during the 
campaign to election-related issues and interviews with leaders of the parties and blocs. 
Rossiiskaya gazeta and Kommersant'' daily published excerpts of the parties’ and blocs’ 
platforms on their pages. The Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) ran an extensive 
press campaign. An advertisement for voters to cast their ballots for the party regularly ran 
in the bottom right hand corner of page 3 in the daily newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta. 
RDDR, compensating for last place position on the ballot paper, conducted a thorough 
media blitz publicising its programme stances and leading candidates. The advertisement, 
appearing in several newspapers, had a header reading ‘Vote for the list of the Russian 
Democratic Reform Movement (last on the ballot paper)’; and a footer stating ‘Our list is last 
on the ballot paper, but we are not last in affairs’.® KEDR ambitiously serialised its 
economic programme in four numbers of Nezavisimaya g a z e t a . In addition, KEDR 
printed a post-election thank you notice. In this advertisement the bloc expressed gratitude
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for their voters’ support during the election campaign and ensured them that they would still 
continue to be involved in the struggle for environmental protection regardless of the 
election’s outcomes.®
There were ‘human factor’ agitational techniques employed during the election. 
Moscow residents, for instance, received election-related materials in their mail boxes. For 
instance, voters living in the areas casting their ballots in Kashirskii district 194 for the State 
Duma; Federation Council district 77 and City Duma district 22 (centring around Kashirskoe 
shosee)™ received the following Russia’s Choice information note in their boxes;
Federation Council District 77
State Duma District 194
City Duma District 22
Dear Friends!
Together we made our choice in the April 1993 Referendum,
We hope that today, in the first free parliamentary elections,
YOUR CHOICE IS "RUSSIA’S CHOICE"
The candidates whom we are supporting in Your district are:
- To the Federation Council S. N. KRASAVCHENKO
Yu. D. CHERNICHENKO
- To the State Duma I. M. KHAKAMADA
- To the Moscow City Duma Ye. I. ISTOMINA
[On] The Presidential draft of the Constitution of Russia - [Vote] YES
[Signed] Yegor Gaidar 
Sergei Kovalev 
Ella Pamfilova^^
Other parties/blocs and citizens’ groups were also active in this district and employed post 
box drops to publicise their candidates. For instance, the supporters of I. N. Petrenko, 
chairman of the governing board of the commercial bank ‘Lyublino’, circulated pre-election
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flyers which not only told about the candidate, but informed voters of the ballot paper they 
would be using (ballot paper three for the single seat districts) and against whom their 
candidate was running. In addition, his candidacy was endorsed by notable figures such as 
I. N. Avachev and D. N. Bezdenezhnykh, respectively chairmen of the Councils of Veterans 
of War and Labour in the South-East and Southern administrative districts of Moscow; R. 
A. Pechenkina, a chief doctor of the Semashko hospital; Ye. I. Zharikov, a People’s Artist 
of Russia and President of the Screen Actors’ Guild of Russia^and A. V. Firsov, a former 
member of several Soviet Olympic and world champion hockey t e a m s . I n  addition, 
Yahloko (here it will be noted that Yabloko is the Russian word for apple) distributed 
information for their candidate in the district, Vera Stanislavovna Stepanenko, director of a 
youth centre (however this is not mentioned on her pre-election materials; however, it is 
mentioned on Petrenko’s sheet and in a list published in the newspaper Kuranty)^m which she 
appears in one photo speaking behind a rostrum and in another with bloc leader Grigorii 
Yavlinskii whose caption states ‘Ya veryu Vere’ ’(I trust in Vera’). The document, in which 
the bloc’s name was surrounded with apples on both sides, contained information on 
Stepanenko’s political experience.
She was born in 1957, is a Muscovite and is married. Her son is a pupil. 
She completed the^^^oscgw Jn|t|tute^or Railroad Transport Engineers and is 
by specialty a/ ' " r. From 1989 she participated in the work
of the Tushin Electors’ Club. From 1990 - 1993 she was a deputy of the 
Moscow City Soviet of People’s Deputies and was chairwoman of the 
Commission for Youth Affairs. She was coordinator of the "Democratic 
Russia" fraction in the Mossovet from 1991 - 1993.^^
The Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) carried a strong publicity campaign in
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Moscow city’s State Duma constituency No. 204 and distributed large amounts of agitational 
materials among the many s t u d e n t s l o c a t e d  around the Kon’kovo metro 
station area. "^^
In addition, several candidates also involved themselves in different photo- and news 
opportunities. For instance, Kommersant" daily reported that Federation Council candidate 
Nikolai Gonchar and Duma candidates Sergei Stankevich, Sergei Shaklirai and Konstantin 
Zatulin attended the blessing of the publications building of the Moscow Patriarchate at the 
end of November.^^ Therefore, the candidates were able to get extra, unpaid publicity 
through their activities.
Daphne Skillen argues that
[i]t was clear from the start that the election campaign would be fought out on 
television. In a country as vast as Russia, with poor roads, fuel shortages and 
unpredicyable delays in travel, campaigning on television made for more 
efficient use of time than having direct c&itact with voters, especially in the 
short time-span which allowed five weeks in all to polling day on 12 
December 1993.'^ ®
Therefore, it appears consistent that there was very little individual candidate and bloc 
campaigning was conducted in Central Electoral District No. 202 for the State Duma around 
the Tverskaya street area in the last two weeks before the elections, where the current author
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was based during his field work. For instance, during this time, the author only observed 
campaign workers passing out leaflets for Russia’s Choice Federation Council candidate and 
Peasants’ Party leader, Yurii Chernichenko^on 3 December 1993 outside the Pushkinskaya 
metro station. Also, there were only several candidates who had their campaign posters up 
in the area during the period immediately after my arrival in Moscow (30 November 1993) 
until 10 December 1993 . These included Vladimir Kozhemyakin, a PRES candidate, whose 
pre-election agitation materials were posted in the Myasnitskaya street area. Kozhemyakin, 
born in 1956 and a state workeij'^ had a campaign poster which read ‘Duma Candidate 
Vladimir Kozhemyakin is your candidate. H e’s young, intelligent and he’s not soiled with 
the politics of the past. This approach of not being tied to the past was not the style 
adopted by Chernichenko in his bid for the Federation Council. One of his pre-election 
documents bearing his photograph and the personal endorsements of notables including writer 
Fazil Iskander stressed his political experience in Soviet o r g a n s . O t h e r  Duma candidates 
who ‘got the jum p’ in the district before the final week were banker Valerii Kubarev, 
historian Aleksandr Kotenev, human rights activist Valerii Fadeev, the only woman standing 
in the district, entrepreneur Vera Balakireva and mining engineer-geophysicist Aleksandr 
Kransov. Kotenev, incidently^ is a co-chairman of the National-Patriotic Party and a 
chairman of the Union of Veterans of Afghanistan^;^° however^ in his election material, only 
this last point was mentioned. On 10-11 December agitational activities increased in this 
area. Supporters for Duma candidate lawyer Anatolii Basargin hegan putting his signs in 
their shop windows on Tverskaya street. At ahout the same time campaigners for Federation 
Council candidate. Presidential administration worker, Vladimir Komchatov started putting 
up posters (he had at least two variants) and distributing his personal and programmatic 
information to prospective constituents. However, it should be noted that during the the two
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weeks preceeding the election, the Liberal-Democratic Party appeared to be the only party 
which set up agitpunkty (agitation points) to attract voters and distribute campaign literature 
to voters demonstrating their dedication and organization.^^
Candidates and electoral associations were not the only actors interested in presenting 
information to the electorate. The Russian government used the media to achieve different 
goals. First, the government had to get voters to the hallot hoxes; and second they had to 
persuade them to vote in favour of the draft Constitution. There were several ways in which 
the status quo promoted and publicized the elections and the plebiscite. The government 
hung large banners over streets stating ‘12 Dekabrya vybory v FederaTnoe Sobranie i 
Gorodskuyu Dumu’ (12 December Elections to the Federal Assembly and City Duma). In 
addition, the government sponsored several public service announcements advising citizens 
when to vote, the institutions they would be choosing and the proper methods to cast their 
ballots.
Under the new rules, voters would have to cast their ballots differently than they did 
when they elected deputies to Soviet institutions. Therefore, the government was responsible 
for informing voters on this subject. Earlier, voters were instructed to cross out the name(s) 
of the person(s) against whom they wished to vote. The new provisions mandate that voters 
put a cross, an ‘x ’ or some other mark in the box next to the electoral association or 
person(s)/<?r whom they wish to vote for deputies on the party lists or in the constituencies. 
However, they were instructed to cross out-as they were instructed before-the opposite 
response to their acceptance or rejection of the draft Constitution.®
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Several government-sponsored public service announcements dealt with election and 
plebiscite procedures. The Rossiya channel broadcast one such informational programme on 
1 December at 16.20 (Moscow time). This particular advertisement informed Russian voters 
that the polling stations would he open from 8  am to 10 pm on 12 December. In order to 
vote citizens would have to bring their passports; voting for others was prohibited. Actors 
in the broadcast properly demonstrated the voting procedures described by the announcer. 
The government sponsored another procedural broadcast pertaining to the elections at about 
21.50 (Moscow time) on 6  December on the Rossiya channel. On this public service 
announcement Central Electoral Commission chair Nikolai Ryabov ‘walked the electorate 
through’ the different numbered ballot papers and demonstrated how to mark them validly. 
First, Ryabov noted that voters would be given four ballot papers (although there were other 
elections to other institutions held in some of Russia’s regions and major cities).® Ballot 
one contained the list of names of Federation Council candidates. The second ballot paper 
was the list of parties and blocs competing for the State Duma. Ballot three contained the 
names of the candidates competing for the State Duma in the single candidate districts. The 
final ballot paper was for the draft Constitution. Nevertheless, as Skillen has pointed out, 
Ryabov ‘used a public service announcement to persuade viewers to make the "right choice" 
and vote for the constitution.’®
The Constitution itself occupied a primary place in the election campaign and affected 
the way in which the electoral associations candidates canvassed. Vice Premier Vladimir 
Shumeiko, in charge of the government commission which oversaw the conducting of the 
nation-wide plebiscite, tried to ban the activities of four electoral associations-Civic Union, 
the Agrarian Party, BRNI and Yabloko-for critically expressing their opinions against the
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Constitution in their pre-election broadcasts.® However, there was a public outcry against 
this proposal. Noted scholar and Civic Union candidate Aleksandr Tsipko opposed 
Shumeiko’s stance^ declaring that if the Tsentrizbirkom harred the dissenting electoral 
associations from participating in the elections all candidates would have a ‘moral question’ 
placed in front of them ahout whether to continue participatating in the ‘vulgar style’ of the 
election campaign.® In addition, neither the Central Electoral Commission nor the 
Arbitration Court, formed to resolve media disputes, supported Shumeiko’s proposal.® 
Finally, in order to clear confusion about the issue (and possibly to distance himself from 
Shumeiko in the eyes of the electorate) Yeltsin himself issued a statement declaring that 
constructive criticism is a ‘natural manifestation of an original position of the different 
parties, population groups and political leaders’; but that ‘indiscriminate, negative [criticism] 
from a position of narrow party egoism and political revenge’ was unacceptable.*® 
Nevertheless, this ‘confusion’ certainly put a damper on even a constructive dehate on the 
Constitution. Parties and blocs did, however, express their opinions on the Constitution.® 
Moreover, former Constitutional Court chairaian Valerii Zor’kin strongly asserted that
[t]he relationship to the Constitution is the basis of [the electoral associations’] 
pre-election platforms. It is forbidden to criticise the draft Constitution-this, 
in effect, violates free elections, it violates a free Russia. This means, that 
one must do nothing but praise if one hopes to gain access to ‘the feeding 
trough’. But excuse me, then this is the same as Orwell.^
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The Voting Process: Observations and Violations
On 12 December voters proceeded to their local polling stations to cast their ballots. After 
arriving at their respective precincts^S voters, in accordance with the Provisions, presented 
their passports to election commission workers. Upon viewing documents, the commission 
workers struck the voters’ names off the electors’ list indicating they participated. 
Subsequently, voters proceeded to another table to receive ballot papers. Again, voters 
presented their passports. The attendants inspected the passports, signed or initialed the 
ballot papers and passed the documents back to the voters. Voters then walked across the 
room taking their ballot papers to the voting booths-little stalls with light blue curtains- 
entered the booths, pulled hack the curtains, closed them and made their selections in secret. 
Voters then exited the booths, folded their ballot papers, walked directly to the voting urns, 
dropping them into the secured ballot boxes; thus completing the voting procedure. The 
voting was largely unceremonious, in stark contrast to the picture of Soviet elections that 
Theodore Friedgut painted in his classic Political Participation in the USSR in which he 
describes polling stations adorned with flowers, young pioneers guarding the ballot boxes and 
election day a national holiday.® Nevertheless, it was noted that in some Russian areas 
the old traditions continued. For instance, in Volgograd the voters treated the elections like 
a holiday® and in Tula, first time voters continued to receive live flowers or books^ ^^  as 
initiation presents for performing their civic duties.
The election and entire campaign were the subjects of external scrutiny. On 9 
December 1993, the Central Election Commission accredited more than 800 foreign 
observers from more than 50 countries and 20 international, parliamentary, social, legal and
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research organisations who worked in more than 100 Russian cities and other population 
points.® There was general agreement among the observers that the contest was held fairly 
and without widespread violations of voters’ or candidates’ rights. For instance, Adzum 
Sedze, Japanese First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, heading the Japanese observers’ 
team, Magdelena Hoff, in charge of the observer team from the Europarliament and the EC 
and the head of the Group of the European Parliament for ties with the CIS and Michael 
Emerson, the official representative of the EC in Moscow noted that the elections were ‘the 
first honest elections in Russia in the last 75 years’.® Dane Ole Espersen and Austrian 
Fritz Probst, observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, after 
visiting 8 electoral precincts, stated that ‘there were no serious violations of voting 
procedures nor was there evidence of any influence over voters.’® Japanese observers, 
focusing their activities in Moscow and Khabarovsk krai, felt that during the preparatory 
stages of the elections all blocs were given free access to the media; however, representatives 
of the European Parliament after concentrating their efforts in 37 regions, felt that Russia’s 
Choice exercised power over the media.®
Despite her generally positive evaluation of the poll, Hoff complained that the right 
of secret ballot had been violated in some instances and that the electorate was ill-informed 
on matters such as candidates’ party or bloc affiliations. She noted that there were no bloc 
representatives to provide further information to voters at polling stations. Moreover, she 
felt that voters did not have enough time to become acquainted with the draft Constitution. 
Hoff also stressed that the wording of the document and the referendum itself were 
Presidentially directed.® Michael Urban’s previously mentioned observations reaffirm 
Hoff’s claims.
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Incidents of ‘foul play’ also occurred during the campaign. For instance, Izvestiya 
reported that entrepreneur Ivan Degtyarev, a candidate for the Democratic Party of Russia 
standing in Arkhangel’sk oblast^ committed a criminal act when he illegally sold fish from 
boats of the Arkhangel’sk ' Fleet in Norway. The Arkhangel’sk tax inspector 
estimates that from the losses and damages caused by Degtyarev, he will face penalties 
amounting to 32 billion roubles. The procurator issued a warrant to arrest Degtyarev
and his assistant; the latter was a r r e s t e d . T h i s  prompted a reaction from the 
Tsentrizbirkom stating that Izvestiya's editors violated a portion of the Provisions prohibiting 
the dissemenation of materials weakening the honour and dignity of a candidate to the State 
Duma and that as a penalty the paper would have to publish the Commission’s decree on 
Mass Information without any cuts, editorial headlines or commentaries before 10 December 
1 9 9 3  lot q'yg appeared in the newspaper on 8 December 1993.^® In order to avoid 
problems that candidates with criminal convictions may have brought to their electoral 
association, PRES adopted a decision to remove any candidate from its list who did not have 
‘a clean past’. Gavriil Popov complained that Russia’s Choice had privileges that other 
blocs did not alleging that Gaidar visited a military unit, whereas, none of the other bloc 
leaders received the opportunity to speak to the army.^ ®'^  In addition, he argued that the 
bloc used Yeltsin’s image on their signs, which, in effect made him a supporter solely of that 
bloc.^® Bagavutdin Gadzhiev, a Federation Council candidate and chairman of the council 
of the ‘Dagestan’ commercial-investment corporation, was killed (along with two others) by 
submachine gun fire while leaving work in the city centre of Makhachkaliya.^®
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Table 6.1 Seat Allocation in the State Duma
Party/Bloc PR SEATS CONSTITUENCY TOTAL TOTAL
(N) SEATS (N) (N) (%)
Russia’s Choice 40 30 70 15.6
LDPR 59 5 64 14.2
KPRF 32 16 48 10.7
APR 21 12 33 7.3
Yabloko 20 3 23 5.1
Civic Union 0 1 1 0.2
DPR 14 0 14 3.1
DiM 0 2 2 0.4
PRES 18 1 19 4.2
Women of Russia 21 2 23 5.1
RDDR 0 4 4 0.9
Other Parties - 14 14 3.1
Independents - 129 129 28.7
Source: Adapted from ‘The Final Tally’, The Economist, 8 January 1994, p. 30.
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Source: Adapted from Terry D, Clark, ‘The Russian Elections: Back to Square One?’, PS: Political Science & 
Politics, Vol. XXVII, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 520-524, at p. 524.
The results (see Tables 6.1 & 6.2) and their subsequent validity have been the subject 
of criticism from just several hours after the polls closed. Emulating the traditions of both 
the American and British political broadcasting, the Russians attempted to hold a night-long
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television special devoted to the reporting official results as they were tabulated. Although
the adoption of the draft constitution was reported quite early on in the programme, actual
voting tabulations kept heing delayed. Due to the show’s presenters failure to provide
accurate and prompt electoral information, the Central Electoral Commission issued a
statment claiming that it was not involved in the delays in any way.^® h
The elections and plebiscite were scrutinised more closely during the months that ^
followed the elections. Protocols from district electoral commissions on the results of the 
plehiscite indicate .. 58,187,755 voters participated (54.8 per cent of the elctorate). Among i
them there were 32,937,630 who cast their ballots in favour of the draft Constitution (58.4 
per cent); 23,431,333 and 23,431,333 who voted against it.^® However, Aleksandr i
Minkin writing in Moskovskii komsomolets noted that there were substantial differences 
among the reportages in a number of newspapers and that the Constitution was approved by 
what amounted to 31 per cent of the electorate.^® Therefore, the legal status of the 
Constitution is indeed questionable. In February 1994, the human rights activist Konrid 
Lyubarskii noted that as late as two months after the elections no one really knew how many 
electors had voted and that there was still no final district by district list published.
However, several preliminary reports e x i s t e d . M o r e o v e r ,  in May 1994 Izvestiya 
published an article which disclosed that nearly 3.5 million votes were falsified at precinct 
level and that ahout 5.7 million were tampered with at the constituency l e v e l . T h u s ,  
election was considered a subject of serious disrepute. Nevertheless, no^were made^uring 
the entire first convocation of the the Federal Assembly.
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Evaluations and Conclusions
Several evaluations can be derived from the final election results. The first conclusion that
can be reached is that the Russian population elected candidates who represent diverse
political tendencies. This factor hy itself reduces the coalition building potential of the
parliament, enhancing the prospects for inter-fractional conflict. Parliamentary fragmentation 
■p
further strenghens Yeltsin’s position within the Russian political system. As the data h
indicate , no party or bloc won an absolute majority in the lower house. In fact the largest 
proportion of elected deputies stood as independents (129 or 28.7 per cent). Among electoral 
associations Russia’s Choice had the largest number of deputies in the Parliament 70 (15.6 
per cent of all seats). However, nearly one third of the Parliament was hostile to Yeltsin 
or ‘democratic refonns’-the Liberal Democrats gained the largest share of voters’ support of 
the party list votes-59 seats (22.8 per cent of the votes in this category); KPRF controlled 
10.7 per cent of the seats while the APR won 7.3 per cent of the mandates.
Richard Sakwa . ; makes several key observations about the elections.
First, he notes that the vote ‘revealed the profound divisions in Russian society and the
absence of consensus over many issues’. He points to the baffling situation that arose as a
result of the choice of electoral system: had the deputies been elected solely according to
a proportional representation system the LDPR would have been the country’s leading party
i4'whereas under a first-past-the-post formula " : ,  hardly would have mattered. In adopting 
the Constitution and electing an anti-reform lower house, the electorate sent forth ‘two 
mutually exclusive signals: in accepting the constitution they were voting for stability; but 
in voting for the opposition, they were rejecting the existing hasis for order.’ The results
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uderlined the significance of regional variations in Russia. Rather than consolidating Russian 
politics, the results indicated its degree of fragmentation. The elections could also be placed 
within the European context of disenchantment with traditional parties and as a protest vote 
against IMF-directed reform. He suggests the elections hark the beginning of ‘a new Russian 
politics’ in which the previous bipolarity of ‘communist’/ ‘democrat’ was replaced by tri­
polarity in which the earlier were joined by a ‘semi-fascist movement of the leadership 
type’.^ ^^
Other authors have suggested other interpretations. Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey 
Evans write that on the one hand the elections could be seen a ‘predictable reaffirmation of 
traditional Russian political culture’ regarding values of ‘"orthodoxy, autocracy and 
nationality" ’ with ‘support for state control of the economy and egalitarianism’ as well as 
‘protest vote by an electorate whose political culture had changed significantly during the last 
forty years’.^ '^^  Terry D. Clark suggests that the communists scored a ‘remarkable victory’ 
reemerging at the centre of the anti-reform movement, however will, nevertheless, not be 
assured of control over the political a g e n d a . H o w e v e r ,  Stephen Sestanovich suggests the 
elections were ‘a communist setback’ because the Russian electorate rejected the Communist 
vision and l egacy . Never t he l es s ,  this inteipretation shows points of weakness. Data that 
the present author compiled and presents in Table 7.3 show that KPRF was the electoral 
association with the greatest number of members in both houses of the Federal Assembly 
(57). They were followed respectively by Russia’s Choice (46) and the LDPR (38). 
Moreover, the results of the 1995 elections in which the KPRF won more than 22 per cent 
of the list votes and the greatest share of seats in the constituencies works against 
Sestanovich’s thesis.
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While other chapters contain much fuller discussions about the implications of the 
elections, a few general observations can serve as a conclusion to the campaign. First, the 
elections to the Federal Assembly marked a greater movement towards-but fell far short of- 
fulfilling the criteria for free and fair elections and satsifying the conditions that elections are 
supposed to serve raised in the Introduction. Moreover, the campaign had many attributes 
which are common to those established in liberal-democratic countries consistently employing 
free elections to change government. Alternative parties and coalitions competed against 
each other to win seats. They publicized their objectives broadly through the media and 
made serious attempts to reach a wide array of supporters using various campaign techniques. 
Nevertheless, Russia’s Choice had particular advantages in particular aspects of the campaign 
that others did not, marginalising the fairness of the poll.
The outcome affected policy-making and the composition of the government. Aspects 
of the former can be seen in the Yeltsin administration’s more hawkish attitude to, for 
instance Serbia, NATO’s eastward expansion and its controversial foray into Chechnya andJjIS
an initial backtracking on economic reform. The government composition was affected by 
the people’s voting preferences. The high vote for the opposition reflected deep 
dissatisfaction with the pace of economic reform. A Russia’s Choice victory could have 
signalled the reverse. Had Russia Choice performed better, it is probable that Yegor Gaidar 
would have replaced Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister and that this could have had some type 
of impact over the pace of the reform process: either its continuance or is acceleration. 
However, as the vote stood, Chernomyrdin remained.
Nevertheless, the 1993 campaign reflected historical trends. There was still some
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form of interference hindering the electoral associations’ and populations abilities to have 
their attitudes reflected accurately. Elements of censorship, government interference, vote 
falsfications, scanty information, restrictions on candidates and electoral associations certainly 
support Michael Urhan’s thesis that the elections replicated early Soviet practices.
There are further points, however, which may be important to consider relating to a 
line of continuity from 1989-1993. In both instances, there was some institution which 
attempted to impede what it considered threatening contestants from winning seats in the 
parliament. However, in both cases, some significant victories were scored by those who 
were supposed to be kept out of seats. In these respects, the electorate was important in
;v
expressing its preferences and : z. _ delivered decisive shots over the bows of the CPSU and 
Yeltsin administration respectively. While it is unconceivable to believe that popular power 
could come close to matching either CPSU or presidential power, the voters showed that they 
certainly have the ability to influence their rulers and inform them of their satisfaction or 
disaffection of particular policies and governance.
There are a few points, however, which need to be mentioned further. Parties and 
political organisations, although considered weak, were ushered into active roles in Russian 
politics. The professional composition of the parliament was altered significantly. This 
factor is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. Citizens were able to establish 
links with their parties. Non-state campaign financing was allowed for the first time. 
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Chapter 7. The Composition of the Russian Federal 
Assembly: Towards a New Russian Parliamentarian?
321
On 12 December 1993 voters in the Russian Federation elected 444 deputies out of 450 (225 
on party lists and 219 in the single seat constituencies)^ to the lower house of the Russian 
Federal Assembly, the State Duma and 171 members of the upper house of the Russian 
Parliament, the Federation Council (see Table 7.1). The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine the composition of the new Russian representative organ.^ Throughout the chapter 
I compare the composition of the Russian parliamentarians elected in 1993 with those of its 
immediate predecessors, the last Soviet era national legislature, the USSR Congress of 
People’s Deputies and the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federated 
Socialist Republic elected in 1990 and forcibly disbanded in September-October 1993. My 
objectives are to examine the degree of change between parliamentary elites resulting from 
the first large-scale election held in the former USSR on a competitive basis in 1989, 
Russia’s first competitive election to its republican legislature and the first election held in 
Russia in which parties and political organizations other than the CPSU were able to 
compete.
Table 7.1 Deputies and Senators Elected to the Russian Federal Assembly on 12 December 1993 According to
Chamber
Chamber (N) (%)




Federation Council 171 96.1
Total 615 96.4
Sources: ‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii Ob ustanovlenii obshchikh itogov 
vyborov deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, No. 155 (25 December 
1993), Rossiiskaya gazeta, 28 December 1993, p. 2; data from ‘Spisok deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy 
Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, izbrannykh po obshchefederal’nomu okrugu’, ibid., pp. 2-3; ‘Spisok 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskog., Federatsii, izbrannykh po odnomandatnym izbiratel’nym 
okrugai^ ibid., pp. 3-5; ‘Spisok deputatov Soveta Federatsii Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 
izbrannyi kli po dvukhmandatnym izbiratel'nym okrugam’, ibid., pp. 5-6.
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Several comparative criteria are utilized in this analysis. First, the biographical traits 
of the deputies are scrutinized in order to determine the dimensions of parliamentary elite 
changes. In particular I address the levels of continuity, contradiction and departure between 
the aforementioned elections focusing on traits such as the parliamentarians’ sex, party 
affiliation, educational attainment, nationality, age, geographic locations and occuaption. 
Second, the State Duma deputies elected through the party lists and through competition in 
the districts are compared against each other. My purpose here is to compare and contrast 
the similarities and differences of the deputies who were ‘selected’ for their offices by their
political organisations and those ‘elected’ by their constituents.^ Hungarian scholar Akos/I
Rona-Tas has noted in a study of the Hungarian Parliament elected in 1990 that deputies 
elected to their seats through party lists had different occupational backgrounds than their 
constituency-based colleagues and were recruited primarily from different ‘parking orbits’ 
which gave them indirect access to politics in the communist period. These individuals were 
more likely to be economists, sociologists, historians and legal specialists. These deputies, 
because they were selected by their political parties^were very likely to si^port the initiatives 
their parties advocated in roll-call votes. By contrast, deputies elected in competitive contests 
in constituencies came from occupational backgrounds which tended to be more familiar to 
the common voter and they would be people with whom voters would regularly come into 
contact (physicians, managers, etc.). More importantly, the study by Rona-Tas indicates that 
these deputies were more likely to support the desires of their constituents in roll call votes 
even if the issues contradicted their party lin es .T h e refo re , it may be possible to suggest 
that the composition of the two different electoral divisions from which the deputies were 
elected may eventually affect the way deputies in the Russian Parliament vote and this may 
have serious consequences for future political developments. Third, the two chambers of
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the Federal Assembly are also compared against themselves to establish which types of 
deputies were most prominent in the Duma and the Federation Council. Finally, this chapter 
includes an overview of deputy re-election. Analyzing deputy re-election or, more 
precisely, continuity and change between the different institutional organs may help suggest 
the extent to which the present Russian political system has been able to distinguish itself 
from the Soviet political system.
This chapter will demonstrate that there were indeed elements of continuity, 
contradiction and departure in the compositions of the first Federal Assembly. For instance, 
typical State Duma deputy was a man between 41-50 years old who had completed higher 
education and was employed as a professional politician (minister, administrator or party
official), white collar manager or some type of academic or researcher. The arch^ypical
V‘ô**ASenator was about 47.7 years old,^ompeleted tertiary education and was a professional 
politician. There was continuity in the following areas: the deputies elected were
overwhelmingly male, the ‘popular representatives’ declined in their number as the electoral 
system became more competitive and voters did not necessarily elect deputies and senators 
who were divorced from the existing power structure. This latter point constitutes somewhat 
of a contradiction between the rhetoric of democracy and actual practice. Under the Soviet 
regime, even under more competitive elections, the great majority of elected representatives 
were linked to the party, while deputies elected in the 1993 elections were largley 
professional politicians linked to the Federal Government, Presidential Administration or 
Subject Administrations. Nevertheless, the composition of Russia’s first Federal Assembly 
marked a significant departure from the Soviet era: the overwhelming majority of deputies 
and senators had not been elected to the previous parliament and constituted a new legislative
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elite.
General Characteristics of Deputies and Senators
Election According to Sex
Table 7.2 Composition of the Federal Assembly’s Chambers According to Sex
All Men Men Women Women
Chamber Members (N) (%) (N) (%)
State Duma 444 385 86.7 59 13.3
Including:
Lists 225 192 85.3 33 14.7
Districts 219 193 8 8 .1 26 11.9
Federation
Council 171 162 94.7 9 5.3
Total 615 547 88.9 6 8 1 1 .1
Under the pre-Gorbachev Soviet political system, the political leadership placed a great 
emphasis on including different groups in the different level legislatures in order to claim 
they were incorporated in the USSR’s institutional structure and participated in decision­
making. It has been discussed in previous chapters that since Khrushchev, the highest 
legislative body in the Soviet Union, the USSR Supreme Soviet, was composed mostly of 
men but women constituted between one quarter to one third of its members. It will be 
recalled from previous chapters that at the last non-competitive election held in 1984, Soviet 
voters sent 492 women (32.8 per cent of all deputies) to the Supreme Soviet. However, 
women’s representation declined significantly under the more competitive elections to the 
USSR Congress of People’s Deputies for various reasons including a patriarchal attitude 
among Soviet voters, a decline in women’s free time and the need for this commodity in 
order to conduct an active campaign, men’s unwillingness to undertake domestic
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responsibilities when women were campaigning, and a lack of support from the Soviet 
Women’s Committee in constituencies. At this time Soviet voters elected 352 women (15.7 
per cent). However, half o f  all women deputies were elected through the largely 
uncompetitive social organisation seats set aside for all-union organisations such as the 
CPSU, Komsomol, Trade Union organizations and the Soviet Women’s Committee. These 
deputies were not elected by Soviet voters, but by delegates to all-union meetings and 
conferences and congresses. Public organisation seats were eliminated from national 
legislation in 1989 and most republics (with the exception of Belorussia and Kazakhstan) 
excluded these provisions from their electoral legislation for the campaigns to their 
legislatures in 1990. As a result there were fewer women elected to republican level 
parliaments. Darrell Slider has noted that in no instances did women exceed 12 per cent of 
republican people’s deputies.^ Indeed, in Russia only 5.3 per cent of its 1,068 deputies were 
women. ^
Women’s representation in the Russian parliament increased slightly after the 1993 
elections’ however, the composition of the State Duma remained overwhelmingly male (see 
Table 2). Among the 444 deputies elected to the State Duma there were 385 men (86.7 per 
cent) and 59 were women (13.3 per cent). List deputies consisted of 192 men (85.3 per 
cent) and 33 women (14.7 per cent). Russian voters elected 193 men (8 8 .1 per cent) and 26 
women (11.9 per cent) in the single seat constituencies. Russians elected 9 women senators 
(5.3 per cent) to the Federation Council. Perhaps the most notable means for promoting 
women’s representation in these elections was the formation of the Women of RussiaCziiK)
movement in late 1993. ZhR fused the Union of Women of Russia (successor to the Soviet
A
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Women’s Committee), Union of Women Entrepreneurs of Russia and Union of Women of
A A
the Navy. The movement united several thousand women and several hundred local 
organisations which helped to promote their candidates. In addition, the movement was able 
to draw upon the support bases of the former Soviet Women’s Committees networks: 
Committee organisations had been established in just about every city throughout the former 
USSR. Moreover, the movement had the widest possible potential base of support-Russian 
women. According to the last set of Soviet official statistics there were 78,797,000 women 
in the RSFSR and they comprised about 53 per cent of the republic’s population.^ In 
addition, the movement, while absconding the promotion of a clearly ‘engendered’ political 
programme, did have the appeal of an entire segment of the population. This is a factor that 
the other parties and blocs may not have been able to create in the few weeks before the 
election. Another factor which may have helped increase women’s representation was the 
fact that there were some outstanding women politicians who emerged in Russia during the 
late-Soviet and inunediate post-Soviet periods. For instance, from 1991 until shortly after 
the 1993 elections Ella Pamfilova, a long-standing democrat, had been the RSFSR’s Minister 
of Social Protection for the Population.® Moreover, among parliamentary circles, Irina 
Vinogradova was the chairwoman of the Free Russia Deputies’ fraction, was a deputy 
chairwoman of one of the largest political parties (before September-October 1993), the 
People’s Party of Free Russia^and a member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet’s Committee on 
Science and National Education.^ However, it must be noted that she failed to win election 
to the Duma as a contestant on BRNI’s list and although she was the number 1 candidate (of 
six) on that electoral association’s Novosibirsk regional sheet, she had a rather 
inconsequential position on their all-federal list, no. 49.^° Nevertheless, the examples of 
Pamfilova and Vinogradova suggest that women politicians may have gained some degree of
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credibility during the post-Soviet period, in stark contrast to the ‘dragon ladies’ who occupied 
party and state positions during the stagnation period. Another factor which may have 
influenced the sex breakdown of the parliament was the fact that men were clearly preferred 
to women as candidates. The associates of the political-psychology faculty of St Petersburg 
University conducted a poll of the population’s conceptions of the ideal leader’s qualities on 
the streets of Moscow, St Petersburg and Yaroslavl’ (which may not be entirely indicative 
of Russian public opinion on the subject) in early December 1993. Their findings noted that 
46 per cent of their respondents felt that men would make the best leaders, while only 7 per 
cent felt the same about women. However, leading ZhR official Alevtina Fedulova cited 
other opinion poll data which suggested that 46 per cent of the electorate was willing to vote 
for women while only two per cent would under no circumstances circumstances vote for 
them.^ ^
Election According to Political Affiliation
As stated earlier, one of the most significant achievements of the 1993 elections was the fact 
that it was the first time since 1917 that Russians voted in multiparty elections. Precise 
electoral association representation in the Federal Assembly has been illustrated and discussed 
in this dissertation’s chapter on the 1993 election campaign. Table 7.3 illustrates the wide 
political spectrum represented in the first Federal Assembly. Nevertheless, there are some 
features of the corps of deputies and the political organisations and blocs elected to the Duma 
which seem somewhat strange. For instance, it seems quite ironic that despite the fact that 
these were Russia’s first post-Soviet multiparty elections and that there were representatives 
of many political organisations who participated in them-eight securing seats through party
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lists-there was a large number of independent deputies who also won seats through these lists. 
Table 3 indicates that 314 members of the Russian parliament (51 per cent of all deputies) 
elected to the Federal Assembly did not belong to any political organisation. Included 
among the 225 deputies elected on an all-Federal level through the lists, 6^(30.6  per cent) 
did not belong to any political party or organization. It is also worthy to note that there were 
two deputies who were elected to the LDPR’s party list from other parties. This included 
one member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and a member of the Party 
of Social Justice.
Table 7.4 contains the breakdown of non-party deputies elected through party list seats. 
It is significant to note that the distribution of seats in the Federal Assembly’s chambers and 
the number of non-party candidates reveals characteristics about the state of affairs of parties 
and political organisations at the time of the elections. As numerous commentators have 
noted, only the KPRF could have been considered to be a true political party and the one 
with the highest degree of support nation-wide. While the LDPR may have won the highest 
number of seats through the list component of the vote, nearly 41 per cent of its deputies 
elected in that manner were not members of that party. Indeed this is ironic given that the 
party boasts that it is one of the most organised parties with large membership reserves. 
This factor is discussed in greater detail in this chapter’s section on centre- vs. periphery- 
based politicians elected to the Federal Assembly. The KPRF had the most party members 
elected to both houses-although in the upper chamber, political party representation is at best 
of marginal significance. Therefore, the arguments put forward by Stephen Sestanovich cited 
in this dissertation’s chapter on the 1993 elections interpreting the vote as the Russian 
population’s rejection of Communist rule stand on , shaky grounds indeed. However,
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Terry Clark’s interpretation that the combined support the KPRF and APR, two neo­
communist formations, garnerd at the elections is clearly more important for the
rinterpretation of post-Soviet politics in Russia: there were clealy established groups which 
identified with their policies and this made them influential; their organisational structures 
made them powerful political contenders.
Table 7.3 Comprehesive List of All Political and Social Organisations Represented 
in the Federal Assembly According to Chamber
Political Organisation DL DD All FC FA
KPRF 30 16 46 11 57
VR 22 18 40 6 46
LDPR 33 5 38 0 38
APR 16 12 28 1 29
DR 9 7 16 1 17
PRES 14 1 15 1 16
ZhR 11 2 13 0 13
DPR 9 1 10 0 10
RPRF 5 2 7 0 7
RDDR 0 4 4 1 5
Renewal 0 2 2 1 3
SPT 0 1 1 1 2
SDPRF 1 1 2 0 2
KPR 0 1 1 1 2
RKhDS-ND 1 1 2 0 2
DIM 0 2 2 0 2
PES 0 2 2 0 2
Senezhskii Forum 1 0 1 1 2
NRPR 0 1 1 0 1
NPRF 0 1 1 0 1
PT 0 0 1 1
KDP-PNS 0 0 1 1
Marii Ushem 0 1 1 0 1
RES 0 1 1 0 1
RTS 0 1 1 0 1
ROS 0 1 1 0 1
RNA 0 1 1 0 1
EZNR 1 0 1 0 1
GS 0 1 1 0 1
DI 1 0 1 0 1
PSS 1 0 1 0 1
SvDPRF 0 1 1 0 1
Yabloko 0 1 1 0 1
SKK 0 0 1 1
SS 0 1 1 0 1
RPST 0 1 1 0 1
Independents 69 129 198 143 341
Unknown 1 0 1 0 1
Total 225 219 444 171 615
^  Voi- <x UsV o4- $ 0 2 -fba.eL/'cdcL 0 & i  
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Table 7.4 Non-Party Deputies Elected As Party List Deputies
Electoral Non-Party Non-Party
Association All (N) (%)
APR 21 5 23.8
DPR 14 5 35.7
KPRF 32 3 9.4
LDPR 59 21 40.7
PRES 18 4 22.2
ZhR 21 10 47.6
VR 40 6 15
Yabloko 20 15 75
Total 225 69 30.7
Another factor to consider in relation to party affiliations is the extent to which there 
were sex differences in the party lists and, moreover, the extent of sex differences in political 
affiliations. The present author’s findings indicate that men were most prominent among all 
parliamentarians in the categories of belonging to a political organisation and as independent 
deputies. Nevertheless, within party lists women were only slightly more likely to have 
beeen members of some type of political organisation (18 who belonged to organisations vs. 
15 independents). Table 7.5 contains a breakdown of the number of women elected to the 
party lists of the eight electoral coalitions.
Table 7.5 List Deputies Elected According to Sex
Electoral Men Men Women Women
Association All (N) (%) (N) (%)
APR 21 21 100 0 0
DPR 14 14 100 0 0
KPRF 32 29 90.6 3 9.4
LDPR 59 54 91.5 5 8.5
PRES 18 18 100 0 0
VR 40 38 95 2 5
Yabloko 20 18 90 2 10
ZhR 21 0 0 21 100
Total 225 192 85.3 33 14.7
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As the data illustrate, women’s representation in the party list seats was overwhelmingly 
supported by the inclusion of the Women of Russia bloc who accounted for 63.6 per cent of 
all women elected through this section of the poll. It is also significant to note that three 
electoral associations-the Agrarian Party of Russia, Democratic Party of Russia and Party of 
Russian Unity and Accord-all had men elected to their party list seats. Also, with the 
exception of Women of Russia, no electoral organisation had women comprising more 
than 10 per cent of its list deputies. Another factor to consider, in light of the fact that there 
were many non-politically affiliated deputies elected to list seat^ is whether the women who 
occupied these seats were predominantly members or independents. As stated earlier, 
Women of Russia’s list comprised 11 deputies who belonged to the organization. Among 
the other blocs, most of the women who were elected belonged to some type of political 
organisation. However, Yabloko’s two women deputies were independents. In addition, 
although Ella Pamfilova was the number three candidate on VR’s national list, she was listed 
as a non-party deputy. All women elected to the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation’s list belonged to the KPRF. Russia’s Choice’s other women deputies, Bela 
Denisenko and Ol’ga Zastrozhnaya were members of Democratic Russia and Russia’s Choice 
respectively. In addition, three of five of the women deputies^, . the LDPR’s list were party 
members.
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Table 7,6 Distribution of Women Party List Candidates
Political Women Women
Ogranisation Candidates (N) (%)
ZhR 36 36 100.0
KEDR 44 9 20.5
Yabloko 172 34 19.8
KRPF 151 16 10.6
RDDR 153 13 8.5
VR 211 16 7.6
BRNI 95 7 7.4
DPR 167 11 6.6
LDPR 147 9 6.1
DiM 58 3 5.2
APR 145 7 4.8
PRES 196 7 3.6
GS 184 6 3.3
Total 1759 174 9.9
Another factor to consider pertaining to the combination of factors regarding sex and 
political affiliation regards the place of women on the party lists. Party lists were drawn up 
in order to ensure that the (theoretically) strongest candidates would get seats in the Duma 
if they failed to win in constituencies. Therefore, it is possible to postulate that if a 
candidate was placed higher on an electoral association's list he or she was valued very much 
by that bloc and was considered to have a high degree of political capital. Conversely, it 
could be argued that a lower ranking on the list could be equated with a candidate having less 
potential appeal to the electorate. Nevertheless there are a few ways in which the political 
value the parties and blocs placed upon women can be analyzed. First, it is possible for 
analysts to consider them important if electoral associations ranked women among their three 
leading candidates on the national lists. Second, their places in the order on the lists 
themselves may serve as an (imperfect) indicator to how highly electoral blocs valued women 
candidates.
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It will be recalled that 13 electoral associations competed for seats in the State Duma 
by putting forward all-federal lists. The ballot paper for the all-federal constituency 
contained the names of the three leading candidates. In some cases-the Agrarian Party of 
Russia, Yabloko, Future of Russia-New Names, Russia’s Choice, Civic Union in the Name 
of Stability, Justice and Progress and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord-the electoral 
associations established regional lists on the ballot paper which included the three leading 
contestants for a particular area. Among the thirteen national lists, therefore, there were 39 
spots for the leading candidates. Excluding Women of Russia’s three leading candidates, 
respectively Alevtina Fedulova, Yekaterina Lakhova and Natal’ya Gundareva, there were 
only two other women who were among any bloc’s top three spots. This included Russia’s 
Choice candidate Ella Pamfilova who occupied the number three spot on the list (who, 
nevertheless won a seat in a constituency) and Lyubov’ Lymar’ who was the leading 
candidate for the Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia (KEDR) which failed to clear 
the five per cent threshold to win seats in the Duma. Thus, women occupied 12.8 per cent 
of the spots on the all-Federal lists of candidates. Women were not represented much more 
significantly as key figures of the Moscow regional lists which also appeared on the ballot 
paper. Among 18 spots available, 3 were occupied by women (16.7 per cent). Shamisyat 
Muradova occupied the number two spot on the Agrarian Party of Russia’s Moscow list, 
Galina Bodrenkova was the number three candidate of Yabloko’s Moscow regional group and 
Svetlana Savitskaya headed Civic Union’s Moscow regional candidates. Future of Russia- 
New Names, Russia’s Choice and the Russian Party of Unity and Accord had all-male 
Moscow regional lists.
The place of men and women on the deputy lists could possibly give some type of
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indication of how the electoral associations felt their women candidates were in their overall 
ranking. Indeed the data suggests that women may have been considered marginally effective 
by their blocs. Table 7.6 indicates the women constituted slightly less than 10 per cent of 
all list candidates. Moreover, men generally occupied much higher spots on the lists than 
did their women counterparts. It has already been noted that Lyubov’ Lymar’ headed 
KEDR’s 44 candidate all-federal list. The other women who stood on KEDR’s list (and their 
places on the list) included Irina Kaminskaya (11), 01’ga Babkina (22), Galina Kuchina (23), 
Natal’ya Ivanova (25), Valentina Farafanova (29), Irina Likacheva (38), Lyudmila Boyarina 
(39) and Svetlana Sutulova ( 4 2 ) . The LDPR fielded 147 candidates on its national list 
and contested 66 constituencies. Most of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia’s list 
candidates were men (138 or 93.1 per cent) and only 4 of its candidates who contested seats 
in constituencies were women (6.1 per cent). None of the women, however, were victorious 
in the districts. Among the bloc’s candidates, men certainly had prominent positions on the 
all-federal list. The first 30 spots were entirely filled by men. Women occupied spots 
numbers 31, 32, 49, 50, 56, 64, 87, 89 and 105. However, it is notable to point out that 
two thirds of the women were included among the top half of the list. This certainly is 
reflected in the electoral association’s Duma composition. More than half of all the women 
who stood for the bloc were elected. It should be noted that Vladimir Zhirinovskii, the 
party’s chair, who held the bloc’s number one position, was elected in the Shchelkovo district 
of Moscow oblast\ Therefore, all the women moved up one more place as a result of his 
e l e c t i o n . T h e  APR’s 9 women occupied spots 70, 77, 96, 97, 110, 131 and 134.^® 
Civic Union’s 6 women candidates fared somewhat better. Three occupied tlie top twenty 
spots on the list (Yelna Vol’demarova, 5; Tat’yana Novikova, 10 and Valentina Kabanova, 
20) while others occupied positions 80, 93 and 163.^  ^ DiM’s women candidates occupied
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spots 11, 38 and 45/® Place numbers 20, 31, 56, 65, 68, 103, 129, 131, 138, 148, 150, 
152 and 153 were occupied by women candidates on RDDR’s 153 candidate list/^ KPRF’s 
women candidates held spots 4, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 43, 54, 55, 62, 63, 82, 89, 95, 109 and 
139/® Women who stood for BRNI were placed in positions 19, 49, 58, 63, 64, 74 and 
84/^ PRES’s women candidates occupied places 60, 66, 72, 135, 147, 167 and 180/^ 
Women on DPR’s list held spots 9, 20, 29, 42, 59, 83, 84, 122, 137, 163 and 164/^ 
Positions 3, 38, 41, 44, 79, 80, 93, 98, 99, 127, 139, 151, 161, 181, 187 and 201 were held 
by VR’s women candidates/"^
Altogether, Yabloko fielded 172 candidates. However, the bloc put forward a 34 
candidate all-federal list and regional lists comprised of the remaining 138 aspirants. The 
three women who were on the all-federal list included Tat’yana Yarigina (8), Oksana 
Dmitrieva (19) and leading feminist activist Anastasiya Posadskaya (33). An additional 31 
women held positions on the bloc’s regional lists.
The inclusion of certain electoral bloc^regional lists and women’s position on them 
certainly sheds doubt on the proposition that they were viewed as candidates with less 
electoral appeal or political capital than men. The places of Irina Vinogradova (BRNI), 
Svetlana Savitskaya (GS) and Shamisyat Muradova (APR) have already been discussed and 
support this position. In addition, it should be noted that APR candidates Valentina Luneva 
(sole candidate), Valentina Anosova, Nina Kovaleva (sole candidate) and Tamara Tokareva 
(sole candidate) led the party’s regional lists in Kursk, Smolensky Perm’ and Sverdlovsk 
oblast^ respectively. Tat’yana Rozanova led GS’s Kaluga regional list. In addition to 
Vinogradova, five other women led regional lists for BRNI. These included Vera
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Skorobogatova (Republic of Komi), Lyudmila Orlova (sole candidate, Orel oblast'), Natal’ya 
Serdyukova (sole candidate, Rostov oblast'), Yelena Bunyashina (sole candidate, Ryazan 
oblast') and Marina Poddubnaya (sole candidate, Chelyabinsk oblast’), Larisa Nozhdina 
(Orenburg oblast'), Bela Denisenko (Kemerovo oblast') and Alla Baydasarova (sole 
candidate, U l’yanovsk oblast') led VR’s regional lists. Tat’yana Latysheva (Belgorod and 
Kursk oblasty) and Galina Bodrenkova (sole, Kemerovo oblast') headed Yabloko’s regional 
lists.
The argument present above certainly indicates that electoral organisations were more 
likely to place men in the top positions in their all-federal lists. However, women were 
occasionally leading candidates on several parties’ and blocs’ . regional lists. Moreover, 
the fact that many were placed in much lower positions on the federal lists may not be 
enough evidence to conclude that the electoral associations valued their potentials as 
candidates less than men. Indeed, the blocs had to target these regions and constituencies 
with their strongest candidates. Some women (and indeed it is possible to include the same 
line of argument for some men) may have been placed lower on the party lists because they 
may have had the potential to win in a particular area. Perhaps it may be possible to note
that the electoral associations may have not had a wealth of women politicians of national
Are: nowni from which to choose their candidates. However, at local and regional levels, 
women may have been potentially stronger players and the electoral associations sought to 
exploit these favourable qualities on their ‘home turf’.
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Election According to Education
Table 7.7 Federal Assembly Members’ Educational Attainment
Education DL DL DD DD Total Total FC FC FA FA
Level (N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%)
Higher
Incomplete
212 94.2 207 94.5 419 94.4 169 98.8 588 95.6
Higher
General
2 0.9 3 1.4 5 1.1 2 1.2 7 1.1
Secondary
Vocational
4 1.8 5 2.3 9 2.0 0 0 9 1.5
Secondary 7 3.1 4 1.8 11 2.5 0 0 11 1.8
Total 225 100 219 100 444 100 171 100 615 100
Traditionally, Soviet elected organs included a large number of deputies who had received 
only secondary levels of education. However, with the onset of electoral reform measures 
in 1989, this situation drastically decreased. For instance, in 1984, 685 deputies (45.7 per 
cent) did not pursue tertiary education.^® By contrast in 1989 Soviet voters elected 547 
deputies with secondary education, including general, specialist and incomplete secondary 
education (24.3 per cent) and 1,702 with higher education-encompassing those who did not 
complete courses, completed tertiary education or achieved a postgraduate degree or 
possessed an academic t i t l e . I n  addition, despite its conservatism, the Russian Congress 
of People’s Deputies could be considered to have been staffed by highly educated politicians. 
For instance, Gregory J. Embree has stated that in the 1990 contest the intellegentsia won 
6 6  per cent of the seats from urban constituencies and in 50 per cent of the rural districts 
Table 7.7 contains the distribution of deputies in the Duma according to their level of
educational attainment. As the data indicate, the corpus is overwhelmingly com p^ed  of
1 0  f
deputies who are either enroled in, completed or participated in at least some tertiaryn A
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education. Among the 444 deputies elected in December 1993, 424 (95.5 per cent) fell into 
this category. In addition there were few differences in this category between deputies
elected in the constituencies or deputies who won their seats through party lists. It should
©also be noted that the majority of the candidates for all electral associations had pursued someA
form of higher education. However, among the 20 deputies in the Duma who had only 
secondary education nearly one third were elected from the LDPR^^ and a fifth were KPRF 
deputies. These electoral associations were supported by individuals in demographic groups 
who had attained similar levels of education: i.e ., young manual workers in state enterprises 
and the elderly.
There are major reasons why parliamentary deputies' educational levels are important 
for the development of democratic values and competent political performance in Russia. 
First, the increase in deputies may lead to a greater professionalization of the institution and 
may therefore have some type of impact on increasing the level of political participation 
among its deputies. Moreover, the increase in educated deputies, in theory, provides a 
corps of deputies who may be potentially more effective in solving the complex problems 
currently facing Russia. Second, Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. has pointed to the work of scholars 
James L. Gibson and Raymond M. Duch and their ideas on the importance of education in 
the promotion of democratic values in Russian society. Gibson and Duch note that 
‘individuals with higher education are more likely to be exposed to and socialized into 
accepting officially sanctioned norms promoting democratic values’; ‘education may 
inherently instill or reinforce liberal values such as equality, tolerance, and respect for 
individual liberties’ and ‘education contributes to support for democatic norms, 
regardless of formal system n o r m s . A l t h o u g h  the team was referring predominantly to
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the population at large with these statements, it does not seem inconsistent if this logic is 
applied to parliamentarians. The high level of education deputies-even from among the 
opposition ranks-may not greatly influence a continued pattern of economic refonn. Indeed 
the political programmes of the parties from which the opposition deputies were elected 
seriously . ... against market orientations. As the next chapter illustrates there were very
high levels of tension apparent between the executive and legislative branches of government 
during 1993-1995. However, the education level of the deputies may help contribute to an 
acceptance of the ‘rules of the game’ or the manner in which decisions in the political arena 
are adopted and implemented. Moreover, it has been noted, in respect to the opposition, that 
the relative government defeat in the 1993 elections ‘made the opposition accept the fairness 
of the election and may thus have helped to entrench the democratic system in Russia’s 
developing political c u l t u r e . T h e r e f o r e ,  a more highly educated corps of deputies and 
a growing political culture in Russia may help contribute to a more stable political system 
in the immediate future.
Generational Changes in the Deputy Corpus
As discussed in earlier chapters, Soviet elected organs generally contained greater numbers 
of deputies older than retirement age and younger than thirty than their Western counterparts 
did. It will also be recalled that despite their incorporation in the Supreme Soviet, these 
deputies did not possess great political power within the institution. This can be illustrated 
Ronald Hill’s proposition that power was equated to an individual’s chance to be re­
elected: these social groups were less likely to be re-elected than deputies in their forties and 
fifties. However, after the election to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, the age
340
structure of the deputies was altered and was comprised of more middle-aged deputies. The 
average age of the deputies was 47,8 years.
Table 7.8a. Age Distribution of Federal Assembly According to Age Group (N)
State Duma Federation Federal
Age Group List Districts Total Council Assembly
30 and younger 14 12 26 3 29
31-40 42 62 104 24 128
41-50 87 93 ISO 75 255
51-60 58 48 106 63 169
61 and older 24 4 28 6 34
Total 225 219 444 171 615
Table 7.8b. Age Distribution of Federal Assembly According to Age Group (%)
State Duma Federation Federal
Age Group List Districts Total Council Assembly
30 and younger 6.2 5.5 5.9 1.8 4.7
31-40 18.7 28.3 23.4 14.0 20.8
41-50 38.7 42.5 40.5 43.9 41.5
51-60 25.8 21.9 23.9 36.8 27.5
61 and older 10.7 1.8 6.3 3.5 5.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Table 7.8c. Age Distributions of Party List Deputies by Electoral Association (%)
Age Group APR DPR KPRF LDPR PRES VR YAB ZhR
30 and under 4.8 7.1 3.1 8.5 0 7.5 15 0
31-40 0 21.4 3.1 25.4 44.4 20 20 14.3
41-50 23.8 57.1 56.3 33.9 27.9 25 40 61.9
51-60 57.1 7.1 21.9 22 16.7 35 15 23.8
61 and older 14.3 7.1 15.6 10.1 11.1 12.5 10 0
Average age
(years) 52.4 44.2 50.1 44.5 45.9 48.6 44.7 45.4
Tables 7.8a-7.8c contain data on the age levels of the deputies elected according to age 
group in the Federal Assembly and the age breakdowns of the party list deputies. The age 
composition of the Parliament is indeed consistent with its predecessors: its corpus is
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generally middle-aged. The bulk of the list deputies were between 41 and 50 years of age 
(87 or 38.7 per cent) and the average age of all list deputies was about 47 years old. It has 
been noted earlier that the average age for Senators was slightly younger than 48 years old. 
As Table 8 c indicates, three blocs, the Agrarian Party of Russia, Russia’s Choice and the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation^had average ages which exceeded the norm for 
the Parliament. By contrast, the remaining blocs had average ages between 44 and 46 years.
Election According to Nationality
As Table 7.9 indicates Federal Assembly politicians were overwhelmingly ethnic Russians. 
Overall, some 366 Duma deputies are ethnic Russians (82.4 per cent). This figure is slightly 
less than the Russian share of the population of the Russian Federation (approximately 85 per 
cent). Among the party list deputies, 83.6 per cent were ethnic Russians. Not surprisingly 
there are slighlty higher representations of non-Russians elected from constituencies and the 
Federation Council, seats which were to reflect regional interests, and in some cases, those 
republics with a titular nationality. Of the 219 deputies winning constituency seats, 41 (18.7 
per cent) are non-Russians. Forty senators were not Russians (23.3 per cent).
Table 7.10 contains a breakdown of the national composition of list deputies elected to 
the Duma. In total, 15 nationalities are represented in the national lists. Following the 188 
Russians there are 5 Belarusian and Jewish representatives, 3 Armenians and 2 Avars. There 
were single representatives from the Adygei, Bashkir, Cherkessian, Chuvash, Georgian, 
Greek, Komi, Lak and Tatar nations elected in this manner. Nevertheless, as the data 
indicate, the Democratic Party of Russia is the only electoral organisation completely
342
represented by Russians.
Table 7.9 Distribution of Federal Assembly Deputies According to Nationality
State Duma Federation Federal
Nationality List District Total Council Assembly
Russians 188 178 366 131 497
Ukrainians 13 9 22 3 25
Belarusians 5 2 7 1 8
Jews 5 2 7 1 8
Germans 0 3 3 3 6
Buryats 0 2 2 4 6
Bashkirs 1 3 4 1 5
Armenians 3 1 4 0 4
Osetins 0 2 2 2 4
Avars 2 1 3 1 4
Komi 1 1 2 1 3
Tuvinians 0 1 1 2 3
Cliuvashi 1 0 1 2 3
Kabards 0 1 1 1 2
Dagrintsis 0 1 1 1 2
Tatars 1 1 2 0 2
Ingushi 0 0 0 2 2
Karelians 0 0 0 2 2
Yakuts 0 1 1 1 2
Adygeians 1 0 1 1 2
Koryaks 0 1 1 1 2
Kalmyks 0 1 1 1 2
Karachais 0 1 1 1 2
Mariis 0 1 1 1 2
Chukchi 0 0 0 1 1
Allais 0 0 0 1 1
Balkars 0 0 0 1 1
Nanais 0 0 0 1 1
Khakasians 0 0 0 1 1
Kazaklis 0 0 0 1 1
Mordovians 0 0 0 1 1
Laks 1 0 1 0 1
Udmurts 0 1 1 0 1
Latvians 0 1 1 0 1
Permyaks 0 1 1 0 1
Evenki 0 1 1 0 1
Koreans 0 1 1 0 1
Georgians 1 0 1 0 1
Greeks 1 0 1 0 1
Cherkessians 1 0 1 0 1
Khanty 0 1 1 0 1




Table 7.10 National Composition of List Deputies
Electoral
Association All Russians Others
APR 21 16 5
DPR 14 14 0
KPRF 32 25 7
LDPR 59 51 8
PRES 18 13 5
VR 40 34 6
Yabloko 20 16 4
ZhR 21 19 2
Election According to Occupation
Previously, deputies elected to Soviet representative organs fell under three major categories: 
elite, needed and fillers. Elite deputies, which comprised about 5 per cent of the deputies 
were usually recruited from the ranks of party and state officials. The ‘needed’, who 
constituted about 20-30 per cent of the deputy corpus.^included specialists whose skills were 
necessary to assist the elite in decision-making. The remaining deputies were the ‘fillers’
Awho were workers and collective farmers who achieved re nown for their workplace 
Uendeavors or for their unswerving loyalty to party directives. In short, the people who K
comprised the ranks of state and party officials were most likely to be re-elected and carry 
the most weight in deliberations and policy making within the representative organ. The 
needed were occasionally re-elected while the fillers were selected to pay Up service to the 
party’s commitment of representing different social strata in governing bodies and to keep 
alive the party’s commitment to make the Soviets ‘schools of administration’ in which the 
average working person would be able to participate in extra-curricular political activities. 
The latter had very little influence over policy-making and were rarely re-elected.
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Deputy Prime Ministers & First 
Deputy Prime Ministers 
Ministers, Deputy Ministers & First 
Deputy Ministers









Prime Ministers, Deputy Prime 
Ministers & First Deputy Prime Ministers 
Ministers, Deputy Ministers &
First Deputy Ministers
Other Subject Government Officials
Chairs of Subject Legislatures, Deputy
& First Deputy Chairs
Other Subject Legislature Officials
Other Officials from Subject Executive,
Legislative & Judiciary Organs
Subject Administration 
Including:
Administrators and their Deputies 
Other Subject Administration Officials
Local Executive, Legislative & Judicial
Officials
Including:
Mayors and Deputy Mayors
Chairs of Legislatures & their Deputies
Other Local Legislative Officials
Chairs of Local Judiciaries & their Deputies
Local Administration 
Including:
Administrators & their Deputies 
Other Local Administration Officials 
Total
>L DD All FC FA
8 5 6.3 6 6
2 0 1.1 1 1
3 2 2.7 3 3
3 2 2.5 2 2
7 4 5.6 2 5
7 3 4.7 0 3
0 1 0.9 2 1
2 8 5 25 11
0 0 0 4 1
0 1 0.7 6 2
0 1 0.7 1 1
0 1 0.5 1 1
0 1 0.2 12 4
1 3 1.8 1 2
0 2 1.1 1 1
2 7 4.5 28 11
1 2 1.4 25 8
1 5 3.2 3 3
1 4 2.3 2 2
0 1 0.5 1 1
0 2 1.4 1 1
0 1 0.2 0 0
0 1 0.2 1 0
0 6 3.2 5 4
0 3 1,6 5 2
0 3 1.6 0 1
20 33 27 68 38
Table 7.11 continued on next page
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D All FC FA
Occupation
Activists and Officials 20.9 5.0 13.1 0.6 9.6
Including:
Political Party Officials 13.3 1.4 15.1 0.6 5.5
Social Organisation Officials 4.4 1.8 3.2 0.0 2.3
Trade Union Officials 3.1 1.8 2.5 0.0 1.8
Management 16.0 28.8 22.3 16.4 20.7
Including:
Agriclutural and Agro-Industry 2.7 6.8 4.7 2.3 4.1
Finance and Banking 3.6 6.4 5.0 0.6 3.7
Industry 6.7 12.8 9.7 10.5 9.9
Media and Communications 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.7
Transportation 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.7
General Directors, Presidents of
Concerns & Funds 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.5
Other Entrepreneurs 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.2
Workers in Science, Culture &
Academic Institutions 30.2 18.7 24.5 7.0 19.7
Including:
Writers & other figures in Arts &
Culture 2.7 0.9 1.8 0.0 1.3
Editors of Newspapers and Journals 2.2 0.9 1.6 1.2 1.5
Journalists (all media) 0.4 2.3 1.4 0.0 1.0
Researchers in Non-University
Institutions and Centres 14.7 5.5 10.1 0.6 11.1
University Rectors and Presidents 0.9 0.9 0.9 2.9 1.5
University Deans 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.3
University Heads of Faculty 3.6 2.3 2.9 0.6 2.3
University Professors 3.1 0.5 1.8 0.6 1.5
University Dotsents 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.3
University Lecturers 0.4 1.4 0.9 0.0 0.7
Directors of Secondary Schools 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.3
Secondary School Teachers 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.7
Scientific Workers 1.8 0.9 1.4 0.0 1.0
Military and Law Enforcement Officials 0.4 3.1 1.8 0.6 1.5
Including:
Military 0.4 2.7 1.6 0.6 1.3
Law Enforcement 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.2
Workers in Health & Legal
Professions 4.0 4.6 4.3 2.3 3.7
Including:
Health 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.5
Legal 2.2 3.2 2.7 1.2 2.3
Manual Workers 1.8 0.5 1.1 0.0 0.8
Including:
Agriculture & Agro-Industry 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
Industry 1.3 0.5 0.9 0.0 0.7
Citizens Receiving State Benefits &
Stipends 4.9 4.1 4.5 4.7 4.6
Including:
Students 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.3
Pensioners 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.5
Unemployed 3.6 3.2 3.4 4.7 3.7
Other 1.8 1.4 1.6 0.0 1.1
Total 80.0 66.2 73.2 31.6 61.6
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As stated earlier, the results of the Gorbachev years brought forth deputies who were 
more technically competent. In addition, there were still large numbers of state and party 
functionaries who were elected to USSR Congress of People’s Deputies and the RSFSR 
Congress of People’s Deputies. However, these elections produced more middle- and lower- 
ranking officials into parliament while the percentage of higher level officials declined. 
Industrial and agricultural managers also had their representations increased as results of the 
more competitive conditions.
Table 7.11 contains data on the occupational composition of the Federal Assembly 
Russians elected in 1993, These data indicate that Russians elected a corps of white-collar 
deputies: the percentage of manual workers was less than 1 per cent. Nevertheless, the 
‘independence’ of the Parliament is a particular stumbling bloc. On the one hand, 
approximately 44 per cent of the Parliament consisted of managers from all sectors of the 
economy, health care and legal professionals, and those in the scientific and creative 
intelligentsia. However, the largest share of the parliamentarians were professional 
politicians. Moreover, within this group, the greatest percentage were linked to the state 
governing structures system (236 or 38.4 per cent). Well over one in four Duma deputies 
were state politicians. This included approximately one in 5 list deputies and one third of 
constituency deputies. Slightly fewer than seven in ten Senators belonged to the same 
occupation groups. The greatest share of state-affiliated list deputies were from the ranks 
of federal officials (8  per cent) and were followed by representatives of the presidential 
administration (7.1 per cent). By contrast, there were fewer politicians elected who worked 
at the subject and local levels of Russian politics. Only 2.2 per cent of the list deputies
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worked in subject administrations, 1 .8  per cent were executive and legislative officials from 
Russia’s subjects and less than one per cent worked at the local levels. Therefore, these 
individuals were clearly recmited from occupation slots with some form of national 
significance.
Conversely, state-affiliated constituency deputies tended to be recruited more frequently 
from subject or local organs of power. For instance, 8.2 per cent of these deputies were 
executive and legislative officials from Russia’s subjects, 6 . 8  per cent belonged to the ranks 
of subject administration officials-however, it should be noted that they were more likely to 
be workers in these administrations; 11 of 15 had these qualities, 6.4 per cent worked in 
local administration and 3.7 per cent were drawn from local executive, legislative and 
judicial organs. There were fewer constituency deputies elected who worked for the federal 
government or presidential administration-respectively 4.6 per cent and 4.1 per cent.
According to the Russian Federation’s Constitution, the Federal Assembly is to be 
comprised of the heads of the executive and legislative organs of Russia’s s u b j e c t s T h e s e  
data reflect that 53.2 per cent of the Senators had these characteristics. Slightly more than 
28 per cent of the upper house’s members were linked to the subject administrations. 
However, in contrast to their counterparts in the lower house, the overwhelming majority 
who worked at this level were either administrators or their deputies. In addition, more than 
one quarter of the senators were heads of the subjects’ executive and legislative bodies. 
Managers accounted for 16.4 per cent of the chamber, a figure nearly 6  per cent less than 
the Duma’s composition. Members of the intelligentsia, health and legal professions 
composed 28.8 per cent of the Duma but only 9.3 per cent of the Federal Assembly. In
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addition, Russians did not elect any manual labourers as their Senators. It is ironic, 
however, that there is a slightly higher percentage of recipients of state assistance in the 
Federation Council than in Duma.
Some important findings need to be highlighted. First, as stated in this chapter’s 
introduction^one of the present author’s primary objectives in this analysis is to determine 
the differences in the ‘parking orbits’ between the list and constituency deputies. The former 
would be individuals with whom the average voter would have come into contact less 
frequently than a constituency deputy. The data indicate that the Russian lower house 
elected in 1993 was generally composed of deputies who fit that pattern. Political and social 
activists formed the largest share of all list deputies elected-approximately 21 per cent. Only 
5 per cent of constituency deputies fell under this category. However, managers from all 
sectors of the economy formed the largest share of constituency deputies elected from 
constituency seats. Among them, industrial managers comprised the largest group-12.8  per 
cent. It should also be noted that there were more than one and a half times more workers 
in science, culture and academic institutions elected from the lists than in the constituencies 
(30.2 per cent vs 18.7 per cent). Citizens receiving state benefits and stipends were more 
likely to have been elected through party lists than in constituencies. Some of them included 
former high ranking political figures. Therefore, these data reflect the occupational trends 
recorded by Rona-Tas. When roll-call voting data become more widely available, it will 
be useful to see if list deputies were more likely to vote along party lines than their 
constituency colleagues.
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Centre vj". Periphery Deputies
Among the most acute problems currently facing the Russian Federation is the conflict 
between the central administration in Moscow and the powers of the regions and subjects in 
the country. One of the means in which this is manifested is in the composition of deputies. 
In this light, this section is a comparison of the composition of deputies elected to the Duma 
who were based in large metropolitan areas of the country against those who were resident 
or work-in the peripheral areas or in the subjects. Also, it is necessary to determine if there 
were differences between the deputies who were elected through the lists and the constituency 
deputies.
Overall, the Duma consisted of 171 deputies who worked or resided in Moscow (38.5
per cent of all deputies). Nevertheless, there seems to be a major discrepency between the
deputies who were elected to party list seats and those who were elected in the districts: the
former were much more likely to have been based in Moscow than were the latter. Thus,
Russian voters probably felt that the people who lived in their areas were more likely to be
able to address parochial concerns ihan politicians of national signficance living inÀ
M o s c o w . L i s t  deputies could probably be considered to be representatives more of the 
political elite or more of an unbranized, intellegentsia than the average voters. Among the 
list deputies 136 were selected from Moscow (60.4 per cent). However, in the pre-election 
stages, it was certainly more Moscow-focused. Russian journalist Yurii Buida has noted that 
originally the party lists contained more than 70 per cent of its candidates who were from 
Moscow and Moscow oblast’. This factor only served to reinforce an anti-Moscow flavour 
among the Russian e l e c t o r a t e . T h e  majority of Federation Council Senators were from
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the areas they represented. Nevertheless, while Moscow city was allocated two seats in the 
upper house, 13 Senators resided there.
A breakdown of the Moscow-periphery deputies among the list deputies reveals some 
important information about the Russian party system and the composition of the parties in 
general-outside Moscow, most political organisations have little organised support. Half of 
the electoral associations which were represented in the Duma drew their deputies from 
Moscow. Nevertheless, the organisations with a more balanced distribution of deputies seem 
to have been around longer and had greater opportunities to develop some regional support 
bases outside the capital. For instance, less than half of the deputies elected to seats for the 
APR, KPRF, and ZhR were from Moscow. These electoral associations (we may consider 
the APR to be elderly, rural communists) were able to draw upon old CPSU and Communist 
Party of the RSFSR networks and Soviet women’s committee links and their all-Russia 
organisational structures to select their candidates and eventually deputies. Moreover, the 
DPR brought about a third of its deputies from Moscow. Three-quarters of the Yabloko 
deputies are from Moscow, however, a significant portion of them are affiliated with the 
EPItsentr economic and political research centre headed by Grigorii Yavlinskii. Similarly, 
nearly two^hirds of Russia’s Choice deputies were from the Moscow area.
There were two electoral organizations which were surprisingly comprised of 
predominantly Moscow- based deputies, PRES and the LDPR. In the first instance, this 
seems rather ironic because PRES calls itself the party of the regions. Therefore, with 16 
of its 18 deputies (88.9 per cent) coming from Moscow, its self-ascription is generally 
misleading. Nevertheless, it has been noted, that when the party initially entered into the
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electoral campaign it suffered from a lack of strong regional support b a s e s . T h e  fact that 
the LDPR’s deputies were mainly drawn from Moscow is extremely ironic. According to 
several Russian encyclopedias and handbooks on political parties and movements, the LDPR 
has some of the strongest regional organizational structures in the contemporary Russian 
political spectrum. Although various authors claim that the LDPR has its largest centres of 
support in Moscow, St Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Nizhnii Taigil, Smolensk, Belgorod and 
Krasnoyarsk, they also mention that at the end of 1992, the LDPR had 33 city organizations 
including 9 located outside Russia’s borders, and an additional 46 strong centres of support 
including 10 outside Russia. In addition to its legal, regionally-established branches in all 
the other republics of the former USSR, the LDPR maintains illegal party organisations in 
the Baltic States and Ukraine. The party also claims to have established cells in Austria, 
Hungary, Germany (Munich) and F in l and .Moreover ,  like all other electoral associations 
that competed in the December 1993 poll, the LDPR did not contest all constituencies. 
However, they competed in a surprisingly low 66 constituencies (29.3 per cent of all 
districts). Nevertheless, the party ran for seats in every district in Vologda, Kamchatka,
p
Kostroma, Kursk, Orlov, Pskov, Tambov and Yaroslavl’ oblastf and the Koryak autonomous 
district. The LDPR also fielded candidates in half the constituencies in St Petersburg, the 
Republic of Komi, Republic of Udmurtiya, Krasnoyarsk, and Stavropol’ kra ya, Belgorod,
40Vladimir, Voronezh, Ivanovsk, Kirov, Penza, Ryazan and Chita oblastf).
The discrepancy between the amount of deputies elected from the centre and periphery 
was a factor which lasted throughout the term of the Duma. In fact, the 1995 Federal Law 
on the Duma Elections restricted the number of list candidates from Moscow and St 
Petersburg to no more than 30 per cent of the entire list. It was hoped that this would help
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stimulate further the development of parties in the peripheral areas and increase greatly the 
proportion of regional representation in the lower house.
Parliamentary Continuity and Change
a .The data in tables 7.12 and 7.13 indicate that the overwhelming majority of parlimentariansA
elected in 1993 had not served in the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies or Supreme 
Soviet. Overall, 82.1 per cent of the parliamentary corpus fell under this category. This 
figure included 85.1 per cent of Duma Deputies and 74.3 per cent of the Senators. 
Therefore, these elections brought forth two important changes in the patterns of political 
participation and parliamentary elite formation in the Russian Federation. First, the elections 
were a stimulus for many candidates new to the Russian electoral politics to compete for 
seats in the Russian Parliament. For instance, only 83 deputies from the Russian Congress 
of People’s Deputies competed on party lists for seats in the Russian Federal Assembly. 
Second, as the following data will indicate, the elections also brought forward an 
overwhelmingly new corps of deputies selected by the Russian voters directly and indirectly 
(as party list deputies). This number included 30 deputies who were elected from party 
lists (13.3 per cent of list deputies) and 33 (15.1 per cent) who were elected in districts. 
Among the parties and blocs which put forward party lists on election day, the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia alone had no candidates who sat , in the previous
Russian Parliament. By contrast, 12 of Russia’s Choice’s 40 deputies (30 per cent) and one 
third of the Agrarian Party of Russia’s deputies were former representatives.
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Table 7.12 Deputy Re-election, 1990-1993 According to Chamber
Deputies Deputies
Chamber (N) (%)




Federation Council 44 25.7
Total 110 17.9
Table 7.13 Party List Deputies Re-elected 1990-1993 According to Electoral Association
Electoral Re-elected Re-elected
Association All (N) (%)
APR 21 7 33.3
DPR 14 1 7.1
KPRF 32 5 15.6
LDPR 59 0 0.0
PRES 18 1 5.6
VR 40 12 30.0
Yabloko 20 3 15.0
ZhR 21 1 4.8
Total 225 30 13.3
Conclusion
The discussion above demonstrates that Russian voters elected a parliament that contained 
elements of continuity, contradiction and departure from its Soviet predecessors. First, there 
was continuity in the sense that it was predominantly staffed by middle-aged men who had 
achieved higher education. These are attributes that Soviet parliamentarians gained after 
electoral reform measures were implemented under Gorbachev’s leadership. In addition, 
there were greater numbers of managers who were elected to the Federal Assembly. This 
is another factor which had occurred from the late 1980s. It is also significant to note that 
there was a substantial number of state-affiliated politicians who were elected. Perhaps it is 
possible to suggest that in some ways these officials are analogous to some CPSU officials. 
This is particularly true in the instances of federal officials and presidential representatives
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who may have had greater loyalties to other institutions than voters. Deputies elected
through party lists also owed their positions more to their respective electoral associations 
4rO
than the voters. Therefore, the Russian electorate may not have had a parliament that would A
take its views completely into account: its deputies may have had divided interests. In 
addition, this situation seems to be somewhat of a contradiction between democratic rhetoric 
and practice.
Nevertheless, the deputy composition of the Duma is a clear departure from its 
predecessors. There are very low levels of continuity between the Russian Congress and 
Supreme Soviet and the Federal Assembly. However, it is significant to note that there 
existed a greater degree of re-election than existed in the late Soviet period.
Data presented in this chapter also argued that the occupational composition of the Duma 
Assembly was analogous to the Hungarian Parliament elected in 1990. Without proper data 
it is not possible for the present author to undertake an analysis of roll-call voting results to 
test this .. _ .. hypothesis further. Nevertheless, part of the following chapter contains 
a discussion of how the Federal Assembly functioned and interacted during its first term with 
the executive branch of government.
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This dissertation has demonstrated that there have been elements of continuity, 
contradiction and departure in Soviet and Russian elections . 1984-1993. Before 
Gorbachev’s elevation to CPSU General Secretary, elections in the USSR were considered 
shams. The regime mobilised-or perhaps it may be more appropriate to state coerced- 
voters into casting their ballots for Party-approved candidates who stood unopposed. 
Moreover, these candidates did not even have any concrete programmes upon which they 
based their campaign strategies. The legislatures to which they were elected were more 
aptly described as ceremonial gatherings of the ‘ideal’ Soviet citizens. These soviets 
existed to rubber stamp previously-adopted CPSU directives.
Gorbachev enacted a comprehensive reform programme which attempted to 
restructure the Soviet economy. Perestroika was also supplemented by glasnost’ which 
opened up the scope of political discussion and political reforms which included a 
restructuring of the state system, a greater acceptance for republican and local autonomy, 
a transference of political authority from Party to state institutions, a revamping of the 
electoral system and the encouragement of greater civic participation in political life.
fiA fW L Sox;
Despite these innovations, until 1990 the CPSU was still considered the sole, legitimate 
political organisation. Although there was a wealth of legislation introduced in the reform 
programme, there were no limitations placed upon the Party.
Electoral reforms under Gorbachev could be considered examples of liberalisation 
because the rights Soviet voters exercised at the polls had not been prohibited earlier. 
Rather, they were never implemented. Moreover, the CPSU had an organisational and 
material superiority in the 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies and
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subsequent elections to republican legislatures. The Party also interfered in the campaign 
to limit the effectiveness of non-endorsed or opposition candidates. These actions
established a continuity in Soviet electoral politicsJthe Party was still overseeing theA
conduct of the elections and restricting some elements of choice. Therefore, this could 
have been considered a contradiction in the regime’s efforts to institutionalise political 
reforms.
Nevertheless, the 1989 elections were a substantial departure from previous elections.
First, the level of competitiveness increased dramatically. In 1984, the last pre-reform
election to the USSR Supreme Soviet there was no competition among candidates.
However, it would be entirely incorrect to claim that all deputies elected to the Congress 
dwon their seats in competitive manner  ^ Earlier it was established that nearly 400 USSRA
People’s Deputies won their seats without competition in the territorial and national- 
territorial districts. Moreover, the average Soviet voter was denied his or her active 
electoral right in relation to the social organisation deputies. Indeed, only the elite could 
select these representatives. The fact that there was, on average, slightly more than one 
candidate per seat further strengthens the argument that the Party largely controlled the 
election campaign.
However, it must be that even in an absence of universal competition
there were signs that the regime would allow voters to have their say and honour their 
choices when they successfully agitated against and defeated Party-endorsed candidates. 
Even in constituencies where candidates stood unopposed voters had to enter ballot booths 
and decide whether or not to keep their ballot papers unmarked and vote in the
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candidate’s favour or to strike out the individual’s name and cast a vote against him or 
her. Case evidence from Leningrad demonstrates that (a) the Party-endorsed candidates 
were indeed defeated and (b) candidates who stood unopposed did not always win. These 
factors can certainly be considered innovations.
In addition, the flow of information increased substantially to accommodate the
explosion in the number of candidates. Soviet television, although not considered
completely objective or thorough in its campaign coverage by the electorate, introduced
new programmes to inform voters of the changes to the electoral system. In addition,
candidates stood on the basis of platforms and the electorate had the opportunity to choose
its representatives in accordance with particular objectives. There were specific
O'?
deficiencies in these platforms; there was no guarantee^how candidates could keep their 
campaign promises; most of the points of the candidates’ manifestos were slogans rather 
than well-developed, achievable policies and many of the candidates competing against 
each other in the same constituencies sought to further identical policies. In this respect 
the electorate was forced to make its choices on the candidates’ personal qualities. 
Therefore, the programmes were not very effective political tools. Nevertheless, this 
innovation was a form of quality control mechanism introduced into the Soviet electoral 
system-one which created (theoretically) a means whereby citizens could observe how 
closely deputies represented their interests. Thus, there was at least some incentive for 
the legislators to take seriously their constituents’ demands-even in the face of democratic 
centralism.
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The elections to the Congress can be considered a departure from previous Soviet 
electoral practices because candidate competition became a core component of the 
political system. This was reflected in the extent of competition in Soviet local and 
republican elections conducted in 1989-1990. The number of candidates increased 
substantially in these elections. Moreover, a greater number of political organisations 
participated in these contests by supporting candidates. However, the CPSU was still the 
only legal political organisation allowed to contest these elections. Thus, the Party’s 
efforts not to recognise formally these organisations and stifle their potential effectiveness 
and harass their members and leaders may be considered forms of continuity from 
previous practices. It is also somewhat of a contradiction in the Party’s efforts to 
increase civic involvement in Soviet politics.
The composition of the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies also reinforces the 
themes of continuity, contradiction and departure in Soviet elections. It is true, however, 
that there were particular representation patterns that were consistent with previous 
elections. Men were most abundant among the legislators. CPSU members formed the 
lion’s share of the parliamentarians.
However, the revamped electoral system helped to create a deputy corps that departed 
radically from those elected under the old style conditions. First, the vast majority of 
Soviet deputies had not served previously in a national-level legislature. This fact stands 
in stark contrast to pre-reform USSR Supreme Soviet deputies-particularly when the 
examples raised in Chapter 3 are considered-of whom nearly 41 per cent were directly re­
elected from the previous convocation.
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The electoral reforms also affected women’s representation significantly. Women’s
( \v \A
overall share in the national legislature decreased by about one half between 1984^^1989. 
Soviet voters elected a greater number of professionals to the Congress than they did to 
any previous Supreme Soviet. However, women were more likely than men to be 
employed in manual industrial or agricultural labour. Nevertheless, the overall share of 
women with professional qualifications increased substantially in comparison with the 
those elected to the Eleventh Convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The combination 
of political reforms, reduced Party influence over the legislative agenda and more 
competent women representatives was reflected in the fact that more women 
parliamentarians contributed to the First USSR Congress of People’s Deputies than they 
did during the Eleventh Convocation of the Supreme Soviet-a factor which can be 
partially be attributed to the Congress^ longer periods in session.
Elections to the Russian Federation’s Federal Assembly in December 1993 certainly 
contained elements of continuity with Soviet practices. A dominant institution (the 
presidency) decreed the elections, included provisions to try to ‘rig’ the elections in 
favour of its supporters and had ‘its people’ overseeing the conduct of the elections. That 
the elections occurred after Yeltsin forcibly dissolved the Russian Parliament can also be 
considered as a contradiction between democratic intentions and deeds.
Nevertheless, the electoral provisions that governed Russia’s first post-Soviet elections 
were a radical departure from those that coordinated pre-reform (and to an extent reform­
era) Soviet elections. Within less than nine years, the electoral system had developed 
from an ‘acclamatory’ manifestation to a multiparty variant. , Although some of the
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electoral associations had similar objectives and voters in many instances cast their ballots 
for them based on the individuals who led them, these electoral associations still managed 
to appeal to particular segments of the electorate. However, it must be reiterated that 
party politics was (and still is) in its infancy. The ‘independent’ variable was extremely 
important in the constituencies. Nevertheless, political organisations, some of which were 
openly antagonistic to the President and Government of the Russian Federation^won seats 
in the Parliament.
In addition, the composition of the first post-Soviet Russian legislature more closely 
resembled Western parliaments in the sense of its greater share of deputies who had 
received tertiary education and the proportion of professionals elected to it. However, 
many of the deputies and Senators elected to the Federal Assembly’s first convocation 
were either linked to the Yeltsin Administration, appointed by Yeltsin or elevated to their 
positions by political parties. Therefore, in many instances, Russian voters did not have 
complete popular control over their representatives. Their legislators’ allegiances went 
elsewhere.
In this dissertation’s ‘Preface’, the present author contends that the transition from the 
pre-reform Soviet electoral system to the Russian Federation’s multiparty framework can 
best be explained through a fusion of institutional, démocratisation (or transition), civil 
society and political culture approaches to political science. The evidence presented in 
the preceding chapters clearly demonstrates the importance of the leading institution in 
initiating electoral reform, setting the parameters and scope for change, its tolerance of 
civil involvement in the hustings and, on occasion^ in how much it interferes in the
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campaign. Despite the fact that these institutions may have tried to restrict particular 
individuals and political organisations from winning seats in the respective parliaments, 
they were unable to prevent them from entering into them. This can be partially 
explained because the leading institutions created conditions which allowed civil society to 
participate in the political process and the (frequently) anti-systemic political organisations 
took advantage of the new political atmosphere to advance their causes, agitate for their 
preferred candidates and against regime-sponsored or supported candidates (Soviet period) 
or field their own lists of contenders (1993 Federal Assembly elections). Moreover, 
Soviet and post-Soviet political culture has demonstrated an anti-systemic pattern in
its voting behaviour. In addition, competition has now become embedded in the political 
culture and has helped create an acceptance for the ‘rules of the game’. It is most 
important to point out that both the leaders and the electorate adhere to the principle that 
the results of elections must be honoured. Therefore, in accordance with the 
démocratisation literature, it is apparent that despite the leading institution’s interference, 
there is a commitment to democracy. In addition, the numerous ‘hiccups’ in electoral 
management and the regime’s and pundits’ misinterpretations and misreadings of political 
events may be partially attributed to the fact that setbacks are bound to occur during 
transitions and that the political climate is fluid, with institutions and bases of social 
support not clearly-defined.
Russia is currently governed by a presidentially-dominated political system. 
However, as the present author has demonstrated elsewhere, this does not mean that the 
Parliament has allowed Yeltsin to reign unchecked. Despite its constitutional limitations, 
the Russian Federal Assembly has worked within its powers to voice its disapproval of
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policies ranging from the intervention into Chechnya, the pace of economic reform and 
Yeltsin’s choices of judges and ministers. Moreover, the Parliament has contested the 
constitutionality of Yeltsin’s secret decrees sanctioning the Chechen campaign, has tried 
to lobby to begin impeachment proceedings against Yeltsin and has conducted several 
votes of confidence in the Chernomyrdin Government. Although these instances 
demonstrate that there are strong divergences of opinion between the executive and I
legislative branches, these conflicts were all conducted within the constitutionally-defined I
guidelines. The ‘opposition’ did not organise mass demonstrations to bring down the 
existing order and transform society by ‘extra-legal’ means. Yeltsin did not use tanks 
against the parliament to resolve issues in his favour.^ Moreover, the two sides have ; i
also demonstrated that they can work through legislation peacefully and make concessions 
for the greater good of the country and political system. The conciliatory manner in 
which the President, Federation Council and State Duma were able to reach agreement on^ 
first, the 1995 State Duma Election Law and^ second, the formation of the Federation 
Council after considerable deliberations illustrates this point.^
Elections are important features in Russian politics. However, they suffer from some
1  ’ ‘ Ideficiencies which should be identified. First, not all the country’s regional executive, 
were filled by election. Rather, Yeltsin has appointed regional and subject administrators 
since early after the 1991 coup attempt and has suspended gubernatorial elections. It is 
only recently that elections to these positions have been held. Therefore, there is a 
minority of governors who won their seats through an election. However, it is now 
required that all governors have to be elected by December 1996. Second, the 
population’s interest in regional and local elections during 1994 declined significantly. As
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a result there were many constituencies in which fewer than 25 per cent of the electorate 
voted for their legislators. Consequently, these representative organs began their sessions 
only partially-staffed. Moreover, the democrats demonstrated their organisational 
weakness and divisiveness and the opposition showed their numerical and political 
efficiency and their abilities to tap into popular concerns in the contests to these 
legislatures.^ As a result, the KPRF demonstrated its position as the country’s most 
powerful political organisation and this carried into the December 1995 elections to the 
State Duma.
There are, however, some points which can further demonstrate how radically
elections and the institutions they produced have departed from the pre-reform era. First,
the Russian Federal Assembly elected in 1993 completed its constitutionally-defined
period in office. This is significant because this convocation of the Parliament was the
first legislature to sit for a full term since electoral reforms began. Second, the elections
to the Second Convocation of the State Duma were conducted within the prescribed time
period-notwithstanding the fact that Russian commentators feared that the hustings might
not occur. Third, anti-Yeltsin and anti-government forces scored considerable victories at
the polls. Nevertheless, the election results were honoured and the Communist-dominated
Parliament is currently functioning. However, during the presidential campaign, YeltsinA
demonstrated his reliance on old-style tactics of censorship and negative campaigning to 
help boost his chance of victory.'^
Elections under Gorbachev and Yeltsin have demonstrated elements of continuity with 
their pre-reform Soviet predecessors. These actions have contradicted the leading
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institutions’ intentions to introduce greater elements of democracy into their respective 
political systems. Nevertheless, the accumulation of changes these institutions introduced, 
their strengths, popular support, commitments to democratic principles, tolerance of civil 
society, civic involvement, the attitude of the population towards the political system and 
their final judgments on election day have resulted in a significant departure from those 
elections held in the pre-reform period.
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Konstitutsiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii (proekt) (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1993)
Konstitutsiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii prinyata vsenarodnym golosovaniem 12 dekabrya 1993 
g. (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1993)
‘Polozhenie o federal’nykh organakh vlasti na pereldiodnyi period’, Izvestiya, 24 
September 1993, p. 3.
‘Polozhenie o vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy’, Izvestiya, 24 September 1993, 
pp. 3-5.
Tsentral’naya izbiratel’naya komissiya po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po vyboram 
Gosudarstvennuyu Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Postanovlenie 
Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po vyboram v 
Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii Vybory deputatov 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 12 dekabrya 1993 
goda O registratsii obshechefederal’nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi 
Dymy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydvidnutogo izbiratel’nym 
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-‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po 
vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshechefederal ’ nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydvidnutogo 
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-‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po 
vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshechefederal’nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty 
Gosudarstvennoi Dymy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydvidnutogo 
izbiratel’nym ob"edineniem "Agramaya partiya Rossii"’, No. 27 (10 November 1993), 
Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 1993, pp. 3-4.
“‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po 
vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii
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Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshechefederal ’ nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty 
Gosudarstvennoi Dymy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydvidnutogo 
izbiratel’nym ob"edineniem "Grazhdanskii soyuz vo imya stabil’nosti, spravedlivosti i 
progressa", No. 28 (10 November 1993), Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 1993, pp. 4- 
5.
-‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po
vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii
Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvemioi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshechefederal ’ nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty 
Gosudarstvennoi Dymy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydvidnutogo 
izbiratel’nym ob"edineniem "Dostoinstvo i miloserdie". No. 29 (10 November 1993), 
Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 1993, p. 5.
-‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po 
vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshechefederal ’ nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty 
Gosudarstvennoi Dymy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydvidnutogo 
izbiratel’nym ob"edineniem "Rossiiskoe dvizhenie demokraticheskikh reform"’, No. 31 
(10 November 1993), Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 1993, p. 6.
-‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po
vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshechefederal’nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydvidnutogo 
izbiratel’nym ob"edineniem "Demokraticheskaya partiya Rossii", No. 32 (10 November 
1993), Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 1993 p. 9.
- ‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po 
vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshechefederal’nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty 
Gosudarstvennoi Dymy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydvidnutogo 
izbiratel’nym ob"edineniem "Kommunisticheskya partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii"’, No. 33 
(10 November 1993), Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 1993, p. 7.
-‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po 
vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshechefederal’nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydvidnutogo 
izbiratel’nym ob"edineniem "Partiya rossiiskogo yedinstva i soglasiya"’, No. 34 (10 
November 1993), Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 1993, p. 8.
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vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshechefederal’nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydvidnutogo 
izbiratel’nym ob"edineniem "Vybor Rossii"’, No. 35 (10 November 1993), Rossiiskaya 
gazeta, 12 November 1993, p. 10.
-‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po 
vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshechefederal ’ nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydvidnutogo 
izbiratel’nym ob"edineniem "Blok: Yavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin"’, No. 36 (10 November 
1993), Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 1993, p. 11.
-‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po 
vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
Vybory deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
12 dekabrya 1993 goda O registratsii obshechefederal ’ nogo spiska kandidatov v deputaty 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii vydvidnutogo 
izbiratel’nym ob"edineniem "Budushchee Rossii-Novye Imena"’, No. 37 (10 November 
1993) Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 1993, p. 7.
-‘Zayavlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii po vyboram v Sovet Federatsii i po 
vyboram v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, No. 
139 (13 December 1993), Rossiiskaya gazeta, 14 December 1993, p. 1.
- ‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii O rezultatakh 
vsenarodnogo golosovanyia po proektu konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, No. 142 (20 
December 1993), Rossiiskaya gazeta, 25 December 1993, p. 1.
- ‘Postanovlenie Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii Ob ustanovlenii 
obshikh itogov vyborov deputatov Gosudarstvennoit Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, 25 December 1993 No. 155, in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 28 December 
1993, p. 2
1(1). Russian Federation Lists of Candidates and Deputies and Election Results
Organizatsionnyi otdel, Tsentr operativnoi informatsii, Upravlenle po rabote c 
territoriyami i predstavitelyami Prezidenta Administratsii Prezidenta RF, Otdel 
regional’noi politiki, Otdel vzaimodeistviya c federal’nymi organami predstavitel’noi 
vlasti i obshchestvennymi organizatsiyami Soveta Ministrov-Pravitel’stva RF, 
‘Predvaritel’nye rezul’taty golosovaniya po obshchefederal’nomu okrugu’ (Moscow, 
1993).
-‘Vybory v Sovet Federatsii RF’ (Moscow, 1993).
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- ‘Vybory v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu po odnomandatnym okrugam’ (Moscow, 1993).
-‘Vybory v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu RF po obshchefederal’nomu okrugu’ (Moscow, 
1993).
‘Spisok kandidatov v deputaty v Soveta Federatsii i Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo 
Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii po izbiratel’nym okmgam goroda Moskvy’, Kuranty, 30 
November 1993, p. 5.
‘Spisok deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 
izbrannykh po obshchefederal’nomu izbiratel’nomu okrugu’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 28 
December 1993, pp. 2-3.
‘Spisok Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, izbrannykli 
po odnomandatnym izbiratel’nym okmgam’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 28 December 1993, pp. 
3-5.
‘Spisok deputatov Soveta Federatsii Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 
izbrannykh po dvukhmandatnym izbiratel’nym okmgam’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 28 
December 1993, pp. 5-6.
I(m). Official Ballot Papers
12 dekabrya 1993 goda. IzbirateVnyi byulleten' po vyboram deputatov Gosudarstvennoi 
Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Obshchefederal'nyi izbiratel’nyi 
okrug. Gorod Moskva (official ballot paper 2).
Vsenarodnoe golosovanie po proektu Konstitutsii Rossiiskoe Federatsii 12 dekabrya 1993 
goda byulleten' dlya golosovaniya.
I(n). Official Documents of Political Parties and Electoral Associations
Agrarnaya Partiya Rossii, ‘Obshchefederal’nyi spisok Ot izbiratel’nogo ob"edineniya 
"Agrarnaya partiya Rossii" vydvinutykh kandidatam v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy na 
osnovanii reshenii vtorogo (vneocherednoi) s"ezda Agrarnoi partii Rossii (APR) 16 
oktyabrya 1993 goda’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 1993, p. 4.
Blok: Yavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin, ‘ Obshchefederal ’ ny i spisok kandidatov ot
izbiratel’nogo ob"edineniya "Blok: Yavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin" vydvinutykh v deputaty
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy na osnovanii protokola No. 3 zasedaniya izbiratel’nogo 
ob"edineniya ot 6 noyabrya 1993 goda’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 1993, pp. 11- 
12 .
Budushchee Rossii-Novye Imena, ‘Obshchefederal’nyi spisok kandidatov Ot izbiratel’nogo 
ob"edineniya "Budushchee Rossii-Novye Imena" vydvinuty kandidatami v deputaty 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy na osnovanii Protokola zasedaniya polnomochnykh predstavitelei
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Molodezhnogo dvizhenii v podderzhku Narodnoi partii Svobodaya Rossiya i Politiko- 
ekonomicheskoi assotsiatsii "Grazhdanskii Soyuz" No. 5 ot 6 noyabrya 1993 goda’, 
Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 1993, pp. 7-8.
Demokraticheskaya Partiya Rossii, ‘ Obshchefederal ’ nyi spisok kandidatov Ot 
Demokraticheskoi partii Rossii na osnovanii resheniya V s"ezda DPR i pravleniya DPR 
(protokol No. 1 ot 5 noyabrya 1993 goda) vydvinuty kandidatami v deputaty 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 1993, pp. 9-10.
Dostoinstvo i miloserdie, ‘Obshchefederal’nyi spisok kandidatov Ot izbiratel’nogo 
ob"edineniya "Dostoinstvo i miloserdie" vydvinuty kandidatami v deputaty 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Rossiiskoi Federatsii na osnovanii resheniya konferentsii 
obshchefederal’nogo politicheskogo dvizhenii "Dostoinstvo i miloserdie" ot 20 oktyabrya 
1993 goda i postanovleniya ispolkoma dvizheniya ot 6 noyabrya 1993 goda’, Rossiiskaya 
gazeta, 12 November 1993 p. 6.
Grazhdanskii soyuz vo imya stabil’nosti, spravedlivosti i progressa, ‘ Obshchefederal ’nyi 
spisok kandidatov Ot izbiratel’nogo ob"edineniya "Grazhdanskii soyuz vo imya 
stabil’nosti, spravedlivosti i progressa" vydvinuty kandadatami v deputaty 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy na osnovanii resheniya izbiratel’nogo ob"edineniya ot 21 
oktayabrya 1993 g .’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 1993, p. 5.
Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘Obshchefederal’nyi spisok kandidatov 
Ot izbiratel’nogo ob"edineniya "Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii" 
vydvinuty kandidatami v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy na osnovanii resheniya 
izbiratel’nogo ob"edineniya ot 26 oktyabrya 1993 goda, protokol No. 1’, Rossiiskaya 
gazeta, 12 November 1993, p. 7.
Konstruktivno-ekologicheskoe dvizhenii Rossii, ‘ Obshchefederal’nyi spisok kandidatov Ot 
izbiratel’nogo ob"edineniya "Konstruktivno-ekologicheskoe dvizhenii Rossii (KEDR)" 
vyvvinuty kandatami v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy na osnovanii resheniya 
rasshirennogo zasedaniya Koordinatsionnogo Soveta "Konstmktivno-ekologisheskoe 
dvizhenii Rossii (KEDR)" ot 2 noyabrya 1993 goda’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 
1993, p. 3.
Liberal’no-Demokraticheskaya Partiya Rossii, ‘ Obshchefederal’nyi spisok kandidatov Ot 
izbiratel’nogo ob"edineniya ‘Liberal’nogo-demokraticheskaya partiya Rossii’, vidvinutykh 
kandidatami v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy resheniem Vysshego Soveta LDPR ot 3 
noyabrya 1993 goda’, Rossiiskaya gazeta 12 November 1993, p. 3.
-‘Spisok kandidatov LDPR v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu po odnomandatnym izbiratel’nym 
okmgam’, Yuridicheskaya gazeta, 1993, Nos. 40-41, p. 7.
- ‘Vystupleniya lidera LDPR V. V. Zhirinovskogo po radio i televideniyu’, Yuridicheskaya 
gazeta. No. 40 - 41, 1993, p. 16.
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Partiya Rossiiskogo Yedinstva i Soglasiya, Yedinstvo i soglasie dlya Moskvy (Moscow: 
PRES, 1993)
- ‘Obshchefederal’nyi spisok kandidatov Ot izbiratel’nogo ob"edineniya "Partiya 
rossiiskogo yedinstvo i soglasiya" vydvinuty kandidatami v deputaty Gosudarstvennoi 
Dumy na osnovanii reshenii Federal’nogo soveta PRES ot 26 noyabrya otkyabrya 1993 
goda i ot 6 noyabrya 1993 goda’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 12 November 1993 pp. 8-9.
-‘Partiya Rossiiskogo Yedinstva i Soglasiya v voprosakh i otvetakh (fragmenty), Partiya 
Rossiiskogo Yedinstva i Soglasiya, Yedinstvo i soglasiya dlya Moskvy, pp. 5-9.
-‘Ustav Partii Rossiiskogo Yedinstva i Soglasiya’, Partiya Rossiiskogo Yedinstva i 
Soglasiya, Yedinstvo i soglasiya dlya Moskvy pp. 10-12.
-‘Struktura Moskovskoi gorodskoi organizatsii PartÜ Rossiiskogo Yedinstva i Soglasiya, 
Partiya Rossiiskogo Yedinstva i Soglasiya, Yedinstvo i soglasiya dlya Moskvy, p. 13.
-‘Kandidaty Partii Rossiiskogo Yedinstva i Soglasiya v Gosudarstvennuyu Dumu Rossii- 
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Errata
List of Abbreviations and acronyms
AN-USSR Academy of Sciences 
APR-Agrarian Party of Russia
DD-Duma District Seats in 1993 Federal Assembly Elections 
DI-Democratic Initiative Party 
DiM-Dignity and Charity
DL-Diima Party List Seats in 1993 Federal Assembly Elections
DOSAAF-Voluntary Society for Solidarity with the Armed Forces
DR-Democratic Russia
EZNR-Entrepreneurs for a New Russia
FA-Federal Assembly
FC-Federation Council
GS-Civic UnionKDP-PNS-Constitutional-Democratic Party/People’s Freedom Party 
KPR-Peasants’ Party of Russia 
KPRF-Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
KSM-Komsomol
KSovZh- S oviet W omen ’ s Committee 
LDPR-Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
NPRF-People’s Party of the Russian Federation 
NRPR-National Republican Party of Russia 
PES-Party of Economic Freedom 
PRES-Party of Russian Unity and Accord 
PSS-Party of Social Justice 
PT-Labour Party
RDDR-Russian Democratic Reform Movement 
RES-Union of Russian Entrepreneurs
RKhDS-ND-Russian Christian Democratic Union-New Democracy Party
RNA-Russian National Assembly
ROS-Russian All-People’s Union
RPRF-Repubhcan Party of the Russian Federation
RPST-Russian Party of Free Labour
RTS-Russian Theatrical Workers’ Union
SDPRF-Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation
SKK-Union of Communists of Karelia
SPT-Socialist Workers’ Party
SvDRPF-Free Democratic Party of the Russian Federation 
VR-Russia’s Choice
VViT-All-Union Association of Veterans of War and Labour
